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A b stra ct
O ur study  engages a  conversation between literature and 
theology by using the narrative fiction of Nikos K azantzakis and 
W hiteheadian process thought. This ‘dialogue’ unfolds in five 
chapters. It begins as we locate an  affinity between K azantzakis 
and  Alfred North W hitehead in the ir understanding  of an  evolving 
deity who relies on our support to progress into the future.
Utilizing The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises and  Process and  
Reality: A n  E ssay in Cosmology, our objective in th is  first chapter is 
to  reveal the common philosophy (Bergsonian transform ism  and 
evolutionary thought) which shapes both K azantzakis and  
W hitehead’s understand ing  of God.
In chapter two, we recognize th a t the exercise of sustain ing  
th is interchange becomes, a t tim es, dem anding because our 
conversation partners use dissim ilar textual m odes and  forms of 
discourse. By further exploring the role of God in  Kazantzakis and 
W hitehead, we hold th a t literature and  theology constan tly  
(de)construct one another. Suggesting th a t th is  (de)constructive 
assignm ent is one th a t cannot bu t be ‘in process’ itself, we re tu rn  
to it th roughout our study.
The following chapters are arranged according to  the 
s tan d ard  order and  progression of C hristian theological topics. We 
bring theology and literature into conversation by com paring a 
specific them e in a  novel by Kazantzakis and  in the work(s) of a  
particu lar W hiteheadian process theologian. In chap ter three. The
Last Temptation is coupled with Jo h n  Cobb’s Christ in a Pluralistic 
Age. Here we note how Kazantzakis and  Cobb write of Je su s  
becoming divine and  of C hrist as one who fights against the 
m ortm ain of the past which holds u s in thrall. We next read God's 
Pauper: S t  Francis o f A ssisi alongside of Blair Reynolds’s Toward a 
Process Pneumatology in a  consideration of God as evolving Spirit. 
Uniting these differently stru c tu red  texts is a  portrayal of the 
divine transcendence-w ithin-im m anence (process panentheism ).
We find in our fifth and final chapter th a t com m on to both 
Zorba the Greek and  David Ray Griffin’s God and Religion in the 
Postmodern World: E ssays in Postmodern Theology is th e  belief th a t 
creativity is universal, th a t spirituality  involves the im itation of an  
adventurous God, and  th a t our a ttem pts to in stan tia te  m oral and 
religious beauiy can enhance the becoming of o thers (hum an and 
divine). With the help of ideas culled from the work of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, we note th a t the tense bu t close alliance between the 
Dionysiac and Apollonian tra its  of Zorba and  the Boss evokes the 
relationship between literature and  theology. We end our final 
chapter with a  discussion of possible points of divergence and 
convergence between the two disciplines in light of insights from 
deconstruction theory, and  we m aintain  th a t the dialogue we have 
susta ined  between them  allows u s  to in terpret K azantzakis’s 
narrative fiction as a  m ythopoesis of process thought. In a 
succinct conclusion, we consider the value of th is  in terpretation  to 
W hiteheadian process theologians and Kazantzakis scholars.
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A ck n o w led g m en ts
It is often said, and  not w ithout a  wry smile, th a t  doctoral 
candidates can appreciate the loneliness of long-distance runners. 
The reasons for th is are both obvious and legion. In spite of th is 
frequently ap t analogy, 1 feel very fortunate to have found myself 
‘in good com pany’ during the years and m onths of preparing th is 
study. It affords me great pleasure to record here my appreciation 
to all the m any family m em bers, colleagues, and friends who have 
been so tirelessly attentive to both my requests for assistance and 
my need for encouragem ent.
My American wife, Betsy, has gracefully endured  so m any 
conversations about K azantzakis and  process theology, b u t her 
curiosity in  my m odest project has never withered. Through four 
long years, she has been a  consistent and discerning reader-critic 
of my writing. As my closest friend, Betsy is the keeper of my soul. 
It is to her th a t 1 dedicate the p resen t work.
1 owe an  enorm ous debt of gratitude to both my English 
parents, Jo an  and  Alan Middleton, and my American paren ts, Bob 
and  Iva Lou Flowers. While 1 have been living and  working in the 
USA for the past three years, my m other and father have 
dem onstrated the ir belief in m y ability and encouraged me through 
consistent letters and  telephone calls. My ‘new’ paren ts in the 
S tates have been a  m atrix of tenderness and  open acceptance ever 
since 1 arrived in Tennessee. A perfect blend of S ou th  M emphis wit
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and  Delta finesse, Bob and  Iva Lou have realized eveiy chance to 
envelope me with their sp iritual wisdom, warm  resourcefulness, 
and  uplifting encouragem ent. In addition, 1 have been veiy 
fortunate to have established loving and lasting friendships with 
my brothers and sisters in  law. Anne and  Coiy Tinker as well as 
Lou and  J e n y  M artin have spen t hours with me in laughter and 
fellowship.
Alongside my English and  American families, a  num ber of 
good friends on both sides of the Atlantic have served as  a  faithful 
source of wisdom and  hum our in recent years: Joe Carr-Hill, Andy 
King, Chris Knight, Joe Kohler, Bobby Caudle Rogers, B ariy  
Whitney, and  Jo an n a  and Andy Williams. 1 w ant to particularly  
th a n k  Dawn and  Greer R ichardson for their constan t In terest in 
and  questions about th is project, for their generosity of spirit, in 
more ways th an  one, and  for their willingness to indulge my 
theological fantasies into the sm all hours of m any a  m orning. The 
congregation of F irst B aptist C hurch, Memphis and  Dr. Ken Corr 
have provided a  needed worshipful retrea t while the  Seekers 
S unday  School class endless theological stim ulation.
My in terest in W hiteheadian process theology can  be traced 
to the  influence of Dr. David A. Pailin, my theology teacher a t the 
University of M anchester between 1986-1989. Through num erous 
lectures and  sem inars, he persuaded  me th a t W hitehead’s view of 
God and  the world is congenial both to curren t understand ings of
lit
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science and to the C hristian faith. In early 1989, he supervised my 
B. A. (Honours) d issertation on process Christology. Ideas for the 
chapter in the presen t work on Jo h n  Cobb’s view of Je su s  were 
first forged in  th is period of undergraduate research. In the wake 
of my years in M anchester, 1 pu rsued  research  a t the University of 
Oxford under the supervision of Professor M aurice F. Wiles. In
1991, 1 wrote my M. Phil d issertation  on w hat sense it m akes to 
say th a t God acts in the world. 1 express here my highest regard 
for Drs. Pailin and  Wiles. They inspired me to form ulate answ ers 
to complex theological questions.
My love for K azantzakis’s  religious writings h as  its genesis in 
the kindness of Revd, Jo h n  Rackley, a  B aptist m inister with whom 
1 worked in the sum m er of 1988. M artin Scorsese’s film version of 
The Last Temptation was equally inspiring. The idea for the present 
s tudy  came to me during my final days in Oxford. It occurred to 
me then, as it does even more so now, th a t points of convergence 
exist between K azantzakis’s narrative fiction and W hiteheadian 
process theology. One of the first scholars to support m y planned 
project was Dr. David Jasper, Director of the Centre for the S tudy  
of L iterature and Theology a t the University of Glasgow. Since
1992, Dr. Ja sp e r has acted as both supervisor and friend. The 
gentle and  critical way in which he has shared  his ideas has been 
extraordinarily helpful to me in  shaping my own intellectual 
formation.
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'In addition to Dr. Jasp er, Professor Peter Bien of D artm outh 
College has been very supportive, first responding with 
encouragem ent to my letter and  m ost recently em barking upon a  
book project with such  a  novice as myself. On the  subject of 
Kazantzakis, he h as  responded to all my requests for clarification.
In particular, a  num ber of the transla tions th a t appear in the 
presen t work have been m ade more accurate because of 
inform ation supplied to me by Professor Bien. For th is specific 
assistance, 1 am  veiy thankful. O ther scholars who have a t some 
stage read  and  com m ented on my work include; Professor Jo h n  B. 
Cobb, Jr., Professor Daniel A. Dombrowski, Professor Ann M. 
Pederson, and  Professor B ariy  L. Whitney. In an  exercise th a t 
provided endless possibilities for m aking m istakes, they have saved 
me fi’om a  few.
For the p ast three years, 1 have been engaged as a  Lecturer in 
Religious S tudies a t Rhodes College, Memphis. Combining study  
and  teaching is never easy, b u t 1 have been given m arvellous help 
from both faculty and  studen ts. My colleagues in the D epartm ent 
of Religious S tudies have m ade my first university teaching 
position exciting and  challenging. Impeccable library assistance 
from the Burrow Libraiy a t Rhodes College has enabled me to 
conduct m y research  swiftly an d  efficiently. Sim ilar support has 
been received from the libraries housed in the M emphis Theological 
Sem inary and  in  the Universities of M emphis and Glasgow.
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V
P re fa ce
This is a  study  which engages a  conversation between literature 
and  theology by using the narrative fiction of Nikos Kazantzakis and  
W hiteheadian process thought. W hat we discover, th roughou t th is 
dialogue, is a  sim ilarity in the concept of a  process God who requires 
the world’s assistance to advance into the future. While sustain ing  
th is conversation becomes, a t tim es, difficult—tensions emerge 
between the  partners because of the different n a tu re  of their tex tual 
modes and forms of discourse—such  an  endeavour allows us to see 
the literary work of Nikos K azantzakis as a  m ythopoesis of process 
thought.
Enthralled by the ancien t Greek con trast between im m utability 
(the One) and  fluctuation (the Many), K azantzakis sp en t m uch  of his 
working life giving an  order and  a  frame of m eaning to his own 
chaotic perceptions of the world. As a  mythopoeic writer, he grapples 
with the eternally unsolvable connundra  of perm anence and change 
th a t seem  to engage his literary im agination: divine and  hum an  
vitality, evil and  suffering, religious formation and  discipline, the 
integration of the sacred and  th e  m aterial universe, and  the 
m ysterious transm uta tion  of in e rt m atte r into zestful spirit.
Educated under the F rench process th inker Henri Bergson a t 
the tu rn  of the tw entieth century, Kazantzakis followed his teacher’s 
lead in rejecting su b stan tia lis t m etaphysics for a  philosophy of 
formation and  growth. Later, in  a  1927 lyrical essay, known now by
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the  title The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises, K azantzakis gave his 
own poetic em bodim ent to Bergson’s idea th a t a  ‘creative im pulse’
(the élanvital) activates the m echanism  of evolutionary changed 
U nderpinned by the concept of flux ra ther th an  perm anence, the idea 
of God w as m arried by K azantzakis to the though t of an  unfolding, 
indeterm inate world. Exploring th is concept with the aid of tools 
provided by Bergson, Kazantzakis wrote poems and  plays until 1941 
when, in the au tu m n  of h is Uteraiy career, he continued his 
exploration in the narrative form of the novel. It is for th is  la tte r p art 
of his writing career, he is best known.
We do not involve all of K azantzakis’s published novels in our 
conversation. This kind of com prehensive study  is far beyond the 
scope of the presen t work. Instead, after discussing The Saviors o f  
God, K azantzakis’s m ajor religious statem ent, we scrutinize three of 
his novels. The Last Temptation, God's Pauper: S t  Francis o f Assisi, and 
Zorba the Greek, all of which can  be interpreted as significant sources 
for K azantzakis’s religious vision. We trea t these th ree  novels in the 
order s ta ted  above. While Kazantzakis critics will recognize th a t this 
m ethod yields a  s tudy  which is chronologically incorrect, the aim  is to 
arrange our chapters not around  dates of com position a n d /o r  
publication b u t around the standard  order and  progression of 
C hristian  theological topics; first, God’s relationship  to a  changing 
world; next, how Je su s  of N azareth becomes the  Christ; then, the 
picture of the divine as an  evolving Spirit; and finally, the value of
hum an  creativity to God.
In analyzing K azantzakis’s writings, we have used  the published 
English translations. In the case(s) where certain  p arts  of these 
transla tions appear to be inaccurate, we am end them  to conform 
more precisely to the Greek. We should  note th a t certain  transla tions 
used in th is s tudy  have been m ade more accurate due to inform ation 
supplied by Professor Peter A. Bien, D artm outh College, USA.
While m ost in terpreters of K azantzakis’s writings acknowledge 
and  delineate his Indebtedness to Bergson, few critics have moved 
beyond the custom aiy  reading of Kazantzakis’s work as a  
narrativization of vitalism . Divided into five chapters, our study 
advances th is custom aiy  reading into an  original direction by viewing 
a  lyrical essay  and  three novels in light of, or in dialogue with,
W hiteheadian process thought. We begin with Alfred North 
W hitehead’s Process and Reality: A n  Essay in Cosmology and progress 
to investigate the W hiteheadian process theology of Jo h n  B. Cobb,
Jr., Blair Reynolds, and  David Ray Griffin.
Surfacing after the F irst World War in the philosophical work
■of W hitehead and  Charles H artshorne, process though t explores the
. ;idea of flux w ithin perm anence by espousing both God’s im m utability 
(in the divine prim ordial nature) and God’s m utability  (in the divine 
consequent nature), and  the s ta tu s  of each relative to an  unfolding 
world.2 Striving constantly  to su rp ass  earlier stages of their own 
development, God and  the world appear m utually  dependent upon
each other for growth and formation. While the use of H artshorne’s 
version of process thought m ay be found a t relevant points in the  
presen t study, our m ethod h as  been to concentrate our efforts on a  
com parative analysis of W hiteheadian process though t and  
K azantzakis’s narrative fiction. To the best of our knowledge, a  
treatise of th is breadth  has not been attem pted before now.
Opening with a  recognition th a t W hitehead and  Kazantzakis 
have Bergson as a  m u tua l influence, chapter one aligns Process and  
Reality with The Saviors o f God in an  attem pt to explore the issue of 
how God relates to the world. We show  how the au th o rs of both texts 
appear to believe th a t God is actually  an  integral p a rt of the world’s 
formation and  noveliy, actively engrossed in life and  affected by events 
in it, som etim es to the point of needing our help to advance forward 
in the evolutionary process. C entral to our d iscussion  is an  analysis 
of W hitehead’s belief, now axiomatic in m odern process theology, th a t 
we can assis t the divine w hen we contribute aesthetic value to God’s 
consequent natu re . God requires our instan tia tion  of divine initial 
aim s in order to  enhance God’s becoming.^ Sim ilar to W hitehead’s 
notion of creating the divine by acting upon the divine receptivity is 
K azantzakis’s own belief th a t we ‘save God’ (defined in  Bergsonian 
term s as the em ancipation of the élanvital from its  m aterial 
congeaknents) w hen we tran su b s tan tia te  flesh into sp irit through 
acts of evolutioneiiy striving. By the close of chap ter one, then, we 
observe two m ajor points of convergence between K azantzakis’s The
Saviors o f God and W hitehead’s Process and Reality. A lthough writing 
a t different tim es and  places, both writers picture the divine as in 
process, subject to time and  change, and  as requiring creaturely 
support in  order to advance forward.
C hapter two develops a  them e th a t becomes apparen t tow ards 
the close of chap ter one; namely, it explores the tension  th a t appears 
to exist in the conversation between narrative fiction and  system atic 
theology when we consider their difference in  tex tual modes. Since 
ours is a  s tudy  of the relationship  between (Kazantzakis’s) literature 
and  (W hiteheadian process) theology, specific a tten tion  is given here 
to a  view of literature as a  first-order discourse and  to theology, as we 
define it, as a  second-order language. Making th is strategic 
distinction between both creative and  conceptual forms enables u s to 
appreciate how Kazantzakis, as a  polysémie writer, seem s im patient 
to the kind of system atic lim its and  form ulated tru th  required by 
proponents of W hiteheadian process m etaphysics. By the sam e 
token, th is con trast in literacy modes perm its u s to observe how 
W hitehead and the  W hiteheadians, w ith their strong penchan t for 
structu red  thought, could be described as unrelentingly opposed to 
K azantzakis’s plurisignative style.
Recognizing th is hostility between the  two as  conversational 
partners  leads u s  to m ake the claim th a t (Kazantzakis’s) literature 
and (W hiteheadian process) theology exist in a  dialogue th a t m ight be 
term ed ‘com plem entary yet antagonistic’. A lthough literature  and
theology frequently possess a  sim ilar agenda in  th a t both regularly 
address issues of religious belief, their dissim ilarity in  literary forms 
often m eans th a t advocates in  each discipline (de)construct the work 
of the other. As writing, literature appears to fru stra te  the 
interiorizing, systematizing, and  reference-claim ing tendencies of 
system atic theology. At the sam e tim e it is system atic theology, with 
its use of argum ents th a t proceed step-by-step in an  elaborate 
network of m u tua l implication, th a t often rem inds the  creative writer 
of the need for conceptual coherence and critical plausibility in her 
work. As we note tow ards the close of chapter two, we do not resolve 
the tension  between (Kazantzakis’s) literature and  (W hiteheadian 
process) theology because th is hostility secures for u s  the m akings of 
‘a  process poetics of faith’. It is th is very tension  th a t m akes possible 
the ta sk  of (de)construction, an  exercise th a t canno t b u t be ‘in 
process’ itself. Because th is tension is never resolved and  ever 
present, we refer to and  explore it throughout the thesis.
O ur stress on the  ta sk  of (de)construction is explained in 
chapter two with reference to scholars currently  engaged in 
postm odern readings of the novel, theology, and  philosophy. W hat we 
learn  from these m en and  women is two-fold. We both  acquire a 
sense of the open-ended n a tu re  of language and  we observe the need 
for deliberately conflicting strategies of reading. W hen both lessons 
are applied to K azantzakis’s narrative fiction, we find th a t we have a  
basis for ou r own ‘stereophonic’ or ‘bifocal’ reading of his novels in
chapters three, four, and  five. Postm odernists teach  u s  th a t no one 
can or should m ake universal claims for reading. They insist th a t no 
single herm eneutical strategy finally cam or should  be used  when one 
is analyzing fiction. Thus, our m ethod is to in te rp ret K azantzakis’s 
The Last Temptation, God's Pauper, and  Zorba the Greek on a t least two 
levels. First, we read  them  as self-sustaining tex ts which invite us to 
su spend  our disbelief and  to navigate their fictional terrain , and, 
second, we read them  as dram atic narratives capable of provoking 
process theological reflections.
After investigating the evolutionary model of God and the world 
proposed in  both W hitehead’s Process and Reality an d  K azantzakis’s 
The Saviors o f God (chapter one), as well as reflecting on the 
consequences th a t appear to follow from th is exchange for a  study  of 
literature and  theology (chapter two), we move into a  com parative 
study  of th ree novels by Kazantzakis and  specific process theological 
texts. The Last Temptation is paired with Jo h n  Cobb’s Christ in a 
Pluralistic Age in  chap ter three. In chapter four, God's Pauper is read 
alongside Blair Reynolds’s Toward a Process Pneumatology. Finally, 
chapter five in terprets Zorba the Greek in fight of David Ray Griffin’s 
God and Religion in the Postmodern World: E ssays in Postmodern 
Theology.
C hapters three, four, and  five follow a  sim ilar s tru c tu re  to th a t 
seen in  chap ter one. Each focuses upon  a  specific theological them e, 
these them es progressing in the  standard  order th a t we alluded to
earlier in our introduction. The them e is initially explored in a  formal 
analysis of the chosen K azantzakis novel, then  considered within 
text(s) of a  specific process th inker as we bring the  two together in a 
su sta ined  conversation. The following paragraphs briefly delineate 
the contents of each chap ter w ithin th is  struc tu re . However, since 
the issues involved in the  consequential dialogue between literature 
and  theology have already been d iscussed in our synopsis of chapter 
two, we have om itted a  d iscussion of the  closing sections of chapters 
three, four, and  five which consider certain  aspects of th is  
conversation.
Having exam ined God’s general agency w ithin a  becoming world 
in  chap ter one, we then  narrow  our field of inquiiy  in  chapter three to 
a  discussion of God’s specific agency in the person and  work of Je su s  
of Nazareth. As a  philosopher ra th e r th a n  a  theologian, W hitehead 
spoke only briefly abou t Je su s , his rem arks being scattered  and  few. 
However, m any theologians have attem pted  to construc t a  Christology 
from a  W hiteheadian process perspective. Jo h n  Cobb’s Christ in a 
Pluralistic Age s tan d s ou t as an  early example of W hiteheadian 
Christological reflection. Accompanying our analysis of th is specific 
text, we investigate Cobb’s rem arks about J e su s ’s person  m ade in his 
article, “A W hiteheadian Christology”, and  we exam ine Cobb’s view of 
C hrist as the power of transform ation in Process Theology: A n  
Introductory Exposition, a  book th a t Cobb co-authored w ith David Ray 
Griffin.
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For K azantzakis, the m ain  text we consider is his fictional 
biography of Jesu s, The Last Temptation. However, we also incorporate 
rem arks abou t C hrist as an  agent of change m ade by Kazantzakis in 
his autobiographical novel. Report to Greco. The s tan d ard  theological 
distinction between Je su s  and  C hrist is assum ed by both  Kazantzakis 
and  Cobb and  is itself m ade clear in  our chapter where appropriate.
Apart from these au th o rs’ texts a s  cited above, it is neither 
feasible nor m andatory  to incorporate into the p resen t work other 
process Christologies m ade by contem poraries of Cobb or further 
references to Je su s  m ade by Kazantzakis (direct or indirect) in earlier 
literary texts. S uch a  ta sk  is far beyond the lim its of th e  present 
work. This selective m ethod is understood to be incorporated in the 
ensu ing  chapters as well.
In our analysis of The Last Temptation, we observe th a t 
Kazantzakis’s Je su s  undergoes a  process of m essianic formation th a t 
involves four stages. Je su s  becomes Christ, the  Son of God, through 
an  a rduous struggle to align his own personal desires with the 
vocational dem ands m ade on his life by God, the divine Cry. By 
trying a t all points to resis t tem pting dom estic and  familial pleasures, 
Je su s  eventually ascends from carpenter to Christ, emerging as a  
person whose self-understanding is co-constituted by h is own 
im m ediate p as t and  by the fullness of his personal reception of the 
lure to tran su b s tan tia te  m atte r into spirit th a t is the  Cry and 
presence of God (or élanvital). Throughout th is th ird  chapter, we note
how K azantzakis’s view of Je su s  is integral to his m ore generally held 
belief th a t we play a  vital part in  God’s own redem ption. Je su s  
evolves to become the classic expression of one who facilitates 
dem aterialization (‘saving God’) in a  changing world. In his book 
Report to Greco, Kazantzakis pictures C hrist as a  d isturbing presence, 
stirring u s  with a  restlessness th a t agitates au then tic  becoming.
W hen we establish  a  conversational exchange between The Last 
Temptation (as well as Report to Greco) and  Cobb’s Christ in a Pluralistic 
Age (as well as the other Cobbian texts cited above), we find th a t 
Cobb’s own W hiteheadian view of Je su s  is sim ilar to the  account of 
Je su s  proposed by Kazantzakis. For Cobb, as for Kazantzakis, Je su s 
of N azareth becomes divine th rough the  increm ental operation of 
God’s agency and Je su s ’s gradual response to God’s providential aim. 
The divine Logos sh ares in  the constitu tion of the h u m an  natu re  of 
Je su s  who, according to Cobb, is the paradigm  of incarnation. In his 
saving work, C hrist is likened by Cobb to a  neu tron  initiating a  chain 
reaction of personal and  social transform ation. Fighting against the 
m ortm ain of the p as t which often holds u s in thrall, C hrist s tirs  in us 
as a  perpetual desire for w hat is enrichingly novel. Reading The Last 
Temptation in light of Cobb’s version of W hiteheadian Christology, we 
in terp ret the former as a  m ythopoesis of process thought.
After a  consideration of God’s specific action in the world 
through  Je su s  of Nazareth, we contem plate in chap ter four the 
concept of divine transcendence-w ithin-im m anence: God’s agency as
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evolving Spirit. In the  world, God is developed; in God, the world is 
enveloped. The divine is All in all. God is a  circum am bient presence, 
a  m atrix  of tenderness w ithin and  around  a  cosm os still in  the 
m aking. With these  thoughts, we establish  ano ther conversational 
exchange between Kazantzakis and  W hiteheadian process thought. 
Here we situa te  God's Pauper, w ith its own version of divine 
transcendence-w ithin-im m anence, alongside Blair Reynolds’s Toward 
a Process Pneumatology, one of the first book-length trea tm en ts  of 
God as evolving Spirit from a  W hiteheadian process perspective.
C entral to our analysis of God's Pauper is an  in terpretation  of 
K azantzakis’s Francis as a  process nature-m ysticist. By th is phrase 
we m ean th a t as F rancis m akes his transition  from affluent 
troubadour to the Poor M an of God, he gradually learns to trea t the 
m any inhab itan ts  of the physical world as incognitos of an  evolving 
God. Appearing to be both transcenden t of and  yet im m anent within 
the world of nature , the God of God's Pauper furtherm ore com m ands 
Francis (as he com m ands Je su s  in The Last Temptation] to forfeit all 
m aterial and  bodily comforts in  order to ascend a  sp iritual m ountain  
starting  from its base cam p of ordinariness (marriage and parenthood) 
and  progressing to its sum m it of m eaningfulness (poverty, chastity, 
and obedience),
T hroughout God's Pauper, K azantzakis’s F rancis becomes the 
Povereilo by struggling to convert all available m atte r into spirit, and  
by seeking to be faithful to the  com m ands of an  evolving Spirit (the
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élanvital) who depends on creaturely assistance in  order to advance 
forward (dematerialization). Only a t the  close of h is life, when his 
struggle to assis t God is complete, does K azantzakis’s Francis emerge 
as ‘objectively im m ortal’ (Whitehead) in the h earts  and  m inds of 
o thers who rem em ber and  learn  from his example.^ Adjusting Peter A. 
Bien’s in terpretation  of God's Pauper as a  ‘post-C hristian’ novel, we 
in terp ret it as a  post-dogmatic m ythopoesis of process thought.
Blair Reynolds’s Toward a Process Pneumatology presents a  view 
of God as an  evolving Spirit (at least in the divine consequent nature) 
actively seeking to persuade the inhab itan ts of a  changing cosmos to 
in stan tia te  God’s aim s of m oral and  religious beauty. Independent of 
the world in the divine prim ordial nature, the divine is the fathom less 
reservoir of noveliy and  transform ation for all things. Enm eshed in 
the world in the consequent natu re , God is viewed by Reynolds as 
em otionally involved, an  all-inclusive environm ent of sensitivity 
w ithin which all actualizations originate. For Reynolds, the concept 
of God’s dipolarity (defined as above) carries with it the idea of divine 
transcendence-w ithin-im m anence. This notion m ay be described by 
another concept: process panentheism  (the doctrine th a t the  world is 
not identical with God nor separate  from God b u t in God, who in the  
divine n a tu re  transcends it). While K azantzakis does not refer to 
either notion in  God's Pauper, we hold th a t the portrayal of God 
w ithin its pages could be described with the aid of both.
However, w hen one begins to scrutinize th e  association of
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hold th a t ou r world has inheren t powers of self-creation. Thus, God 
is never the total cause of any event in the world. For Kazantzakis, 
as for Griffin, God is p ictured as ou t in front of th e  evolutionary
13
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K azantzakis with W hiteheadian forms of process theology, divergences 
regarding the ir view of God’s agency wifi inevitably appear. While 
Reynolds follows W hitehead in his portrayal of th e  divine tender 
goading, K azantzakis narrativizes the  Ciy’s more radical pushing. At 
first sight, th is  con trast appears as an  im passe. However, while the 
tension  cannot be resolved, we do suggest th a t th is divergence m ay be 
a  difference in the m atte r of em phasis. While process th inkers do 
em phasize God’s persuasive and tender providence, they also 
acknowledge th a t God’s lure is frequently for th e  less th a n  gentle 
since the struggle to in stan tia te  aesthetic value often involves 
discord, intensity, and  chaos. A susta ined  discussion  of th is tension, 
and  how it leads into the  strategic difference between theology and 
literature, closes chap ter four.
After the exam ination of God as an  evolving Spirit in chap ter 
four, our closing chap ter addresses the them e of hu m an  creativily 
relative to both  K azantzakis’s Zorba the Greek an d  David Ray Griffin’s 
God and Religion in the Postmodern World. W hen we s itua te  these two 
texts in conversation, we find com mon to both K azantzakis and 
Griffin is a  belief in  the universality of creativity; all living things, 
including God, embody energy. However, neither Kazantzakis nor
I
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Griffin believe th a t God is the sole possessor of creativity; rather, they
process, the Cry or lure for feeling. W ithin th is  process perspective of 
God and  the creative advance, sp iritual formation is neither 
Impossible nor irrelevant.
In th is  chapter, we note Griffin’s view of spirituality  as the 
im itation of a  God who perpetually seeks an  increase in  satisfaction 
in order to progress. We also record K azantzakis’s own account of 
sp irituality  as  the  im itation of God’s Cry (élanvital) th rough  acts of 
evolutionaiy striving. On one level of in terpretation, Zorba appears to 
embody process spirituality  (in the  Kazantzakian-Griffin sense of the
term) because he successfully copies the struggles of an  adventurous fF':
God. In addition, the Boss’s novel about Zorba seem s to suggest th a t 
he, too, has struggled to im itate the creativity of the  élanvital.
The B oss’s  decision to immortalize Zorba in  the form of a  novel 
evokes the process theological belief th a t our lives m ay become a  part 
of the legacy (W hitehead’s objective immortality) th a t  we leave for God 
and  for o thers to incorporate into their own future lives. According to 
Griffin, w hat we can contribute to God is aesthetic potential, and  th is 
is cherished and  preserved in the  m ind of God. In h u m an  term s, w hat
;Y
we m ay offer to others is the bequest of our lives. In terpreting Zorba’s 
life in light of Griffin’s process ideas, Zorba could be viewed as a  m an 
who contributes both  to God (his m ining of lignite and  women are b u t 
two acts of evolutionaiy striving th a t facilitate the dem aterialization 
of the élanvital) and  to o thers (his Mfe so affects the  Boss th a t the 
Boss objectively im m ortalizes it in art).
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In the m idst of showing how Griffin and K azantzakis believe 
th a t a  process spirituality  is both possible and  relevant w ithin a  
changing world, we re tu rn  to and  further exam ine some of the 
postm odern them es th a t we d iscussed in  earlier chapters, particularly 
chap ter two. We delineate how Griffin’s work moves W hiteheadian 
process thought into a  radically new site by engaging the work of 
th inkers who call into question m any of the beliefs—a  common 
rational discourse, universal ethical precepts, an  ordered universe, 
and  the difference between fact and  in terpretation—th a t form the 
foundation of m odernism .
We then  consider w hat Griffin term s the deconstructive or 
eliminative postm odernism  of a /theo log ians like M ark C. Taylor. 
Griffin relies upon Bergson and  W hitehead to argue against Taylor 
whom he believes prom otes an  anti-worldview th a t eradicates the 
possibility of belief in God. Griffin, instead , favours the  radical 
am endm ent of key theological concepts from w ithin m odernity’s 
world-view, a  ta sk  he term s constructive or revisionary 
postm odernism .
A source common to both Kazantzakis and  postm odernism  (by 
whatever neime) is Friedrich Nietzsche. Interestingly, Nietzsche’s 
ideas have contributed to Taylor’s deconstructive postm odernism , 
and, as we have discussed, Griffin views Taylor as  his major 
interlocutor. After d iscussing  Taylor and  Griffin on the subject of 
God, we indicate how their debate applies to K azantzakis’s narrative
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fiction. We also dem onstrate how  the reliance of Griffin’s argum ent 
upon Bergson and  W hitehead connects it to the work of Kazantzakis.
Although we m ake brief allusions to Nietzsche’s writings in 
earlier parts  of our study, one reason we wait un til chap ter five is 
because critics believe th a t Zorba the Greek, perhaps more th an  amy 
o ther Kazantzakis novel, owes an  im portan t debt to Nietzsche, 
especially Nietzsche’s two books, The Birth o f Tragedy and  Thus Spake 
Zarathustra. For instance, Zorba’s characterization is based  largely 
on Nietzsche’s understand ing  of the Dionysiac m ode of life, and the 
B oss’s characterization is based  chiefly on the Apollonian form of 
existence.
In our analysis of character in Zorba the Greek, we note th a t the 
tense b u t close alliance between the Dionysiac an d  Apollonian tra its  
of Zorba and  the Boss evokes the  relationship between literature and 
theology, and  we close our fifth and  final chap ter w ith a  d iscussion of 
possible points of divergence and  convergence between the two in light 
of insights from deconstruction  theoiy. We m ain tain  th a t the 
dialogue we have sustained  between the two disciplines allows u s to 
in terp ret K azantzakis’s narrative fiction as a  m ythopoesis of process 
thought. In a  succinct conclusion, we consider the value of th is 
in terpretation  to W hiteheadian process theologians and  Kazantzakis 
scholars.
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NOTES FOR THE PREFACE
1. It is worth noting that The Saviors o f God, although first published in 1927, was 
written in 1922-23 and given a different ending in 1928. The version now available in both 
Greek and English is, in effect, the 2nd edition, incorporating the revised ending. Here 
and elsewhere. Saviors is not treated as equivalent to Nikos Kazantzakis’s novels. A 
fiction is that which is feigned or imagined, as opposed to that which is true; it is an 
imaginative, invented creation that does not directly represent reality. Saviors, on the 
contraiy, is Kazantzakis’s attempt to represent precisely what is frwg -the nature of being 
and becoming. Kazantzakis uses figurative language in Saviors; however, the figurative 
language in itself does not convert this essay into fiction. Clearly, the discrete 
(autonomous or self-sufficient) world of Kazantzakis’s novels—his fictions—should be 
separated from his lyrical credo.
2. In Whiteheadian process thought, God is ontologically independent of the world in the 
divine primordial nature only. In the consequent nature of God (the mutable aspect of the 
divine), God needs some cosmos or other if not this one.
3. To ‘instantiate’ means ‘to make real, to concretize, or to offer as an example’.
4. Objective immortality is Alfred North Whitehead’s term for the legacy that completed 
actual occasions may, in effect, leave for others. This term receives extensive treatment in 
the following chapter.
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1. P ro c ess  P ersp ec tiv es:  
K a za n tza k is , W h iteh ead , and  th e  God-W orld R e la tio n
In the tem poraiy  living organism  these two 
stream s collide: (a) the  ascen t tow ard com position, toward life, tow ard immortality; (b) 
the descent toward decomposition, toward 
m atter, tow ard death. Both stream s well up  
from the dep ths of prim ordial essence. Life 
startles u s  a t first; it seem s som ew hat beyond 
the law, som ew hat contrary  to natu re , 
som ew hat like a  transito ry  counteraction  to the 
dark  eternal fountains; b u t deeper down we feel 
th a t Life is itself w ithout beginning, an  
indestructible force of the Universe. Otherwise, 
from where did th a t superhum an  streng th  come 
which hu rls  u s from the unborn  to the born and  
gives u s —plants, anim als, m en—courage for the 
struggle? B ut both opposing forces are holy. It 
is our duty, therefore, to grasp th a t vision which 
can  em brace and  harm onize these  two 
enorm ous, timeless, and indestructib le forces, 
and  w ith th is vision to m odulate our action.— Nikos K azantzakis 1
The passage of time is the journey  of the world 
tow ards the  gathering of new ideas into actual fact. This adventure is upw ards and  downwards. 
W hatever ceases to ascend, fails to preserve 
itself and  enters upon its inevitable pa th  of 
decay. It decays by transm itting  its na tu re  to 
slighter occasions of actuality, by reason of the 
failure of the new forms to fertilize the 
perceptive achievem ents w hich constitu te its 
past history. The universe show s u s two 
aspects: on the one side it is physically wasting, 
on the other side it is spiritually  ascending.— Alfred North W hiteheads
A. K a za n tza k is  an d  W hitehead: D o es A K in sh ip  o f  T h o u g h t E x ist?
Throughout Nikos K azantzakis’s (1883-1957) narrative fiction 
there is a  deep a ttachm en t to the ancient tradition of gods and  hum ans 
interacting and  struggling, as Aeschylus portrays it, in the world of the
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In-between. Also, Kazantzakis responds to n ineteen th  cen tu ry  notions 
of ‘dynam ism ’ and  ‘vitality’ by discerning a  v ibrant o u tb u rs t of energy in 
the  world th a t seeks to propel all m a tte r forward.^ Following the thought 
of h is philosophical m entor Henri Bergson (1859-1941), K azantzakis 
views th is palpitating sp irit as disem bodied creativity, th e  so-called élan 
vital (Kazantzakis u ses the term s ‘God’, ‘Cry’, and ‘creative B reath’ to 
describe th is processive life-force) which launches itself into m atte r and 
then  sets abou t unm aking itself by striving for d e m a te r ia l iz a tio n In  
K azantzakis’s view, the élan vital is a  dynam ic energy which invites us to 
wi*estle constantly  to ‘tran su b s tan tia te ’ (pexoucncjowi) all m atte r into 
spirit. In th is way, life allows us to play our p art in the  process of 
sp iritua l evolution, and  th u s  to collaborate with God, indeed to ‘save 
God’ (or a ss is t the dem aterialization of élanvital) from the  confines of 
corporeality.^
Like Kazantzakis, Alfred North W hitehead (1861-1947), com bines 
prem odern wisdom abou t the relatedness of th ings (Heraclitus and  the 
la ter dialogues of Plato) w ith m odern evolutionary theory  to  picture deify 
as the energizing ground from which every dynam ic event escalates.® For 
W hitehead, God is th a t non-tem poral and  vital actuality  th a t gives 
unity, direction, and  hum anity  to life by seeking persuasively to lure the 
world (and its m any inhabitan ts) forward in the tem poral advance.^ 
Following W hitehead’s lead, process theologians now write abou t ''change 
in  God, C hrist becoming divine, and  the on-going process of revelation”.®
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In spite of th is sim ilar belief in evolutionary striving, very few 
scholars working in either the  field of m odern Greek literature or process 
stud ies have se t out to com pare K azantzakis’s narrative fiction and  
W hitehead’s process philosophy. While m uch ink h a s  been spilt in 
describing Bergson’s influence upon Kazantzakis and  in elucidating 
W hitehead’s relationship to Bergsonian transform ism , only a  few articles 
and  references exist th a t poin t up  w hat it is th a t W hitehead and  
Kazantzakis appear to share  in common.® By placing Kazantzakis, who 
w as once persecuted for heresy, ‘in dialogue’ with W hitehead, whose 
ideas are seen as congenial to C hristian  faith, th is  s tudy  hopefully opens
up  an  entirely new avenue for scholars of both. ^  ®
At the tu rn  of the p resen t centuiy , particularly  in  continental 
Europe, there surfaced an  in tellectual trend  which soon stirred  the 
philosophical im agination: ‘Vitalism ’. Evolutionary v italists favour 
evanescence, intuition, and  the becoming th ru s t of the  universe. Henri 
Bergson, a  Nobel prize-winning writer, w as one of the  first of a  cluster of 
th inkers in th is  area. In Creative Evolution, Bergson repudiates 
sub stan tia lis t m etaphysics in  favour of a  relational philosophy:
It is n a tu ra l to our intellect, whose function is essentially practical, m ade to presen t to  u s things and  s ta tes  ra th er 
th a n  changes and  acts. B ut things and  s ta te s  are only 
views, taken  by our mind, of becoming. There are no things, 
there are only actions. More particularly, if 1 consider the 
world in which we live, I find th a t the  autom atic and  strictly 
determ ined evolution of th is  well-knit whole is action which 
is unm aking itself, and th a t the unforeseen forms which life 
cu ts out in  it, forms capable of being them selves prolonged 
into unforeseen movem ents, represen t the action th a t is 
m aking itself. 11
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The centre of Bergson’s philosophy is the vital im pulse, the élan
vital.^'^ Conceptually, Bergson places th is  idea in  direct opposition to the
C artesian  bifurcation of m ind and  body. It is m isguided, Bergson
teaches, to  concentrate exclusively on the prim acy of m ind over body or
body over mind. W hat is needed is a  holistic approach to Üfe.^® Using
term s like ‘in tu ition’, ‘du ration ’, and  ‘creative evolution’, Bergson views
being as an  abstraction  from becoming:
Like eddies of d u s t raised  by the wind as it passes, the living 
tu rn  upon  them selves, borne up  by the  great b last of life. 
They are therefore relatively stable, and  counterfeit 
immobility so well th a t we trea t each of them  as a  thing 
ra th e r th a n  as a  progress, forgetting th a t the  very perm anence of the ir form is only the  outline of amovement. 14
‘Reality’ could be described as a  tussle  between élan  and  m ateriality. 
While the former surges forever upw ard towards new expressions of 
creativity, the la tte r pushes downward toward equilibrium  and 
stagnation . ^  ® As a  consequence, evolution is viewed as the  ceaseless 
unfolding of the tem poral advance (‘the  world’) because élanvital is the 
agitating im pulse which propels m atte r to cultivate itself.
O ur study  does not d istance itself from the  custom ary  reading of 
K azantzakis’s narrative fiction as a  m ythopoesis of Bergsonian 
vitalism . ^  ® We acknowledge th a t both K azantzakis and Bergson sense in 
them selves, in others, and  in the world a t large, a  drive or dynam ic for 
transform ation. In Creative Evolution, Bergson w rites of process and  the 
changing world:
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As the  sm allest grain of d u s t is bound up  w ith our entire 
solar system , draw n along w ith it in  th a t undivided 
m ovem ent of descen t which is m ateriality  itself, so all 
organized beings, from the hum blest to th e  highest, from the 
first origins of life to the  tim e in  which we are, and  in aU 
places as in all tunes, do b u t evidence a  single Impulsion, 
the inverse of the m ovem ent of m atter, an d  in  itself 
indivisible. All the  living hold together, and  aU yield to the  
sam e trem endous push . The anim al takes its s tan d  on the 
plant, m an  bestrides anlmality, and  the whole of hum aniiy, 
in space and in  time, is one im m ense arm y galloping beside 
and  before and behind each of us in an  overwhelming charge 
able to beat down eveiy resistance and  clear the m ost formidable obstacles, perhaps even d ea th .1 7
After Bergson, K azantzakis uses his Report to Greco to  conceive of God
(“a  great Ciy”) as  ceaselessly active and  enduringly p resen t th roughout
the creative advance:
Blowing th rough  heaven and earth , and  in our hearts 
and  the heart of eveiy living thing, is a  gigantic breath --a  
great Cry--which we call God. P lant life w ished to continue 
its m otionless sleep next to s tagnan t w aters, b u t the  Cry 
leaped up  w ithin it and  violently shook its roots: ‘Away, let 
go of the earth , walk!” Had the tree been able to th in k  and judge, it would have cried, “I don’t w ant to. W hat are you 
urging me to do! You are dem anding the  impossible!” But 
the Cry, w ithout pity, kept shaking its roots and  shouting, 
“Away, let go of the earth , walk!”
It shouted  in th is way for th o u san d s  of eons; 
and  lo! as a  resu lt of desire and  struggle, life escaped the m otionless tree and was liberated.
Animals appeared—worm s--m aking them selves 
a t home in w ater and  m ud. “We’re ju s t  fine here," they said. 
“We have peace and  security; we’re not budging!”
B ut the terrible Cry ham m ered itself pitilessly 
into their lo ins.“Leave the m ud, stand  up, give b irth  to your betters!”
“We don’t  w ant to! We can’t!”
“You can’t, b u t I can. S tand up!”
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And loî after th o u san d s of eons, m an  emerged, 
trem bling on his still unsolid  legs.
The hu m an  being is a  centaur; h is equine hoofs 
are p lanted in  the ground, b u t his body from b reast to head 
is worked on an d  torm ented by the m erciless Cry. He has 
been fighting, again for th o u san d s of eons, to  draw  him self 
out of h is hum an  scabbard. Man calls in despair, “Where 
can  I go? I have reached the pinnacle, beyond is the abyss.” And the Cry answ ers, “I am  beyond. S tand  up!”i8
The guiding principles of K azantzakis’s religious quest are included
in th is  quotation from Report to Greco: the  relationship  of spirit to
m atter, the  sanctification of m atter, its  transform ation  in to  spirit, and
the indwelling of the  la tte r in  all m aterial m anifestations of the  n a tu ra l
world. All these principles ascribe the ir origin to central them es in
Bergson’s vitalism: God as sp iritual reality assum es a  m aterial fomi by
taking on flesh and  subjecting Godself to corruption, so th a t  we, God’s
m aterial counterparts, m ay be able to assum e a  divine and  sp iritual
form.  ^® In his book Kazantzakis: The Politics o f Salvation, Jam es F. Lea
notes th is strong connection between Bergson and  Kazantzakis:
Life is a  flowing, expanding, and ubiquitous stream  of 
consciousness for Bergson and Kazantzakis, which forever 
explores new channels in seeking to join w ith the rhythm ic, oceanic tide of the  cosm os .2 0
While a  detailed reading of Bergson is necessary  for coming to 
term s w ith K azantzakis’s narrative fiction, m any scholars have provided 
it.^ 1 B ecause of this, we believe ano ther com parison of these  two writers 
would be only mildly in teresting a t best. O ur purpose is to  th u s  advance 
into a  new  direction in K azantzakis studies. Developing one process 
theologian’s early suggestion th a t the philosophies th a t shaped
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K azantzakis and  W hitehead are sim ilar, we have elected to draw  out 
w hat these  two th inkers had  in  common.
In his book God and the World, Jo h n  Cobb m akes a  strong case for 
harm onizing K azantzakis’s idea of the ‘great Cry’ w ith his own theory of 
the  divine ‘call forward’. As a  W hiteheadian theologian, Cobb holds th a t 
God m ay be defined as One who sensitively provides optim um  initial 
aim s a t the base of subjective becoming.^® Since these in itial aims, 
vocational lures to novel expressions of aesthetic worth, rep resen t fresh, 
relevant possibilities for the emerging entity, Cobb feels th a t  God m ay be
Î,;
addressed  as the One who lovingly calls u s forward.®^ At first glance, 
Cobb’s call forward’ seem s analogous to K azantzakis’s ‘Cry’ issuing from 
and  forming the  ground of our evolutionary-historical trajectoiy.®®
In The Last Temptation, however, the Cry becomes a  blood­
curdling shriek w hen depicted as a  predatoiy  claw digging into Je su s ’s 
scalp.^® How can th is image o f ‘violent grace’ be reconciled with Cobb’s 
W hiteheadian God of persuasive love? Cobb answ ers by claim ing th a t 
K azantzakis has a  legitimate point to m ake in h is literary  fiction, and  
th a t th is m ay profitably be seen as complementing, supplem enting, and 
even refining the W hiteheadian process model of God:
î i '
There is a  valid em phasis in  Kazantzakis w hich is only partly 
to be found in  W hitehead. K azantzakis perceives the Cry or 
call forward as terrible and  terrifying. W hitehead also knows 
th a t a t tim es th e  situation  is such  th a t  the b es t th a t is 
offered us m u st appear as oppressive fate. B u t Kazantzakis 
m eans more th a n  this. He sees how passionately each thing 
w ishes to continue essentially as it is, w hereas the stability, 
the happiness, and  the security  it enjoys are shattered  by the
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For Jo h n  Cobb, the existential power of K azantzakis’s symbols
and  m etaphors for God lies in  the struggle th a t engages ou r indifference.
As Cobb notes, K azantzakis believes th a t the Cry lures u s  toward novel
possibilities for au then tic  becoming, b u t th is involves u s in pain and
loss as we reach beyond the ty ranny  of the given:
Kazantzakis nam es th a t process the Cry, and  he expresses 
with poetic power the cost in anguish  and  suffering by which 
the creation moves, in response to th a t  Ciy, into new trium phs a n d  j o y s . 2 8
Recognizing th a t both our quest for God and  our struggle to advance the
divine purpose m ay cause great distress, Cobb allows K azantzakis’s
portrait of God’s need for ou r assistance to  redraw  his own W hiteheadian
construa l of God as th a t which issues the ‘call forward’ a t  the base of
subjective becoming:
The call forward is toward intensified life, heightened 
consciousness, expanded freedom, more sensitive love, b u t the way lies th rough  the valley of the  shadow  of d ea th .2 9
Thus, Cobb in terprets the evolutionaty process as an  a ren a  in  which we
grapple with a  hostile environm ent to become children of God. It is only
by virtue of our creativity, forged in  the  m idst of evil and  suffering, th a t
we contribute to or ‘save’ God.
Drawing on the  work of W hitehead and  W hiteheadian theologians 
like Jo h n  Cobb, we will develop in th is  particu lar p a rt of th e  thesis the 
relation of K azantzakis’s theological trea tise  The Saviors o f  God: Spiritual 
Exercises to W hitehead’s a ttem pt in Process and Reality: A n  E ssay in
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Cosmology to rein terp ret teachings of the C hristian  trad ition  in light of 
contem poraiy physical science and  evolutionary theory. O ur study  holds 
th a t a  strong case can  be m ade for seeing Kazantzakis and  W hitehead as 
p art of a  general m ovem ent in  the early p a rt of the  tw entieth  century 
tow ards a  d is tru s t of classical aspects of the C hristian  theological 
tradition.®® More th an  their shared  misgivings, we shall observe how 
K azantzakis and  W hitehead advance process qualifications of divine 
power, knowledge, action, creativity, im passibility an d  im m utability in 
con trast to the classical doctrines of divine om nipotence, omniscience, 
and  creation exnihilo.
B. K a za n tza k is  an d  W hitehead: W hat K ind O f A llia n ce?
Since it is in tended as a  com parative study, our thesis proceeds 
from th e  particu lar belief th a t intellectual and sp iritua l affinities, like 
those cited above, m ay be noted in a  com parison of Nikos K azantzakis’s 
religious ideas w ith the  W hiteheadian process m odel of God. While we 
believe K azantzakis and Alfred North W hitehead share  a  k insh ip  of 
thought, we are no t attem pting to m ake Kazantzakis over in  the image of 
contem porary process theology. Furtherm ore, we do not view process 
theology as the kernel trapped  inside the h u sk  of K azantzakis’s narrative 
fiction. This does not m ean, however, th a t we rule ou t all ta lk  of any 
affiliation between K azantzakis and  process theology in th a t  Kazantzakis 
was, in fact, heavily influenced by Henri Bergson, a  process theologian of 
sorts. Thus, som ething abou t how Kazantzakis, sim ilar to a  num ber of 
process theologians, views life as a  tem poral advance involving subjective
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becoming, in tense sp iritual fortitude, and  the enveloping presence of the 
divine, will emerge little by little as our thesis develops. It is not our 
task , however, to fu rn ish  a  case for ‘K azantzakis a s  process theologian’. 
O ur chief aim  is to u n d erstan d  both  W hitehead (as well as  W hiteheadian 
process theology) and  Kazantzakis as conversation partners.
Moreover, in the m idst of ou r specific atten tion  to ideas found in 
Kazantzakis and  process theology we will address fundam ental questions 
about the n a tu re  and  s ta tu s  of the  relationship between narrative fiction 
and  m odern, system atic theology. How do novelists relate to theological 
argum entation  in  the form of the ir writing? Is reading narrative fiction 
very different from the ac t of reading system atic theology? If so, w hat 
ensues from th is distinction? And how m ight theologians begin to say 
anything to o ther w riters caught u p  in the curren ts of contem porary 
critical thinking outside ‘theology’ and  its prem ises?
Many m odern critics of very different k inds believe th a t theology 
does no t im m ediately collaborate with the  literary project; ra ther, it 
moves a t cross purposes.® ^  The complex reasoning behind th is  uneasy  
relationship  of creative writing and  theology is the focus of our second 
chapter. By em phasizing K azantzakis’s  dialogical connection to process 
theology, th is  thesis will se t up  a  ‘conversation piece’ which will help to 
show  how narrative fiction and theology endlessly (de)construct one 
another, th is (de)constructing being an  exercise w hich can only b u t be 
‘in process’ itself.
With an  early example of the ir potential for dialogue given, we
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m u st now go on to consider K azantzakis and  process theology in more 
detail. Over K azantzakis’s narrative fiction broods the interm inable 
struggle to m ake sense of divine and  hum an  becoming. It is to th is 
aspect of his work th a t we now tu rn .
C. K a za n tza k is’s  B e c o m in g  God: S o m e  In itia l R em ark s
“...W hen you w ant to conceive [of] the face of our god, be careful to 
avoid w hat you learned abou t the God of the  C hristians”.®^  These are 
strong words of w arning from Nikos Kazantzakis to his Greek Orthodox 
friend, F ather P apastephanou. In The Suffering God: Selected Letters to 
Galatea and to Papastephanou, K azantzakis issues th is  cau tionaiy  note 
because he w ishes to circum vent all traditional ta lk  of divine 
omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. He avoids ascribing 
these classical predicates to God for one reason. K azantzakis doubts 
w hether we could recognize process—we shall shortly  consider w hat 
Kazantzakis h as  to say abou t a  universe of process—in God if God were 
ontologically perfect:
O ur God is not all-good [omnibeneficient], no t almighty, not 
all-beautiful, not all-wise [omniscient]. If he were, w hat 
value would our collaboration have? If he were, how could he suffer, struggle, ascend? Avoid rom antic t h e o l o g i e s . . . 3a
In place o f ‘rom antic theology’, K azantzakis shares w ith P apastephanou
his own process model of God:
My God is all m ud, blood, desires, and  visions. He is 
not pure, chaste  [spotless,w ithout fault], almighty, 
om niscient [all-wise], ju s t, all-kind. He is no t [the] light.
By m eans of struggle and  toil he tran su b s tan tia te s  the night 
in his in n a rd s and  tu rn s  it into light. Panting, he ascends 
the ascen t of virtue. He cries ou t for help. He does not save
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us. We save him. Salvatores D e i ! 84 
Not surprisingly, K azantzakis’s severe a ttack  on the  classical God of the 
C hristian  tradition  brought him  few  friends. Until h is d ea th  in  1957 he 
w as a  sp iritual rebel, finding little comfort from m any clerics and  laity in 
h is native, Greek Orthodox Church.®® Yet his m ain religious conclusion, 
the  provocative assertion  th a t we are the  ‘saviours of God’, is extremely 
attractive to certain  eclectic C hristian  theologians.®®
The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises, K azantzakis’s m ain 
religious statem ent, provides the necessaiy  background to th is 
conclusion, w hich is based on a  relational view of ourselves and  God: a  
view which m ain tains th a t deify and  the world are striving ceaselessly to 
su rp ass  earlier stages of their own development. To show  this, 
K azantzakis analyzes our growth into a  process involving th ree duties 
and  th en  four conceptual steps.
O ur first duty  is to use our m inds to develop a  rational, coherent 
understand ing  of the world in w hich we live.®^ O ur second duty  to follow 
our h ea rt’s dep th  of feeling is inspired by a  profoundly relational vision:
Let u s  unite, let u s  hold each other tightly, let u s 
merge our hearts, let u s  create—so long as th e  w arm th of 
th is earth  endures, so long as no earthquakes, cataclysm s, 
icebergs or comets come to destroy u s —let u s  create for 
E arth  a  b rain  and  a  heart, let us give a  h u m an  m eaning to the superhum an  struggle.
This anguish  is our second duly. 3 Q 
O ur th ird  du ty  is to su rm o u n t w hat both the m ind and  h ea rt have to 
offer. Kazantzakis challenges u s to appropriate the radically nihilistic
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notion th a t nothing of any value exists and  th en  to live th is  tru th  with 
courage and  dignity:
O ur body is a  sh ip  th a t sails on deep blue waters. 
W hat is our goal? To be shipwrecked!
B ecause the  Atlantic is a  cataract, the  new E arth  
exists only in the  h ea rt of m an, and suddenly, in  a  silent whirlpool, you will sink  into the ca tarac t of death , you and  
the whole world’s  galleon.
j-W ithout hope, b u t w ith bravery, it is your duty  to  set your prow calmly tow ard the  abyss. And to say: “Nothing 
exists! ”3 9
By fulfilling these th ree duties, we undertake a  voyage of self 
discovery th a t enables u s to discover the  relational n a tu re  of an  evolving
.God whom we are called upon to save. We ‘save God’ by helping to 
liberate the  Bergsonian élanvital from the clutches of m atter. This is the M
complex process of dem aterialization. For Kazantzakis, th e  genesis of 
dem aterialization is a  single Cry. Indeed, K azantzakis no tes th a t in  the
first of the four conceptual steps th a t give u s  an  increasingly broad view t
of the surrounding  world, we hear a  Cry for help em anating fi-om deep 
w ithin our soul: “Someone w ithin me is in danger, he ra ises his h an d s f
and  shouts: ‘Save me!’ Someone w ithin me climbs, stum bles, and 
shouts: ‘Help me!”’4® This appeal, an  im portant p a rt of K azantzakis’s 
process-relational vision, is the  Cry of the threatened, vulnerable God 
within U S :
B ut w ithin me a  deathless Cry, superior to me, 
continues to shout. For w hether I w an t to  or not, I am  also, 
w ithout doubt, a  p art of the visible an d  invisible universe.
We are one. The powers which labor w ithin me, the powers 
which goad me on to live, the  powers w hich goad me on to
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die are, w ithout doubt, its own powers alsoH i 
Is K azantzakis’s view of God’s Cry congruous w ith Alfred North 
W hitehead’s persuasive God? It would seem  so. Notice how Kazantzakis 
links the  term s ‘goad’ and  ‘Cry’ in th e  above quotation from The Saviors 
o f God. For Kazantzakis, God urges u s  to  in stan tia te  dem aterialization 
through  rigourous sp iritual exercise. Insofar as W hitehead’s God is “the  
goad tow ards novelty”, it appears th a t a  correlation between both 
th inkers is p o ss ib le .H o w e v e r, we m u st acknowledge one im portant 
difference between K azantzaklan and W hiteheadian m odels of divinity; 
namely, K azantzakis’s  God does not ac t by persuasion.^® Indeed, 
K azantzakis often characterizes God as a  b ru ta l Vagabond and  not as a  
benevolent Com panion (following Whitehead)."^^ Utilizing Jo h n  Cobb’s 
work, Daniel A. Dombrowski’s Kazantzakis and  God suggests th a t 
K azantzakis’s model of God’s violent Cry m ight inform  a  process view of 
a  loving God:
The ‘Cry’ of God serves as a  caU forward to new possibilities, 
som e of which m ay in  fact strike u s as terrifying. For 
example, in order to  show  ‘forgetfulness’ of self we m ight be 
asked to k iss a  leper, as w as St. Francis. Each of us, a t 
least some of the time, and  perhaps m ost of the  time, w ants 
to  continue essentially as  we are, and it is  th is  security  th a t 
is shattered  by the  Cry. B u t our response to the  Cry is for 
the sake of some things th a t are good in us: life in extremis, 
heightened consciousness, expanded freedom. . . , and, in some cases, more extensive and  more sensitive love. As 
Cobb em phasizes, however, the way to these  often Ues 
th rough  the  valley of the shadow  of death. Bergson’s God of 
love and  K azantzakis’s dark  divinity do not contradict one another; ra ther, they are m utually  reinforcing correlatives.45
The second step  requires even more courage and  audacity. Here
31
Kazantzakis enjoins u s to plunge beyond ego in order to discover our 
intellectual, social, and  historical tradition. This selective investigation 
of racial origins is followed by the th ird  step, in w hich we transcend  all 
nationalism  and  provincialism in  order to em brace a  new spirit of 
in ternational understand ing  and  togetherness. P art of our pilgrimage is 
envisaged by Kazantzakis as ou r individual identification w ith the wider 
spirit of hum ankind, culm inating in a  relational understand ing  of our 
place in  the entire universe. M ost im portantly, K azantzakis reiterates 
how God’s cry m ay be heard  from the depths of our becoming, luring us 
to ascend:
“Lord, who are you? You loom before m e like a 
C entaur, his hands stretched  tow ard the  sky, h is feet 
transfixed in  m ud .”
“I am  He who eternally ascends.”
“Why do you ascend? You stra in  eveiy m uscle, you 
struggle and fight to emerge from the beast. From  the beast, 
and  firom m an. Do not leave me!”
“1 fight and  ascend th a t 1 may not drown. 1 stre tch  out 
my hands, 1 clutch a t every w arm  body, 1 raise my head above 
my brains th a t I m ay breathe. 1 drown everywhere and can 
nowhere be contained .”
“Lord, why do you trem ble?”
“I am  afraid! This dark  ascen t h as  no ending. My 
head is a  flame th a t tries eternally to detach  itself, bu t the 
b reath  of night blows eternally to p u t m e out. My struggle is 
endangered every mom ent. My struggle is endangered in 
every body. I walk and  stum ble in the flesh fike a  traveler overtaken by night, and  I call out: ‘Help m e ! ’”4 6
In K azantzakis’s  narrative fiction, ‘God’ often perform s as a  strong and
rich m etaphor for the groans and travails of the emerging cosmos and  its
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m any inhab itan ts. Expressed in Bergsonian term s, God is a  trope for 
the  'Teality which is making itself in a reality which is unmaking itself'
■ IIn his “In troduction” to  The Saviors o f God, Kimon F riar better helps to 
explain K azantzakis’s indebtedness to Bergsonian transform ism :
It is our tu rn  now. It molds, pum m els m a tte r w ithin 
u s  and  tu rn s  it into spirit, tram ples on our brains, m ounts 
astride our sperm , kicks ou r bodies behind it, and  strugglesto escape.49
From  Bergson he [Kazantzakis] learned th a t  all of nature, all 
of the pluriverse, all of life was the expression of an  evolutionary drive, an  élanvital, an  inconceivable energy 
w hich ceaselessly renew s itself, a  continual creativity, a  leap 
upw ard, not tow ard a  fixed, predeterm ined, final end, b u t 
w ithin a  teleology im m anent in the life force itself, which 
was creating its own perfectability as it evolved eternally.
This creativity tow ard a  perfectability never reached bu t 
always postulated, th is  agonized tran sm u ta tio n  of m atter 
into spirit, is w hat K azantzakis m eant by God.48
Finally, our courageous journey  brings u s to a  fuU identification of 
ourselves w ith the entire cosm os’s evolutionary advance. After Henri 
Bergson, Kazantzakis postu lates a  vital, agitating im pulse a t the  h ea rt of 
the universe:
A Spirit ru shes, storm s through m atte r and  fructifies 
it, passes beyond the anim als, creates m an, digs its claws 
into his head  like a  vulture, and  shrieks.
.
In K azantzakis’s  fourth step  of expanding discovery, we identify 
ourselves with the ‘vital im pulse’ th a t creatively lures the entire universe 
to novel forms of aesthetic worth. In doing this, we perceive ourselves as 
p art of an  endless struggle and  realize th a t our final and  suprem e duty  is 
to collaborate w ith “the  rhy thm  of God’s m arch” as all realiiy m akes its 
painful b u t tireless evolutionary ascen t from m atte r to  form s of life
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increasingly more intelligent.®® This is certainly the closest Kazantzakis 
comes to postulating a process God a t work in the world:
My God is not Almighty. He struggles, for he is in peril 
every m oment; he trem bles and stum bles in  every living 
thing, and he cries out. He is defeated incessantly , b u t rises 
again, full of blood an d  earth , to  throw  him self into battle 
once m ore...
My God is not All-holy. He is full of cruelty  and  savage justice, and he chooses the  best mercilessly...
My God is not All-knowing. His b rain  is a  tangled 
skein of light and  darkness which he strives to unravel in 
the labyrinth  of the  flesh.
He stum bles and  fumbles. He gropes to the right and 
tu rn s  back; swings to the left and  sniffs the  air. He 
struggles above chaos in anguish. Crawling, straining, 
groping for unnum bered  centuries, he feels the  m uddy coils 
of his brain  being slowly suffused with ligh t...
It is our duly, on hearing his Cry, to ru n  under his 
flag, to fight by his side, to be lost or to be saved w ith him ...
W ithin the province of our ephem eral flesh all of God is imperiled. He cannot be saved un less we save him  with 
our own struggles; nor can  we be saved un less he is s a v e d .s i
For K azantzakis, the divine is woven into the all the  dynam ics of 
created life: God as circum am bient spiritual presence assum es a  tangible 
form by taking on flesh and subjecting Godself to adulteration , so th a t 
we, God’s physical counterparts, m ay be able to assum e a  divine and 
sp iritua l form. However, we do no t save God via a  false ethic of hum ility 
th rough  which we cultivate v irtues of concern and mercy; rather, we ‘save 
God’ via sp iritual exercises, actively collaborating w ith God in the  
developm ent of the creative advance. In the world, God is developed; in 
God, the world is enveloped:
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The world is our m onastery, the true  m onk he who lives with 
m en and  works w ith God here, in  contact w ith the soil. God 
does not s it on a  th rone above the clouds. He w restles here 
on earth , along w ith us. Solitude is no longer the road for 
the m an  who strives, and  true  prayer, prayer which steers a 
course straigh t for the Lord’s house and  enters, is noble action. This, today, is how the tru e  w arrior p r a y s . 5 2
K azantzakis’s scandalizing of the traditional order of the C hristian  
soteriological project, one th a t links the process of our redem ption to the 
process of God’s redem ption, fosters the belief th a t we are bound up  with 
the  salvific processes of h isto iy  and  nature.®® We are no t passive before 
om nipotent deity; ra ther, we are challenged to su rm o u n t lim itations, 
ascend  to the  sum m it of hum an  authenticity , and  m ake an  identifiable 
contribution to the wider, unfolding purposes of God.®^ Basically, the 
process view th a t the world is the arena  wherein we collaborate with 
G od--and hence both fu rther the creative advance and  contribute to the 
richness of God’s on-going experience—is a  consistently  reiterated motif 
in  K azantzakis’s narrative fiction.
In The Spiritual O dyssey o f Nikos Kazantzakis: A  Talk, Kimon Friar 
claim s th a t “m odern theologians have recently come to [Kazantzakis’s] 
position, unaw are . . . th a t  poets have know n about it for cen tu ries”.®® 
While we do not distance ourselves from Friar’s rem ark, we can be more 
specific th a n  he is and  suggest th a t Kazantzakis’s sense th a t we are 
‘saviours of God’ is actually  veiy close to W hitehead’s version of process 
philosophy which asserts  th a t th rough  our actions we affect the fife of 
God.®® Responding, as did Kazantzakis, to notions of progress and
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evolution prevalent a t the  end of the  n ineteen th  centu iy , W hitehead and 
the  theology of W hiteheadian process though t appears to have an  affinity 
w ith K azantzakis’s own account in  fiction of a  becoming God a t work in 
an  unfolding world.
D. W h iteh ead  And T h e  Lure O f D iv in e  Love; B r ie f O b serv a tio n s
In his book Religion in the Making, Alfred North W hitehead tells of
the im portance of the doctrine of God for ou r time:
To-day there is b u t one religious dogma in  debate: W hat do 
you m ean by ‘God’? And in th is  respect, to-day is like all its 
yesterdays. This is the  fundam ental religious dogma, and all 
o ther dogm as are subsid iary  to it.57
Theology fascinated W hitehead, who tau g h t m etaphysics and  cosmology
a t H arvard after a  long and distinguished career a t Cambridge University
in  England. His process vision of God a t work in a  becoming world has
been enorm ously appealing to theologians in North America, Europe, and
the  Far E ast.
In term s of W estern intellectual histoiy, the conceptual roots of 
W hitehead’s process philosophy m ay be traced to Georg Hegel.®® It was 
Hegel who first spoke system atically within philosophy (in the  m odern 
period) of th e  universe as a  rational dialectic, of life a s  a  developm ental 
process. C entral to Hegel’s idealism  w as h is affirm ation of Absolute 
Spirit, Mind, or God as the creative power which perm eates the ground, 
structu re , and  depth  of an  unm istakably  processive world. There is a  
‘creative urge’ within God, which is gradually unfolding and  coming to 
self-realization w ithin th e  processes of histoiy. Also, Hegel believed th a t
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the law governing the functioning and  unfolding of the  Absolute Spirit is 
dialectical.
Dialectic denotes the m ovem ent of being and  is a  triple passage. 
Hegel’s own paradigm  case of th is idea is called the  organological dialectic. 
In created life it is b irth  (thesis) an d  decay (antithesis) w hich come 
together to form life (synthesis). It m u s t be noted, however, th a t the 
cen tral point to th e  notion of dialectic is not the triple passage a t all. 
This simply expresses the deeper conviction th a t being is an  abstraction 
fro m  becoming.
For Hegel, everything is in m otion and contributory  to the 
continuous flux which is reality. Although observation of the table upon 
which one writes m ight suggest a  static, su b stan tia l reality, th is  would 
be quite wrong. Everyday experience m ight suggest categories of 
substance , b u t the allegation th a t reality is su b stan tia l is w ithout 
serious foundation. Reality is developmental, processive. And for Hegel, 
the notion of dialectic serves to underscore one o ther key idea, th a t the 
Absolute S pirit initially existed in harm ony with itself b u t had  to expose 
itself to its opposite (the unfolding universe) to be vital. Ultimately, it is 
reconciled in the synthesis of N ature and  Spirit.
Hegel’s ‘philosophy of becoming’ (together with C harles Darwin’s 
evolutionaiy theoiy) eventually formed the intellectual im petus for a  
variety of scholars an d  philosophies united, for the m ost part, in the  use 
of ‘em ergence’, ‘process’ and ‘evolution’ as new herm eneutical keys for 
unlocking the secret of our organism ic cosmos. As a  consequence, an
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elaborate portrait of the universe as a  v as t field of in teracting  organism s,
a t various levels of developm ent or organization, began to emerge in the
early decades of our present century.
In Process and Reality: A n  E ssay in Cosmology, W hitehead’s m ajor
philosophical text, he affirms the  ‘ontological principle’: th e  belief tha t,
“ap a rt from things th a t are actual, there  is nothing”.®® From  th is basic
starting  point he builds an  entire m etaphysical fram ework for
understand ing  reality. His overall m ethod takes the form of imaginative
reflection on w hat observation tells u s abou t the n a tu re  of reality.®®
Controlled by the requirem ents of “coherence” and  “logical perfection”,
though aware th a t any kind of ‘exactness’ is ‘fake’, his world-view h as
the  following tenets.® ^
W hitehead m ain ta ins th a t the world of our experience is
characterized by dynam ic change and  process. From  the sm allest
particle of energy right th rough to individual m en and  women,
development and growth occurs. New finite realities come to be, yet this
is no t w ithout some continuity  from the past nor w ithout consequences
for the future.®^ O ur world is in  no way a finished item, for th a t which is
evolving is forever pregnan t w ith possibilities for more complex m odes of
existence.®® In The Fnnctlon o f Reason, W hitehead describes our world of
evolutionary striving:
H istoiy discloses two m ain  tendencies in the  course of 
events. One tendency is exemplified in  the slow decay of 
physical nature . With stealthy  inevitableness, there is 
degradation of energy. The sources of activity sink downward
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and  downward. Their very m atter wastes. The other 
tendency is exemplified by the yearly renew al of na tu re  in the 
Spring, and  by the upw ard course of biological evolution.64
In The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises, Nikos K azantzakis writes in
vivid, m etaphorical language of these  sam e two tendencies in life:
All th is  world th a t we see, hear, and  touch  is th a t 
accessible to the h u m an  senses, a  condensation of the two 
enorm ous powers of the  Universe perm eated w ith all of God.
One power descends and  w ants to scatter, to come to a  
standstill, to die. The o ther power ascends and  strives for 
freedom, for immortality.
These two arm ies, the dark  and  the fight, the arm ies of 
fife and  death , collide eternally. The visible signs of th is 
collision are, for us, p lants, anim als, m en.
The antithetical powers collide eternally; they meet, 
fight, conquer and  are conquered, become reconciled for a  
brief m om ent, and  th en  begin to battle again th roughout the 
Universe—from the invisible whirlpool in  a  drop of w ater to the endless cataclysm  of s ta rs  in the  Galaxy.6 5
Utilizing the evolutionary philosophy of his day, W hitehead’s
Process and Reality a sse rts  th a t the  building blocks of our world are not
‘su b stan ces’ or ‘static en tities’ b u t real ‘events’ charged w ith energy:
‘Actual en tities’—also term ed ‘ac tual occasions’—are the final real things of which the  world is m ade up. There is no going behind ac tual entities to  find anything m ore real. They differ 
am ong them selves: God is an  ac tual entity, and  so is the 
m ost trivial puff of existence in far-off em pty space. But, 
though there are gradations of im portance, and  diversities of 
function, yet in the principles which actuality  exemplifies all are on the sam e level. The final facts are, all alike, ac tual 
entities; and  these ac tual entities are drops of experience, complex and  interdependent.66
W hitehead believes th a t m atte r is thoroughly relational, viewing entities
as both processive and  yet discrete un its  in the process of evolutionary
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becoming.^^ Actual entities are intim ately kn it together.®® This is 
because each ‘drop of experience’ evolves in an  intersubjective process he 
term s “concrescence”.®® W hitehead’s theo iy  of concrescence, how actual 
entities arise together, constitu tes his ontological thought. The ‘coming- 
to-be’ of an  actual en tity  is m ade possible by w hat W hitehead calls the 
“prehension” of, the grasping and  responding to, a  series of complex 
influences.^® Physical prehensions include, principally, th e  p as t actual 
entity to which the concrescing entity is intim ately related  and  whose 
charaeter it genetically and  m assively inherits.^^
For W hitehead, actual entitles conceptually prehend so-called 
“eternal objects” an d  the “basic conceptual aim ”.^^ The former indicate 
all fu ture possibilities for th e  emerging entity.^® The eternal objects are 
grasped as ‘real’ in w hat W hitehead term s the “prim ordial na tu re  of God” 
(a term  we shall shortly  d e f i n e ) . T h e  basic conceptual aim , on the other 
hand, is the  im pulse felt by the conscrescing entity to work for and  move 
tow ards its  richest aesthetic fulfillment. For W hitehead, th is  m eans 
th a t each emerging entity is co-creative within a  deUcate fabric of 
dynam ic rela tionsh ips. ®^ As one contem poraiy physicist suggests.
The dynam ism  of its relationality is su ch  th a t  m atter 
displays rem arkable developmental drives, so th a t m atter itself m ay be said  to be constructive and  developm ental—itbuilds. 7 6
The C O -creative, concrescing n a tu re  of each ac tual entity  m eans 
th a t W hitehead pictures each unity  of experience as dipolar. Each 
ac tual entity  has a  physical an d  a  m ental com ponent. W ith th is dipolar
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view, W hitehead’s process philosophy seem s to Imply ‘pan-psychism ’, the 
view th a t all reality h as  a  psychical character, and  so all ac tual entities 
are th u s  seen to be trea ted  (at least metaphorically) as sub jects able to 
‘decide’ abou t possibilities and  ‘respond’ to lu res from o ther influences.
Modern th inkers are hereby sceptical.^® It m ay be possible to 
affirm th a t even a t the  level of atom s and  sub-atom ic particles there is 
some freedom, even or a t  least in random ness, b u t it is reasonable to 
question w hether quarks and  bozons have a  psychical character. 
Although certain  aspects of reality can  be explained by using  th is model, 
it is doubtful w hether all aspects of reality can.
The picture which W hitehead sketches for u s in Process and Reality 
is of a  universe com posed of m om entary, yet dynamic, societies of actual 
entities. Reality is m arked by a  series of ‘concrescing events’ which 
become and  then  perish. Each perished entity is followed by a  successor 
whose stru c tu re  is the sam e. In a  becoming world, then , each actual 
entity provides the ground for the next event in the flow of the creative 
advance. And all ac tual entities, despite the ir perishing natu re , ‘live on’ 
(or “objective im m ortality”) by forming the im m ediate p as t of the next 
concrescing event.
These m etaphysical ideas lead W hitehead to a sse rt th a t “God is 
not to be trea ted  as an  exception to all m etaphysical principles, invoked 
to save the ir collapse. He is the ir chief exemplification”.® ® Now one of 
W hitehead’s key ideas is the “reformed subjectivist principle”.®^  And this
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is the notion through  which we gain a  clue to the m eaning of reality
w hen we reflect upon ourselves as experiencing, existential subjects.®®
As a  ‘self I am  related to my body. This body which is m e functions
th rough  cells w ith in te rna l and  external relations. F u rth e r reflection
indicates th a t I am  dependent and  related to the wider society of selves.
I am  therefore characterized by social relatedness and  tem porality. I also
have the  ability to express sym pathetic, responsive love which seeks to
promote intelligent and  purposive activity. The h u m an  is not simply a
passionless giver of good things, b u t one who seeks to respond to needs
by allowing the appreciation of context to Influence sub seq u en t action.
As the chief exemplification of aU m etaphysical principles, then , God
m u st be conceived as tem porally ordered, socially related, and  active
th rough  responsive love:®®
God is in the world, or nowhere, creating continually  in us 
and  around  us. The creative principle is eveiywhere, in 
anim ate m atte r eind so-called inanim ate m atter, in the  
ether, water, ea rth  and  hum an  hearts . B u t th is  creation is a  
continuing process, and  the ‘process is itself the  actuality ,’ 
since no sooner do you arrive th a n  you s ta r t a  fresh journey. 
Insofar as M an partakes of th is process, does he partake ofGod.84
Com pare th is com m ent from The Dialogues o f Alfred North Whitehead to a  
rem ark  from K azantzakis’s The Saviors o f God. Here K azantzakls records 
his own sense th a t it is a  dynam ic God who propels evolution up  the 
precipitous slope of entropy, defeating m atter’s drift tow ards stagnation 
and  decay:
Eveiy word, eveiy deed, every though t is the heavy 
gravestone he is forever trying to lift. And m y own body and
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all the visible world, all heaven and earth , are the gravestone 
which God is struggling to heave upward.
Trees shout, anim als and  stars; “We are doomed!”
Every living creature flings two huge han d s as high as the 
heavens to seek help.
With his knees doubled up  u nder h is chin, w ith his 
h ands spread  tow ard the light, w ith the  soles of his feet 
tu rned  toward h is back, God huddles in  a  kno t of every cell 
of flesh.
W hen I break  a  fruit open, th is is how every seed is 
revealed to me. W hen I speak  to m en, th is is w hat I discern 
in  their th ick  and  m uddy brains.
God struggles in  every thing, h is han d s flung upw ard 
toward the light. W hat light? Beyond and  above every thing! 8 5
In Process and Reality, W hitehead expresses his d issatisfaction 
with cu rren t understand ings of God.®® In his view, trad itional pictures of 
God as “im perial ru le r”, “a  personification of m oral energy”, and  “an  
ultim ate philosophical principle” serve only to dehum anize the creative 
advance and  its m any inhabitants.®^ In light of th is  criticism , W hitehead 
re-im ages God in term s com m ensurate with an  evolutionary approach to 
our world.®®
“W hen the W estern world accepted C hristianity ,” declares 
W hitehead, “C aesar conquered; and the  received text of W estern theology 
was edited by his lawyers”.®® W hitehead goes on to declare th a t “the brief 
Galilean vision of hum ility flickered th roughout the ages . . . ” b u t the 
construal of God “in  the image of the Egyptian, Persian, an d  Roman 
im perial ru lers w as retained. The C hurch  gave un to  God the  a ttribu tes
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w hich belonged exclusively to C aesar”.®® In other words, classical
C hristian  theologians applied to deity the m etaphor of m onarchy. God
as ‘ruling C aesar’ em phasizes divine coercive control over every fine detail
of our evolutionary-historical trajectory. In th is  co n stru a l of God, the
presen t cosmic order is as it is because God wills it to be so. Against
th is, W hitehead believes th a t if God fully determ ines ou r world we
remove all ta lk  about God as a  non-tem poral actuality  th a t  gives unity,
direction, an d  hum aniiy  to life.®^
W hitehead concerns him self as weU with the m odel of God as
“ru th less m oralist”.®® This model of God in sists  th a t the  divine, as
personalized m oral force, lays down an  unalterable ethical code for
universal adherence. In Process and Reality, W hitehead believes th a t th is
way of picturing God denigrates ou r innate m oral creativiiy and secular
autonom y. Failing to call u s  into a  creative partnersh ip , it dehum anizes
our life vis-à-vis the  unquestionable dictates of God the  cosmic m oralist.
He attacks it scathingly:
The doctrine of an  aboriginal, em inently real, transcenden t 
creator, a t whose fiat the world came into being, and whose 
im posed will it obeys, is the fallacy which h as  infused tragedy into the histories of Christianity  an d  
M ahom etanism . 9 3
Finally, W hitehead criticizes trad itional a ttem p ts to  th ink  of God
“in  the image of an  ultim ate philosophical principle”.®^  He a ttacks those
th inkers who fashion God according to the A ristotelean m etaphysical
presupposition th a t perfection entails changelessness. For Aristotle, to
44
be in  flux is to be ontologically inferior to  th a t w hich is static. On th is 
basis, and  largely th rough the  efforts of St. Thom as Aquinas, the model 
of God as unm oved mover h as  acquired a  significant place in  the  history 
of C hristian  thought.®® The American theologian Langdon Gilkey, 
concerned to ground pragm atically all ta lk  of deity, lam ents the practical 
non-significance of th is conception th a t m akes God passionless and  
im m utable:
A changeless and  unrela ted  God probably would seem  to 
m ost of u s not only a  com pensatory chim era of the 
Imagination, unexperienced and  unknow n, b u t even more a  
notion devoid of all real content and  value since su ch  a  deity 
would lack rela tedness to the  changing world where initially all reality and value r e s i d e s . 9 6
Although sym pathetic to process though t in  m any ways, Gilkey is 
not a  process theologian; nonetheless, he recognizes th a t  the  term  
‘unm oved mover’ Implies (1) th a t God is unaffected by the tem poral 
advance and  (2) th a t the world contributes nothing to the life of God.
He finds both views religiously alarm ing. If the classical C hristian  
tradition  is correct, and  love is predicable of the divine, th en  God’s love 
m u st be understood in relational term s as open to being shaped  and 
moved  (that is, ‘changed’) by the m any joys and  sorrows of our creative 
advance. W hitehead agrees, suggesting th a t we th in k  of God’s 
in teraction with the world as  conditioned a t least in  some respects by 
divine responsiveness to the unforeseen, self-determining, and  self- 
creative activities of hum anity  and  nature.®^ W hitehead’s point about 
divine m utability is sum m arized with clarity by Norm an Pittenger, one of
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the earliest theological exponents of W hiteheadian process thought, in 
his Picturing God:
The old model of God as one who cannot be affected by 
hu m an  activity, and  who in any event is so m uch  self- 
contained th a t he does no t participate in  th e  world’s 
angu ish  as in  its joys, is of no u s e . 9 8
W hitehead’s theistic analysis concludes w ith th e  claim  th a t “the 
Galilean origin of C hristianity” opposes all three s tran d s  of classical 
C hristian  theology:
It does not em phasize the ruling Caesar, or the ru th less 
m oralist, or the unm oved mover. It dwells upon  the tender 
elem ents in the world, which slowly and  in  quietness operate 
by love; and  it finds purpose in the p resen t immediacy of a  kingdom  no t of th is  world. Love neither ru les, nor is it 
unmoved; also it is a  little oblivious as to  m orals. It does 
not look to the future; for it finds its own rew ard in the imm ediate present.99
From th is  understand ing  of divine love-in-action, W hitehead builds an
elaborate m etaphysical framework to help explain God’s presence as
circum am bient love for our becoming world.
In Process and Reality , W hitehead’s doctrine of God rests  on his 
notion of a  dipolar deity, a  concept th a t we m u st now attem pt to 
explain. According to W hitehead, there are two poles to divine becoming. 
The m ental pole of divine dipolarity is God’s “prim ordial n a tu re”.^ ®® Here 
God is the reservoir of possibiliiy for the cosmos, the foundation of 
novelty.i®^ Also, the prim ordial n a tu re  of God indicates th a t  which is 
abstract, im m utable, unalterable, and  changeless w ithin the life of God. 
The divine contains w ithin Godself all th a t m ight ever be, since God is 
“the  unlim ited conceptual realization of the absolute w ealth of
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potentiality”4®® Furtherm ore, the  character of God's valuation  of 
possibilities in the prim ordial envisagem ent is conceived in term s of the 
urge tow ard the in tensity  of experience. W hat th is m eans is th a t God’s 
initial aim  is the  proliferation of adventure, zest, beauty, harm ony, and 
peace in  the creative advance.^®® For W hitehead, God’s “purpose in the 
creative advance is the  evocation of in tensities”.^®  ^K azantzakls agrees.
His God, like W hitehead’s, bristles with frenetic energy, evokes fresh 
exertion from the  world’s m any inhab itan ts, and rails against life’s 
tedium:
My God struggles on w ithout certainty. Wül he 
conquer? WIU he be conquered? Nothing in th e  universe is 
certain. He flings him self into uncertainty; he gam bles all 
his destiny a t every mom ent.
He clings to w arm  bodies; he has no o ther bulwark.He sh o u ts  for help; he proclaim s a  m obilization throughout 
the Universe.
It is our duty, on hearing his Cry, to ru n  u nder his flag, to fight by his side, to be lost or to  be saved withhim. 105
It is W hitehead’s contention, then, th a t God’s prim ordial n a tu re  
virtually contains within Godself all th a t m ight ever come to fruition 
within the  creative advance.^®® Moreover, W hitehead holds th a t God 
‘endow s’ each entity  w ith a  specific and  relevcint aim  a t the base of its 
becoming, and  th is is com bined w ith God’s lovingly persuasive offer of a  
particularized an d  local lure for the  fulfillment of God’s aim.^®^ W ithout 
th is prim ordial aspect of God, nothing novel occurs in the  processes of 
reality:
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Apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing 
new  in the world, and  no order in  the world. The course of 
creation would be a  dead level of ineffectiveness, with all 
balance and  in tensity  progressively excluded by the cross 
cu rren ts  of incompatibility. 10 8
From  an  observation of our world, we can  see while certain 
context-relevant possibilities are in  fact actualized, they  also eventually 
perish  and  discontinue. The existential com ponent to th is  m ay be th a t 
we are all m ortal and  one day we will die. For some of u s, aw areness of 
one’s finititude can lead to acu te anxiety a t th e  th o u g h t of nothing living 
on or being preserved after bodily death. W hitehead resolves the problem 
of m eaninglessness implied by the  perpetual perishing of all actualities 
by positing the  divine “consequent n a tu re” owing to w hich nothing of 
any value to the Ufe of God is ever lost in the perfect divine memory.^®® 
Now, Im m anuel K ant once tried to in sist th a t “there are  no special 
duties to God in a  universal religion, for God can receive nothing from 
U S ;  we cannot act for Him, nor yet upon him".^ ®^ Yet W hitehead, when 
he posits God’s consequent natu re , affirms th a t everything th a t occurs 
within our world affects and, in som e cases, actually enriches divine 
becoming. The consequent n a tu re  of God is the em otional pole of divine 
dipolarity or the appreciative aspect of divine becoming:
The consequent na tu re  of God is his judgm ent on the 
world as it passes into the immediacy of h is ovm life. It is 
the judgm ent of a  tenderness which loses nothing th a t can 
be saved. It is also the judgm ent of a  wisdom which uses 
w hat in the tem poral world is m ere wreckage. 111
When Kazantzakls affirms how God is imperiled, in need of our 
assistance, he seem s to be struggling with th a t which W hitehead here
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affirms: the  dependent pole or appreciative aspect of divine becoming is 
in  need of our contribution. For W hitehead. God is dependent on the 
world for final completion. Indeed, God’s concrescence relies on our 
resolve to play our p art in w hat W hitehead calls “the creative advance 
in to  novelty”:
Neither God, nor the World, reaches sta tic  completion. Both 
are in the grip of the ultim ate m etaphysical ground, the  
creative advance into novelty. E ither of them , God and  the
God’s own development. God may be enriched by w hat we accom plish 
through acts of evolutionary striving. Possibly K azantzakls would agree
World, is the in stru m en t of novelty for th e  other. 112  
Temporal actualizations m ay contribute to the  on-going process of
' 1
with W hitehead’s theistic perspective. In K azantzakis’s view, as we have
'seen, it is m en and women who are able, th rough  sp iritua l exercises, to 
resis t life’s tedium , to ‘save’ the  divine, and  to fu rther the  world’s novel 
development:
W hat is the  essence of our God? The struggle for 
freedom. In the indestructib le darkness a  flaming line 
ascends and  em blazons the  m arch of the Invisible. W hat is 
our duly? To ascend with th is blood-drenched Une.
W hatever ru sh es upw ard and helps God to ascend is 
good. W hatever drags downward and  im pedes God from 
ascending is evil.
All virtues and  evils take on a  new value. They are 
freed from the m om ent and  from earth , they exist completely 
within m an, before and after m an, eternally.
For the essence of our ethic is no t the  salvation of 
m an, who varies w ithin tim e and space, b u t the  salvation of 
God, who within a  wide variety of flowing h u m an  forms and  
adventures is always the sam e, the indestructib le rhythm  which battles for freedom. 1 1 3
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In W hitehead’s view, the  consequent na tu re  reveals God’s modus
operandi as the  ultim ate experiencer, m ost sym pathetic participator, and
the  strongest sp iritual presence w ithin our world.^
In Process and Reality, W hitehead writes abou t the  “superjective
n a tu re ” of God as weh.^^® This concept ties in with h is earlier two term s
to form an  overall scheme:
. . . (i) The ‘prim ordial n a tu re ’ of God is the  concrescence of 
a  unity  of conceptual feelings, including am ong the ir d a ta  all 
eternal objects. The concrescence is directed by the subjective aim, th a t the  subjective forms of the  feelings shall 
be su ch  as to constitu te the eternal objects into relevant 
lu res of feeling severally appropriate for all realizable basic 
conditions, (ii) The ‘consequent n a tu re ’ of God is the 
physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving 
universe. His prim ordial natu re  directs su ch  perspectives of objectification th a t each novel actuality  in  the  tem poral 
world contributes su ch  elem ents as it can  to a  realization in 
God free from inhibitions of in tensity  by reason  of 
discordance, (in) The ‘superjective n a tu re ’ of God is the 
character of the pragm atic value of h is specific satisfaction 
qualifying th e  tran scen d en t creativity in the  various 
tem poral Instances.
This is the conception of God, according to which he is considered as the outcom e of creativity, as  the  foundation of order, and  as the goad towards n o v e l t y .
In o ther words, hum an  and  created life en ter into the constitu tion  of 
God’s experience as God ‘panentheistically’ em braces th e  world and  its 
m any creatures, and  is siffected by them.^ ®^ And w hat is cherished in the 
divine consequent na tu re  can be com m unicated back—encouraged by 
God’s superjective natu re--to  u s  th rough  our own religious intuitions. 
God perfects and  ‘throw s back’ into the world w hat the  world has given 
to God.^^® In Process and Reality, th is perfected actuality  is used by God
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to lure th e  world in  novel directions, to accelerate evolutionary 
development:
W hat is done in the world is transform ed into a  reality in heaven, and  the  reality in heaven passes back into the world. 
By reason  of th is reciprocal relation, the  love in  the world 
passes into the  love in heaven, and  floods back again into 
the world. 1
It is th is  complex concept of God, prim ordial and consequen t as well as 
superjective, th a t enables u s to grasp  W hitehead’s point regarding the 
bilateral need of God and  the  world, each relian t on the o ther for 
realization.
In Religion in the Making, W hitehead ivrites of God an d  the world as
intim ately kn it together:
Every event on its finer side in troduces God into the world. 
Through it h is ideal vision is given a  base in  ac tual fact to 
which He provides the  ideal consequent, as  a  factor saving 
the world from the self-destruction of evil. The power by 
which God su sta in s  the  world is the power of him self as the 
ideal. He adds him self to  the actual ground from which 
every creative act takes its rise. The world lives by its incarnation  of God in  itself. 1 2 0
In The Saviors o f God, Kazantzakls also senses God’s ub iqu itous presence
in our evolving world:
Even the  m ost hum ble insect and  the m ost insignificant idea are the m ilitary encam pm ents of God. 
W ithin them , all of God is arranged in fighting position for 
crucial battle.
Even in the m ost m eaningless particle of earth  and  sky 
I h ear God crying out: “Help me!”
Eveiything is an  egg in which God’s sperm  labors 
w ithout rest, ceaselessly. Innum erable forces w ithin and w ithout it range them selves to defend i t . 121
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Like W hitehead, K azantzakls w rites of the  divine as One who 
agitates, stim ulates, and  sways u s in  our restlessn ess . ®^® God calls us 
into a  creative partnersh ip  to m ake the world; therefore, ‘salvation’ for 
God and  for u s  is a  m ovem ent forward. In keeping with the m ain them es 
in  W hitehead’s Process and Reality, K azantzakls in sists  th a t ours is the 
struggle to em brace the  entire circle of hum an  activiiy to  the full extent 
of our abilities, to optimize the freedom and  weU-being of all created life. 
In The Saviors o f God, th is  struggle is the way we contribute to the 
richness of the divine experience. The challenge is to heed God’s plea for 
help:
With the light of the  brain, w ith the  flame of the  
heart, I besiege every cell where God is jailed, seeking, tiying, 
ham m ering to open a  gate in the fortress of m atter, to create a  gap through which God m ay issue in heroic attack. 1 2 3
E. T h e A p p rec ia tiv e  A sp e c t o f  D iv in e  B eco m in g
In Process and Reality: A n  E ssay in Cosmology, Alfred North 
W hitehead describes how the consequent na tu re  of God (we refer to  th is 
as ‘the appreciative aspect of divine becoming’) acts both  by prehending 
and being prehended.^^^ The divine positively prehends those deeds 
which involve u s in enterprise and  verve. At the sam e time, God 
negatively prehends the  torpor of those who m ake all of life a  spectator 
sport, the kind of slothfulness which contributes very little to the 
forward th ru s t of creation.^®® As can  be clearly seen, W hitehead’s 
concept of divine prehension (positive or negative) en tails th a t we have 
the ability to prom pt and  stim ulate the consequent n a tu re  of God with
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our actions.^®®
W hitehead also believes th a t God needs u s to sp u r  the  divine 
consequent nature.^®^ In the  th ird  of “four creative phases in which the 
universe accom plishes its actuality", we find th a t our own endeavours 
m ay become vital to God because they m ay help to form the dynamic 
ground for fu ture possibfifiities in the divine prim ordial nature.^®® 
W hitehead refers to th is th ird  dim ension of the creative process as “the 
phase of perfected actuality”.^ ®® In Process and Reality, W hitehead’s God 
depends on u s to  in stan tia te  creativity, adventure, and  zest so th a t God 
m ay use our action as the foundation for new initial aim s and  lures to 
fulfillment in  ou r changing world.
While ou r accom plishm ents m ay affect the appreciative aspect of 
God’s becoming, they can be com m unicated back—encouraged by the 
divine superjective characte r—to us through our own ‘prehensions’. ^   ^
Indeed, our cognizance th a t our struggle to seek higher aesthetic goals 
and  fresh opportunities for sp iritual growth m atters to God can serve to 
foster our own com m itm ent to a  life-stance which m akes for hum an  
togetherness an d  ecological sensitiveness. And so spirituality, a t least 
for W hitehead, is to be understood as flowing out of a  d iscernm ent of the 
p a rt we play as ‘co-creators’ with God in  the creative advance.^®®
W hen Nikos K azantzakls w rites in The Saviors o f God: Spiritual 
Exercises of God’s Cry to be saved, of th e  divine need for our support, he 
seem s to imply the existence of a  dependent ‘pole’ or appreciative aspect
u
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to the divine b e c o m in g .A c c o rd in g  to Kazantzakls, we m inister to God 
whenever we work for the dem aterialization of spirit, defeating m atter’s 
inclination tow ards haphazardness and  disteleology.^®^ W hen we m arch 
in  step with “the indestructib le rhy thm  which battles for freedom” 
th roughou t the entire universe, we find th a t we help liberate the divine 
from the confines of corporeality. ^ ®® This is K azantzakis’s provocative 
religious conclusion:
The Ciy w ithin me is a  call to arm s. It shouts:
“1, the  Cry, am  the  Lord your God! I am  not an  asylum . I 
am  not hope and  a  home. I am  not the F a th er nor the Son 
nor th e  Holy Ghost. I am  your General.
“You are not my slave, nor a  plaything in  my 
hands. You are not m y friend, you are no t m y child. You 
are my com rade-in-arm s!
“Hold courageously the  passes which I en trusted  
to you; do not betray them . You are in du ty  bound, and  you 
m ay ac t heroically by rem aining a t your own battle station.
“Love danger. W hat is m ost difficult? T hat is 
w hat 1 want! Which road should  you take? The m ost craggy ascent! It is the one I also take: follow me!”136
It is the appreciative aspect of divine becoming th a t requires our 
help. It is the dependent pole of God’s dipolar n a tu re  th a t  requires our 
aid (read ‘salvation’). We believe th a t th is  idea un ites the  distinctive 
writings of K azantzakis and  W hitehead. While it is correct th a t they 
wrote Independently of one another, both seem  to value ou r contributed 
satisfaction to the divine fife. In The Saviors o f God, K azantzakis w rites 
of God’s need for redem ption in a  changing world:
D uring those fearful m om ents w hen the  Ciy
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passes through our bodies, we feel a  p rehum an  power driving 
u s ruthlessly. Behind u s a  m uddy to rren t roars, full of 
blood, tears, an d  sweat, filled w ith the squeals of joy, of lust, 
of death.
An erotic wind blows over the E arth , a  giddiness 
overpowers all living crea tu res till they un ite  in the sea, in 
caves, in the air, under the ground, transferring  from body to 
body a  great, incom prehensible m essage.
Only now, as we feel the  onslaught behind us, 
do we begin dimly to apprehend why the  anim als fought, 
begot, and died; and  behind them  the plants; and  behind 
these the huge reserve of inorganic forces.
We are moved by piiy, gratitude, and  esteem  for 
our old com rades-in-arm s. They toiled, loved, and  died to 
open a  road for our coming.
We also toil with the sam e delight, agony, and  
exaltationjor the sake o f Someone Else who with every courageous deed o f ours proceeds one step fa rther A
Now com pare to W hitehead’s Process and Reality:
God and  the  World stan d  over against each other, 
expressing the final m etaphysical tru th  th a t appetitive vision an d  physical enjoym ent have equal claim  to priority in 
creation. B u t no two actualities can be to rn  apart: each is 
all in  aU. Thus each tem poral occasion em bodies God, and 
is em bodied in God. In God’s nature, perm anence is prim ordial and  flux is derivative from the  World: in the 
World’s nature , flux is prim ordial and  perm anence is 
derivative from God. Also the World*s nature is a primordial 
datum  fo r  God; and  God’s n a tu re  is a  prim ordial datum  for the World. Creation achieves the reconciliation of 
perm anence and  flux w hen it has reached its final term  which is everlastingness—the Apotheosis of the  W o r l d .  138
In these two passages, K azantzakis and  W hitehead seem  to 
accentuate God’s need for u s  to fortify the  divine experience in each new 
m om ent. Both w riters s tress  the evocative na tu re  of the felt knowledge 
of divine receptivity for us. In other words, if we become aware th a t the
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quality of our ‘sp iritual exercises’ m atters to God, particularly  those 
values and  dispositions consisten t w ith the divine n a tu re  as energetic 
process, th en  th is can serve to foster our own activity. God is ‘active’ 
th rough  the taking into Godself edl th a t occurs in the evolutionaiy 
advance, being ‘moved’ in the em otional pole of divine becoming by our 
creativity, and  by ubiquitously seeking to evoke our a ttach m en t to life. 
O ur knowledge of th is  can  help u s  to appreciate the value of striving for 
those values, creativity, passion, sp iritua l ascension, congruous with 
God’s character.
F. C o n clu d in g  R em ark s
We began th is chap ter by pointing out a  possible unanim ity  in the 
way th a t Alfred North W hitehead and Nikos K azantzakis wrote of 
‘m atte r’ being constitu ted  by pulses of energy. From there we w ent on to 
explore fu rther the ir evolutionary view of God and  the world. Common 
to Kazantzakis and  W hitehead is the concept of divine and  hum an  
becoming; together w ith God we constantly  strive to su rp ass  earlier 
stages of our own development. This is a  perpetual process. The stream  
of life inexorably flows onward. In th is outlook, both K azantzakis and  
W hitehead follow the work of H enri Bergson.
We could easily trace the  roots of evolutionaiy tho u g h t fu rther 
back th a n  Bergson, to Charles Darwin, Georg Hegel, and  perhaps the 
ancien t wisdom of H eraclitus and  the  later dialogues of Plato. B ut it is 
unnecessary  to do so here, for we already have ju s t established th a t 
K azantzakis and  W hitehead have a  shared  philosophical influence. In
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the course of th is first chapter, the shape of th is influence has emerged 
more clearly, and  we have seen Kazantzakls and  W hitehead united  in 
their p icture of a  dynam ic God a t work in  the processes of reality.
However, the relationship  th a t exists between K azantzakls and 
W hitehead is exeeedingly more complex th a n  these initial observations 
suggest. If we are to u n d erstan d  th is affiliation, we m u st also look a t 
some of the features of the ir work th a t render them  very different from 
one another. Therefore, the  next chapter wifi be devoted to  a  com parison 
of the literaiy  m odes used  by Kazantzakis and  W hitehead (as well as a 
num ber of W hiteheadian theologians). This will enable u s  to appreeiate 
how any specific alliance between K azantzakis’s narrative fiction and  
W hiteheadian process thought, as for literature and  theology in general, 
is one which is com plem entary yet antagonistic.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE
1. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises, trans. and with an 
introduction by Kimon Friar (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960) 43-44. For the 
original Greek text of this lyrical essay, see Kazantzakis, Salvatores Dei. Acict]Tikt ,^ 
Avcxyewr|cyrj July-Aug. 1927: 599-631. This is the first version, unrevised. Also, 
see Kazantzakis, AcTtcrjTiK'q, Salvatores Dei, 2nd. ed. rev. (Athens, 1962). In 1908, 
Kazantzakis arrived in Paris to attend lectures given by Henri Bergson (1859-1941), one of 
the founding fathers of evolutionary thought in philosophy. Full details regarding this 
period of Kazantzakis’s career are in Peter A. Bien, Kazantzakis: Politics of the Spirit 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989) 36-53. More specifically, Kazantzakis’s 
sense that the universe is a battle between antagonistic forces connects with Bergson’s own 
account of the relationship between matter and spirit in our becoming world. See Bergson, 
Creative Evolution, auth. trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1911):
It is true that in the universe itself two opposite movements are to be distinguished,. . . “descent” and “ascent.” The first only unwinds a roll ready prepared. In principle, it might be accomplished almost instantaneously, like releasing a spring. But the ascending movement, which corresponds to an inner work of ripening or creating, endures essentially, and imposes its rhythm on the first, which is inseparable from it. (II)
Later, Bergson asserts:
In reality, life is a movement, materiality is the inverse movement, and each of these two movements is simple, the matter which forms a world being an undivided flux, and undivided also the life that runs through it, cutting out in it living beings all along its track. Of these two currents the second runs counter to the first, but the first obtains, all the same, something from the second. (249-50)
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: Macmillan, 1926) 159- 
60. Compare with Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution'.
Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will
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3. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 84.
I
appear as a wave which rises, and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter. (269)
,iS
4. Ibid., 68-69; passim. See also Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, trans. Peter A. 
Bien (London: Faber and Faber, 1965) 291-92; 416.
5. Nikos Kazantzakis’s idea of divine dependence is indebted to Henri Bergson’s belief 
that disembodied spirit (God) hurls itself into matter and then sets about unmaking itself. 
See Bergson, Creative Evolution, 247-48. Kazantzakis’s God is not all-powerful; indeed, 
the divine does not find it easy to unmake Godself in the processes of reality. On the 
contrary, Kazantzakis’s God is doomed to remain forever incarcerated in matter unless we 
assist God’s release (the dematerialization of spirit) through acts of spiritual asceticism. 
This is why Kazantzakis calls us potential ‘saviours of God’. See Kazantzakis, The 
Saviors of God, 80-81. We will address and develop this theme throughout this chapter.
6. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, ed. David Ray 
Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, cor. ed. (1929; New York: The Free Press, 1978) 21, 
39, 83, 94-96, 159, 208,309. We should note that Whitehead spends very little time 
discussing either Charles Darwin or biological theory, in contrast to physical theory and 
physicists, whom he treats at great length.
7. Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 155-56, 159.
8. Robert B. Mellert, What is Process Theology? (New York: Paulist Press, 1975) 19. 
Although we often use the terms “Whiteheadian process theology” and/or “Whiteheadian
process thinkers”, we suspect that Alfred North Whitehead saw himself as a metaphysician 
and not a theologian.
9. Henri Bergson’s influence on Nikos Kazantzakis is recorded in Peter A. Bien, 
Kazantzakis: Politics of the Spirit, 36-53; Andreas K. Poulakidas, “Kazantzakis and 
Bergson: MeXuyhy sic Journal of Modern Literature 2.2(1971-72): 267-83;
and, finally, Maurice Friedman, “The Modern Vitalist: Bergson and Kazantzakis”, To Deny 
our Nothingness: Contemporary Images of Man (New Y ork: Delacorte Press, 1967) 63-
79. Friedman sees Alexis Zorba, Kazantzakis’s famous literary creation, as a modern day 
vitalist. Alfred North Whitehead’s connection with Bergson is mentioned in Peter A. Y. 
Gunter, “Henri Bergson”, Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Pierce, 
James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne , et. al. David Ray Griffin (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1993) 133-64. Also, see Charles Hartshorne, 
“Bergson’s Aesthetic Creationism Compared to Whitehead’s”, Bergson and Modern 
Thought, ed. A. C. Papanicolaou and P. A. Y. Gunter (New York: Harwood Academic 
Publishers, 1987) 369-82. Scholarship which mentions Kazantzakis and process theology 
is sparse. Bien mentions “process theology” in connection with Kazantzakis in his 
Kazantzakis: Politics of the Spirit, 50. Daniel A. Dombrowski compares Kazantzakis to 
American process thinker Charles Hartshorne in Dombrowski, “Kazantzakis’ Dipolar 
Theism”, Sophia 24.2 (1985): 4-17. Finally, see John B. Cobb, Jr., God and the World 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976) 52-66.
10. Here it seems appropriate to introduce the name of Charles Hartshorne (1897-). He is 
a leading process philosopher, co-founder of the process metaphysics with Alfred North 
Whitehead. Our present study will utilize the ideas of Hartshorne from time to time; 
however, the main focus for us is the ‘conversational exchange’ between selected features
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of Nikos Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction and the religious aspects of Whitehead’s process 
metaphysics as well as Whiteheadian process theology.
11. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 248.
12. Ibid., 50-1, 53-5, 85, 87, 9^-105, passim.
13. Ibid., 23-29.
14. Ibid., 128. It is helpful here, in this explanation of Henri Bergson’s opposition to 
Cartesian dualism, to note that matter, for Bergson, is not a separate entity, but the 
coagulation of the élanvital. Life, he writes, is the élanvital “loaded with matter, that is, 
with congealed parts of its own substance” (252).
15. Ibid., 369. Note that the vital impulse is thoroughly involved with corporeality.
16. We understand ‘mythopoesis’ as an author’s delibemte re-activation (from the Greek 
poiein, meaning to make, to create) of ancient stories in order to organize and secure an 
understanding of human personhood relevant to her own epoch. By drawing on the mythic 
heroes of Odysseus, Jesus of Nazareth, and St. Francis of Assisi (to name but three 
examples) we believe Nikos Kazantzakis shows himself to be a mythopoeic author. The 
interpretation of Kazantzakis’s literary fiction as a ‘mythopoesis of Bergsonian vitalism’ 
owes a great deal to the innovative research of Peter A. Bien, Nikos Kazantzakis,
Columbia Essays on Modern Writers 62 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) 
26-38. Other scholars do not disagree with Bien’s hermeneutic. See James F. Lea,
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Kazantzakis: The Politics of Salvation (Tuscaloosa AL: University of Alabama Press,
1979) 20-25; Morton P. Levitt, The Cretan Glance: The World and Art of Nikos 
Kazantzakis (Columbus OH: Ohio State University Press, 1980) 88-109.
17. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 270-71.
18. Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, 291-92. Here “Cry” is Peter A. Bien’s English 
rendering of Kpoîtjyf). Kpotuyq is used in the New Testament in Mat. 25:6, Acts 23:9, 
Rev. 14:18, 21:4, and Hebrews 5:7. The meaning seems to be ‘an articulate or inarticulate 
loud cry’. In a Greek-Greek dictionary, Kpooïyq can mean: outcry, shout, call, bawl, 
scream, yell, and yelp (in notification, tumult, or grief). It is closely associated with 
KpK^w: ‘to croak’ (as a raven) or scream, i.e. to call aloud (to shriek, to exclaim, or to 
intreat). For Kazantzakis, Kp cxuyfj is much more than just a loud noise. It’s a declaration. 
On such grounds, perhaps ‘outcry’ seems an acceptable term for Kazantzakis’s usage of 
Kpcmyfj. In e-mail to the author (26 March 1996), Bien agrees.
19. Nikos Kazantzakis’s religious convictions share a kinship of thought with Greek 
Orthodox beliefs regarding incarnation and theophany, the spirit made flesh. See 
Demetrios J. Constantelos, “Wrestling With God”, Greek Accent Nov.-Dqc.. 1988: 23-43.
20. James F. Lea, Kazantzakis: The Politics of Salvation, 25.
21. See note 9.
22. John B. Cobb Jr., God and the World, 56. Cobb is one of America’s leading
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proponents of Whiteheadian process theology. He is the co-founder of the Center for 
Process Studies in Claremont CA, USA, and served as its director until he retired in 1991. 
Now Cobb is co-director of the Center with David Ray Griffin, Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, 
and Mary Elizabeth Mullino Moore.
23. The twin concepts of ‘initial aims’ (often referred to as ‘basic conceptual aim’) and 
‘subjective becoming’ explain how Alfred North Whitehead envisages one of God’s 
functions to be that of providentially affecting each emerging reality (atoms, plants, 
animals, men and women) at the foundational phase of their development. How both 
notions fit into Whitehead’s process philosophy will become clear later in this chapter.
24. There is a debate in process thought about whether Alfred North Whitehead’s 
metaphysics is better defined as theistic or humanistic. Donald W. Sherburne is the leader 
of the ‘Whitehead without God’ humanism. See Sherburne, “Whitehead Without God”, 
Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr. and 
Gene Reeves (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971) 305-28. Also see Sherburne, 
“Decentering Whitehead”, Process Studies 15.2 (1986): 83-94. For a theistic response to 
Sherburne’s position, see John B. Cobb, Jr., “Sherburne on Providence”, Process Studies 
23.1 (1994): 25-29. In addition, see Thomas E. Hosinski, Stubborn Fact and Creative 
Advance: An Introduction to the Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead (Lanham MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1993) 207-24. Although we must recognize this on­
going debate, it does not destroy our thesis.
25. Cobh, ii\, God and the World, 56.
26. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Last Temptation, trans. Peter A. Bien (London: Faber and
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Faber, 1961) 31.
27. John B. Cobb, Jr., God and the World, 56. In Process and Reality, Alfred North
Whitehead notes that the divine offer of initial aims may appear more like the Cry:
... the initial stage of the aim is rooted in the nature of God, and its completion depends on the self-causation and of the subject-superject. This function of God is analogous to the remorseless working of things in Greek and Buddhist thought. The initial aim is the best for that impasse. But if the best be bad, then the ruthlessness of God can be personified as Atè, the goddess of mischief. The chaff is burnt. (244)
28. John B. Cobb, Jr., God and the World, 56.
29. Ibid., 56. Although Nikos Kazantzakis refers to God’s Cry as a struggle against our 
conservatism, slothfulness, and stagnation, Alfred North Whitehead does not say that God 
stmggles. Indeed, there are no clear quotes from Whitehead which refer to the divine lure 
as a struggle. Does this disparity destroy our thesis that a correlation exists between 
Kazantzakis and Whitehead? We do not think so. In fact, we believe that Whitehead’s 
process thought could be better understood with a God who struggles. Modifying 
Whitehead’s view of persuasion in light of an informed reading of Kazantzakis, we suggest 
the following. First, we follow Whitehead in holding to the doctrine of the partial self- 
determination of every actuality in the creative advance. In our subjective concrescence, we 
finally create ourselves out of the material presented to us in each new moment of 
becoming. In each phase of our formation, the divine lure is an important possibility 
among many other possibilities which vie for our attention as we orient ourselves towards 
the future. Moreover, God does not compel us to instantiate what God urges us to become; 
rather, God’s role is to offer us a vocational aim for our lives and a persuasive lure for the 
fulfillment of this aim. We can freely choose to appropriate this divine goal but there is 
nothing written into creation that obliges us to act in this way. Indeed, Whitehead would
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say that our subjective aim can be other than the divine initial aim. For a full account of 
Whitehead’s theory of how God persuades us, see his Process and Reality, 343-51. 
Second, we accept this Whiteheadian view of God as the goad towards novelty, that the 
divine lovingly lures our evolving world forward, but, third, we recognize with 
Kazantzakis that God regularly must wrestle with our established habits, our traditional 
customs, our ethical conservatism, and even our slothfulness, in order to call us beyond the 
tyranny of the given. God does not coerce us to fashion our lives after what God desires; 
rather, God takes a risk with a partially free creation and stmggles to call it (and its many 
inhabitants) forward to new heights of aesthetic enjoyment. So, we would modify 
Whitehead’s theory of persuasion to include the Kazantzakian idea (which in some measure 
we believe Whitehead’s theory implies) that God wrestles with God’s partially autonomous 
world by urging it to evolve onward, even though there is no guarantee that we (as 
inhabitants of this creation) will respond successfully to God’s persuasive aim and lure. 
John B. Cobb, Jr. is important here for he is rare among process theologians in trying to 
show a similar correlation of Whitehead with Kazantzakis.
30. We identify ‘classical theism’ with the doctrine of God commonly associated with the 
Platonic-Aristotelean-Augustinian tradition, and where the picture of divine immutability is 
prevalent. As our thesis unfolds, we shall observe how both Nikos Kazantzakis and 
Alfred North Whitehead/Whiteheadian process theologians take exception to the idea that 
nothing in the world affects God.
31. For example, see Robert Detweiler, Breaking the Fall: Religious Readings of 
Contemporary Fiction (San Francisco: Flarper and Row, 1989). Also see Robert Alter and 
Frank Kermode, eds., The Literary Guide to the Bible (London: Collins, 1987). Finally, 
see T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays, 3rd ed. (1935; London: Faber and Faber, 1951).
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32. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Suffering God: Selected Letters to Galatea and to 
Papastephanou, trans. Philip Ramp and Katerina Anghelaki-Rooke, and with an 
introduction by Katerina Anghelaki-Rooke (New Rochelle NY : Caratzas Brothers, 1979) 
35. For the Greek text, see Kazantzakis, O K(X (^xvt;^&icng pL-tAjct-ytcx0c6, ed. Kyriakos 
Mitsotakis (Athens: Minoas, 1972) 85. The English translation has been altered to make it 
conform more accui'ately to the Greek.
33. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Suffering God, 35. Also, see Kazantzakis, O 
Kcx^oivi;^G.icr|  ^[X'lhjGi'yia 0 e 6 ,85. The English translation has been altered to make it 
confomi more accurately to the Greek.
34. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Suffering God, 38. Also, see Kazantzakis, O 
Ktx^oivx^G.icr|£ YiK ®eo, 97. The English translation has been altered to make it 
conform more accurately to the Greek.
35. For infonnation regarding Nikos Kazantzakis’s confrontations with various members 
of the Greek Orthodox Church, see Michael Antonakes, “Christ, Kazantzakis, and 
Controversy in Greece”, Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 6 (1990): 331-43.
36. When Nikos Kazantzakis writes of God, he appears to narrativize Henri Bergson’s 
concept of the élanvital. Furthermore, God is ‘saved’ whenever and wherever 
dematerialization (the release of spirit from matter) occurs. For Kazantzakis, our 
contribution to the process of dematerialization is of incalculable value; therefore, one aim 
of our thesis is to show that ‘saving God’ amounts to our being able to contribute to the on­
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going process of God’s own development. We can affect God because what happens in 
the world matters to God. This interpretation of Kazantzakis dovetails with the 
Whiteheadian process idea of divine mutability.
37. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 49-50.
38. Ibid., 55.
39. Ibid., 59. It is well known that Nikos Kazantzakis was deeply influenced by 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s celebration of Dionysus, the mythical Greek god of ascending life, 
adventure, and ecstatic motion. See Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, 317-39. Exalting 
stmggle as the real ‘joy’ of life, Kazantzakis utilizes Nietzsche’s voluntarism in order to 
throw burning coals into the courtyard of every peaceful home, to stir up spiritual tension, 
and to provoke men and women to achieve their true potential in the face of a frustratingly 
purposeless life (‘the abyss’). However, Kazantzakis modifies Nietzsche’s nihilism, 
teaching that it is only by living ‘betwixt and between’ —by accepting not only the ‘No’ of 
our lives but also the ‘ Y es’ —that we are able to enhance our becoming. For a discussion of 
Kazantzakis’s Nietzscheanism, see Peter A. Bien, Kazantzakis: Politics of the Spirit, 24-
36. For further insistence on the direct influence of Nietzsche’s philosophy on 
Kazantzakis’s world and art, see Charles I. Glicksberg, “Kazantzakis: Dionysian 
Nihilism”, The Literature of Nihilism (Lewisburg PA: Bucknell University Press, 1975) 
275-99. Finally, see Andreas K. Poulakidas, “Kazantzakis’ Zorba the Greek and 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra”, Philological Quarterly49 (1970): 234-44. Nihilism 
is just one ingredient in Kazantzakis’s complex philosophy of life.
40. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 65.
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4L Ibid., 68-69.
42. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 88.
43. The vast majority of process theologians follow the Whiteheadian-Hartshornean belief 
that God’s power is solely persuasive. For a brief history of this theme and a bibliography 
of relevant writings, see Barry L. Whitney, “God as Persuasive”, Evil and the Process 
God, Toronto Studies in Theology 19 (Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1985) 88-114.
-■j
44. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 112-13. For Alfred North Whitehead’s view 
of God as Companion, see his Religion in the Making, 16-17. God’s tenderness is 
affimied in Whitehead, Process and Reality, 105, 346. This contrast in the way that 
Kazantzakis and Whitehead picture God is discussed at length, and a rapprochement 
between them is suggested, in Darren J. N. Middleton, “Vagabond or Companion?: 
Kazantzakis and Whitehead on God”, God’s Straggler: Religion in the Writings of Nikos 
Kazantzakis, ed. Darren J. N. Middleton and Peter A. Bien (Macon GA: Mercer University 
Press, 1996) 189-211.
45. Daniel A. Dombrowski, Kazantzakis and God, unpublished book (1996) 45-46.
";î:Dombrowski’s typescript is currently under review with State University of New York 
Press. We want to thank Professor Dombrowski for making this text available to us in this 
present study.
46. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 80-81.
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47. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 248.
48. Kimon Friar, introduction, The Saviors of God, by Nikos Kazantzakis, trans. Kimon 
Friar (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960) 37.
49. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 84. Compare with Henri Bergson, Creative 
Evolution:
At a certain moment, in certain points of space, a visible current has taken rise; this current of life, traversing the bodies it has organized one after another, passing from generation to generation, has become divided amongst species and distributed amongst individuals without losing anything of its force, rather intensifying in proportion to its advance. (26)
50. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 100.
51. Ibid., 104-05. Notice the savage nature of Nikos Kazantzakis’s God. By contrast, 
the images of God in Whiteheadian process thought are not as bloody as those suggested 
by Kazantzakis.
52. Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, 305-06.
53. Although we use the word ‘scandal’ to describe Nikos Kazantzakis’s inversion of the 
traditional Christian account of redemption, and some conservative evangelical Christians 
have found Kazantzakis’s ideas ‘scandalous’, we do realize that in the history of Christian 
mysticism it is common to hear that God is changed by the loving embrace with those who 
seek union with God, as in St. John of the Cross or Teresa of Avila.
54. Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco:
When I say the Invisible, I do not mean any priestly version of God, or
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metaphysical consciousness, or absolutely perfect being, but rather the mysterious force which uses men—and used animals, plants, and minerals before us—as its carriers and beasts or burden, and which hastens along as though it had a purpose and were following a specific road. (402)
Compare with Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution:
There is no doubt that life as a whole is an evolution, that is, an unceasing transformation. But life can progress only by means of the living, which are its depositaries. Innumerable living beings, almost alike, have to repeat each other in space and in time for the novelty they are working out to grow and mature. (230-31)
God thus defined, has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation, so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely. (248)
Now is an appropriate time to comment on Kazantzakis’s use of the so-called ‘ring
stmcture’ in the composition of his creative writing. This is because it is directly related to
the way in which Kazantzakis looks at the world through Bergsonian spectacles.
According to Peter A. Bien, Kazantzakis “concentrates poetic elements at the beginning and
end of his novels so that they frame a middle devoted to realistic elements” (Bien, Nikos
Kazantzakis-Novelist [London: Duckworth, 1989] 10). More specifically, the beginning
and end of The Saviors of God contains what one might call ‘metaphysical’ or ‘spiritual’
elements, such as the affirmation of nihilism in the early chapters as well as the emphasis
on negation, apophasis, and silence in the final section. In contrast to this, the central
portion of Kazantzakis’s lyrical essay is “filled with recipes for realistic action in the ‘world
of things’ ” (10). This narrative structure is in accord with Kazantzakis’s view of life as a
“luminous interval” between two dark voids (Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 43), with
our existence viewed “as a period of evolutionary striving bounded before and after by pure
spirituality (‘nothingness’)” (Bien, Nikos Kazantzakis—Novelist, 10). We shall return to
the ‘ring structure’ motif in chapter three of our study.
55. Kimon Friar, The Spiritual Odyssey of Nikos Kazantzakis: A Talk, ed. and with an
introduction by Theofanis Stavrou (St. Paul MN: The North Central Publishing Company, 
1979) 26.
56. See Nikos Kazantzakis, Zorba the Greek, trans. Carl Wiidman (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1961) 59. Here Uncle Anagnosti, a proud Cretan peasant, echoes Kazantzakis’s 
belief that we affect the becoming of God when he tells Zorba, “Hey, friend, don’t chew 
out God...The poor fellow [God], he too depends on us”. For the Greek text, see 
Kazantzakis, BiogicotmoAiiEtot Tou Zopp,TTCt, 5th ed, (Athens, 1959) 82. The 
English translation has been altered to make it conform more precisely to the Greek. Alfred 
North Whitehead’s God relies on the world as well. See Process and Reality, 31, 345, 
347. Here Whitehead talks of how the ‘consequent nature’ of God (the mutable aspect of 
the divine) results from God’s physical prehensions of the actual world. Without the 
consequent nature, Whitehead’s God is incomplete. Indeed, his God requires the world 
for God’s final realization. Therefore, Whitehead’s God needs us.
57. Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 67-68.
58. Alfred North Whitehead, 11, 113, 166, 167,210. Whitehead’s 
similarity to Georg Hegel is clear.
59. Ibid., 40. Also, see 19, 24, 32, 41, 43, 46, 244, 256 for more extended definitions. 
Henri Bergson concurs with Alfred North Whitehead’s emphasis on actuality and 
becoming. For Bergson, Creative Evolution, “ . . . becoming exists: it is a fact” (316).
60. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 3-17. See also Thomas E. Hosinski,
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Stubborn Fact and Creative Advance, 1-18.
61. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 6. Notice how Whitehead, in spite of
similarities to Georg Hegel, anticipates the deconstructive postmodern observation that final
meaning is impossible because human language seems to evade all claims to reference:
Philosophers can never hope finally to formulate these metaphysical first principles. Weakness of insight and deficiencies of language stand in the way inexorably. Words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of language be stabilized as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap. (4)
62. Alfred North Whitehead’s own emphasis on the primacy of ‘becoming’ over ‘being’ is 
recorded in Process and Reality, xiii-xiv, 23, passim.
63. This is an important idea in Bergsonian transformism as well. See Creative Evolution:
Now, life is an evolution. We concentrate a period of this evolution in a stable view which we call a form, and, when the change has become considerable enough to overcome the fortunate inertia of our perception, we say that the body has changed its form. But in reality the body is changing form at every moment; or rather, there is no fonn, since form is immobile and the reality is movement. What is real is the continual change <?/form: form is only a snapshot view of transition. (302)
64. Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason (1926; Boston: Beacon Press Ltd., 
1958) i.
65. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 119-20. Also, Henri Bergson speaks of 
these antagonistic tendencies in Creative Evolution, 245.
Is
66. Alfr&dNoi'thWhiteheRd, Process and Reality, 18. Also, see Thomas E. Hosinski,
Stubborn Fact and Creative Advance, 33-45.
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67. In Process and Reality, Alfred North Whitehead refers to a group of actual entities as a 
“society” (89). Any ‘society’ that yields a ‘thing’ which persists is an “enduring object” 
(34). Both ‘society’ and ‘enduring object’ are Whiteheadian tenus which accentuate the 
relationality of our emerging world.
68. Alfred North Whitehead’s theoiy concerning the relativity of actual entities is recorded 
in his Process and Reality, 22, 50, 148. This theory opposes all mechanistic ways of 
understanding our world.
69. Ibid., 7; For example, “the process, or concrescence, of any one actual entity involves
the other actual entities among its components. In this way the obvious solidarity of the 
world receives its explanation” (7). For a detailed account of Alfred North Wliitehead’s 
theory of concrescence, see Thomas E. Hosinski, Stubborn Fact and Creative Advance, 
46-127.
70. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 22-26. Here each actual entity is “a 
concrescence of prehensions, which have originated in its process of becoming” (23). 
Furthermore:
“ . . . every prehension consists of three factors: (a) the ‘subject’ which is prehending, namely, the actual entity in which that prehension is a concrete element; (b) the ‘datum’ which is prehended; (c) the ‘subjective form’ which is how that subject prehends that datum”. (23)
Notice here that prehensions are both physical and conceptual. This means that each actual
entity is dipolar (a term we shall soon define).
71. Physical prehension involves ‘perception in the mode of causal efficacy’. See Alfred 
North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 81, 129. How we inherit from our immediate
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physical past is also discussed in Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan,
1933) 186-89. For Whitehead, we aie always receiving something from our immediate
past. Compare with Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution:
Evolution implies a real persistence of the past in the present, a duration which is, as it were, a hyphen, a connecting link. (22)
72. For eternal objects, see Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 22, 23, 40, 44, 
164; basic conceptual aim, 105, 108, 224, 244, 283.
73. Ibid., 148-149. Alfred North Whitehead classifies‘eternal objects’ as “the pure
potentials of the universe; and the actual entities differ from each other in their realization of 
potentials”. (149)
74. Ibid., 343-51.
75. Ibid., 47.
76. H. K. Schilling, The New Consciousness in Science and Religion (London: SCM 
Press, 1973) 26.
77. Alfred North Whitehea.d, Process and Reality, 45, 107-08, 239-40, 244-45, 247-49, 
277.
78. David A. Pailin is Britain’s main exponent of process theology. He criticizes the idea 
of panpsychism. See Pailin, God and the Processes of Reality: Foundations for a Credible 
Theism (London: Routledge, 1989) 54. To be fair, there are some American process 
theologians, like David Ray Griffin, who accept Pailin’s criticism and prefer to speak either
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of ‘panexperientialism’, ‘panenergism’, or ‘postmodern animism’ rather than
‘panpsychism’. See Griffin, God and Religion in the Postmodern World: Essays in
Postmodern Theology (Albany NY : State University of New York Press, 1989) 5, 23, 24.
In ‘postmodern animism’, for instance, Griffin maintains that:
the world is composed exclusively of momentary units of partially self- creative perceptual experiences. Each unit of experience is partially spontaneous, or self-creative, and then exerts causal influence upon subsequent units. (35)
79. Alfred UorthWlnteiiQad, Process and Reality, 29, 60, 82, 223.
80. Ibid., 343.
81. Ibid., 79-80, 157, 160, 166-67, 189, 196-97. Also, see Thomas E. Hosinski, 
Stubborn Fact and Creative Advance, 36-45:
The reformed subjectivist principle is the formal and generalized statement of one of Whitehead’s fundamental methodological principles: that human experience (in its totality) is the only source of data and evidence for philosophical reflection, and that what is found in the metaphysical interrogation of human experience may be used legitimately to construe the structure of reality. (42)
82. Alh edNorthWhitehead, Process and Reality, 119. Henri Bergson’s philosophical 
method has much in common with Whitehead’s ‘reformed subjectivist principle’. See 
Creative Evolution, 1-23.
83. In Alfred North Whitehead’s process metaphysics, God is temporally ordered in the 
divine consequent nature only. Temporality is not part of God’s primordial nature. See 
Process and Reality, 343-51.
84. Alfred North Whitehead, The Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead, rec. Lucien Price 
(London: Frederick Miller, 1954) 297.
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85. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 91. Process theologians would agree with
Kazantzakis’s sense that God is an upward lure or drive towards complexification. For
instance, David A. Pailin believes that the evolutionary pull towards complexity of
organisms and experience is the clue to the nature and development of the creative advance,
and not the Second Law of Thennodynamics. See God and the Processes of Reality. Here
Pailin reflects on the work of Alfred North Whitehead and John B. Cobb, Jr. (especially
Cobb’s idea of the ‘call forward’, a notion that we examined earlier in this chapter):
What Whitehead and Cobb describe as the creative activity of God may be expressed in more scientific terms as that tendency in natural processes which brings it about that there appeal* areas of intensification and complexification of forces as localized alternatives to the general tendency of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. (141)
Henri Bergson agrees. In his Creative Evolution, he maintains that “all our analyses show
us, in life, an effort to re-mount the incline that matter descends” (245). Furthermore, he
holds that:
The truth is that life is possible whenever energy descends the incline indicated by Camot’s law and where a cause of inverse direction can retard the descent—that is to say, in all the worlds suspended from the stars. (256)
86. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 342.
87. Ibid., 342-43.
88. Ibid., 31-36; 342-51.
89. Ibid., 342.
90. Ibid., 342.
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91. Alfred North Whitehead enables other scholars, too, to challenge the use of the 
monarch metaphor in Christian theology. See, for example, Daniel Day Williams, “Deity, 
Monarchy and Metaphysics”, Essays in Process Theology , ed. Perry LeFevre (Chicago: 
Exploration Press, 1985) 51-71. In his book Toward a Process Pneumatology 
(Selinsgrove PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1990), Blair Reynolds has claimed that 
the Louis-XIV-of-the-Heavens constmal of God is religiously unsatisfying: “The monarch 
metaphor carries too many ugly connotations of God as mthless moralist and ruling 
Caesar, and therefore does not square with a God of love” (31). As an alternative, 
Reynolds asserts the theistic relevance of the metaphor of the universe as God’s body, for 
“it does greater justice to God’s radical sensitivity to all things” (32). Among those who 
echo Whitehead’s criticism of the use of the monarch metaphor in theology are non- 
Whiteheadian thinkers such as Sallie McFague. In her book Models of God: Theology for 
an Ecological, Nuclear Age (London; SCM Press, 1987), McFague sees only danger in 
the use of “triumphant, royal metaphors” in Christian theology (65). In her view, the 
monarchical model “implies the wrong kind of divine activity in relation to the world, a 
kind that encourages passivity on the part of human beings” (69).
92. Alfred North Whitehead, 342.
93. Ibid., 342.
94. Ibid., 343.
95. Ibid., 343. Henri Bergson criticizes this model of God as well. See Creative 
Evolution, 248.
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96. Langdon Gilkey, “God”, Christian Theology: An Introduction to its Traditions and 
Tasks, ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Philadelphia; Fortress Press, 1982) 79.
97. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 343.
98. Norman Pittenger, Picturing God (London: SCM Press, 1982) 9.
99. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 343. Compare John B. Cobb, Jr. and
David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1976):
The notion of God as Cosmic Moralist has suggested that God is primarily interested in order. The notion of God as unchangeable Absolute has suggested God’s establishment of an unchangeable order for the world.And the notion of God as Controlling Power has suggested that the present order exists because God wills its existence. In that case, to be obedient to God is to preserve the status quo. Process theology denies the existence of this God. (9)
In his book Process Pneumatology, Blair Reynolds agrees:
Process theology views with disdain the static, abstract God of classical theism, alternatively termed the Ruthless Moralist, the Unmoved Mover, the Ruling Caesar, or the philosopher’s God, In its place, stands the Whiteheadian God as ‘tender poet’. (70)
100. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 31.
101. Ibid., 46.
102. Ibid., 343. Committed to the ‘ontological principle’, Alfred North Whitehead cannot 
say that ‘potentiality’ appears ‘out of the blue’ ; rather, Whitehead thinks of the primordial 
nature of God as the sole reason for why eternal objects or potentialities exist, and why 
they are introduced to the emerging entity at each new moment of the entity’s becoming.
For Whitehead, God is the non-temporal reservoir of potentiality for the processes of 
reality (7, 40, 46).
103. Ibid., 88, 105, 346.
104. Ibid., 105.
105. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 104-05.
1 0 6 . Alfred North Whitehead, 31-32, 40, 46, 87-88, 164, 257, 344.
107. Ibid., 244.
108. Ibid., 247.
109. Ibid., 340-41. A\^o, IE. Stubborn Fact and Creative
Advance, 181-206.
110. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore Greene 
and H. H. Hudson (New York: State University of New York Press, 1960) 142.
111. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 346.
112. Ibid., 349. On the complex relationship between God and creativity in Whiteheadian 
process metaphysics, see Thomas E. Hosinski, Stubborn Fact and Creative Advance, 207-
24. Also see Robert C. Neville, Creativity and God: A Challenge to Process Theology
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(New York: Seabury Press, 1980). While the debate regarding the ultimacy of God and 
the status of creativity is still ‘in process’, a full discussion of this issue is beyond the 
scope of our present study.
113. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 108-09.
114. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 350-51. See also Marjorie Hewitt 
Suchocki, God-Christ-Church: A Practical Guide to Process Theology (New York: 
Crossroads, 1986) 39. Whitehead’s dipolar God seeks intensities of human flourishing 
within the context of world-loyalty and ecological sustainability, and lovingly ensures that 
all expressions of creative value are remembered in God’s everlasting memory.
115. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 88.
116. Ibid., 87-88.
117. Panentheism is the theological doctrine which affirms that all created life is included
■within the life of God. Alfred North Whitehead does not use this term in Process and 
Reality. In fact, ‘panentheism’ is a theological term which owes a great deal to the insights 
of Charles Hartshorne. For Haitshome, all of the creative advance is in God, but God is 
more than this world (ontologically, valnatively). We are the actualized aspects of God’s 
infinite possibilities. See The Divine Relativity (New Haven CT : Y ale University Press,
1948) 90. In The Living God: A Christian Theology Based on the Thought of A. N.
Whitehead (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1967), author and British process theologian 
Peter Hamilton clarifies the difference between Whitehead and Hartshorne regarding the 
subject of panentheism:
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119. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 351.
120. Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 155-56.
121. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 120.
122. In Process and Reality, Alfred North Whitehead’s God is the “goad towards novelty’ 
(88). Likewise, in The Saviors of God, Nikos Kazantzakis’s God is a power which 
“goads” men and women (68).
a■1
.. . Whitehead is not strictly a “panentheist”; his complete insistence on "ffreedom means that although we are influenced and indeed surrounded by God, each of us remains a separate subject. God includes us in his consequent nature by prehending us as objects: we are not included as ■ Isubjects. “Panentheism”—in Hartshorne’s sense that God “literally |contains” us—would upset Whitehead’s superb balance and interrelation between God and the world, and between the transcendence and immanence of each in relation to the other. (165)
This caveat is important for us to remember. It does not mean that we cannot describe
J:
Whitehead’s God as One who ‘panentheistically embraces the world’ —Whitehead’s God j
clearly envelops the world in a way implied by panentheism-only that we must remind 
ourselves that Whitehead is not “strictly” a “panentheist”.
118. With regard to Alfred North Whitehead’s notion of the three fold character of God, it J
is the divine supeijective nature which takes perfected actuality and uses it as the basis for 
the world’s future direction. See Whitehead, Process and Reality, 87-88. For a helpful 
explanation of how Whitehead understood the supeijective nature of God, see Marjorie 
Hewitt Suchocki, God-Christ-Church, 215.
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123. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 120.
124. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 350-51.
125. Ibid., 23-24, 26, 41-42, 44, 83, 101, 106, 220-21, passim. For Alfred North 
Whitehead, both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ prehensions are important for the concrescence 
of actual entities. This includes God.
126. Ibid., 348.
127. Ibid., 350.
128. Ibid., 350.
129. Ibid., 350.
130. Ibid., 351.
131. Ibid., 351. Compare with Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, The End of Evil: Process 
Eschatology in Historical Context (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 
1988):
God, as well as the world, is internally affected by that which is other; God as well as the world, has an effect on the on-going reality of temporal existence . . . God everlastingly receives the world into the divine nature, transforming and unifying the world within the richness of the primordial vision. Consequent upon this process, God offers back to the world possibilities for its own transformation. (154)
132. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 349.
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133. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 63.
134. Ibid., 123-24.
135. Ibid., 109.
136. Ibid., 67-68.
137. Ibid., 83-84; emphasis added.
138. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 348; emphasis added.
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2 . R ubbing T e x ts  T ogether:
S o m e  I s su e s  to  C on sid er  W hen R ea d in g  K a za n tza k is  an d  W hitehead^
A. T ex tu a l P roblem s: A C om p arison  o f  L iterary F orm s
By placing the texts of Process and Reality: A n  E ssay in Cosmology 
and  The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises alongside one another, we have 
dem onstrated in our first chapter th a t Alfi*ed North W hitehead’s process 
philosophy and  Nikos K azantzakis’s m ythopoesis of Bergsonian vitalism  
coalesce in  a t least th ree ways. F irst, W hitehead and  Kazantzakis share 
a  sense of how the world we live in  evolves and  su rp asses  earlier stages of 
its own formation. Second, they  hold a  bilateral view th a t God is ‘in 
process’, sub ject to time and  development, containing w ithin the divine 
life all th a t m ight ever ‘com e-to-be’ w ithin our world. Third, Kazantzakis 
and  W hitehead profess a  m u tua l belief th a t God needs ou r assistance to 
enhance divine becoming (in God’s consequent nature). This is the idea 
o f ‘saving’ God through  sp iritual exercises.
In our opening chapter on K azantzakis’s and  W hitehead’s process 
religious beliefs we have been rubbing the texts of both  w riters together 
to behold w hat sparks will fly. As we continue to practice th is technique 
for reading, we discover th a t in  spite of the in tellectual affinities th a t we 
note in our first chapter, some difficulties rem ain. Indeed, one tension 
m ay be seen when we com pare textual forms.^ For while W hitehead’s 
process philosophy (and W hiteheadian process theology) is arguably 
com m itted to argum entation  and s truc tu red  thought, leaving little room  
for plurality and  ambiguiiy, K azantzakis’s dithyram bic narrative, free
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from the constra in ts of theological system atization, adopts a  literaiy 
‘mode’ which is differently struc tu red  and  jux taposes opposite viewpoints 
a t the sam e time. At least one K azantzakis critic, Frederic Will, seem s 
to agree w ith th is observation.
Will proclaim s th a t K azantzakis’s The Saviors o f God is not 
“disciplined conceptualizing’’ (of the kind we notice in  W hitehead’s 
Process and Reality) b u t “sequential though t generated by intuition, 
perceptions which gather up  and direct m asses of m astered  experience”.  ^
The abiding value of K azantzakis’s work, a t least for Will, is therefore 
not so m uch  to be found in  w hat Kazantzakis consciously articulates 
b u t in w hat he ‘allows’ u s to say  in m aking the connections between 
logic and  reason, on the one hand, and  emotion and  feeling, on the 
other. Paradox and irony, so m uch  a  p art of hum an  experience, are 
allowed to exist as a  realiiy in  K azantzakis’s a rt while they  are invariably 
denied in the  rational, generalizing approach of W hiteheadian process 
theology.^
B ernard Meland is rare  am ong process theologians in  addressing
the question of how literatu re and  theology relate to one another:
The poet and  the m etaphysician often trespass upon one 
ano ther’s ground. The m etaphysician se ts  ou t to gather in 
the m eaning of th is vast exterior and  he re tu rn s  from his 
quest for m eaning w ith the  words of the poet upon his lips. 
The language of lesser m en simply would no t carry  meeming 
so suffused w ith vastness and  ta lk  of s ta rs . The poet, too, w hen he gets over being absorbed in words and  attends to the m eaning of words, soon finds him self travelling in a  
country  unfam iliar to common m inds. W hether he looks a t 
s ta rs  or observes events abou t him  he will be carried, in his 
sensitive reflections, to th in k  upon w hat is going on m ost
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hlddenly in  these tho u san d  places th a t contain  or 
circum scribe the hum an  m ind.5
Here Meland seem s to suggest th a t any alliance between theology and
literature is enriching, perhaps, b u t potentially inimical. While the poet
m ay consum m ate the theologian’s endeavours by rem inding her th a t she
is engaged in  a  narrative exercise, the  theologian m ay facilitate the
creative w riter in  stressing  the im portance of ‘conceptual plausibility’ in
his work. M eland’s te rm  ‘tresp ass’ connotes encroachm ent, invasion,
violence, and  even sinfulness. T. R. Wright suggests why transgression
occurs w hen these two disciplines meet:
M uch theology, for example, tends tow ards unity  and 
coherence, a  system atic exploration of the  conten t of faith 
which attem pts to impose lim its on the m eaning of words, 
while literature, as E zra Pound insisted, is often dangerous, 
subversive and  chaotic, an  anarchic celebration of the creative possibilities of language.G
W hat Wright appears to a sse rt is th a t literature, as  writing, perpetually
tends to deconstruct the essentializing, system atizing and  reference-
claiming tendencies of a  great deal of contemporciiy theology. On th is
argum ent, literature can  be said to be self-contained (discrete). Unlike
m uch theology, th a t is, fiction enjoys its own world.^
Reading Henri Bergson (and W hitehead) m ight illum ine our grasp
of K azantzakis’s novels but, from a  certain  perspective of reading, we can
peruse, say, K azantzakis’s Zorha The Greek discretely. Conflicting
strategies of reading su ch  as these do not necessarily invalidate any one
approach to reading because no critic can or should m ake absolute and
universal claims for reading. In fact, our foremost desire m ight be for
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w hat Giles B. G unn calls “a  principled eclecticism in all questions of 
theoiy and m ethod”, a  complex of reading strategies th a t frustrate any 
attem pt to ‘totalize’ an  Interpretation.® It is for th is  reason that, from 
time to time in our study, we shall adopt deliberately conflicting 
strategies for reading Kazantzakis’s writings. For example. The Saviors o f 
God will appear to be (at least) ‘two tex ts’ throughout th is thesis; Saviors 
can and wiU be read both discretely and theologically. This ‘bifocal 
reading’ m eans th a t we shall have to learn how to live with the 
incongruity th a t Kazantzakis both is and is not a  ‘theologiem’.
B. L iterature and T heology: A n ta g o n istic  Yet C om plem entary®
By now it should be clear th a t we are using a  very specific model of 
‘theology’ in th is study. With the help of Sallie McFague, in  fact, we 
propose th a t ‘theology’ be defined as a  form of “second-level language, 
language which orders, arranges, explicates, m akes precise the first-order 
revelatory, m etaphorical language”.^ ® In th is view, ‘theology’ is 
understood predom inantly to be a  descriptive discipline, the ordered 
reflection on and articulation of religious experience. Seen in th is way, 
‘theology’ often appears inescapably reductive, seeking to abstract, 
generalize, and  diminish parabolic language to its so-called ‘essence’. 
While ‘theology’ requires continual stim ulation by the poetic or religious 
experience, it frequently offends literature because fictive devices are 
themselves irreducible and seem  im patient to conclusive analysis. In his 
book Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, Max
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Black tells u s w hat we can and cannot do with figurative devices. In th is
way, Black underscores our point about the irreducibllity of metaphors:
We can comment upon m etaphor, bu t the m etaphor itself 
neither needs nor invites explanation and paraphrase. 
M etaphorical thought is a  distinctive mode of achieving 
Insight, not to be construed as an  ornam ental substitu te  for 
plain thought. 11
M etaphors appear endlessly productive of further tropes, and so
‘meaning’ appears forever deferred. Never revealed in a  ‘final’ or ‘once-
and-for-all’ way, m eaning’ seem s interm inably postponed: literature as
an  elaborate striptease.
It is this ‘infinite complexity’ of fiction and poetry, moreover, 
which serves to em ancipate us ceaselessly to play’ with texts; Christian 
theological writers, seemingly obliged to a  propositlonally-oriented 
tradition, appear to operate on a  m uch more restricted budget of 
meaning. ^  ^  Labouring within the confined and determ ined rules of 
system atic thought, m any C hristian theological writings often become 
exercises in reduction: arden t attem pts to avoid lim itless theological 
opinion and, instead, to find unshakeable tru th  about God. Indeed, 
Christian writers talk  of God’s indubitable self-revelation in Je su s  of 
Nazareth as the foundation and  structu re  of C hristian theology, the 
essential reason for professing an  advantage in ascertaining tru th  about 
the way things are. ^  ^  While th is C hristian theological ‘foundationalism ’ 
seductively promises indubitabillty and im m unity from all possible 
objections, it arguably cannot m ake good on its pledge because it never
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seem s foundational enough J® In contrast to this, w riters of narrative
fiction and poetry seem  to promote a  herm eneutic of openness, not of
reduction, because they ‘play’ on the tendency of fictive devices to yield
multiple m eanings and limitless interpretations. Robert Detweiler sees
th is last point as forming the basis of a  presiding assum ption  in curren t
literary criticism;
W hat has been understood as the substance of parable and a 
tra it of m etaphor has been expanded into a  critical principle. All discourse, it is said, resists (like the parable) conclusive 
analysis, frustra tes closure, opens up (like metaphor) to 
multiple readings, so th a t Interpretation becomes less of an 
effort to  provide a  text’s ‘proper’ m eaning and more an 
attem pt to disclose its m any possibilities of signification. 17
Detweiler is here alluding to the value of insights fi*om postm odern 
theory for the study of literature and  theology. And Detweiler is one of 
m any critics who believe th a t ‘deconstructive postm odernism ’ represents 
the m ost serious challenge to traditional ways of reading these various 
texts, and the m ost powerful censure of all established approaches to 
thinking theologically today. ^  ® It follows the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
who him self suspected th a t all traditional W estern categories for ‘God’ 
have led to m etaphysical idols, in Nietzsche’s declaration th a t ‘God is 
dead’ and in its efforts to dem onstrate th a t no text can  be totalized 
w ithout a supplem ent of signification.
Deconstructive postm odernists assert th a t there is no unm ediated 
knowledge. Indeed, they believe th a t all discourse, including theological 
discourse, is already interpretation and th a t there is no distinctive,
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%extralinguistic location, no Archimedean point, no transcendental 
signified, from which one can judge conflicting interpretations. Kevin 
H art states:
r
D econstruction provides a  critique not of theology as such 
bu t of the m etaphysical element within theology and, for 
th a t m atter, w ithin any discourse. If we take ‘God is dead’ 
to be a  sta tem ent about the impossibility of locating a  
transcendent point which we can serve as a  ground for 
discourse, then  deconstruction is indeed a  discourse on iGod’s death .20
In fact, all th a t is thought to rem ain after ‘God’s death ’ is the unending 
play of signification. And it is believed th a t no escape from the maze of 
textual analysis and  interpretation exists. In the words of Ja n e t M artin il
Soskice:
Man only deceives him self when he regards his own linguistic constructs as embodying some trans- 
anthropological tru th . Escape to a  purer, strictly 
representational language is not even possible; a t most, one 
can revel in the fact th a t m an, like the spider, spins out of him self the world which he inhab its .2 1
D econstructionists often claim th a t literature, as  writing, is less 
prone th an  structured  theology to making decisive rem arks about the 
‘highest ground’, the ‘singular perspective’ (‘God’).^^ Pregnant with 
polysemy, literature strongly resists totalization, and it repudiates a 
terminology of presence. In other words, creative writing is hostile to 
‘logocentrism’ where ‘logocentrism’ is seen as the practice of deciding 
questions of m eaning’ or ‘being’ with recourse to ‘origin’ or ‘final 
ground’. Narrative fiction positively encourages the unceasing play of 
signification. For literaiy tropes, as we have suggested, appear endlessly
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productive of further tropes. Also, the novel susta ins its characters
through competing and  conflicting voices which occur w ithin the text’s
discrete world, and  this tra it entails th a t fictional characte rs—like Nikos
Kazantzakis’s St. F rancis—often appear im patient to system atic
clarification. Literary texts and  fictional characters seem  to inspire an
endlessly recessive series of conversations. David Jasp er writes:
We discover, therefore, in the text itself a  perpetual denial 
both of m eaning and  also the pronouncem ent of conclusions 
which rest ultim ately upon some extralinguistic concept of signifier. Rather we come to recognize writing as a  never- ending displacem ent and deferral, escaping the delusions of 
a  stable and  self-deceiving tradition. There are no answers, 
only extreme scepticism, and a continual evasion of the self­
enclosed systematizing of texts by which we long to find m eaning—the answ er to our problem, the final s o l u t i o n . 2 3
In contrast to the apparen t open-endedness of literaiy texts, (most) 
modern theologies, including W hiteheadian process theology, seem to 
m anifest an  implicit desire for totality, a  loquacious lexicon of presence, 
and ‘God’ functions as a  transcendental signified. For example, some 
critics point out th a t uniquely process theological term s like creativity’, 
‘initial aim ’ and ‘primordial na tu re’ often serve for process the ists as 
logocentric notions denoting a  pure signified, a  translinguistic reality 
th a t depends on nothing for its significance and yet grounds eveiything 
else it relates to in a  system  of lan g u ag e .^ N o t surprisingly, it is the 
discoveiy of the logocentric error in m odern theology th a t forces thinkers 
like Carl A. Raschke to go so far as to suggest th a t ‘theology’—in the way 
we’ve been defining the word--is merely a  certain type of writing in  which 
the signifying element of language has been erroneously and dangerously
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elevated to a  position in favour of the signified.
This excursus into the field of postm odern theory has enormous 
resu lts for the way we read fiction and the way we th ink  theologically. 
For how we read Kazantzakis’s fiction is now to be seen as perhaps very 
different to the act, say, of reading John  Cobb’s W hiteheadian process 
Christology. With respect to the la tter it seems th a t we are expected to 
appropriate as m uch as possible of the argum entation th a t is Cobb’s 
chosen form of address, argum entation which has been expressed in a 
direct way. In fact, process theological term s like ‘concrescence’, 
‘dipolarity’, and  ‘becoming’ are effective only when they are seized and 
com mandeered (‘appropriated’) into so-called precise definitions and first 
principles. When we im m erse ourselves in Kazantzakis’s literary fiction, 
however, we learn th a t the power of his stories lies in  their refusal to be 
abducted or captured in reductive propositions and formulaic 
pronouncem ents.
Kazantzakis’s fictional characters always seem  ‘other’ to us. With 
th is term  ‘other’, we m ean th a t Kazantzakis’s protagonists often appear 
to frustrate any desire to describe, analyze, and evaluate their words and 
deeds. Zorba, Papa-Fotis, and Brother Leo may have tra its  th a t are 
illustrative of ourselves, of course, b u t these fictional characters (like 
King Lear and S tephen Dedalus) are almost always ‘other’, defying any 
conclusive appraisal on our part. Accordingly, David Patterson insists 
th a t literature is not an  object to be grabbed and owned; rather, it is an 
experience where we abdicate any sense of rulership over the text:
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[Literature is] . . .  a  process, forever in flux, dancing the 
dance of the Hindu god Shiva, creating and destroying with 
every step. Its epic heroes can shape nations; its hum an 
characters can change lives. In the light of th is idea, it is 
easy to see why the effort to pin tru th  down to the letter or 
to fix it in a  formula is so tempting. If litera tu re’s relation 
to the tru th  is transform ational, then  1 can never be sure of 
the ground beneath my feet; instead of rooting myself in firm 
ground, 1 m ust dance along the shifting edges of an  abyss. 
Presence is always in question, and the certainty of the 
senses m ust be exchanged for the passion of faith, for the im agination of poetry .2 7
In th is passage, ‘dancing’ is Patterson’s basic m etaphor for literature’s
tendency to twist and swirl m eaning beyond the clutches of any one
reader. Possibly KazantzaMs would agree vHth Patterson’s perspective.
Indeed, dancing is an  instructive symbol for the creative process in
Kazantzakis’s Zorba The Greek. From a  certain perspective of reading,
the Zorbatic gambol appears to reflect Kazantzakis’s own sense th a t
‘m eaning’ or ‘tru th ’ is in process, unfinished, and multifold:
“Boss,” he shouted, “1 have a  lot to tell you, I never 
loved a  person as m uch as you, 1 have a  lot to teU you, b u t 
my tongue can’t  manage it. So I’ll dance it! S tand  aside so 1 don’t  step on you! Ready! Hop! Hop!”
He m ade a  jum p, his feet and hands tu rned  into 
wings. Stemding straight, he charged above the earth, and as 1 watched him  in th is way against the background of sky 
and sea, he seemed to me like an  aged, archangelic rebel. 
Because this dance of Zorba’s was all provocation, 
obstinacy, and  rebellion. You’d th ink  he was shouting: 
“W hat can you do to me. Almighty? You can’t  do anything to me; only kill me. Kill me; 1 don’t give a  dam n; I’ve let off 
my steam; I’ve said w hat 1 wanted to say; I’ve m anaged to 
dance, and 1 don’t  need you anymore!”
1 was watching Zorba dance and  sensing for the first 
time hum anity’s demonic rebelliousness, to conquer weight 
and  m atter, the ancestral curse. I was adm iring his 
endurance, nimbleness, pride. Down on the sand, Zorba’s
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impulsive and a t the  sam e time adroit stam ping was engraving hum anity’s satanic his tory. 2 8
Given w hat we have said here about the often uneasy  alliance
between literature and theology in general, it is obvious th a t an  attitude
exists, prevalent in both fields, th a t the two disciplines are m utually
exclusive. Writers in both fields seem  hostile to one another because
they frequently tiy  to occupy the sam e ground with different agendas and
different personae.^® Theologians readily acknowledge the religious
content of m uch creative writing, bu t where clashes have occurred with
literary critics, then  the former often retreat into an  arcane defensiveness
which accuses their critics of m isreading the Christian tradition. By the
sam e token, literaiy theorists happily acknowledge the im portance of
religious discourse in fictional narrative, bu t have been eager to
deconstruct theological language by challenging the theologian’s
tendency to systematize her thought.
This apparent hostiUfy need not be present. It may prove far more
fruitful to speak of the fundam ental difference between the creative
writer and  the theologian as existing in a  difference of em phases. The
modes of discourse and reception are different in both cases. For both
the novelist and the theologian ‘tell a  sto iy’, bu t seem  to be tuned into
‘experience’ differently, and so invariably write different kinds of
narratives, though these are never far apart from one a n o t h e r . T h i s
difference of em phases would appear to entail th a t any so-called
‘partnersh ip’ between the novelist and the theologian, whose joint task  it
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seem s is to disorient and orient one another, is sustained  ‘in  process’ at 
all times.
In her book Metaphor and Religious Language, J a n e t M artin Soskice
rails against any attem pt systematically to extrapolate the so-called
‘m essage’ of a  literaiy text. In her view, the fiction writer is not merely a
shrewd illustrator of religious dogma. Novels are not artfully-contrived,
theological tracts. Indeed, any proposal “th a t the value of a text consists
wholly in the set of m oral or spiritual dicta which m ay be extracted firom
it” is likely to resu lt in  a  serious underestim ation of a  novel’s fictive
power, and Soskice m aintains th a t such  an  approach is “the crudest
form of theological em piricism”.  ^  ^Michael Goldberg agrees:
Any attem pt at theological abstraction m u st take seriously 
the fact th a t it is a narrative from  which the abstracting is 
done. Such abstraction m u st not trea t the narrative as a  
shell which may be discarded once the ‘theological pearl’ has been extracted.32
By implication, process theology may not with im punity be spoken 
of as the kernel trapped inside the hu sk  of Kazantzakis’s  fiction. And 
Kazantzakis may not be read as providing an  emotional overcoat for the 
structu red  activities of Alfred North W hitehead. Support for th is point 
may be found in the work of Gabriel Vahanian. He, too, resists the urge 
to use literature to ‘illustrate’ theological concepts. In The Death o f God: 
The Culture o f Our Post-Christian Era, V ahanian is svHft to condem n those 
who would distort the novelists and  dram atists they read  in the direction 
of their own theological prejudices:
S artre did not write No Exit so th a t a  C hristian  would use it
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as a  homiletic pretext for all kinds of easy and cheap 
considerations about the situation of m an w ithout God.
O ur approach is diametrically opposed to th is kind of 
abusive and pro domo in terpretation to which literature is 
fallaciously subjected by those whose concern is merely a utilitarian  apology of an  etiolated Christianity. 3 3
So, w hat are current scholars saying about the m any-sided
relationship between narrative fiction and  C hristian theology? It is veiy
difficult to evaluate correctly the present state of the debate, bu t some
kind of stalem ate seem s to have been reached. Despite the fact th a t
writers in both disciplines sometimes appear to craft texts which are
m utually  offensive to each other, some novelists and some theologians
are engaging in essentially the sam e conversational task.^^ This involves
contradicting, correcting, and rem inding one another of the kind of text
they are both writing. And th is discussion, as we have suggested already,
is one th a t seem s forever ‘in process’ itself. Literature and theology are
conversational partners. They do not always agree in w hat they say, of
course, bu t there’s seemingly nothing th a t prevents either one from
talking to the other. Burton F. Porter pu ts it th is  way:
. . . the artis t and the philosopher are not in opposition; 
rather, they are m utually compatible. Thus, Plato can award 
the Muses a  place in disciplining the character of the youth; 
Schopenhauer can find liberation from the unceasing desires of WiU in aesthetic contemplation; and  Whitehead can 
maintain that Individuality and personal development may be 
deepened through habits o f aesthetic apprehension.^^
With th is general excursus on the enriching bu t uneasy  alliance between
literature and theology, we m ust now proceed to consider in more detail
its particular application to sta tem ents about Kazantzakis’s narrative
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fiction and W hiteheadian process theology.
C. H ow  K azan tzak is and W h itehead  T resp ass U pon O ne A n oth er's  
G round.
It is not exact origins th a t the poet and m etaphysician seek 
bu t a  way of apprehending the large-scale idea of creation as 
a  continual event in the life-process th a t contains us. Both 
poet and m etaphysician, in fact, have sought to understand 
the life-process as a  continuous, creative event: the one has 
given us penetrating glimpses of its meaning; the other, comprehensive envisagement of its w o r k i n g .se
Bernard M eland's rem arks may here be seen to apply to the specific 
alliance between Nikos Kazantzakis and Alfred North W hitehead for it is 
a  shared  em phasis on ‘em ergent evolution’ th a t seems, a t least in part, 
to constitute their trespassing  upon common ground.^^ Having placed 
Kazantzakis £tnd process theology in conversation, however, we find in 
their dialogue th a t they disagree as m uch as they agree: Kazantzakis and 
W hiteheadian process theology appear to instantiate M eland’s idea th a t 
poets (Kazantzakis) and m etaphysicians (Whitehead and  W hiteheadian 
process theology) often “trespass upon one another’s ground”.
When Kazantzakis speaks of our ‘saving God’, he is not offering a  
soteriological trac t for theologians to ponder over, bu t he is providing a  
lyrical narrative; soteriological questions m ay emerge from our reading of 
Kazantzakis’s creative writing, particularly the essay in which he m akes 
his assertion about redeeming the divine, bu t his work is primarily to be 
judged on its own term s. In short. The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises 
is self-sustaining because it uses a  ‘ffrst order language’. By contrast, 
‘theology’ (in the way we’ve been defining the word) is a  ‘second order
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language’. The process th inker would therefore be guilty of trespassing I
H-
upon Kazantzakis’s ground if she tried unwittingly to m ake The Saviors o f
God over in her own image. In his article “Literature and  Religion”, J .
HiHis Miller agrees and indicates how tem pting—although dangerous—it
is for u s to commit literaiy eisegesis by reading our own theological ideas
into lyrical credos and works of fiction:
There is an  intrinsic particularity in the world view of each 
age or individual, a  particularity which may not with 
im punity be blurred by transhistorical schem es of 
interpretation . . . Only the wdsest and best of m en can avoid 
distorting the writers he studies in the direction of his own beliefs, and th is tendency is all the more powerful the more firmly he holds those beliefs.39
How is our reading of Kazantzakis’s novels likely to be affected by 
this contrast between ‘first’ and ‘second order’ language? We suggest 
th a t K azantzakis’s  narrative fiction works, if it works a t all, not merely 
because we are able to detect a  kinship of thought with certain aspects of 
the model of God proposed in W hitehead and others, b u t because we 
read it, we enter the discrete world th a t Kazantzakis creates, and 
because we implicitly believe w hat we are shown by Kazantzakis in his 
novels. Thus, we suspend our disbelief in order to navigate the fictional J
terrain  th a t Kazantzakis m aps out for us as readers. In process 
theology, though, and as we have suggested already, we do not suspend
our disbelief; on the contrary, when we read John  Cobb or Blair Reynolds i
we veiy often address issues of belief by assessing their doctrinal 
credibility and credal ‘appropriateness’ to the wider, C hristian tradition 
of which they claim to be a  part. Kazantzakis’s association with process
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theology, like literature’s alliance with theology in general, would 
therefore seem to be dialogical and uneasy. When examined together, 
Kazantzakis and process theology may represent competing and 
conflicting voices or, to use Meland’s trope once again, they appear to 
trespass upon one another’s ground.
Process theological reflections may be provoked by Kazantzakis’s 
writing, and  earlier sections of our work indicate w hat these m ight be, 
b u t his fictional characters will not finally inhabit them . Consider 
Kazantzakis’s use of irony in The Last Temptation. Here Kazantzakis 
Inverts the traditional Christian portrait of Ju d as  Iscariot’s  function in 
Je su s’s ministiy. For Kazantzakis, Ju d as  is not a  tra ito r to Jesus. On 
the contrary, Kazantzakis portrays Ju d as  as a  necessary agent of God’s 
passion. The point of th is observation is th a t C hristian ‘theology’, tied 
as it often is to the investigation and  delineation of the normative 
aspects of the C hristian tradition, is not free to m ake th is sort of ironic 
claim for Judas. When one tu rn s to a  poetics though, as Kazantzakis 
does, one invariably is free (from assum ed theological notions) both to 
invert the traditional theological project and  to su sta in  such  an  
inversion throughout one’s narrative.
Kazantzakis’s characterization of Ju d as  Iscariot is deeply ironic. 
And irony, as we earlier intim ated, forever defies the rational, system atic 
clarification often dem anded by the theologian. Irony frustra tes closure, 
sh u n s conclusive analysis, and appears ceaselessly hostile to the heresy 
of paraphrase or reduction. Irony opens up the possibility of multiple
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readings, playful detachm ents, a  labyrinth of textual in terpretations 
from which there is no escape. And irony dem onstrates how fiction often 
operates on levels th a t ultim ately extend beyond the printed page. In 
contrast to this, ‘theology’ (on the model we’ve been using in  th is study) 
veiy often appears inescapably reductive. However, w ithout ‘theology’s ’ 
disciplined ordering of experience, fiction has no guard against the 
dangers of practicing a  ludic random ness by which it is impossible for us 
to live. It is th is difference in textual em phasis th a t accounts for the 
antagonistic, b u t potentially enriching relationship between 
(Kazantzakis’s) literature and (process) theology.
The creative Avriting of Nikos Kazantzakis is insightful and poetic.
It is not so philosophically precise as is the W hiteheadian process
theology with which he shares ideas (narrative fiction, though, has its
own kind of ‘precision’). Yet th is is far from being a  draw back to his
work. On the contrary, it is an  advantage since, as David Ja sp er rightly
points out, ‘theology’ often contains some dangerous tendencies:
Too often it tends to prefer the false security of fixed and definite phrases and formulations, and then  it either slips 
away from the m ysterious language of living faith, or else it 
traps faith into dependence on platitudes and  
generalizations which, in the ir very fixity, become hopelessly vague and abstract. Theology needs to be rem inded in its 
quest for the normative, th a t in faith there is a  mystery and 
a  ‘secret’ which is inexhaustible and irreducible—a  secrecy 
which is to be perpetually reinterpreted and which keeps 
theology and its definitions continually trem bling on the edge of ambiguity and p a r a d o x .  4 o
Possibly Kazantzakis would agree with Jasper’s com ments. Kazantzakis
sees the movement of the élan vital as  so complex and so bewildering to
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the finite mind th a t it cannot be adequately described. He refuses to fall 
into the trap  of Verbal immobility’ in  which the word, by trying to define 
mobility, immobilizes it.^^ Creative writing, Kazantzakis’s fiction being a  
good example, is therefore an  im portant corrective to the logocentrism at 
the heart of m uch m odern theology
D. C on clud ing  R em arks
We have shown in our second chapter the natu re  and s ta tu s  of the 
antagonistic, yet potentially com plem entary aUiance th a t exists between 
Nikos Kazantzakis and various W hiteheadian process theologians. The 
them e of conversational exchange between them  has been justified. And 
following Bernard Meland, we have been careful to note th a t when poets 
and  m etaphysicians encounter each other they invariably trespass, not 
only upon common—but upon one another’s — ground. The points we 
have m ade here, though, come together and are m ade explicit in 
subsequent chapters. In particular, we are now to attem pt a  comparative 
study of Kazantzakis’s The Last Temptation and  Jo h n  Cobb’s 
W hiteheadian process Christology.
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23. David Jasper, The Study of Literature and Religion, 121.
24. Carl A. Raschke, “Deconstmction and Process Thought”, 120.
25. Carl A. Raschke, preface. Deconstruction and Theology, et. al. Thomas J. J. 
Altizer, viii.
26. We do not mean to suggest that all fiction is postmodern, and theology is not 
postmodern. This idea is not a part of our thesis; rather, we are here making a small but 
important claim that postmodern literaiy theory enables us to become conscious of the 
tensive relationship between ‘literature’ and ‘theology’ (as we are using these terms in our 
study).
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28. Nikos Kazantzakis, Zorba The Greek, trans. Carl Wildman (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1961) 294. Also see Kazantzakis, Biogicon TïoAiiïiot tou Zop\mâ, 5th 
ed. (Athens: 1959) 343. The English translation has been altered to make it conform more 
accurately to the Greek.
29. The divorce between literature and Christian theology is declared in John Killinger, 
The Failure of Theology in Modern Literature (Nashville TN: Abingdon Press, 1963) 15, 
31, 35. See also T. R. Wright, Theology and Literature, 1-13; J. Hillis Miller, “Literature 
2iXïàRe[i%iovi\ Religion and Modern Liter ature:Fssaysin Theory and Criticism, ed. G. B. 
Tennyson and Edwai'd E. Ericson, Jr. (Grand Rapids MI; William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1975) 32, 34, 39; David Jasper, The Study of Literature and 
Religion, 31-33; Sallie McFague, Speaking in Parables, 105, 115, 181; Michael 
Goldberg, Theology and Narrative: A Critical Introduction (Nashville TN: Abingdon 
Press, 1981) 35.
30. As a fiction writer, Nikos Kazantzakis employs a host of literary devices to ‘tell’ his 
stories. Theologians, too, ‘tell stories’ even though they may not make extensive use of 
paradox and irony. Is this latter claim sufficiently acknowledged by contemporary 
process theologians? It does not seem so. Indeed, very few process theologians 
acknowledge the postmodernist claim that all discourse is metaphorical, suspect, even 
fictional. But when Alfred North Whitehead calls God a ‘companion’, is that not a 
metaphor? Do not process theologians make models of the universe that, at best, are
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approximations of reality—inventions, really, in the same way that ‘literary’ fictions are? 
Perhaps the time is right for process theologians to dwell on such questions.
31. Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, 158.
32. Michael Goldberg, Theology and Narrative, 202; emphasis added.
33. Gabriel Vahanian, The Death of God: The Culture of Our Post-Christian Era (New 
York: George Braziller, 1961) ix.
34. Much of Nikos Kazantzakis’s literary output scandalizes the classical aspects of the 
Christian tradition. Consider Kazantzakis’s The Last Temptation, a fictional biography of 
Jesus which attempts to occupy the same ground as the Christian Christological creeds. 
Some of the irony in this novel—Jesus the cross-maker becomes Jesus the cross-taker—is 
directed against the credal aspects of the Christian tradition. This is perhaps one of the 
many reasons why Kazantzakis’s narrative appears to be so ‘disgraceful’ and ‘appalling’ 
in the eyes of his critics. Creative literature, as we have been saying thus far, often 
appears scandalous to ‘theology’. Not surprisingly, the reverse is true. While 
Kazantzakis’s use of irony and word-play often defies the kind of systematic clarification 
that theology, at least in its credal form, strives to achieve, process theology’s massive 
search for coherence entails a strong resistance on its part to the labyrinthine ways of, say, 
Kazantzakis’s God's Pauper: St. Francis of Assisi. As a result, narrative fiction and 
theology perpetually provoke one another into coping with each other’s infamy. In some 
respects, this is a necessary but impossible exercise that can be sustained only ‘in 
process’.
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35. Burton F. Porter, Philosophy: A Literary and Conceptual Approach (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1974) 6; emphasis added.
36. Bernard Meland, Seeds of Redemption, 156.
37. Here seems an appropriate point to remind ourselves how Alfred North Whitehead
and Nikos Kazantzakis trespass upon common ground. Whiteheadian process theology
views God as the circumambient reality whose sympathetic participation in the world acts
as a general, directive urge towards ever-novel processes of reality. In her God-Christ-
Church: A Practical Guide to Process Theology (New York: Crossroads, 1986), Marjorie
Hewitt Suchocki writes of how we can collaborate with the divine to make and umnake
our world in each new moment:
God’s redemptive activity conjoins with our own responsively creative activity; it does not obliterate our activity. We become co-workers, and the future follows upon the choices of our responsive activity. God invites us into a future that we must create in our response to God, in our awareness of divine wisdom, we replace fear with trust, and move into the contingencies of time. And God waits. (78)
In Report to Greco, trans. Peter A. Bien (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), Nikos
Kazantzakis articulates his own process view of our creative role in God’s development:
The forces released within us in the forward propulsion we develop in order to jump are a threefold unity: personal, panhuman, and prehuman. At the instant when man contracts like a spring in order to undertake the leap, inside us the life of the entire planet likewise contracts and develops its propulsion. This is when we clearly see that simplest of truths which we so often forget in comfortable, barren moments of ease: that man is not immortal, but rather serves Something or Someone that is immortal. (217)
The God pictured and discussed here by Kazantzakis is struggling to burst the bonds of
matter and requires our heroic assistance to accomplish this task. In other words, divine
becoming is inextricably linked to our own subjective concrescence. Our duty, according
to Kazantzakis, involves collaborating with God so that the divine may break free of all
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that confines Godself. See Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises, 
trans. and with an introduction by Kimon Friar (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1960) 
92-95. The model of God favoured by Whiteheadians shares a kinship of thought with 
Kazantzakis at this point. Here, too, God is thought to be affected by the world and by 
humans, seeking intensity. In The Lure of God: A Biblical Background for Process
Theism (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1978), Lewis S. Ford promotes the Whiteheadian |
view that God calls the world forward with a message of truth, beauty, and goodness:
God is not the cosmic watchmaker, but the husbandman in the vineyard of the 
world, fostering and nurturing its continuous growth throughout the ages; He is 
the companion and friend who inspires us to achieve the very best that is within 
us. (21)
Ford compares the world to a vineyard; Kazantzakis, as we saw in chapter one, likens it to 
a monastery. In both thinkers, God and humankind unite to develop the creative advance 
and contribute to the richness of the divine experience. While there is no precise unanimity #
between religious ideas found in Kazantzakis’s literary writings and the systematic 
doctrine of God in Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, they both seem to share 
a theological mood. Whitehead and Kazantzakis seem most comfortable with a way of 7
picturing God that emphasizes being as an abstraction of becoming, that avoids the 
reduction of all individual existence to contingent existence, that advocates universal 
creativity as characteristic of becoming, and that takes seriously the stochastic, 
indeterminate nature of the evolutionary processes. Although there are substantive 
differences, and later chapters will unearth what these are, in the above respects the two I
ways of discussing God seem to possess rich potential for further dialogue.
38. Bernard Meland, Seeds of Redemption, 155.
39. J. Hillis Miller, “Literature and Religion”, 33.
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3 . Jesu s-B ecom in g-C h ris t : 
K azan tzak is and Cobb C om pared
A. In trod u ctory  R em arks
Thus far in this thesis we have been considering the witness of 
Nikos Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction and Alfred North W hitehead’s 
process philosophy to the m eaning of God’s progressive agency within 
our on-going world. Both writers claim th a t God is in fact part of the 
processes of transition and novelty, th a t God is energetically in the 
world, and th a t God is affected by occurrences in the unfolding cosmos. 
While the form  of their writing is different, Kazantzakis and W hitehead 
nonetheless seem in accord with each other regarding their beliefs th a t 
God is in process, is in our changing world, and cannot be isolated from 
it.
For W hitehead and Kazantzakis, Jesu s (as the) C hrist is essential 
to each’s understanding of his process God. ^  Whüe K azantzakis’s  views 
about God’s increm ental self-revelation in Jesu s can be found in several 
of his Literaiy texts, they culm inate in his fictional biography of Jesus,
The Last Temptation, and th is account of Je su s ’s spiritual evolution is 
reflected in Jo h n  Cobb’s W hiteheadian process Christology, m ost 
specifically in his book Christ in a Pluralistic Age. It is to Cobb (as 
W hiteheadian theologian) and Kazantzakis th a t we now turn .
Throughout th is th ird  chapter, we shall notice how Kazantzakis’s
'Viunderstanding of Je su s  is integral to his more generally held belief th a t
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we play a  vital part in God’s own redemption. Indeed, his Je su s  evolves 
through four life-stages to become the classic expression of one who 
facilitates dematerialization in a  changing world. Accompanying our 
formal analysis of The Last Temptation, we examine Cobb’s W hiteheadian 
account of Je su s  as the co-constitution of persuasive divine agency and 
hum an prehension in order to dem onstrate th a t a  com parison between 
Kazantzakis and Cobb is instructive. For both thinkers, Je su s  of 
Nazareth ‘becomes Christ’ through the increm ental operation of God’s 
agency and Je su s’s gradual response to God’s providence.
Having identified th is correlation between Cobb and Kazantzakis, 
a  penultim ate section in th is chapter m akes a  distinction between them  
both in the form of their wiiting. As we situate Kazantzakis and Cobb in 
‘conversation’ with one another regarding their understanding of Jesus, 
we find further evidence for the ‘complementary yet antagonistic’ alliance 
between Kazantzakis’s  narrative fiction and W hiteheadian versions of 
process theology.
B. The Last Temptation: J e su s 's  Early S p iritua l F orm ation
Nikos Kazantzakis begins his fictional biography of Je su s  of 
Nazareth with a  personal confession:
My principal anguish and the source of all my joys 
and sorrows from my youth onward has been the incessant, merciless battle between the spirit and the f l e s h . 2
We have noted already th a t it is from Henri Bergson th a t Kazantzakis
developed his ‘process’ belief th a t ‘reality’ is a  ceaseless tussle between
the constraints imposed by m atter and the anim ating drive of spirit.^
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This perpetual warfare between the élan vital and the flesh Is declared at 
eveiy level of becoming, and especially our own.
In The Last Temptation, Kazantzakis views our sp iritual formation 
as a  metaphysical campaign; each of us is a  bloody arena  in which spirit 
strives for liberation from the  confines of matter.^ God (or Bergson’s élan 
vital) scream s for freedom a t the base of our becoming. In The Saviors o f 
God: Spiritual Exercises, the divine cries out to be ‘saved’ (‘salvation’ may 
be defined as the dem aterialization of spirit), and we especially (God’s 
m aterial counterparts) can assist the divine along the rocky road to 
redemption.^
Central to Kazantzakis’s process beliefs is h is view th a t "eveiy m an 
partakes of the divine n a tu re”, for he is the battleground where spirit and 
flesh converge and vie for control of personality.® By accentuating this 
sense of universal religious struggle and passion, Kazantzakis clearly 
intends for us to avoid treating The Last Temptation as ju s t  another 
m odern renarration of the Gospel story. ^  Rather, Kazantzakis believes 
th a t The Last Temptation depicts the ubiquitous confrontation between 
m atter and spirit ra ther th an  their complementarity. Je su s  of Nazareth 
is Kazantzakis’s model of this struggle between the persuasive lure of the 
élan vital and the forceful dem ands of corporeality:
Struggle between the flesh and the spirit, rebellion 
and resistance, reconciliation and subm ission, and finally-- 
the suprem e purpose of the struggle—union with God: this 
was the ascent taken by Christ, the ascen t which he Invites 
us to take as well, following in his bloody tracks.
1 1 4
This Is the Suprem e Duty of the m an who struggles— 
to set out for the lofty peak which Christ, the first born son 
of salvation, attained.^
Evolving through four stages of spiritual formation, Kazantzakis’s 
Je su s  first enters life’s m etaphysical fray while still a  carpenter.^ With 
each subsequent transition in vocational understanding, Je su s  struggles 
with tem ptations to happiness, begins to see the processes of reality as 
charged with God’s presence (‘panentheism ’) and, a t the novel’s end, 
Je su s  finally effects ‘union with God’ by learning how to em ancipate 
spirit from m atter. Writing about the fourth and final phase of Je su s’s 
m essianic evolution in his Nikos Kazantzakis-Novelist, Peter A. Bien 
explains Kazantzakis’s ‘union with God’ motif in Bergsonian term s. This 
rem inds us once again of the process them es in Kazantzakis’s narrative 
fiction:
Kazantzakls speaks of ‘union with God’ because 
Jesus, a t the end [of the novel], unites with the spiritual 
force th a t directs the entire process ju s t  completed—with the 
force that, universally and eternally, employs m atter as a  
m echanism  to ensure m atter’s dissolution. Seen in  th is 
way, Jesu s does w hat ordinaiy men do not. He deliberately 
co-operates with th is universal process (‘God’) ra ther than  trying to resist it or pretending th a t it does not exist. By 
accepting his vocation as the Messiah, he im itates the 
evolutionary journey towards dem aterialization th a t is 
eternally dem anded by the creative force in control of the universe. . .1 0
In addition to the Bergsonian process basis of th is fourth rubric. 
The Last Temptation's overall narrative form recalls Kazantzakis’s 
Bergsonian picture of the world. In keeping with the ring s tructu re’ he 
uses in The Saviors o f God, Kazantzakls consolidates poetic facets a t the
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beginning and the end of The Last Temptation. This takes the pattern  of 
two dream  sequences which encircle the m ain narrative concerning 
Je su s’s spiritual becoming. This particular narrative strategy reflects 
Kazantzakis’s Bergsonian vision of life as ‘becoming’ surrounded by 
dreamlike ‘nothingness’.^^
In The Last Temptation's first dream  sequence, dwarfs, devils, and 
‘the Redbeard’ pursue an unsettled Jesu s of Nazareth in his sleep. Inside 
Jesus, the soldiers of discontent are m arching from his heart to his head 
and declaring war on any happiness he feels with his curren t life as a 
carpenter. He is upset as skirm ishes break out between dynamic and 
competing forces inside him. For instance, Kazantzakis’s Je su s  blames 
himself for his father’s immobility, feels culpable for M aiy Magdalene’s 
waywardness, and is burdened with Israel’s sin and wrong-doing.^^ This 
opening scenario clearly m arks the genesis of the first stage in Je su s’s 
vocational understanding and spiritual evolution respectively. As ‘Son of 
the C arpenter’, Je su s  finds th a t h is own soul is a  coliseum for a  ru th less 
fight between happiness and meaningfulness. In different terms, 
Kazantzakis’s Jesus feels torn between the persuasive lure of middle- 
class existence and the dem ands of life m arked by spiritual teleology.
In these early stages of The Last Temptation, Kazantzakls uses the 
m etaphor of the bird of prey’ to connote the power and verve of God’s 
‘Cry’ to avoid the beguiling allure of domestic bliss. As a  figurative 
device of divine agency, th is ‘bird of prey’ stands in ironic opposition to
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the traditional Christian image of the dove of peace. Where traditional 
theologians and pastors seem content to use the m etaphor of the dove of 
peace to speak of God’s providence, Kazantzakls declares th is to be 
un true to his own experience of divine agency. An entry in Kazantzakis’s 
Report to Greco confirms th is point for us:
IMy youth had been nothing bu t anxieties, 
nightm ares, and questionings; my m aturity  nothing bu t 
lame answers. I looked toward the stars, toward men, toward ideas--w hat chaos! And w hat agony to h u n t out God, the blue bird with red talons, in their m idst!16
As mentioned in our first two chapters, Kazantzakls views God as 
th a t Spiritual Presence which functions as the inexhaustible ground and 
depth of the processes of reality. God is the vital im petus for individual 
and social transform ation. Although m any Christian theologians and 
artists since St. Augustine have recognized and affirmed a  sim ilar model 
of God, we should notice the difference in imagery a t th is point. ^  ^  Listen 
to the Voice’ of Kazantzakis’s ‘spiritual grandfather’ in Report to Greco:
“They paint the Holy Spirit descending upon the 
Apostles’ heads in the form of a  dove. For shame! Haven’t 
they ever felt the Holy Spirit burning them ? Where did they 
find th a t innocent, edible bird? How can they present th a t 
to u s  as spirit? No, the Holy Spirit is not a  dove, it is a  fire, a  m an eating fire which clamps its talons into the very crown 
of saints, m artyrs, and great stragglers, reducing them  to 
ashes. Abject souls are the ones who take the Holy Spirit for 
a  dove which they imagine they can kill and  ea t.”is
In The Last Temptation, Kazantzakis’s Jesu s constantly feels the torm ent 
of th is seemingly pitiless vulture as God (the élanvital) seeks to liberate 
Godself from the confines of Je su s’s own m aterial happiness.
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In an  early passage from The Last Temptation, Kazantzakis’s Jesus 
(the Ironic ‘cross-m aker’) is provoked by the Spirit of God to forsake his 
carpentry for the w astelands of the desert. Here God’s Spirit wrestles 
with Je su s  like a  merciless kestrel picking remorselessly a t a  discarded 
carcass:
But while the youth leaned on the cross, his eyes 
shut, thinking nothing and  hearing nothing except the 
beating of his own heart, suddenly he jolted with pain. Once 
more he felt the invisible vulture claw deeply into his scalp.
“He’s come again, he’s come again . . . ,” he m urm ured, and 
he began to tremble. He felt the claws bore far down, crack 
open his skull, touch his brain. He clenched his teeth so 
th a t he would not cry out: he did not w ant his m other to 
become frightened again and sta rt screaming. Clasping his head between his palms, he held it tightly, as though he 
feared it would ru n  away. “He’s come again, he’s come again . . . ,” he m urm ured, trem bling . 2 0
■i .
If vultures and  kestrels suggest God’s energizing spirit and the 
anim ating th ru s t of the élanvital, where are the m etaphors for the trap  of 
middle-class existence, settled happiness, and the devilish conventional? 
Temptation to live habitually is enacted largely by female characters in 
Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction. In The Last Temptation, it is Mary the 
m other of Jesu s who initially prevents Jesu s fi*om hearing God’s Ciy 
stirring deep within his own soul. She attem pts to halt the process of 
Je su s’s spiritual evolution, his becoming God. Indeed, Mary repeatedly 
tries to dissuade her son from taking the “evil road’’ away from the “ways 
of m en”: marriage, property, children.^ ^  Mary is acutely distressed by
Je su s’s apparent inability to find happiness, feels saddened by Je su s’s 
collaboration with the Romans in agreeing to make crosses for
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condemned Jewish nationalists, and is scared by Je su s ’s vivid and 
torm enting nightmares.^^ When Je su s’s uncle (Rabbi) Simeon suggests 
th a t Je su s  might be divinely favoured, Maiy not surprisingly recoils in 
horror and defies God to leave her son alone, to let Je su s  be ‘happy’:
“Hail, Mary,” he said. “God is all-powerful; his designs 
are inscrutable . . . Your son might be . . .”
B ut the unfortunate m other u ttered  a  cry:
“Have pity on me. Father! A prophet? No, no! And if 
God has it so written, let him  rub  it out! I w ant my son a  
m an like everyone else, nothing more, nothing less. Like everyone else . . . Let him  build troughs, cradles, ploughs 
and household utensils as his father used to do, and not, as 
ju s t now, crosses to crucify hum an beings. Let him  m arry a  
nice young girl from a  respectable hom e—with a  dowry; let 
him  be a liberal provider, have children . . . , and then  we’ll all go out together every Saturday to the prom enade— grandma, children and grandchildren—so th a t everyone can 
admire u s .”
The rabbi leaned heavily on his crosier and got up.
“Mary,” he said severely, “if God listened to m others 
we would all rot away in a  bog of security and easy living. 
When you are alone, th ink  over everything we have said.”2 3
Rabbi Simeon sees familial gratification as M ephistopheles’s ruse 
and chastises Mary’s m aternal instincts. Through the voice of Rabbi 
Simeon, then, Kazantzakis is able to assert his opinion th a t the ‘devil’s 
snare’ is the comfort of marriage, the security in ‘settling down’, and the 
pleasures of parenthood; in short, the joys of so-called ‘normal life’.^^ In 
Kazantzakis’s view, Je su s  m u st listen attentively to God’s Cry if he is to 
evolve spiritually. Je su s  m ust sh u t out all other cries and  claims on his 
life. To do th is he m ust su rm ount obstacles placed in his way by the
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women he meets.
Adèle Bloch and Richard W. Chilson are Kazantzakis scholars who 
have written about the nature and function of women vis-à-vis male 
spiritual evolution in Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction.^® In particular.
Bloch asserts th a t Je su s’s struggle in The Last Temptation is a  private one
■Ïbetween a  godly Father (Spirit) and an  all-encompassing feminine
principle. Mother (Matter). We, too, have m entioned th is religious 
struggle. According to Bloch’s literary analysis, though, Kazantzakis’s 
fictional women “can grasp neither the M essiah’s abstract idealism, nor Ë
his dedication to soul and God”.^^ in  addition, his female characters “are 
unable to recognize the divine spark  in one closely related to them ”.^ ® It 
therefore follows th a t ‘the Kazantzakian Man’, including Jesus, “m ust 
escape from the m aternal grip if he is to forge ahead on the evolutionary 
p a th ”.^^
In The Last Temptation, Kazantzakis’s Jesu s spiritually disengages
:him self from all the women in  his life, including his m other. Women
tem pt Je su s  with the promise of domestic tranquility, b u t Kazantzakis’s
Je su s  doggedly resists for only so will his m essianic formation ripen and
u n f o l d . I n  his article “The Christ of Nikos Kazantzakis”, Chilson
situates Kazantzakis’s female characters firmly within Kazantzakis’s
Bergsonian view of the world:
They are a  real source of tem ptation, alm ost symbols of the 
great tem ptation, the symbol of bodily embrace and wifely 
com panionship in God’s law, against the h arsh  way of God alone and the symbol of the Cross. The final tem ptation of ’I
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Jesu s is to forsake his life of struggle for the life of 
domesticity. This is the greatest and m ost enticing th rea t to 
the great Cry of the Invisible.si
Je su s  eventually severs his link with the m aternal home and  leaves Mary
for the desert and new m etaphysical battles. Chilson locates the reason
for th is in God’s dram atic need for redemption:
God’s salvation does not advance through home-making but 
through setting out from the home, leaving it behind, and facing the unknown and the u n c e r t a i n .s2
For our present interest, the point to be m ade is th a t spiritual
evolution is the dom inant characteristic of Je su s’s hie in Kazantzakis’s
The Last Temptation. In order to show w hat effect such  an  evolution has
on Je su s ’s life, it will be useful to isolate a  very sm all b u t im portant
episode which occurs as Je su s  m akes the transition from ‘Son of the
Carpenter’ to ‘Son of Man’. This is the moment when Je su s  halts his
wilderness pilgrimage to read just the position of a  butterfly on a  tree.^^
C. K azan tzak is on  T ran su b stan tia tion  a s Sp iritual P ro cess
In Nikos Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction, butterflies are m etaphors
of the ‘transubstan tia tion ’ (perouoiœcyiç) of flesh into s p i r i t . T h e y
connote the energizing and frenetic agency of the élan vital as it catapults
itself into m atter, becomes intermingled with corporeality, and then sets
about unm aking itself. In Kazantzakis’s Report to Greco, the unfolding
career of the caterpillar-butterfly is a  fundam ental clue to the widespread
creative advance, and a  vibrant w itness to our place in the evolutionary
processes of reality:
It is impossible to express the joy I experienced when I first
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saw a  grub engraved on one tray of the delicate golden branches discovered in the tombs of Mycenae and a  butterfly 
on the other—symbols doubtlessly taken from Crete. For me, 
the grub’s yearning to become a  butterfly always stood as its- 
-and m an’s—m ost imperative and at the sam e time m ost legitimate duty. God m akes us grubs, and we, by our own efforts, m ust become butterflies.35
In The Last Temptation, Kazantzakis has Jesu s read just a  butterfly on a
tree and refer to her as “my sister”, a  rem ark which captures both the
potency and immediacy of the élanvital as it cries w ithin Je su s  for
emancipation.^®
In his article “Kazantzakis and the Meaning of Suffering”, Tom
Doulis extends Kazantzakis’s butterfly m etaphor to render Kazantzakis’s
Je su s  as “God in the cocoon of m an”.®^  By developing this m etaphor of
Je su s’s spiritual becoming, Doulis comes also to see The Last Temptation
as depicting the time it takes for Je su s to emerge from his chrysalis and
eventually fly in union with God,^® This m aturation process inevitably
takes time because a t least four stages are involved in Je su s ’s becoming
Christ. Doulis’s article concentrates on the first and second of these
four phases.
In focusing on Je su s ’s transition from ‘Son of the C arpenter’ to 
‘Son of Man’, Doulis draws our attention to two M onarch butterflies who 
set down on Je su s’s blood-soaked bandanna (a recent spoil from the 
Romans for helping to crucify a  Zealot insurrectionist) as Je su s  wanders 
through the desert. This is how the narrator of The Last Temptation 
describes the incident:
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They [the Monarch butterflies] danced gleefully, frolicking in 
the sun, and a t the very last alighted on the m an’s 
ensanguined kerchief with their proboscises over the red spots, as though they wished to suck up  the blood. Feeling 
their caress on the top of his head, he recalled God’s talons and it seemed to him  th a t these and the butterfly-wings 
brought him exactly the same message. Ah, if only God 
could always descend to m an not as a  thunderbolt or a  
clawing vulture, bu t as a  butterfly!39
This passage from The Last Temptation joins together both of
Kazantzakis’s preferred m etaphors of divine agency—butterflies and
vultures—and appears to suggest th a t the “message” which they bring to
Jesu s is th a t God w ants him to transform  m atter into spirit, shedding
the chrysalis of hum an convention in order to make the flight towards
unity  in God. Tom Doulis agrees with th is reading. In the following
quotation, Doulis connects the m etaphors of butterflies and vultures
together as well, showing how they fit into Kazantzakis’s sense th a t
Jesu s becomes Christ:
The butterflies are of course winged, bu t so is the golden 
eagle, the traditional Byzantine (and therefore R ussian and 
modern Greek) symbol of God and Monarch; thorn-claws refer to the sensation Je su s  feels when He sees an  object of 
tem ptation, or when he weakens in His discipline (He is still 
in  the cocoon-stage of His life), and they also foreshadow the thorns He will wear in His Passion, when He will have broken the c o c o o n .4o
While we might in general say th a t Kazantzakis links butterflies 
and thorn-claws in The Last Temptation in order to give palpable form to 
his own recondite belief in spiritual becoming, Andreas K. Poulakidas 
specifically rem arks how Kazantzakis im bues poetic significance into the 
Christian theological idea of ‘transubstan tia tion’. In “Kazantzakis and
123
Bergson: Metaphysic Aestheticlans”, Poulakidas reveals th a t while the 
“explosive” Greek expression (peroummmg, peraucnmw)) which Kazantzakis 
often uses is “usually translated  as transm utation  or to transm ute”, it is 
correctly rendered by “transubstan tiation  or to transubstan tia te , to 
change from one substance into another”.  ^^  This is an im portant link for 
it opens up the possibility of connecting Eucharist to Christology 
through the idea of process.
As in traditional Roman Catholic and E astern  Orthodox doctrine, 
‘transubstan tiation’ refers to the dynamic process whereby bread and 
wine become, through God’s progressive agency, the body and blood of 
Je su s  Christ a t the Sacram ent of the Eucharist. As Alister E. McGrath 
points out, in  h is Christian Theology: An Introduction, and as Kazantzakis 
would have known, the origins of transubstan tiation’ stretch  back to 
early Greek philosophy:
This doctrine, formally defined by the Fourth Lateran 
Council (1215), rests upon Aristotelean foundations— 
specifically, on Aristotle’s distinction between “substance” and “accident.” The substance of som ething is its essential nature, whereas its accidents are its outward appearances 
(for example, its color, shape, smell, and  so forth). The 
theoiy of transubstan tia tion  affirms th a t the accidents of 
the bread and wine (their outward appearance, taste, smell, 
and so forth) rem ain unchanged a t the m om ent of 
consecration, while their substance chctnges from th a t of 
bread and wine to th a t of the body and blood of Jesu sC hrist.4 2
Poulakidas believes th a t Kazantzakis had th is ecclesiastical use of 
‘transubstan tiation’ in mind whenever he wrote of our duty to convert 
flesh into spirit.^® However, w hat appears useful for our ovm discussion
124
of Kazantzakis and process theology is th a t while Kazantzakis knew th a t 
metousiosis was a  popular term  in various forms of C hristian doctrine, in 
his own writings it reflects his account of Bergsonian transform ism .
In Kazantzakis: Politics o f the Spirit, Peter A. Bien situates the idea
(and task) of ‘transubstan tiation’ in Kazantzakis’s Bergsonian process
way of picturing God in the world:
His [Kazantzakis’s] god can evolve only through matter; th u s 
we, the visible signs of the élanvitals struggle upward 
through m atter toward dematerialization, can and m ust help 
god in his progress. The only way we can do th is is by 
avoiding the stagnation th a t strengthens Bergson’s 
descending force. Hence we m ust act energetically to 
Increase the world’s motion or, in the Kazantzakian cliché, to transubstan tia te  flesh into spirit, flesh being in Bergson’s 
system  characterized by inertia, spirit by f r e e d o m .4 4
For Kazantzakis, metousiosis hints a t God’s enveloping presence, and the
mysterious way in which the divine stirs us in our restlessness to evolve
into w hat we have the potential to become.^^ Metousiosis is the fulcrum
between actual hum an existence and the ideal towards which we often
feel ourselves being lured. It suggests God’s panentheistic agency a t work
in our world, agitating us with a  broad range of aesthetic values and
willing th a t we instantiate one of them , namely, the drive to surm ount
ourselves.
In his systematic study of ‘transubstan tia tion’ in  Kazantzakis’s 
writings, the process philosopher Daniel A. Dombrowski builds on Tom 
DouUs’s reading of The Last Temptation in two ways. First, Dombrowski 
takes the butterfly m etaphor we have been discussing and  situates it in a  
trinity of Kazantzakian m etaphors of the lesson and worth of spiritual
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metousiosis:
H um an transform ation of m undane existence into a  glorious reign, into God, follows from the caterpillar who becomes a 
butterfly, from the fish who leaps into the air, from the silkworm who tu rn s  dust into silk.4 7
Dombrowski’s rem ark is confirmed by an entry in  Kazantzakis’s Report to
Greco:
There is this as well: I was always bewitched by three 
of God’s creatures—the worm th a t becomes a  butterfly, the 
flying fish th a t leaps ou t of the w ater in an  effort to 
transcend its nature, and the silkworm th a t tu rn s  its 
entrails into silk. I always felt a  mystical unity  with them, 
for I always imagined them  as symbols symbolizing the route of my soul.48
Second, Dombrowski notes how Kazantzakis views the m echanism  
of metousiosis a t work “throughout the whole evolutionary process”.^ ® He 
delineates Kazantzakis’s own concrete examples of transubstan tiating  
process: communion tropes, eating and drinking, evolution, histoiy, and 
change in one’s personal life.®® In The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises, 
metousiosis is th a t mystical process of change which touches eveiyone 
and everything in the creative advance:
B ut we set out from an  almighty chaos, from a  thick 
abyss of light and darkness tangled. And we struggle— 
plants, animals, men. Ideas—in th is m om entary passage of 
individual life, to pu t in order the Chaos w ithin us, to 
cleanse the abyss, to work upon as m uch darkness as we can 
within our bodies and to transmute it into ligh ts  ^
In Report to Greco, Kazantzakis m akes it clear th a t transubstan tia tion  is
wrought by God’s all-pervasive agency:
I know of no anim al more disgusting th an  the mouse, 
no bird more disgusting th an  the bat, no edifice of flesh, 
hair, and bones more disgusting than  the hum an body. But
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th ink  how all this meinure Is transubstantiated and deified 
when God is embedded in it—the seed which develops intowings.52
Aside from these two ways of budding on Tom Douds’s own work,
Dombrowski’s study is vital for our purposes because he appears to have
process theology in m ind when he proceeds to describe Kazantzakis’s
concept of God as transubstan tiating  process:
God is the alpha of Kazantzakis’s universe because, as far as 
we can tell, the m aterial world has always been involved in 
the process whereby the divine breath has allowed earth to blossom into spirit.53
Compare Dombrowski’s gloss regarding God’s all-encompassing agency in
our changing world to the ‘panentheism ’ of Kazantzakis’s The Saviors o f
God:
All th is world th a t we see, hear, and touch is tha t 
accessible to the hum an senses, a  condensation of the two 
enormous powers of the Universe permeated with all of God.54
“Within Christianity”, Dombrowski continues,"this eternal process 
of transubstan tia tion  is focused on Christ”.®® Kazantzakis fully agrees.
In fact, he believes th a t his fictional Je su s  of Nazareth is spiritually vital 
for us because Jesu s “continuaUy transubstan tiated  desh into spirit, and 
ascended” to God.®® In The Last Temptation, Je su s co-operates with the 
universal process by transubstan tiating  familial concerns into self- 
sacridce and despair into glimmerings of hope. He evolves through four 
stages of spiritual becoming and ‘saves’ God by responding, in each new 
phase of his m essianic formation, to the divine Ciy to help Uberate the 
élan vital from the restrictions imposed on it by m atter.
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“By partaking in the process of metousiosis (creative evolution)”,
writes Andreas K. Poulakidas, “one grows in the spirit of God”.®^  In the
Kazantzakian cliche, we ‘save’ God whenever and wherever we preoccupy
ourselves with those creative actions which foster spiritual change and
development.®® In “Kazantzakis and the Process of T ransubstantiation”,
Dombrowski helps u s understand in process term s w hat it is of God tha t
needs to be saved and can be saved by us:
By engaging in these processes of transubstan tiation  [metousionontas] we save, a t the very least, the issue of God if 
not God itself in the sense that, and  to the extent that, the 
dependent pole o f the divine nature is in need o f salvation.^^
Once again, Dombrowski has process theology in m ind when he links
Kazantzakis’s em phasis on the m any ways to transubstan tia te  flesh into
spirit--eucharist, eating and drinking, personal development—with the
process theological notion th a t we can affect and influence God in the
appreciative aspect of the divine dipolarity.
Alfred North W hitehead’s concept of the dependent pole of God’s 
becoming was addressed in chapter one when we spoke of how temporal 
actualizations may contribute to the richness of God’s on-going life. In 
W hitehead’s process philosophy, the divine needs us to stim ulate God’s 
consequent natu re  in order th a t God might use w hat we accomplish as a 
basis for the world’s future direction.®® What appears to be ‘saved’ by our 
creative acts of transubstan tiation  is therefore the consequent nature of 
God. Relating this notion of ‘saving’ God’s dependent pole to Jesus, a  
W hiteheadian process theologian influenced by Kazantzakian categories
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might say something along the following lines. Possibly she would 
describe the totality of Je su s’s ministiy, his life-long struggle to effect 
metDusiosis, as a  filial response to God’s initial aim. And if, as the 
Christian New Testam ent affirms (and The Last Temptation indicates), 
Je su s completely opened himself up to the divine lure or Cry, she might 
also suggest th a t there was nothing of Je su s’s life th a t God needed to 
disown, so God made only positive prehensions of Je su s’s num erous acts 
of creative transubstan tiation  in the world. This is equivalent to saying 
th a t Je su s  contributes to or ‘saves’ the appreciative aspect of divine 
becoming, and even th a t God is able to ‘use Je su s’ to bring about change 
in our (on-going) world as we prehend the effect th a t Je su s’s m inistiy 
has on God’s consequent nature.
D. ‘S on  o f  M an’: J e su s , B ecom in g , and th e  B ody-Soul D ia lec tic
In The Last Temptation Je su s’s sense of calling, together with his 
aw areness th a t he m ust evolve if his m essianic vocation is to be fulfilled, 
is im m ature and unformed in his ‘Son of the C arpenter’ stage. Cracks 
have appeared in Je su s’s chrysalis; Je su s has left home for the desert, 
spurning his m other and Magdalene, bu t there is still little sign of God’s 
butterfly. To rem ain ‘Son of the Carpenter’ is not to be th a t to which the 
divine Cry lures Jesus, so th is first stage in Je su s’s spiritual growth is 
eventually replaced by a  second, the Son of Man’ phase.
Although the ‘Son of Man’ is a  complex term  in the Hebrew Bible, 
Nikos Kazantzakis seems to have accepted Daniel’s specific vision of the 
‘Son of Man’ as an  eschatological figure with corporate significance.® ^  In
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Daniel, the author encourages people to believe th a t God protects those 
who suffer, like Daniel in the lion’s den, and yet rem ain loyal to God’s 
law. History is providentially ordered; God is working out a  preconceived 
plan th a t will be Israel’s vindication and the validation of s u f f e r in g .®  ^
In The Last Temptation, Kazantzakis has Daniel’s vision read out 
loud to Joachim, the ailing abbot of the m onastery which Je su s  visits.®® 
It transpires th a t Joachim  has grown tired of advancing imperialism and 
delayed apocalyptic promises from God, and so he rails against God to J
usher in a  new period of history by sending forth his ‘Son of Man’. In his
-iTempted by Happiness: Kazantzakis' Post-Christian Christ, Peter A. Bien 
believes th a t this particular incident constitutes the “w atershed” between 
Je su s’s former, ‘Son of the Carpenter’ phase, and his new actuality as 
the ‘Son of Man’.®^  We do not disagree with Bien s estim ation. Lured by 
the butterflies and thorn-claws we alluded to earlier, Kazantzakis’s Jesu s 
enters the monastery, reflects on Daniel’s  vision, and through the agency 
of God evolves into the newest phase of his spiritual becoming.
Any clouds of vocational unknowing in Je su s’s life are lifted during 
the time he spends at the monastery. Purified by God, Jesu s declares his 
readiness to preach his Renanian gospel of love.®® Writing his biography 
of Je su s  in the nineteenth century, E rnest Renan thought of Jesu s as a  
gentle, Galilean prophet who wandered over the rolling hills of Palestine, 
and who moved from town to town preaching and enacting his gospel of 
unconditional charity. Kazantzakis’s ‘Son of Man’ phase m akes full use
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of Renan’s ‘aesthetic Je su s’ as Kazantzakis’s Je su s  m akes peace and love 
the pivotal aspect of his own message. In The Last Temptation, Je su s’s 
preaching about love frustrates Ju d as  who, depicting Je su s ’s darker, 
demonic side, would rather see Jesu s become a  Davldic messiah.®® Also 
disillusioned is Maiy, Je su s’s mother, whom Kazantzakis reintroduces at 
th is point in his novel in order to tem pt Jesu s once again. Here is Mary 
in conversation with Salome, wife of the m ean-spirited and  thrifty 
Zebedee, a  dialogue crucial to our grasp of The Last Temptation:
“Congratulations, Mary,” said old Salome, her aged 
face gleaming. “Fortunate mother! God blew into your 
womb and you don’t even realize it!”
The woman loved by God heard and shook her head, unconsoled. “I don’t w ant my son to be a  sa in t,” she 
m urm ured. “I w ant him  to be a  m an like all the rest. I want 
him  to m arry and give me grandchildren. That is God’sway. ”6 7
As we noted earlier, th is is the voice of womankind as ‘tem ptress’; 
Maiy’s desire is for her son to resist the dynamic th ru s t of the élanvital, 
and the Cry of God in his life. Je su s  w ithstands th is enticem ent and 
goes on to pass the first test of his evolving m essiahshlp: Je su s  averts 
possible mob violence, saves Maiy Magdalene’s life, and issues a  homily 
on universal sin as well as the pressing need for merciful love.®® Jesu s’s 
mother, depicting a  strong tendency working in the opposite direction to 
dematerialization, implores the crowds not to listen to her son. In fact, 
she accuses Je su s  of being an  extreme religious fanatic in need of serious 
medical attention.®® When Mary begs Jesu s to re tu rn  home to Nazareth,
1 3 1
to assum e his carpentry once more, Je su s Ignores her, and he appears 
Indifferent to her sorrow.
Is Je su s’s insouciance sinful? Not according to Kazantzakis. If we 
roam  around Kazantzakis’s fictional terrain  for long enough, we discover 
th a t “the greatest sin  of all is the sin  of satisfaction".^^ Since Mary the 
m other of Jesu s wants to arrest the dematerialization process (‘the 
transubstan tiation  of flesh into spirit’) with the m anacles of domestic 
happiness (‘satisfaction’), Kazantzakls believes tha t Je su s  m ust eschew 
Mary’s ‘sinful’ vision of familial tranquility and forbearance. This 
devastates Maiy and yet, in a  rare instance of a  woman assisting the élan 
vitaVs progress in Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction, Salome rem onstrates 
with Mary for her theological shortsightedness:
“While he spoke, didn’t  you see blue wings, thousands 
of blue wings behind him? 1 swear to you, Mary, there were 
whole arm ies of angels.’’
B ut Mary shook her head in despair. “I didn’t  see anything,” she m urm ured, “I didn’t  see anything. . . , 
anything.” Then, after a  pause: “W hat good are angels to me, 
Salome, m a’am? 1 w ant children and grandchildren to be following him, children and grandchildren, not angels!’’^ i
As Son of Man’, Jesu s leaves behind all thoughts of progeny, a 
lucrative career, and provincial comforts, transubstan tiating  domestic 
bliss into concern for the spiritual destiny of others. Since he is armed 
with his message of unconditional love, Je su s’s revolt against his m other 
may be seen as evidence th a t he is clambering up the metaphysical 
m ountain of authentic hum an development, away from the base-cam p of 
conventional happiness, and toward the sum m it of spiritual
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m eaningfulness. In Tempted by Happiness: Kazantzakis ' Post-Christian
Christ, Peter A. Bien describes th is phase of Je su s’s m aturation by using
a  similar climbing trope:
As Son of Man, he has ascended from ordinariness to 
vocation: Instead of toiling for himself, he is tolling for the 
salvation of everyone. . . Seeing hum ankind as a  single entity invited to participate in the everlasting kingdom, he exhorts his fellows to be righteous and to come into u n i t y .  72
The Last Temptation is a  mythopoesis of process thought, for the
governing structure of Kazantzakis’s novel, the four stages of Je su s’s
m essianic evolution, suggests th a t Jesu s becomes Christ by prehending
the Incremental agency of God’s lure or Cry at work in his üfe. In The
Living God and the Modem World: A  Christian Theology Based on The
thought o f A. N. Whitehead, Peter Hamilton offers a  sim ilar process view
of Jesus. Like Kazantzakls, Hamilton writes of how Je su s  becomes
Christ through a  dynamic combination of divine agency and Je su s’s own
spiritual exercises (prayer and self-commitment):
In Whitehead’s term s, prayer is a  way of prehending God, a  
way th a t takes account of all other prehensions of everything 
in one’s environment, including all earUer prehensions of 
God. In an  interdependent universe all prehensions are 
Interdependent: one’s knowledge of anyone, for example 
one’s wife, is affected by one’s whole outlook and 
environment: so was Je su s’s knowledge of God, which came 
to him as part of his total environment. It was a  big part, 
for it seems clear from the gospels th a t Je su s  gave top 
priority both to prehending God through all available m eans 
and to obeying these prehensions. Je su s  th u s  kept his own 
“subjective aim ” in alignment with God’s aim and purpose: “thy WÜ1, not mine, be d o n e ”.73
For Hamilton and Kazantzakis, Je su s’s m essianic self-understanding is
not given to Jesu s by God through some unique m eans of grace a t the
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is not a t all sure how to either designate Jesu s or to ‘read’ some of his 
statem ents about compassion for one’s enemies:
beginning of his life. For both thinkers, Je su s  evolves into the ‘Son of 
God’ by virtue of his filial response to the divine lure or Ciy forward.
With his message of selfless love for others, Kazantzakis’s Jesu s 
th u s  evolves from ‘Son of the C arpenter’ to ‘Son of M an’. Accompanying 
this change in m essianic designation is a  development in the way crowds 
see and Interpret Je su s’s vocational formation. Consider how Philip and 
“simple N athanael” respond to one of Je su s’s short homilies of universal 
concern:
“1 like him ,” said the gangling cobbler [Nathanael]. 
“His words are as sweet as honey. Would you believe it: 
listening to him, I actually licked my chops!”
The shepherd was of a  different opinion. “1 don’t like 
him. He says one thing and does another; he shouts ‘Love! 
Love!’ and builds crosses and crucifies! ”
“That’s  all over and done with, 1 tell you, Philip. He 
had to pass that stage, the stage o f crosses. Now*s he passed  it and taken God’s road .”75
In contrast to N athanael’s enthusiastic reaction to Jesus, Ju d as  Iscariot
I
“I don’t  know w hat to call you—son of Maiy? son of 
Carpenter? son of David? As you can see, 1 still don’t  know 
who you are--but neither do you. We both m ust discover the 
answer, we both m ust find relief! No, th is uncertainty 
cannot last. Don’t  look a t the o thers—they follow you like 
bleating sheep; don’t  look a t the women, who do nothing but 
admire you and spfil tears. After aU, they’re women: they have hearts and no minds, and we’ve no use for them. It’s 
we two who m ust find out who you are and w hether this 
flame th a t burns you is the God of Israel or the devil. We must! We m u s t !  76
Notice here th a t Ju d a s’s theological struggles are prompted not by
134
„ïr
his own faithlessness, bu t by the fact th a t Jesu s appears ceaselessly to 
change his religious views. On some occasions, Ju d as  th inks Jesus 
speaks weU, while a t other tim es he vehemently disagrees with him. One 
such confrontation takes place ju s t outside Nazareth and Is crucial to 
our grasp of Kazantzakis’s treatm ent of the classical split between the 
body and the soul:
The redbeard gave a start. Grasping Je su s’ shoulder, 
he shouted with fiery breath: “You w ant to free Israel from 
the Rom ans?”
“ . . .  to free the soul from sin .”
Ju d as snatched his hand away from Je su s’ shoulder 
in a  frenzy and banged his fist against the tru n k  of the olive 
tree. “This where our ways part,” he growled, facing Jesus 
and looking at him  with hatred. “First the body m ust be 
freed from the Romans, and later, the soul from sin. This Is 
the road. Can you take it? A house isn’t  built from the roof 
down, it’s built from the foundation u p .”
“The foundation is the soul, Ju d a s .”
“The foundation is the body—th a t’s where you’ve got to begin. Watch out, son of M a r y .”7 7
Ju d as is accurate, as Je su s  will soon discover. In the context of 
our thesis, we can say th a t Jesu s wishes to be set free from his physical 
self (matter), bu t em ancipation (dematerialization) eludes him. His body 
frequently declares war (temptation) on his soul [élanvital], each striving 
for m astery over the other, and so The Last Temptation dem onstrates how 
Jesu s learned to take account of this struggle by trem substantlating his 
bodily pleasures into spiritual exercises. We sense th is frightening, often 
unpredictable battle between the draw of physical concerns and the
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dem ands of religious discipline when Kazantzakis suggests th a t Jesu s 
might have been tem pted to live a  more conventional family life and 
forget his m inistry altogether. A discussion of th is ‘last tem ptation’ 
comes later in this chapter. For now, we can say th a t in th is revealing 
dialogue between Ju d as and Jesus, Kazantzakis offers us another reason 
for describing his work as a  mythopoesis of process thought.
E. ‘S on  o f  D avid’: E vo lu tion , R egression , and A dvance
In The Last Temptation, Je su s’s encounter with Jo h n  the Baptist 
signals the birth-pangs of a  new development in Je su s’s m essianic 
understanding. This is because Jo h n ’s nationalistic message, th a t the 
M essiah m ust brandish an ‘axe’ to remove the rancid fruit of Israel, 
appears both to contradict and force a  change in Je su s’s earlier belief in 
the power of unconditional love to effect personal as well as social 
transform ation. Screaming for the destruction of Jerusalem , and with it 
the purification of a  nation presently in decline, John  preaches tha t God 
calls the Saviour to employ violent and fierce m eans to usher in the Day 
of Reckoning:
“Isn’t  love enough?” he [Jesus] asked.
“No,” answered the Baptist angrily. “The tree is 
rotten. God called to me and gave me the axe, which 1 then 
placed a t the roots of the tree. I did my duty. Now you do 
yours: take the axe and strike!”
“If 1 were a  fire, 1 would burn; if I were a  wood cutter,1 would strike. But I am  a heart, and I love.”78
Opting to take one of two roads, the road which ascends, Jesu s  travels to
the deseirt, speaks with God and the Devil, and allows his m essiahshlp to
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evolve into w hat God w ants Je su s  to become7^
In the desert, Je su s  is beguiled by taloned birds, the image of his
mother, and crunching footsteps in the baked sand, these all serving as
m etaphors of the Devil’s tem ptations. In one scene, Je su s  watches
helplessly as crows descend on the carcass of a  sacrificial {scape) goat
sent out in the wilderness by priests to atone for Israel’s sins.®® Seeing
the fate of the goat as figurative of his own destiny, he calls the carcass
“Brother” and immediately proceeds to cover the dead anim al with sand,
thereby preventing the crows from continuing their tasty  feed.®^ The
amgiy birds divert their attention away from the goat’s carcass and
towards Jesus. For the crows, Jesus becomes the surrogate goat,
something new to stalk  and feed on. This scene is clearly a  m etaphor for
God’s brutish  and remorseless assau lt on Je su s’s soul, a  pursu it which
we know has been unfolding throughout Je su s’s life, and Nikos
Kazantzakis uses it as a  hinge upon which the ‘Son of M an’ is brought
to new cognizance of his unfolding m essiahshlp:
“I am unable, why do you [God] choose me [Jesus]? I cannot 
endure!” And as he cried out, he saw a  black m ass on the 
sand before him: the goat, disembowelled, its legs in the air. 
He remembered how he had leaned over and seen his own 
face in the leaden eyes. “I am  the goat,” he m urm ured, “God 
placed him along the path  to show me who I am  and where I am heading . . . ”82
Other m etaphors ebb and flow as Jesus is tem pted three times by
the devil. In each instance, the prhnaiy images, serpent, lion, and
consum ing fire, together with the secondary images, rabbit, partridge.
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and goat’s  carcass, indicate the lonely, oppressive fight within Jesu s as 
he wonders w hat sort of m essiah God w ants him to become for others.
In one scene, a  serpent (connoting a  counter-tendency to the complex 
process of dematerialization) seductively accosts Jesu s with the promise 
of ‘happiness’ or, better put, relief from physical loneliness through 
marriage to Magdalene and subsequent parenthood.®® Jesu s  resists and 
almost immediately Kazantzakis has Jesu s imagine a  partridge as it 
saun ters into the wide-open m outh of the serpent.®^ In the context of 
our thesis, th is image requires further explanation.
Earlier in the novel, when Jesu s first visits Magdalene on his way 
to the desert, the narrato r of The Last Temptation draws our attention to 
a  caged partridge bird in Magdalene’s courtyard, struggling to break free 
from its gilded confines.®® In this earlier scene, the partridge appears to 
signify the imprisoned spirit, the élanvital trapped inside the jail of 
corporeality. In the desert, the serpent seems to suggest the devil’s bait 
of ‘normality’ with which Je su s  has had ceaselessly to wrestle, and the 
partridge indicates the élanvital as it struggles to liberate Itself from the 
charm  of bodily comforts. Both ‘readings’ receive support when the 
partridge in th is wilderness tem ptation is gorged by the serpent as Jesus 
watches “trembling Uke the partridge” and as Jesu s concludes, “the 
partridge is m an’s soul”.®® Once again, it is this em phasis on the body- 
soul dialectic, the progressive tussle between m atter and  élanvital, and 
the duty to transubstan tiate  private struggle into public m inistry which
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provides us with the chance to reiterate our thesis: Kazantzakis’s The 
Last Temptation is a  mythopoesis of process thought.
In The Last Temptation, the m any ways in which the devil tries to 
snare Jesu s are used by Kazantzakls to emphasize the on-going struggle 
th a t Je su s  has to become Christ. The tem ptations ‘to be happy’ depict 
an  im portant feature of the process of discerning the divine Ciy. In his 
The Living God and the Modern World: A  Christian Theology Based on The 
thought o f A. N. Whitehead, Peter Hamilton shares Kazantzakis’s idea:
The companions grew numb. This voice was severe. It no longer frolicked and laughed; it was calling them  to arms. 
In order to enter the kingdom of heaven, then, would they 
have to go by way of death? Was there no other road?s9
In The Last Temptation, nearly all of Je su s’s followers fail to
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The tem ptations of Je su s  may illustrate a  part of this 
process of learning God’s wiU. Behind the pictorial language 
of miracle and of interrogation by the devil there may weU lie 
a  series of real decisions, perhaps arrived a t gradually and  
after much thought and  p rayer—decisions to avoid using his 
undoubted popularity and powers of healing for the advancem ent of either himself or his teaching, s 7
Emerging from the terror of the tem ptations, Je su s’s  m essianic
understanding evolves for a  third time. Lured by God’s increm ental
agency, Jesu s rejects his former stage, ‘Son of M an’, with its ideal of
brotherly love and universal forgiveness, and, instead, cultivates
revolutionary antagonism  as ‘Son of David’:
Now begins my own duty: to chop down the rotted tree....I 
believed I was the bridegroom and th a t I held a  flowering 
alm ond-branch in my hand, bu t all the while I was a  wood-chopper.88
For m ost of Je su s’s disciples, another change of heart is bewildering:
com prehend the complexity of his spiritual evolution, have little or no 
knowledge of his interior world, and seem powerless to in tu it Je su s’s 
psychological anguish. They constantly bicker among themselves, appear 
spiritually facile, and vie for leadership positions in the new earthly 
kingdom which they mistakenly believe Je su s  intends to instantiate.®® 
Between Jesu s and Judas, however, the connection is exceedingly 
close.® ^
As the narrator of The Last Temptation says, “a  terrible secret 
joined the two of them  [Jesus and Judas] and separated them  from the 
rest”.®^  On num erous occasions Jesu s and Ju d as converse late into the 
night, seem intuitively to know w hat the other is feeling and thinking, 
and see themselves as inextricably bound up with the destiny of the 
other. As Richard W. Chilson indicates, “the savior-martyr never stands 
alone bu t always with a  savLor-hero”.®® One explanation for th is close 
friendship m akes use of the spiritual-m aterial dialectic which we alluded 
to earlier. Here Ju d as depicts the fleshly driven antithesis to Je su s’s 
spirit-fined, ekui-urged existence. This concrescing, frequently volatile, 
alliance between m atter, m arked here by Judas, and spirit, signified by 
Jesus, is therefore another reason to reiterate our thesis: Kazantzakis’s 
narrative fiction is a  mythopoesis of process thought.
Kazantzakis’s Je su s  needs Ju d as to remind and agitate him 
continually with thoughts of th is world of imperial aggression and 
political resistance, the captivating lure of materiality. By the sam e
140
token, Ju d as requires Jesu s to preach ceaselessly a  spiritual wlU-to-
power which, although worked out in our earth-bound lives, is not
confined by tem poral existence. Richard W. Chilson seem s to agree:
The spiritual, represented by Jesus, is the higher level 
wherein salvation rests, bu t it m ust work and struggle 
through the m aterial order and th is involves crucifixion of 
the spirit. The whole relationship of Je su s  to Ju d as  is on this level of allegoiy.94
Besides Judas, m ost of those who hear Je su s’s new message of
divine fire and war find it religiously unsatisfying. The frequent and
dram atic shifts in Je su s’s m essianic consciousness seem to yield only
confusion in the m inds of those Jew ish peasants who listen to Jesus and
chart his serpentine progress. In Capernaum, Zebedee {father to two of
Je su s’s disciples in Kazantzakis’s novel) entertains Je su s  in his home
bu t confesses th a t he does not know w hat to make of him:
“So speak, son of Mary. Bring God again into my house! Excuse me if I call you son of Mary, bu t I still don’t know 
what to call you. Some call you the son of the Carpenter, others the son of David, son of God, son of m an. Eveiyone 
is confused. Obviously the world has not yet m ade up itsmind. ”9 5
With great fervour, Kazantzakis has Jesu s ‘bring God’ to Zebedee and the 
others by preaching th a t “love comes after the flames”, meaning th a t one 
cannot love w hat is unjust, and th a t God’s impending Conflagration will 
be responsible for purifyJng the base metal of hum ankind into something 
infinitely valuable.®®
In Kazantzakis’s  narrative fiction, fire and flames are symbols of 
process in our changing world. They signify dynamism, animation, and
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zest in  both hum an and divine becoming. In The Last Temptation, Jesus
asserts th a t men and women have a divine ember within them. Indeed,
“God is a  conflagration...and each soul a  spark".®^ In Report to Greco,
Kazantzakis describes divine agency as “an  insatiable flame", and our
struggle to spiritualize our being in the m idst of evolutionary change as
being “like a  conflagration".®® In The Saviors ojGod, Kazantzakis takes
‘fire’ to indicate the processes of reality:
The soul is a  flaming tongue th a t Mcks and struggles to set 
the black bulk of the world on fire. One day the entire 
Universe will become a  single conflagration. Fire is the first 
and final m ask of my God. We dance and weep between two 
enormous pyres.99
God’s holocaust begins in Jerusalem , bu t it does not appear as 
Jesu s expects it, and he confesses this to Judas. More im portant, the 
next stage in Je su s’s spiritual evolution is felt as Je su s  shares his new 
vision of the m essiah as Suffering S e rv a n t .K a z a n tz a k is  has Jesus 
discern this new direction during one of m any visits to Golgotha. Here 
the Hebrew prophet Isaiah presents Jesu s with a goat sk in—the very 
goat, in fact, which Jesu s had previously buried in the desert—upon 
whose hide is written the full text of Isaiah 53.
Isaiah’s prophecy th u s becomes the new hinge which Kazantzakis
uses to bring his Jesu s to full awareness of his m essianic character.
With th is prescience, Je su s shrugs off the last vestiges of his chrysalis
and God’s butterfly prepares to take flight:
For the world to be saved, I, of my own wiU, m ust die. At 
first, I didn’t understand it myself. God sen t me signs in
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vain: sometimes visions in the air, sometimes dream s in my 
sleep; or the goat’s carcass in the desert with all the sins of 
the people around its neck. And since the day I quit my 
m other’s house, a  shadow has foUowed behind me like a dog 
or a t times has ru n  in front of me to show me the road.W hat road? T h e  C r o s s ! " ! 0 2
Before Jesu s can fully embrace Isaiah’s prophecy, and evolve into 
his final phase of spiritual becoming as ‘Son of God’, Je su s  m ust fall in 
his capacity as the ‘Son of David’. This happens when Je su s  storm s the 
Jerusalem  temple only to delay m ilitant resistance, anguishing over his 
function as a  servant-m arfyr ra ther than  as a  political revolutionary.^®^ 
The ‘flame’ of armed insurrection fades and Jesus, together with his 
em barrassed disciples, dejectedly retreats from Jerusalem  to nearby 
Bethany. ^
In his Tempted by Happiness: Kazantzakis'Post-Christian Christ, 
Peter A. Bien writes tha t th is third phase of Je su s’s m essianic becoming 
seems “strangely regressive, a  retreat rather than  an  advance”. We 
agree with Bien’s observation. Indeed, we m ust remind ourselves th a t up 
until th is point in Je su s’s spiritual evolution, Jesu s has m ade a  
concerted effort to promulgate disinterested love, universal fellowship, 
humility, and self-renunciation. These ‘virtues’ are the defining tra its of 
Je su s’s ‘Son of Man’ phase. As ‘Son of David’, though, Je su s  replaces 
these qualities with political m essianism  grounded in patriotic ardour.
As a  consequence, Je su s’s messianic consciousness oscillates wildly from 
‘gentle Jesus, meek and mild’ to ‘Je su s  the militant, eschatological 
warrior’. In short, Je su s’s m essianic concerns narrow as he shuns
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universal redemption in favour of Jewish liberation. B ut Je su s’s 
‘political theology’ is not a  trem endous success. He is unable to declare 
war on advancing Roman imperialism. Given this particular failure, why 
would Kazantzakis—who seems so interested in the forward development 
of Je su s ’s personality—w ant his Je su s  apparently to backslide in this 
way? Indeed, why would Kazantzakis reserve a  place for talk  of 
regression in his mythopoesis of process thought? Peter A. Bien suggests 
it is because Kazantzakis wishes to make two very im portant points 
about “the complexity of spiritual evolution”.^ ®®
First, Bien believes th a t Kazantzakis wishes to m ake the political 
point, “the best way to succeed is to fail”.^ ®^  To understand  this aspect 
of Kazantzakis’s philosophy, we m ust note th a t during his travels 
around R ussia shortly after the Bolshevik revolution, he was eager to see 
Lenin as a ‘Christie’ figure.^®® Despite th is initial adm iration of Lenin, 
Kazantzakis soon became convinced th a t Russia’s economic prosperity 
had been acquired a t the cost of her spiritual bankruptcy. ^  ®® He believed 
th a t in order to susta in  the new Russia, the Bolsheviks spent m ost of 
their time preserving fiscal equilibrium at the expense of spiritual 
development. ^   ^® We m ust then  ask  how this episode from Russian 
political history applies to Kazantzakis’s Jesus, the “quintessential 
model of spiritual evolution” in The Last Temptation?^  ^^
As the ‘Son of Man’, Jesu s rejects hatred and violence in order to 
preach a  message of universal love which becomes like the seed falling on
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stoney ground, unable to bear any fruit. Hardly anyone appropriates 
Je su s’s ideas when he addresses them; rather, the crowds upbraid Jesu s 
and accuse him of religious fanaticism. In his ‘Son of Man’ phase, 
Kazantzakis’s Je su s  fails to inspire his fellow Jews to love all people 
everywhere, including one’s enemies. However, Bien believes tha t this 
particular failure averts a  far more vital loss.^^^ If Je su s’s message had 
taken root among the Jews, if selfless love had been shown to be all th a t 
was required to transform  the world, Je su s  may have become ‘satisfied’ 
and self-righteously convinced th a t his mission had been accomplished. 
And as we recall, ‘satisfaction’ is the worst kind of sin in Kazantzakis’s 
fictional world.
For spiritual progress to continue, Kazantzakis has Jesus faü in
his ‘Son of Man’ phase, radically re-group himself, and finally endorse
w hat previously he could only resist: revolutionary m essianism . ^   ^^  For
Bien, this explains Je su s’s  second and third phase of becoming in The
Last Temptation:
This political point provides one way for u s to understand 
why Kazantzakis tu rns Jesu s into the Son of David and why 
this change, though seemingly regressive, is actually a  step forward in Je su s’ spiritual j o u r n e y .  115
For Je su s’s vocational understanding to evolve in his Son of David’
phase, he m ust actively collude with the ‘demonic’ signified by Ju d as
Iscariot in The Last Temptation. This brings Bien to his second point
regarding the complexity of Je su s’s spiritual evolution.
According to Bien, Kazantzakis has Je su s  fail as Son of David’ for
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psychological reasons as well as political ones. Throughout The Last 
Temptation, Jesu s  seems to be adventuring towards an  integration of his 
own soul, harmonizing psychic contrasts, bu t th is can only be reached 
as Je su s  wrestles with his darker side (Judas), transm uting  evil into 
service of the good.^^® W hat th is aspect of Je su s ’s characterization 
indicates is th a t Kazantzakis believes th a t a  healthy, balanced life is 
found wherever and whenever someone has learned to countenance the 
opposites in his or her character. In the context of our thesis, 
Kazantzakis’s  belief about harmonizing contrasts finds support in 
pastoral theology undertaken from a  W hiteheadian process perspective. 
Indeed, Gordon E. Jackson’s Pastoral Care and Process Theology uses 
W hiteheadian analysis to write of how we acquire ‘personality’ as we 
learn to navigate the “maze of feelings” which vie for attention in each 
new m oment of subjective concrescence. ^   ^^
This idea of reconciling opposites is a  vital them e in Kazantzakis’s 
narrative fiction, and we see th is in the relationship between Jesu s and 
Judas. In term s of Je su s’s spiritual becoming, Ju d a s  is a  dom inant lure 
for feeling. Convinced by the Davldic model of m essiahshlp, Ju d as 
beckons Jesu s to instantiate physical rebellion. The divine Cry, however, 
has a  different aim and lure for Je su s’s life: dematerialization of the élan 
vital through self-sacrifice. Adventuring to harmonize these dynamic and 
competing impulses, Jesus has to learn how to love Ju d as  because in 
doing so he learns how to accept his own evil: the swirling m ass of 
bitterness, pride, and violence within Je su s’s own soul. To evolve into
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his fourth and final stage of m essianic formation, Je su s  m ust learn to 
appropriate his own demonic aspects.^
F. J e su s , D iv in e  A gency, and th e  U nm aking o f  th e  C reative P rocess
The commencement of Je su s’s fourth stage of spiritual evolution is 
a  renouncem ent of his th ird  phase, ‘Son of David’. At the turning point 
between talk  and physical rebellion, Jesu s disowns his m ilitant political 
theology, escapes into hiding, and then subsequently broadens his public 
m inistry to embrace all humankind.^ As ‘Son of God’, Je su s develops a  
challenging attitude to the Temple, to the restoration of Israel, as well as 
to the worthiness of sinners, and he looks for an  eschatological miracle. 
Je su s  provokes a  hostile response from the Jews, so he deliberately 
surrenders himself in an act of apocalyptic self-immolation to bring 
about God’s Kingdom. Thus, Nikos Kazantzakis has Jesus 
consciously try  to fulfill Isaiah’s eschatological expectation th a t the 
Messiah would suffer and die to redeem hum ankind.
In common with the treatm ent of Ju d as  in more recent fiction, like 
Morley Callaghan’s A  Time fo r  Judas and Taylor Caldwell’s I, Judas, 
Kazantzakis views Ju d as  as a  vital agent in the salvation p r o c e s s . I n  
Kazantzakian terms, Je su s and Ju d as  are ‘co-saviours of God’, dynamic 
men who hear the divine Ciy to consciously assign their incalculable 
energies to the evolutionary advance. While Ju d a s  is a t first reluctant to 
collude in Je su s’s death, Jesu s persuades Judas to discern the Ciy of his 
time and to see th a t his ‘disloyalty’ is providentially w i l l e d . W i t h o u t
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Ju d a s ’s betrayal, the transubstan tiation  of Je su s’s flesh Into spirit, the 
m ain them e of The Last Temptation and the signal of ‘God’s redem ption’ 
(the freeing of élan vital from the confines of matter), will not come to 
pass. W ithout Ju d a s’s help, the élanvital a t work in Je su s ’s life will not 
become disembodied.
Unable to disavow the body by himself, Jesu s needs Ju d as’s 
treacheiy to help him pu t an  end to m aterial ‘happiness’. Indeed,
Ju d as’s duplicity enables Je su s  to throw off the fetters of physical 
stagnation, to be in phase with the divine current which leads the way, 
and to ascend towards God. Expressed in Bergsonian term s, Jesus and 
Ju d as  unite to assist the dematerialization of élan vital. In the context
of our thesis, their creative actions have unfathom able value for the 
appreciative aspect of divine becoming.
From w hat we have said thus far about transubstantiation , the 
creative process, the flesh-spirit dialectic, and God’s progressive agency, 
it would seem th a t The Last Temptation and The Saviors o f God: Spiritual 
Exercises have close ties as mythopoetic accounts of process thought. 
Common to both texts is a  sense of God’s increm ental presence in our 
evolving world, and the belief th a t we can aid God’s becoming. In short, 
Kazantzakis presents his Je su s  as the paradigm of the individual who 
‘saves’ God through a  series of spiritual exercises. Aside from shared 
content. The Last Temptation and The Saviors o f God possess a  similar 
form. In each, the central portion of the text is bounded on either side 
by poetic elements. Regarding The Last Temptation, poetic elem ents’ may
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be seen In the two ‘dream  sequences’ which serve to encircle the 
unfolding tale of Je su s’s spiritual m aturation.
In the closing pages of The Last Temptation, Kazantzakis’s Jesus 
faints and ‘finds him self in a  dream  which begins as a  negro lad helps 
Jesu s down from the c r o s s . I n  a  scene rem iniscent of The Binding of 
Isaac, where God’s angel informs Abraham th a t God no longer requires 
him  to ‘prove’ his faith by sacrificing his only son, the negro lad shares 
with Jesu s the news th a t God does not require Je su s’s death on the 
cross. Ironically, the young boy convinces Jesus th a t his crucifixion has 
been lived in a  dream  and th a t ‘real pleasure’ awaits him:
. . . “Beloved, the earth  is good—you’U see. Wine, laughter, 
the lips of a  woman, the gambols of your first son on your 
knees—all are good. . . . We angels (would you believe it?) 
often lean over, up there in heaven, look a t the earth—andsigh.”! 25
As the dream  unfolds, Jesu s eventually agrees to m arry Magdalene. More 
im portant, Jesu s becomes aware th a t God’s wfil is not to shun  the earth 
and its rich beauty; rather, the “whole secret” is to find unity between 
earth  and the hum an heart, suggested in this dream  sequence by the 
ordinance of marriage.
Throughout Je su s’s dream, Kazantzakis accentuates the lure of 
carnal satisfaction, the last tem ptation’ of the novel’s title, through his 
use of ancient fertility symbols. Consider how the negro boy liberates a  
tethered and frustrated bull ju s t before Je su s’s marriage to Magdalene. 
Upon being set free, the bull copulates with heifers in a  m e a d o w . H e r e
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the bull signifies the newly liberated Jesu s who, now th a t he realises he
was crucified only in a  dream, is similarly free to procreate with
Magdalene. Indeed, after sex with his new bride, Je su s  reclines
underneath  a  lemon tree and hears the buU “beUowing in the distance,
rested now and satiated”.
Overcome with the joys of the flesh, and in a  reversal of the beliefs
he held prior to his crucifixion, Je su s  asserts th a t the world (matter) is a
“daughter of God, a graceful sister of the soul”.^ ^® Furtherm ore, Jesus
apparently succum bs to his la s t  tem ptation’ when he m akes the
following confession to Magdalene;
I went astray because I sought a  route outside of the flesh; I w anted to go by way of the clouds, great thoughts, and 
death. Woman, precious fellow-worker of God: forgive me. I bow and worship you, Mother of God.i^o
In ironic mockery, Kazantzakis has Jesu s propose “Paraclete, the
Comforter”, the Christian New Testam ent term  for ‘God’s Spirit’, as a
suitable name for the child he will have with Magdalene.^®^
After Magdalene unexpectedly dies, Je su s’s happiness continues
with his new wife amd more children. After announcing th a t the Saviour
comes “gradually—from embrace to embrace, son to son”, Jesu s confesses
th a t he has no further need for any miracles of God.^®^ Rather, “a  tiny
house is big enough for me, amd a  m outhful of bread, and the simple
words of a  w o m a n ! F i n a l l y ,  as if to underscore his newest vocational
outlook amd, by Implication, his la test acquiescence to the devil’s la s t
tem ptation’, Je su s  declares an  end to all previous metaphysical
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perplexity:
Je su s’ face shone. ‘Tve finished wrestling with God,” 
he said. “We have become friends. I won’t  build crosses any 
more. I’ll build troughs, cradles, bedsteads. I’ll send a  
message to have my tools brought from Nazareth; I’H have 
my embittered m other come too, so th a t she can bring up 
her grandchildren and feel some sweetness on her lips at last, poor thing. ”134
Je su s’s domestic composure, made clear for us in some of the 
statem ents cited above, steadily deteriorates with three vital incidents in 
Je su s’s imagined life as an  old man: (1) Lazarus’s sister, Maiy, appears 
scared by nightm ares th a t her m arried life with Jesu s is nothing bu t a lie 
created by the devil, (2) Simon of Gyrene visits Je su s  to inform him th a t 
Pilate was crucified on Golgotha, and (3) Je su s’s provocative exchange 
with the Apostle Paul.^®^ Each of these three episodes frightens and 
intim idates Jesus, especially his uncomfortable encounter with the 
Apostle Paul. As a  result, Je su s  spins out the rest of his soliloquizing 
life in a  restless, agitated mood.
Only Judas, appearing once more as Je su s’s demonic side, seems
able and willing to remind Jesu s of his original role as saviour-martyr.
After revealing the Satanic origin of the negro lad, Ju d as  castigates Jesus
for succum bing to the devil’s la s t  tem ptation’ to be ‘happy’:
“Where is the cross which was supposed to be our 
springboard to heaven? As he faced the cross this fake 
M essiah went dizzy and fainted. Then the ladies got hold of 
him  and installed him to m anufacture children for them. He 
says he fought, fought courageously. Yes, he swaggers about like the cock of the roost. But your post, deserter, was on the cross, and you know it.”i36
With such trenchan t rem arks, Ju d as insinuates th a t heroic fife on earth
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involves transubstan tiating  fleshly concerns into spiritual discipline. 
However, Ju d as  sees the ‘hom espun Je su s’ of the ‘last tem ptation’ dream 
sequence as little more th an  a  decorated foot-soldier in the Great Army 
of the Mediocre.
Struggling to escape the allure of his last tem ptation’ and with
Ju d a s’s rem arks still ringing in his ears, Kazantzakis’s Je su s  wishes
himself back onto the cross and the dream  sequence ends. In The Cretan
Glance: The W orldand Art o f Nikos Kazantzakis, Morton P. Levitt links
this dream  a t the end of Kazantzakis’s novel with the dream  which opens
The Last Temptation. He connects Je su s’s death with the butterfly trope
we used earlier in this chapter, and he asserts, as we have done, tha t The
Last Temptation and The Saviors o f God are two texts with close ties:
. . .  he [Jesus] struggles to awake from his last tem ptation— 
as earlier he had fought out of his dream  of Redbeard and 
the dwarfs—and aided by Judas, he awakes and dies on the 
cross, affirming the life he has chosen to lead and denying 
the one he might have enjoyed. He truly lives and  dies with 
his visions. In the silence at the edge of the precipice, 
confronting himself across the abyss of hum an  desires and 
forgetfulness, he has a t last sprouted wings, his life a 
dram atization of all m en’s struggles, a  living m etaphor th a t 
grows from the rhetorical imagery of The Saviors o f G o d . 137
Our thesis throughout this chapter is th a t The Last Temptation is a  
mythopoesis of process thought. In other words, Kazantzakis’s fictional 
biography of Jesu s parabolizes how disembodied spirit [élanvital], the 
m echanism  of evolutionary change in our processive world, constantly 
launches itself into m atter, how the élan vital energizes corporeality, 
transm uting  flesh into spirit (the process of dematerialization), and how
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the élan vital begins the creative process anew once it has unm ade itself. 
Jesu s exemplifies this cyclical process of dematerialization. Through the 
increm ental agency of God, energetically present throughout all four 
stages of Je su s’s messianic formation, Jesus is lured to act in ways tha t 
spiritualize his own being. Kazantzakis’s Jesus therefore becomes Christ 
through a  co-constitution of God’s agency and his own heroic struggle.
In The Last Temptation, Je su s reflects Kazantzakis’s understanding
of the complexity of spiritual evolution. From the last page of th is novel,
it is clear th a t Kazantzakis intends us to grasp how Je su s’s stage-by-
stage advance is a creative evolution towards dematerialization:
No, no, he was not a  coward, a  deserter, a  traitor. No, he 
was nailed to the cross. He had stood his ground 
honourably to the very end; he had kept his word. The 
moment he cried ELI ELI and fainted, Temptation had 
captured him for a  split-second and led him astray. The joys, marriages and children were lies; the decrepit degraded 
old men who shouted coward, deserter, traitor a t him were 
lies. All—aU were illusions sent by the Devil. His disciples 
were alive and thriving. They had gone over sea  and land 
and were proclaiming the Good News. Everything had turned out as it should, gloiy be to God!
He uttered a  trium phant cry: IT IS ACCOMPLISHED!
And it was as though he had said: Everything hasbegun. 138
For Kazantzakis, the “everything” which has “begun” is the process of 
dematerialization, the ceaseless making and unm aking of the élanvital.
In his four stages of messianic formation, Jesus evolves and becomes 
Kazantzakis’s parable of th is process of demateriahzation, and with The 
Last Temptation's final statem ent—“Everything has begun”--it is clear
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th a t the élanvita litséif does not ‘die’ with Je su s’s death; rather, Je su s’s 
crucifixion signals the liberty of élan to begin the creative process 
anew.^^®
The Saviors o f God is the basis for The Last Temptation's process 
view of an  evolving God and the changing world:
All the concentrated agony of the Universe bu rsts out 
in every living thing. God is imperiled in the sweet ecstasy 
and bitterness of flesh.
B ut he shakes himself free, he leaps out of brains and 
loins, then  clings to  new brains and new loins until the 
struggle for liberation again breaks out from thebeginning. 140
A similar, process understanding of God, where God advances along with 
the forward th ru s t of the cosmos, is developed in John  Cobb’s 
W hiteheadian process Christology. In the next section, we compare and 
contrast Kazantzakis and Cobb. Despite clear differences in the form of 
their writing, and these will become apparent as we progress, we believe 
substantive concerns unites far more than  it divides these two thinkers.
G. Cobb on  God, C hrist, and th e  P rocess o f  C reative T ransform ation  
It is clear from Part I of his Christ in a Pluralistic Age th a t John  
Cobb’s process understanding of Christ as ‘creative transform ation’ owes 
an im portant debt of influence to Alfred North W hitehead’s distinction in 
Process and Reality: A n Essay in Cosmology between the primordial and 
consequent natures of God.^^^ Indeed, Cobb identifies his view of the 
Logos with W hitehead’s notion of the divine primordial nature; namely, 
God as the creative source of novelly, order, possibility, and harm ony in
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our evolutionary advance. And like Whitehead, Cobb th inks of the
divine Logos as both transcendent and im m anent presence, a  particular
providence a t work in our emerging world:
The Logos in its transcendence is timeless and infinite, but 
in its incarnation or immanence it is always a  specific force 
for ju s t th a t creative transform ation which is possible and optimal in each situation. 143
In Christ in a Pluralistic A ge, Cobb holds th a t the divine Logos 
provides each actual entity within the creative process with both a 
foundational aim and a  lure for the fulfillment of th is specific goal:
The Logos is im m anent in aU things as the initial 
phase of their subjective aim, th a t is, as their fundam ental impulse toward actualization. 144
According to Cobb, God’s providential ‘aim and lure’ is contextually
shaped because there is a  gradation of immanence of the Logos within
the temporal advance. In so-called ‘inanim ate objects’ fike tables and
chairs, Cobb believes th a t the Logos is im m anent in the re-enactm ent of
the object’s immediate past, ensuring the continuance of the enduring
object. In living persons, though, Cobb holds th a t God’s “initial aim
is a t a  relevant novelty rather th an  a t reenactm ent”.^ ^® In common with
Nikos Kazantzakis, who throughout his writings refers to the ubiquitous
and progressive agency of the divine Cry or “creative B reath”, John  Cobb
holds th a t the Logos perm eates all aspects of our dynamic and relational
world, even its ‘lifeless’ features. And like Kazantzakis, Cobb concerns
himself with the functioning of the Logos in  subjective life, for, Cobb
states, “it is in living things th a t the proper work of the Logos is
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slgnlfLccintiy m anifest”. ^  ^  ®
John  Cobb’s view in Christ in a Pluralistic Age is th a t the Logos 
incarnates itself whenever and wherever we try to instan tia te  creative 
novelty in our experience. As we have observed, Kazantzakis often uses 
the word metousiosts for this type of ‘novelty’ or ‘creative transform ation’. 
Although Cobb claims novelty aim s for the “maxim um  incorporation of 
elements from the past in a new synthesis”, he concedes th a t it often 
struggles for actualization because of our anxiety and provinciality.^'^® 
Nonetheless, one finds th a t the principle of creative transform ation 
(‘Logos’) is m ade m anifest as ‘Christ’ wherever and whenever novelty is 
instantiated in the temporal process.^®® For Cobb, th is is the subjective 
meaning of the Logos as it refers to us and as it m anifests itself in 
critical and creative reasoning, disinterested love, the free play of the 
imagination, and  intellectual curiosity. In Christ in a Pluralistic A ge, 
‘C hrist’ signifies “the imm anence or incarnation of the Logos in the 
world of living things and especially of hum an beings”.
In the context of our thesis, we believe we can say th a t Cobb’s 
process view of Christ, developed in Christ in a Pluralistic Age and in other 
theological Avritings, and Kazantzakis’s account of God’s dynamic agency 
in Jesus, expressed in a  num ber of literaiy works bu t culminating in The 
Last Temptation, draw together. Indeed, Cobb’s W hiteheadian idea of how 
the incarnate Logos dem ands “th a t we give up w hat we ourselves love, 
our security in our own achievements” compares with Kazantzakis’s
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claim in Report to Greco (and implied throughout The Last Temptation] 
th a t the “creative B reath” toils against our desire to be ‘happy’ and 
‘settled’, luring us to transubstan tia te  flesh into s p i r i t . I n  Report to 
Greco, Kazantzakis teUs us th a t “the Ciy of the Invisible” advances by 
declaring war on all our established custom s and revered wisdom. And 
in The Last Temptation, God’s Ciy appears to Jesu s as vicious thorn- 
claws, beckoning Je su s  to transform  himself from a  simple carpenter into 
the Son of God. By the same token, Cobb asserts th a t ‘C hrist’ nam es 
the incarnate Logos as it seeks “to introduce tension between w hat has 
been and what might be” in our emerging world.
In their m any and varied texts, Cobb and Kazantzakis use the 
term  ‘God’ to signify th a t Spiritual Presence which seeks the dynamic 
transm utation of the entire pluriverse. In Cobb’s process thought, God 
strives to call the world forward to novel expressions of aesthetic worth. 
Similarly, Kazantzakis’s Report to Greco characterizes God as One who 
“advances along with us, He too, searching and being exposed to danger; 
He too is given over to the struggle”.
As previously mentioned, Cobb m aintains in his Christ in a 
Pluralistic Age th a t the Logos incarnate (‘Christ’) is present in the world 
as the provider of initial aim s for actual entities. At the hum an level, 
our concrescence entails differing degrees of openness to a  myriad of 
influences which function as data  for our creative synthesis. Where 
novelty occurs in the creative synthesis of past influences and  future
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possibilities, it is then  th a t it is appropriate to say th a t we are creatively 
transform ed. Here Cobb believes th a t Christ is discernible as the 
principle of creative transform ation Incarnate. For Cobb, we are m ost 
open to the presence of the Logos when we first feel ourselves confronted 
by an  initial aim as coming from beyond ourselves, and when we then 
nam e the initial aim, ‘Christ’ (Whitehead thought it sufficient to call it
‘God’). 1^7
Kazantzakis’s own reflections on the value of C hrist for our
changing world are close to Cobb’s process view of C hrist’ as creative
transform ation. In Report to Greco, Kazantzakis describes Christ as an
agent of personal and social change, an im portant fulcrum  between
facticity and possibility in hum an existence:
... I knew th a t here on earth, for the full span  of our lives, 
Christ was not the harbor where one casts anchor, but the 
harbor from which one departs, gains the offing, encounters 
a  wild, tem pestuous sea, and then struggles for a  lifetime to 
anchor in God. Christ is not the end, He is the beginning.
He is not the “Welcome!” He is the “Bon voyage!” He does 
not sit back restfuUy in soft clouds, bu t is battered by the waves ju s t as we are, His eyes fixed aloft on the North Star, 
His hands firmly on the helm. That was why I liked Him; th a t was why 1 would follow him .158
In Report to Greco, Kazantzakis characterizes Christ as the “great Striver”
whose OAvn becoming disrupts our conservative impulses, and who incites
us to transm ute flesh into spirit. As we have noted, Je su s ’s spiritual
evolution (into the Christ), how he strives to overcome his own bodily
desires and the provinciality of others, is parabolized in all four stages of
The Last Temptation.
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In common with Kazantzakis’s view of Christ’s dynamic and 
disturbing presence in our changing world, Cobb beheves th a t Christ as 
the incarnate principle of creative transform ation challenges our social 
structures, hierarchical patterns, established rules of conduct, and 
revered moral maxims. In Christ in a Pluralistic Age, Cobb’s Christ 
relativizes our experience of the world, confronting us with a  rem inder of 
w hat has been and a  suggestion for what can be if we assign our energies 
to an open future:
To nam e the Logos “C hrist” is to express and to ehcit 
trust. It is to promise th a t the unknown into which we are called is life ra ther than  death. In short, it is to call for and 
make possible radical conversion from bondage to the past to 
openness to the future. This is to say th a t to nam e the 
Logos “Christ” is to recognize th a t the cosmic Logos is love. 
This is not an  easy recognition. We experience the Logos as 
demanding of us th a t we give up w hat we ourselves love, our 
security in our own achievements. It forces u s  to recognize 
tha t in fact these are not our own achievements a t all but 
achievements of the Logos in which we have actively participated. We w ant to rest in them  and stabilize them. 
The Logos m akes us restless and condemns our desire for 
stability. In short we experience the Logos as judgm ent.
But when we name it Christ we recognize th a t the judgm ent 
is for our sake, th a t what it condemns in us is th a t in us 
which would destroy us, th a t which it dem ands of us is what it gives us. 160
For Cobb, the Logos incarnate as Christ confronts us as 
‘judgm ent’ because sloth is the very enemy of creatM fy and curiosity. 
Thus, w hat the Logos condemns in our experience is the quality which 
would destroy the meaningfulness of life. In The Last Temptation, the 
élan vital or God functions in ways similar to Cobb’s grasp of the Logos 
incarnate. Indeed, the élanvital denounces Je su s’s initial desire for
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marriage and progeny precisely because both, when seen as chances to 
‘settle down’, th reaten  to destroy Je su s’s chances of becoming the Son of 
God.
H. J e su s  as th e  In carn ate  Christ: Cobb's W hitehead ian  C h risto logy
In Part II of Christ in a Pluralistic Age, John  Cobb m akes it clear 
th a t he considers his view of Christ as creative transform ation to be 
integrally bound up  with the historical Je su s of Nazareth. This is 
because ‘Christ’ nam es not only creative transform ation bu t also “the 
singular figure of a  Nazarene carpenter”.^ ® ^  To grasp how Cobb arrives at 
this statem ent, we m ust examine his “A W hiteheadian Christology”, an  
article written in the early 1970s which is assum ed in his 1975 Christ in 
a Pluralistic A ge. In th is early article, Cobb uses W hiteheadian process 
categories to show how it is possible to speak of one actual entity being 
present in another w ithout either of them  becoming any the less 
independent. ^  ^
In “A W hiteheadian Christology”, Cobb invites us to consider two 
occasions of hum an experience, A and B. In its concrescence by B, A is 
said to be present in a  significant m anner. Yet B is still an  independent 
entity. No aspect of B is displaced by the presence of A, yet the presence 
of A is a  real and genuine feature of B’s becoming. In B’s concrescence, 
then, A is prehended and incorporated by a  creative synthesis into B. As 
a  consequence, A is genuinely and effectively present w ithin the actual 
occasion, B. This m eans th a t in B’s concrescence there is the inclusion 
of A as prehended datum . For Cobb, w hat is im portant in his theoretical
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discussion is this notion o f ‘prehension’, for “the mode of presence of one 
occasion in another is as prehended datum”. C o b b  also insists in this 
essay th a t we should conceive of the ontological s ta tu s  of God like th a t 
of actual occasions. Cobb’s conclusion is therefore th a t “God is also a 
prehended datum , and he is therefore present in actual occasions in the 
way in  which data  generally are present”. T h e  im portant idea here is 
th a t the divine is to be thought of as present in all actual occasions in 
our emerging world.
In “A W hiteheadian Christology”, Cobb says th a t if we grant this 
sense of God’s ubiquitous presence in the creative process, then our next 
task  is to find a  way to affirm the distinctive divine presence in  the Hfe of 
the historical Jesus. For Cobb, such distinctiveness rests on the idea 
th a t in the creative process not all actual occasions prehend the divine 
in the sam e way. Indeed, Cobb thinks th a t within our world it is 
generally the case th a t “prehensions by one actual occasion of others are 
highly differentiated”.^ ®® The same is true when referring to God as 
prehended datum . With regard to subjective becoming, the process God 
is thought to provide context-dependent initial aims for our individual 
advancement. For Cobb, though, our prehension of God’s aim for our 
Uves differs since our awareness of such  aims, coupled with our 
Avillingness to actualize them , is subject to a m ultitude of factors.^®®
In Cobb’s view, it is possible th a t in the act of concrescence B may 
prehend A in such a  way th a t the faet th a t A is being prehended becomes
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of decisive significance for B. Religiously speaking, Cobb claims tha t 
th is is true of the Eighth-Centuiy Hebrew Prophets. According to Cobb, 
prophets like Isaiah prehended the initial aim to preach the dem ands of 
justice as issuing from God, and th is had a  decisive effect upon them.^®^ 
Unlike the prophets who experienced the divine as Other, Cobb declares 
in Christ in a Pluralistic Age th a t Je su s ’s unique structure of existence 
center on his T, the organizing centre of his life, as being co-constituted 
by inheritance from its personal past, and by fullness of the “subjective 
reception of the lure to self-actualization tha t is the call and presence of 
the Logos’’.^ ®®
Writing in Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition, Cobb 
insists th a t there is no tension between the two elements in Je su s ’s co­
constitution, for “whereas Christ is incarnate in everyone, Jesu s is the 
Christ because the incarnation is constitutive of his very selfhood”.^ ®®
In Christ in a Pluralistic A ge, Cobb m aintains th a t Je su s ’s hum anity is 
not displaced by the Logos in th is structu re of existence. On the 
contrary, the Logos shares in the constitution of the hum an ‘1’ of Je su s 
who, in his personhood, is the “paradigm of incarnation”.^ ^®
In The Last Temptation, it is clear to us th a t a  strikingly similar 
‘co~constitution’ m arks the ‘personality’ of Nikos Kazantzakis’s Jesus.
We say th is because Jesu s ceaselessly wrestles with God’s Cry, because 
he prehends the divine in aU the m any features of the creative process, 
and because he is frequently seized by God and taken on to new stages of
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spiritual becoming. The character of Je su s in The Last Temptation 
rem ains vital and alive as a  character and yet also bears a  perceptible 
Christological quality. In his self-understanding, Je su s  appears to be 
dynamically co-constituted by his own immediate past and by the 
fullness of his personal reception of the lure to transubstan tia te  m atter 
into spirit th a t is the Cry and presence of God (or élanvital).
In Part 11 of Christ in a Pluralistic Age, Cobb m aintains th a t the 
qualify of Je su s’s structure of existence can be grasped when we examine 
Je su s’s words and ministry. Although Jesus inherits m any traditions 
and sources from within Judaism , Cobb declares th a t Je su s  creatively 
transform s Jewish theological thought because his message concerning 
the Kingdom of God places a question m ark over ancient Jewish wisdom 
and practice, calling for a  renewed moral em phasis on love and justice 
within inter-personal r e l a t i o n s . ^ C o b b  is sure th a t Je su s’s message 
does not negate or supersede Jewish tradition(s); rather, Cobb believes 
th a t Je su s sensitively took elements from it (them) and called people out 
from w hat he perceived as a  meaningless religiosity and into a  life of 
hope based on the message of unconditional concern grounded in 
forgiveness and expressed in the pursu it of justice. In Cobb’s view, it 
was not so m uch w hat Jesu s inherited by way of Jewish theological 
ideas, bu t how Jesus arranged them  and made use of them  to creatively 
transform  the Judaism (s) of his day. ^
Accompanying this em phasis on Je su s’s dynamic message, Cobb 
grounds Je su s’s importance in his vital ability to effect “the advancement
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What attracted me and gave me courage above 
everything else was how—with w hat striving and deering-do, what frantic hope—the person who found himself in Clnrist 
set out to reach God and merge with Him, so th a t the two 
might become indissolubly one. There is no other way to 
reach God but this. Following Christ’s bloody tracks, we m ust fight to transubstan tia te  the m an inside us into spirit, so th a t we may merge with God. 176
Furtherm ore, Cobb suggests th a t if the message and work of Jesu s is so
powerful in opening believers up to creative transform ation, then  the
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of creative transform ation in others”. L i k e  a  dynamic neutron which 
sta rts  a  chain reaction of transformation, Je su s’s words and m inistry 
effect transvaluation of value. In Christ in a Pluralistic Age, Cobb insists 
th a t Je su s  challenges our stabilities, introducing a  spirit of restlessness 
and creativity into our conventional world. Kazantzakis agrees. In a 
March 19, 1915 notebook entry, Kazantzakis shares his own sense of 
being creatively transform ed after he hears the twelve Gospels of Holy 
Thursday:
Great emotion in church. The Crucified seemed to me 
more mine, more myself. I felt the “suffering God” deeply 
within me and said: May Resurrection come with 
perseverance, love, and effort. Joy, victory over passion, dematerialization, freedom. Simplicity and  serenify, 
composed of the essence of all the passions, which have been 
subordinated to the divine Eye. Spirit like light and like the clear water of the fountain. 174
In Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition, Cobb announces 
th a t the sayings of Jesu s question our virtue,* indeed, “by reversing our 
self-evaluation he [Jesus] opens us up to creative transform ation”.^ ^® In 
a  similar way, Kazantzakis intim ates in Report to Greco th a t C hrist’s 
power resides in Christ’s ability to inspire and creatively agitate devotees:
term  ‘Christ’ is appropriately associated with J e s u s . I n d e e d ,  Cobb
believes th a t when the words of Je su s  are heard with an  open mind, they
function to destroy our complacency and call us forward to actualize new
possibilities. When this occurs, Jesus can be seen as the Christ, as
creative transform ation or, to use Kazantzakis’s words in Report to Greco,
Christ becomes “the harbor from which one departs". Lastly, Cobb
believes th a t whenever we creatively respond in faith to the words and
m lnistiy of Jesus, it is then th a t a  deepening of the incarnation occurs
or, as Kazantzakis pu ts it, “a  M essiah is always advancing [moving
forward, making progress]...”^
I. C hrist and th e  P rocess o f  S a lva tion
In Christ in a Pluralistic Age, John  Cobb holds th a t the process of
salvation is directly related to a  creative social energy which God in
Christ has let loose within the processes of history. As Christ Incarnate,
Jesu s is the locus of this novel force. Furtherm ore, Cobb believes tha t
Je su s’s redeeming power is his abilily to draw us into the vigour of this
dynamic energy set in motion by God, the Logos:
The real past event of the crucifixion and resurrection of 
Jesus, involving his total being, has objectively established a 
sphere of effectiveness or a  field of force into which people 
can enter. To enter the field is to have the efficacy of the 
salvation event become causally determinative of increasing aspects of one’s total life.iso
In The Last Temptation, Nikos Kazantzakis m akes it clear th a t he
sees Jesu s as the Christ for reasons similar to those advanced by Cobb.
Indeed, Kazantzakis notes th a t in Je su s’s struggle to effect ‘union with
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God’, to respond to the lure to self-surm ount th a t is the call and 
presence of the divine Ciy, Jesu s evolves through four arduous stages of 
materiality to the apex-point of dematerialization. With Je su s’s death, 
Kazantzakis says, the élan vital is unleashed from the flesh, set free to 
energize the world anew, and an  inspiring model of transubstan tiation  is 
placed in front of us:
In order to m ount to the Cross, the sum m it of 
sacrifice, and to God, the sum m it of Immateriality, Christ 
passed through all the stages which the m an who struggles 
passes through. That is why his suffering is so familiar to 
us; th a t is why we share it, and why his final victory seems 
to us so m uch our own future victory. That part of Christ’s 
nature which was profoundly hum an helps us to understand 
him  and love him and to pursue his Passion as though it 
were our own
In Part 111 of Christ in a Pluralistic Age, Cobb tells us th a t he finds 
Christ in the m echanism  of creative transform ation (Kazantzakis would 
call this ‘transubstan tiation’), a  process which has the Logos (the divine 
Cry) for its genesis. Christ is particularly focused in Je su s ’s ministry 
and, according to Cobb, Christ is made real in each new moment by the 
Christian community th a t positively prehends the lure toward relevant 
novelty. Now, Cobb concedes th a t our world is one where few of u s are 
persuaded by this lure to transform  ourselves. He believes th a t we often 
miss out on the process of salvation by deciding negatively to prehend 
Christ’s transforming presence. Negative prehension occurs when we 
retreat into cherished customs, comfortable social arrangem ents, and 
emotionally withdraw from our world. That is to say, in our bid for 
self-assurance we often become indifferent to our fellow m en and women.
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This leads to a  settled stability, shying away from risk, vulnerability,
weakness, cuid anguish. Paradoxically, th is situation yields only guilt
and anxiety, for such indifference is inauthentically hum an. According
to Cobb, only God in Christ saves us and gives us hope by confronting us
in each concrescing moment with the persuasive influence of the divine
transforming power:
The Logos [which is incarnate as Christ in Cobb’s 
Christology] brings novel possibility th a t reopens the future 
a t every moment. It calls for the expansion of horizons of concern and interest. By continually incarnating itself, the 
Logos constitutes a  process th a t favors growth and historicaladvance. 184
For Cobb, Jesu s as the Christ is therefore contem poraneous as the 
struggling (and sometimes effective) presence of creative transform ation 
in our changing world. Similarly, in The Last Temptation Kazantzakis 
ties the complex process of salvation to Jesu s as the Christ, and he 
states his belief in the continuous and creative agency of Je su s  when he 
affirms how “we have a  model in front of us now, a  model who blazes our 
trail and gives us strength".^®® In short, Jesu s as the Christ compels 
both Cobb and Kazantzakis because Jesu s is the exemplification of 
creative transform ation /transubstan tiation  in our world, one whose 
‘personality’ is co-constituted by his immediate past and  by the fullness 
of his personal response to God’s lure or Cry forward.
J . Cobb and K azantzak is: C om p lem en tary  Y et A n ta g o n istic
Thus far in this third chapter we have been considering how Nikos 
Kazantzakis’s account in fiction of Je su s  of Nazareth and John Cobb’s
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W hiteheadian process Christological discourse appear to draw together. 
Indeed, both thinkers seem to be in broad agreement in five m ain areas 
of thought. First, Kazantzakis and Cobb jointly emphasize the dynamic 
character of reality. Second, they hold th a t movement and novelty are 
intimately a  part of hum an as well as divine experience. Third, they 
believe th a t God’s lure or Cry forward is the dynamic m echanism  which 
drives the evolutionaiy advance into an open future. Fourth, they seem 
united in their portrayal of how Jesu s  of Nazareth becomes the decisive 
Instance of God’s creative presence in our on-going world. They both 
believe th a t Je su s’s T, the organizing centre of his own experience, is 
gradually co-constituted both by Je su s’s own immediate past and by the 
fullness of his subjective reception to the call or Cry of God. Fifth, they 
hold th a t Je su s’s public m inistry of ‘creative transform ation’ (Cobb) or 
metousiosis (Kazantzakis) is a  catalyst for continuous change. For both 
thinkers, Je su s’s words and deeds are not merely an event of the past but 
also a  perpetual inspiration for metanoia in the present and  foreseeable 
future. Using a  phrase th a t we first introduced in our second chapter, 
we believe we can say th a t because of their five points of convergence, 
Kazantzakis’s The Last Temptation and John Cobb’s W hiteheadian 
process Christology ‘trespass’ upon common ground.
Having noted the nature of their agreement, we are compelled to 
recognize th a t Cobb and Kazantzakis also appear to ‘trespass’ upon one 
another’s ground. While they b y  to occupy the sam e location (they both 
write about Je su s’s becoming Christ), they execute th is task  with very
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different agendas and personae. Indeed, we cannot ignore the contrast in 
the form of their writing. While Kazantzakis wrote The Last Temptation 
in fictional narrative, Cobb’s W hiteheadian process Christology is 
expressed through the mode of argum entation. This difference in textual 
em phasis has some bearing on the way we place Cobb and Kazantzakis 
in dialogue with another.
When he characterizes Je su s’s spiritual evolution as passing 
through four stages, Kazantzakis is not offering a  Christological trac t for 
theologians to contemplate; rather, Kazantzakis is furnishing a  dram atic 
narrative. Christological questions may emerge from our reading of The 
Last Temptation, bu t Kazantzakis’s fictional account of Je su s  is primarily 
to be judged discretely, on its own terms. The Last Temptation is self- 
sustaining because it uses a  ‘first-order language’; indeed, it has a 
concrete, poetic, and imagistic character. By contrast, Cobb’s Christ in a 
Pluralistic Age is an  example o f ‘second-order language’; indeed, it is an 
attem pt to provide a  coherent, rational, and systematic account of the 
implications of Christian religious experience. This textual difference 
entails th a t the process theologian would be guilty of trespassing upon 
Kazantzakis’s ground if she tried to make The Last Temptation over in her 
image.
Kazantzakis’s The Last Temptation should not be seen strictly as a 
Christological text. It neither serves as a  vehicle for Christological 
reflection, nor depends for its energy upon its connection to such. When 
we read it, we imaginatively enter the discrete world th a t Kazantzakis
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creates, and we implicitly believe w hat we are shown by Kazantzakis in 
his novel. Thus, we suspend our disbelief in order to negotiate the 
fictional terrain th a t Kazantzakis m aps out for u s as readers. In Cobb’s 
process Christology, as we’ve suggested with process theology in general, 
we rarely suspend our disbelief; on the contrary, when we read Christ in a 
Pluralistic Age we find th a t we often address issues of belief by assessing 
their doctrinal credibiliiy and their credal ‘appropriateness’ to the 
Christian tradition. The Last Temptation's association with Christ in a 
Pluralistic Age, like literature’s alliance with theology in general, would 
therefore seem to be dialogical and uneasy. When examined together, 
Kazantzakis and Cobb represent competing and conflicting voices or, to 
use Meland’s trope once again, they seem to trespass upon one another’s 
ground.
The proposal in the previous paragraph th a t Kazantzakis and Cobb 
trespass upon one another’s ground does not necessarily invalidate our 
earlier stated  conviction th a t both thinkers trespass upon common 
ground. While reading Christ in a Pluralistic Age can and does Illumine 
The Last Temptation, we can and do read The Last Temptation discretely. 
These apparently conflicting strategies of reading do not negate one 
another, though, because reading often requires th a t ( 1 ) we use not one 
bu t a  complex of strategies of interpretation and, (2) th a t nobody can or 
should make absolute and universal claims for reading because such a 
position is not sustained by the form  of the text itself. Critics who 
appear to profess and depend on an ultimate interpretation will, once
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th a t interpretation is taken to its logical end, often deconstruct and 
undercu t themselves. This is deconstruction’s key insight. Thus, we 
freely adopt deliberately conflicting strategies of reading vis-à-vis 
Kazantzakis’s novels. The Last Temptation is, in one im portant sense,
‘two texts’. We read it bifocally, we have a  stereophonic experience. As 
we read it in this ‘bifocal’ way, so we learn to live with the paradoxical 
tension th a t Kazantzakis is and is not a  process theologian.
It should now be apparent th a t our sense of the complementary yet 
antagonistic relationship between Kazantzakis and Cobb rests on the 
specific model of ‘theology’ which we first introduced in chapter two of 
our thesis. Utilizing the work of scholars as diverse as S allie McFague, 
Michael Goldberg, David Jasper, T. R. Wright, and Gabriel Vahanian, we 
have suggested th a t ‘theology’ can be seen as a  type of ‘second-order’, 
disciplined reflection on ‘first-order’ religious experience. This theory of 
the nature and task  of theology has strong finks with Anselm’s model of 
theology as ‘faith seeking understanding’. In this view, ‘understanding’ 
involves critical reflection on abstract concepts; therefore, faith seeks 
conceptual clarity and logical exactitude, which it is theology’s task  to 
furnish. John  Cobb is a  good example of this kind of theologian. As we 
have seen in our exposition of his work, Cobb’s process Christology 
concerns itself (following Alfred North W hitehead’s own philosophical 
procedure) with a disciplined search for conceptual coherence within an 
undisturbed sense of temporal progression.
Accompanying his concern for logical exactitude, Cobb also
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believes th a t theological understanding m ust be germane to the biblical 
and apostolic witness, and  be purposeful to the hum an condition as it is 
lived and experienced today. Through his argum ent to affirm Jesus as 
the Christ and as the incarnate principle of creative transform ation at 
work in our on-going world, Cobb believes th a t his own reflections meet 
these criteria and views his process Christological understanding as 
critically plausible, appropriate to the biblical tradition, and existentially 
satisfactory. The assum ptions of Cobb’s position, though, have not gone 
unchallenged. Indeed, in his article “Transfiguration: Poetic Metaphor 
and Theological Reflection”, Frank Burch Brown sta tes th a t there are 
textual problems with how modern process theologians, Cobb included, 
approach complex m atters of faith.
Writing about the literary form of scripture, Brown points out that 
the biblical witness is “not conceptual in essence” and th a t our ovm lived 
experience very often cannot be expressed through so-called “clear and ,1'
distinct ideas”; therefore, “conceptual discourse”, traditionally thought 
to furnish us with the m ost reasonable cognizance of faith, hardly ever 
provides us with the ‘complete picture’ of reality which process thinkers 
often suppose it does.^®® Indeed, Brown holds th a t the m etaphoric base 
of scriptural language is often undercut by those process theologians 
who use conceptual language to ‘extrapolate’ or ‘abstract’ the so-called 
‘essence’ of the biblical witness.^®®
The literary mode of narrative fiction may similarly be contrasted
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with th is understanding of theology as proposltlonal discourse in th a t
creative writers often see (in ways th a t theologians sometimes struggle to
do) th a t Icinguage and m eaning are plurisignative. As T. R. Wright
indicates in Theology and Literature, narrative fiction is self-referential,
unlike theology, and through its num erous figurative devices, literature
resists totalization and celebrates ambiguity, paradox, and incongrufiy:
In literature, meaning is never fixed; any ‘complete’ 
interpretation would render the literaiy ‘work’ redundant 
(both the artefact and the Imaginative processes involved in 
its production, its writing and its reading). Interpretation of literature is always a  tem porary illumination, never, 
fortunately, a  ‘final solution’. There will always, therefore, be a  tension between conceptual and creative discourse. 
Systematic theology will continue the necessary attem pt to 
impose clarity and consistency upon language while 
literature will no doubt m aintain its equally necessaiy task, to explore, to complicate and to enrich the apparent security 
of theological concepts.i9i
In the above passage, Wright describes how literature perpetually tends
to frustrate the interiorizing, systematizing, and reference-claiming
tendencies of theological understanding. We can see w hat Wright m eans
when we contrast the conceptual language of John  Cobb’s W hiteheadian
process Christology with the m etaphoric discourse favoured by Nikos
Kazantzakis in The Last Temptation.
Throughout Christ in a Pluralistic A ge , with its chosen form of 
proposltlonal discourse ra ther th an  stoiy, Cobb’s concern is always for 
adequate conceptualization and the task  of theology, as he would see it, 
is the search for critically plausible and existentially fruitful concepts. 
While Kazantzakis’s poetic discourse has the capacity to give rise to
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conceptual thought, it generally defies any kind of clear-cut analysis.
This is because the figurative devices he uses in The Last Temptation, like 
butterflies for God’s agency as well as a  caged partridge for an  imprisoned 
élanvital, possess a  certain ‘tension’ which results from the ‘is and is 
not’ quality of the trope itself. This ‘tension’ between m etaphorical 
affirmation and negation, which creates ‘space’ for the reader, liberates 
the interpretive imagination to ‘play’ with the text under scrutiny. This 
‘tension’ entails th a t poetic discourse may not be constrained by rigorous 
and systematic argum ent without being evacuated o j all itsfictionaltty.
It is worth noting th a t Kazantzakis never formally approached the 
relationship between literature and theology in any of his publications. 
Despite this, one of Kazantzakis’s early philosophical articles has been 
translated  from Greek into English and is, upon close analysis, relevant 
to our current discussion. In this 1926 document, which appears in 
Peter A. Bien’s Kazantzakis: Politics o f the Spirit and which we propose to 
quote a t length, Kazantzakis contrasts w hat he refers to as “fiction” 
with “hypothesis” (we wonder if argum entation’ is synonymous with 
“hypothesis”?) and he suggests th a t those (are theologians included 
here?) who conceptualize “Mysteiy” in the form of dogmatic or formulaic 
pronouncem ent are misguided:
I divide people who w ant to solve philosophical 
problems not into materialists, idealists,positivists, etc., but 
into two large categories:
1) Those who accept the words matter, spirit, God, Ife  soul, ions, electrons, etc. as a  satisfactory answer. 1 place 
m aterialists, idealists, positivists, etc. in th is category.
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In other words, a  hypothesis discovers, a fiction invents.
second category in order to advance beyond the words 
“m atter,” “spirit,” etc. are not “hypotheses”—they are 
“fictions”. 193
2) Those who find these words unsatisfactory . . . .  
They are aware of (no, not simply aware of: they experience) 
the terrifying dark forces behind this bulkhead of words.This second category is divided into three classes:
a) All those who tremble and do not dare to step 
beyond these words. . . .
b) All those who advance with cerrtainiy beyond these words. They have discovered Mystery’s eternal, real form, 
and have outlined its substance, activily, and  relation to 
hum anity in irrefutable dogmas.
c) All those who . . . advance beyond the words and 
give a conscientiously transitory form to the unknown forces, 
bu t a  form th a t helps us advance.
In this second category, the first group strike me as 
more “thunderstruck” th an  is proper, the second as more 
naïve than  is proper. It is to the th ird—call them  w hat you 
will--that I belong.
B ut in order for th is third class to be adequately 
defined, we m u s t . . . distinguish the following two notions: hypothesis and fiction. A  hypothesis claims to discover the 
T ruth (with a  capital T); it w ants to conform to Realfiy (with 
a  capital R) as faithfully as possible. A fiction m akes no 
such naïve claim; it is a  useful m eans com m ensurate, in a  fruifful way, with m ankind’s need to integrate the fragmented 
details of its observations and theories. A fiction helps us 
(1) to advance, (2) to avoid self-deception. . . .
The m eans used by people in the th ird  class of the
We m ust remember th a t Kazantzakis’s rem arks in this 1926 
subjectivist manifesto’ are an  example of his political way of looking at 
the world. They do not reflect his understanding of the relationship 
between the disciplines of theology and literature. Despite this, we
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believe th a t his comments Indirectly issue a  challenge to received notions 
of the nature and ta sk  of theology. We say th is because Kazantzakis 
appears to heed Friedrich Nietzsche’s call to surm ount epistemological 
realism. Like Nietzsche, he both attacks the dogmatic th inker’s 
essentializing fetish for accounts of the highest ground (T ru th  with a 
captial T’ and ‘Reality with a  capital R’) and locates tru th ’s origin in the 
power of metaphor. In this way, Kazantzakis anticipates insights from 
deconstructive postm odernism (which we discussed in chapter two) and 
its rejection of w hat Carl A. Rashcke, in his article “The Deconstruction 
of God”, calls the “spurious m etaphysics of self-reference” in constructive 
theology (logocentrism ’ ). ^  ^  ^
For our purposes, logocentrism is best understood as describing 
those metaphysical and rational forms of thought which base themselves 
on a  pre-linguistic, Archimedean point-of-reference, the ‘transcendental 
signified’, which is believed to be somehow exempt from the paradoxes 
and ambiguities which are characteristic of the discourse which it itself 
grounds Two contemporary logocentric theologians, religious thinkers 
who use foundational concepts to anchor all meaning in their system(s) 
of thought, are (1) Karl Barth and his idea of God’s gracious self­
revelation in Jesu s Christ and, (2) Paul Tillich and his notion of God as 
Being-ltself. In addition, John  Cobb’s ‘becoming God’ functions in some 
respects as a  pure signified; in other words, his God’ is an  ontologically 
independent reality which depends on nothing else for its significance
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and meaning. Furtherm ore, Cobb’s ‘Logos as the principle of creative 
transform ation’ operates as the unassailable infrastructure in his 
process Christology.
Against logocentrism, Kazeintzakis’s fictional presentation of Jesus 
stands in judgm ent on Cobb’s desire to find unify, rational coherence, 
and m etaphysical ‘presence’ in all thought and experience. Unlike Cobb, 
Kazantzakis does not concern himself with metaphysically extrapolating 
notions of divinity to arrive a t ultim ate tru th  about reality. In his 
narrative fiction, Kazantzakis does not yearn for a  linguistic anchor, the 
sign which gives final m eaning to all others. Rather, Kazantzakis works 
with a  m ultitude of open-ended figurative devices to recreate the story of 
Jesu s anew for our time. The Last Temptation, to use Kazantzakis’s 
term s, is fiction which invents. By contrast, Cobb’s Christ in a Pluralistic 
Age is a  hypothesis which  claims to discover Truth. Therein lies an 
im portant contrast between Kazantzakis and Cobb.
There is one vital consequence which appears to follow from our 
discussion of the textual contrasts between Cobb and Kazantzakis: we 
can say th a t the creative tension between proposltlonal discourse and 
m etaphoric discourse helps to explain (at least in part) why there is a  
glacial divide between the disciplines of theology and literature. Indeed, 
the adopted form of writing in each specially stands in judgm ent of its 
immediate opposite, and this often entails th a t a  strain  is placed on any 
relationship between the theologian and the fiction vrriter. For example, 
the infinite complexity of Kazantzakis’s m etaphors of God’s presence
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invariably deconstruct Cobb’s process Christology which, a t least in its 
propositional form, is an exercise in reduction. By the sam e token, 
Cobb’s process Christology, a t least in its disciplined ordering of 
experience, highlights the danger in The Last Temptation's endless play of 
signification.
The difficulties th a t th is difference in textual form throws up may 
meem th a t theology and fiction nonetheless require one another. While 
it seems correct to rem ark th a t in  the form of their writing theology and 
literature deconstruct and disorient one another, it appears equally 
correct to claim th a t they reconstruct and orient one another. Indeed, 
theology often serves as the presence behind the writing of literature. We 
see th is to be so when we consider the Bergsonian process theology of so 
m any of Kazantzakis’s novels. Similarly, literature often provides the 
grounds for theological possibilities. We observe th is to be the case 
when we consider how eager John Cobb is to draw from the insights of 
artists and  fiction writers alike, including K a z a n t z a k i s . S u f f i c e  to say, 
the task  of literature and theology, to deconstruct and reconstruct, to 
orient and disorient one another, is a  task  which perhaps can be 
sustained only in process.
K. C onclud ing R em arks
With regard to Nikos Kazantzakis and John  Cobb, th is chapter 
has outlined the common centrality of Je su s  as the Christ in each 
writer’s understanding of a  process God and the concrescing world. Both 
write of Je su s  becoming Christ through his filial prehension of God’s
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Incremental agency. Thus, we m aintain th a t reading Cobb’s 
W hiteheadian process Christology can and does illumine our reading of 
Kazantzakis’s The Last Temptation. Bringing both writers together 
enables us to note points of convergence in their work. At the same 
time, we believe th a t reading Kazantzakis can lead us to become more 
perceptive regarding certain features of Cobb’s own work. Indeed, we 
have shown th a t one point of divergence between Kazantzakis and Cobb 
is in the form of their writing. In chapter four, we will observe further 
points of convergence and divergence when we situate Nikos 
Kazantzakis’s God’s Pauper: S t  Francis o f Assisi ‘in conversation’ with 
Blair Reynolds’s Toward a Process Pneumatology.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE
1. Although Alfred North Whitehead never developed a systematic Christology in his 
numerous books on process philosophy, the so-called “brief Galilean vision of humility” is 
central to his thought regarding the process God. See Whitehead, Process and Reality: An 
Essay in Cosmology, ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, cor. ed. (1929; 
New York: The Free Press, 1978) 342. Having noted this, the Christological implications 
of Whitehead’s process philosophy have been explored by theologians like John B. Cobb, 
Jr. In this chapter, we examine Cobb’s Whiteheadian Christology. To obtain an idea of 
how Cobb grasps the person and work of Christ from Whitehead’s process perspective, 
we examine three major Cobbian texts. Our main focus is his Christ in a Pluralistic Age 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975). We also cover his article “A Whiteheadian 
Christology”, Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. Delwin Brown, Ralph E. 
James, Jr., and Gene Reeves (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971) 382-98. In 
addition, we examine Cobb’s Christology in the 1976 book he co-authored with David Ray 
Griffin. See Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976) 95-110. With regard to Nikos Kazantzakis, his 
thoughts about Christ may be located in at least four major texts. In 1928, Kazantzakis 
wrote Hristos (Christ), currently untranslated into English. See Kazantzakis, ®e«.i:po 
(Athens: Difros, 1956). For more information about this drama, see Peter A. Bien, 
Kazantzakis: Politics of the Spirit (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989) viii, 
xviii, 128, 174, 186. In addition, see Peter A. Bien, “Kazantzakis’s Long Apprenticeship 
to Christian Themes”, God’s Straggler: Religion in the Writings of Nikos Kazantzakis, ed. 
Darren J. N. Middleton and Peter A. Bien (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1996) 
113-132. In 1954, Kazantzakis published his fictional transfiguration of Jesus, O Hristos
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ksanastawoneîai (In England: Christ Recrucified). For the Greek text, see O Xpiorôç 
|txvoi.cn:cxupCü\?Gi:at, 2nd ed. (Athens: Difros, 1955). For the English translation, see 
Christ Recrucified, trans. Jonathan Griffin (London: Faber and Faber, 1962). In 1955, 
Kazantzakis published his fictional biography of Jesus, O teleftawspirasmos (In England: 
The Last Temptation). Again, for the Greek text, see O TEipac^og (Athens:
Difros, 1955). For the English translation, see The Last Temptation, trans. Peter A. Bien 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1961). Finally, thoughts about Christ appear scattered 
throughout his 1961 (composed between 1955 and 1956) autobiographical novel, Anaford 
ston Gréko (In England: Report to Greco). For the Greek text, see Avoü|)Opot crxov 
FKpCKO (Athens: Eleni N. Kazantzaki Publications, 1964). For the English translation, 
see Report to Greco, trans. Peter A. Bien (London: Faber and Faber, 1965). In this third 
chapter of our study, we concentrate on The Last Temptation and Report to Greco. Our 
reasoning for this reading strategy is as follows. Report to Greco is Kazantzakis’s 
retrospective survey of the many influences which shaped his litemry career and personal 
life. Christ is an important influence throughout this text. With regard to The Last 
Temptation, we have two reasons for selecting this novel. First, we join literary critics like 
Theodore Ziolkowski and Georg Langenhorst in making a high estimation of the literary 
quality of this fictional biography of Jesus. See Theodore Ziolkowski, Fictional 
Transfigurations of Jesus {Princeton U]: Princeton University Press, 1972) 16-17. For 
Georg Langenhorst, see his “The Rediscovery of Jesus as a Literary Figure”, literature 
and Theology 9.1 (1995): 85-98. Our second reason for selecting The Last Temptation 
concerns its Bergsonian (and therefore ‘process’) basis. Indeed, Peter A. Bien sees 
Bergsonian themes in Kazantzakis’s The Last Temptation. See Bien, Kazantzakis: The 
Politics of the Spirit, 50. Similar thoughts appear in Bien, Nikos Kazantzakis—Novelist 
(London: Duckworth, 1989) 72-73. Also, see Bien, Tempted by Happiness: Kazantzakis’
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to Bien, Jerry H. Gill notes the Bergsonian basis of The Last Temptation, See Gill,
“Conflict and Resolution: Some Kazantzakian Themes”, Encounter 35 (1974): 219.
Finally, see Richard W. Chilson, “The Christ of Nikos Kazantzakis”, Thought 41 (1972):
69-89.
2. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Last Temptation, 7.
3. Nikos Kazantzakis’s view of life as a “luminous interval”, with a “dark abyss” on either |  
side, and in which spirit and matter war for mastery over each other, is recorded in 
Kazantzakis, The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises, trans. and with an introduction by 
Kimon Friar (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960) 43-44. Henri Bergson’s process 
philosophy is the intellectual parent of this way of picturing the world. The disembodied 
‘vital impulse’ propels itself into matter, agitates the creative advance, and stimulates it 
according to its dynamic tendencies. See Bergson, Creative Evolution, auth. trans. Arthur 
Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911) 11, 249-50.
4. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Last Temptation, 7-10.
5. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors o f God, 115-18. For a description of the idea of 
‘dematerialization’, see chapter one of this study.
6. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Last Temptation, 7.
7. Ibid., 7.
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9. See Peter A. Bien, Tempted by Happiness, 5. Nikos Kazantzakis’s own notebooks, 
lent to Professor Bien by Kazantzakis’s second wife, confirm that Kazantzakis envisaged 
Jesus’s spiritual formation passing through four distinct phases: “Son of the Carpenter”, 
“Son of Man (meek)”, “Son of David (fierce)”, and “Son of God”. Kazantzakis’s Jesus 
oscillates wildly between four ways of viewing his own Messianic work. Bien tells us that 
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personhood (5). In this second scheme, Kazantzakis’s Jesus moves through three 
Freudian-Jungian stages: “Individual unconscious (Freud)”, “Collective unconsciousness 
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classifications are diagrammatically represented by Bien (7). Since the above categories 
signify the governing structures with which Kazantzakis works in the construction of The 
Last Temptation, we will of necessity incorporate them in our own study of how 
Kazantzakis’s Jesus scales the metaphysical mountain from its base camp (ordinariness, 
convention, happiness) to its summit (meaningfulness or ‘authentic’ existence) and how 
Jesus liberates spirit from the confines of matter.
10. PqXqi A. Bi&n, Nikos Kazantzakis-Novelist, 73.
11. See Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 43. Also, see Peter A. Bien, Nikos 
Kazantzakis, Columbia Essays on Modern Writers 62 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1972) 13. Finally, see Peter A. Bien, Nikos Kazantzakis—Novelist, 10.
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15. For a discussion of this contrast, see Darren J. N. Middleton, “Dove of Peace or Bird 
of Prey?: Nikos Kazantzakis on the Activity of the Holy Spirit”, Theology Themes 1.3 
(1993): 15-18. While we hold that a strong tension exists between Nikos Kazantzakis’s art 
and images of God in the Christian tradition, note the more violent wording of the Mark 1:
10 text in the New Revised Standard Version of the Christian New Testament. Here it 
describes how Jesus of Nazareth “saw the heavens tom apart and the Spirit descending like 
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16. Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, 487; emphasis added.
17. See Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God, 84. Here Kazantzakis depicts ‘God’ as 
a merciless vulture who, advancing from carcass to carcass for something to feed on, f  
inexorably flies forward on a journey unfinished.
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20. Nikos Kazantzakis, The Last Temptation, 31. This is only the beginning. Along with 
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21. Ibid., 38.
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unhealthy exercise. In his answer, the monk recounts one of his many dreams. In this 
dream, the monk plays a rabbi who ‘cures’ Jesus of his religious doubts and spiritual 
struggles (recall that Kazantzakis originally intended his fictional biography of Jesus to be 
entitled, ‘Jesus Has Been Cured’), enabling him to become “the best carpenter in Nazareth” 
(297). At this point, Kazantzakis uses the incident to discuss the meaning of ‘disease’ and
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which to struggle and wrestle, not abject ones, and so Kazantzakis projects, through his 
Jesus, the idea that it is contentment (‘disease’), not spiritual tribulation (‘health’), which is 
the devil’s snare. For further discussion, see Darren J. N. Middleton, “Wrestling with 
God: Kazantzakis and Some Thoughts on Genesis 32: 22-32”, Movement: Journal of the 
Student Christian Movement Slimmer 1990: 11-12. J:
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spiritual maturation. Expressed in Bergsonian terms, we might say that Magdalene’s
bodily licentiousness frustrates the dynamic agency of the élanvital in her own life.
Possibly Magdalene is one of those “weak” souls who do “not have the endurance to resist
the flesh for veiy long” (7). She certainly identifies herself with matter rather than spirit
(95). Kazantzakis seems to suggest that his Jesus can facilitate the movement of the ‘vital
impulse’ only when Jesus resists the ‘significant other’ in whom the élanvitalhacs ceased to
move. Jesus must dispute and negate Magdalene (especially in her possible role as his
wife) to be assured of his spiritual evolution (98-101). Jesus does this and is beckoned by
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4 . T ran scen d en ce-iü îth iïi-Im m an en ce;  
K azan tzak is and R eyn o ld s on  God as E vo lv in g  Sp irit
A. From  The Last Temptation  to  G od's Pauper: St Francis o jA ssisi
In the previous chapter, our reading of Nikos Kazantzakis’s The 
Last Temptation as a  mythopoesis of process thought rests on two key 
ideas. First, Kazantzakis’s Je su s  heeds the Ciy of an  evolving God 
anxious to su rpass earlier stages of divine concrescence. Second, Jesus 
labours to ‘save God’ through his own spiritual entropy; indeed, he 
accelerates the dem ateriahzation of the élanvital (‘God’s salvation’) by 
negating domestic happiness and affirming religious discipline. In 
addition to th is view of The Last Temptation as an  account in fiction of a  
process God incarnate in our changing world, we were able in chapter 
three to collate The Last Temptation with John  Cobb’s Christ in a 
Pluralistic Age, as well as show some im portant points of agreem ent and 
disagreem ent between these two thinkers and their respective writings.
Shortly after completing The Last Temptation, Kazantzakis wrote to 
Borje Knos fi*om Villa Manofita in Antibes. In th is message, dated 
Septem ber 9, 1952 and recorded for us in Nikos Kazantzakis: A  Biography 
B ased on his Letters, Kazantzakis reflects on a  visit to  Italy and outlines 
his urge to craft another mythopoesis of religious struggle and spiritual 
evolution;
...I’ve finally returned to my green hermitage and I’m  
sitting again before the desk of my m artyrdom  and  joy, 
holding the pen and vrriting. 1 saw very beautiful things 
once again in Italy, was very pleased, thought a  lot and 
reexperienced in  Assisi the great m artyr and hero whom 1
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love so m uch, Sain t Francis. And now I have been overcome 
by the desire to write a  book about him. Will 1 write it? 1 
still don’t  know yet; I’m  waiting for a sign, and then  I’ll begin 
it. As you know, the stable leitmotif of my life and work is 
always the struggle Inside us between the hum an  and God, 
m atter and sp irit... i
J u s t  over three m onths later, th is time writing from Antibes to his friend
Pandehs Prevelakis, Kazantzakis reveals the nature of his newest literary
project: “...I’m  writing Saint Francis now, and 1 th ink  it will be good. The
struggle between m an and God, th a t’s w hat interests m e....”^
This notion of divine-hum an tussle seems to form the connective
tissue holding The Last Temptation and God’s Pauper: S t  Francis o f Assisi
together as fictional narratives capable of provoking process theological
reflection. Je su s  and St. Francis are major models of spiritual becoming;
indeed, Kazantzakis views them  as sanctified heroes energized by the
desire to redeem  God through the increm ental conversion of flesh into
spirit. In our analysis of The Last Temptation, we m ade a  note of how
Je su s’s spirituality ripens through acts of creative metousiosis. In
Bergsonian term s, Kazantzakis’s Je su s  helps to ‘unm ake’ the elanvitalhy
practicing ‘spiritual exercises’ th a t enable him to transcend  all the
wonders of the m aterial world. In God’s Pauper, Kazantzakis describes
the Poverello’s religious formation in similar terms:
S ain t Francis is the model of the dutiful m an, the m an who by m eans of ceaseless, supremely cruel struggle succeeds in 
fulfilling our highest obligation, som ething higher even than  
mdraUty or tru th  or beauty: the obligation to 
transubstan tia te  the m atter which God en trusted  to us, and tu rn  it into sp irit.3
In this chapter, we tu rn  from The Last Temptation and  Christ in a
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Pluralistic Age to compare KazantzakLs’s God’s Pauper and Blair 
Reynolds's Toward a Process Pneumatology to find further support for our 
‘process reading’ of Kazantzakis’s literary writings.^ Although we intend 
to incorporate other process th inkers a t various points in th is chapter, it 
is Reynolds who seems best to articulate a  view of God as evolving Spirit 
in  W hiteheadian process theology. W hat we find when we establish this 
m utual confrontation between Kazantzakis and Reynolds is th a t while 
they adopt different modes of discourse, Kazantzakis (fictional narrative) 
and  Reynolds (theological argum entation) nonetheless further a  message 
of God’s transcendence-within-im m anence. Both th inkers com municate 
the view th a t although God is ontologlcally independent of our changing 
cosmos, God includes the creative advance as a  com ponent in the divine 
reality.^ While th is chapter concludes with the concession th a t neither 
Kazantzakis’s Je su s  nor his St. Francis finally wlU inhabit the process 
theological reflections which are arguably provoked and stim ulated by 
Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction, we hold th a t Kazantzakis’s creative 
writing is a  fecund source for the engagement of W hiteheadian process 
theology.
B. Leo and F rancis: M odels o f  S p iritual B eco m in g  in  G od's Pauper
The starting point for God’s Pauper: S t  Francis o f A ssisi is Brother 
Leo, the narrator who focuses the novel. Initially, B rother Leo presents 
him self as a  beggar roaming Northern Italy in search of God. Before 
long, several villagers advise him  to travel to Assisi and  introduce himself 
to Francis Bernadone, the only son of Pietro and Lady Pica. They make
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th is suggestion because it tu rn s  out th a t the villagers adm ire Francis’s 
spiritual sensitivity and suppose Francis will find Leo’s m etaphysical 
explorations to be helpful in his own search for God.^ Leo, however, feels 
disappointed when he m eets Francis for the first time.
At th is early stage in Francis’s religious m aturation  Nikos 
Kazantzakis characterizes him, not as the paragon of spiritual struggle, 
bu t as the reigning m onarch of a  barren world of aesthetic immediacy. It 
is true  th a t Kazantzakis’s early Fremcis is interested in ‘spiritual issues’, 
b u t first and foremost he is a  conspicuous consum er who thrives on the 
finer things in life: vintage wine, sum ptuous feasts, elegant silk 
raim ents, and opulent living quarters. Even in th is initial phase of 
God’s Pauper, we observe the ‘stable leitmotif of K azantzakis’s art; the 
them e of dialectical tussle  between concerns of the flesh and  issues of 
the spirit. It is clear th a t the rest of the novel will be given over to an  
account of how Francis and Leo together assist the dem aterialization of 
the élanvital. God’s Pauper is a  mythopoesis of process thought from the 
onset.
Leo eventually im pugns Francis for not overcoming the m aterial 
luxuriance which seem s to regulate Francis’s spiritless life. Consider the 
uncomfortable scene near the beginning of the novel where Leo listens as 
Francis the troubadour serenades Clara, Count Scifi’s  daughter, with a  
ballad about a  white dove being pursued  by an  insatiable hawk. Upon 
hearing Francis’s rom antic melody, Leo’s first inclination is to arraign 
Francis on charges of languishing in mediocrity and conventionality:
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He [Francis] was dressed in silk, with a  long red plume in his 
velvet cap and a  carnation in his ear. This m an  isn ’t 
searching for God, I said to myself; his soul is wallowing in flesh. 7
In th is respect, Francis m irrors the approach to life of other Assisi 
townsfolk. Leo narra tes th a t they, too, “had found the God they were 
seeking, found Him on earth, ju s t as they wanted Him: their own size, 
complete with children, wives and  all the best things in  life”.® We will 
recall th a t th is dom estication of God is an  issue which Je su s  confronts 
in Kazantzakis’s The Last Temptation; indeed, it forms an  im portant part 
of Je su s’s dream  on the cross. In contrast to Francis and  other villagers,
Leo “roamed the streets of Assisi bare-footed, hungry, shivering, and beat 
on the doors of heaven, cursing one m om ent and lustily repeating the 
Kyrie eleison the next in order to keep warm ”.®
In Nikos Kazantzakis—Novelist, Peter A. Bien refers to th is early part 
of the novel as the “Prelude” to Francis’s “Vocation ” of ‘poverty, chastity, 
and  obedience’.^ ® A crucial point about Francis’s personality’ m ust be 
m ade here. At th is lower echelon of development, Francis is self-divided 
because one half of him  finds delight in sensual joys and basic pleasures, 
while the other half rejects such concerns as religiously irrelevant and 
spiritually unsatisfying. In keeping with his characterization of Je su s  in 
The Last Temptation, Kazantzakis portrays his St. Francis as one who 
feels desperately unsure of himself. Before long, though, Francis is
 iovercome by sudden strange insights—he is the white dove being pursued 
by the voracious hawk—and these intuitions are used by Kazantzakis as
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the fulcrum  to bring his protagonist to a  new cognizance of his innate 
evolutionary appetite. ^  ^
It is worth noting th a t Francis’s model of God s ta rts  to change a t 
the sam e time as he is shaken by sudden glimpses of w hat his life could 
be. Significantly, th is  evolution in theological understanding  parallels 
the changing views of God in certain stages of Je su s ’s life in  The Last 
TemptaUon. Initially, Francis com pares God to “a  glass of cool w ater”.
In keeping with Kazantzakis’s often violent descriptions of God in The 
Last Temptation, however, Francis eventually comes to sense God as a 
fiery presence which th reatens to engulf and crem ate his former life.^® 
And like Kazantzakis’s Jesus, Francis hears God through dream s and 
nightm ares. Before we outline the nature of the dream  which functions 
as Francis’s own call to vocation, we m u st reintroduce Leo. His spiritual 
search for God has an  im portant bearing on our grasp of Kazantzakis’s 
perceived tussle between m atter and spirit.
Brother Leo’s active search for God paradoxically holds laziness as 
its motivating force. Here laziness, a t least in a  conventional sense, is 
contrasted with industriousness. Indeed, Leo sees the la tter as involving 
courtship, marriage, pu rsu it of a  career, and parenthood (‘settling down’) 
respectively. According to Leo, industriousness is to be avoided because 
he believes it potentially squeezes all theological reference out of any 
understanding  of our world. In short, Leo feels th a t the ‘norm al’ and 
industrious m an cannot find time for God:
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“The labourer who lives from hand to m outh re tu rn s home 
each night exhausted and famished. He assau lts  his dinner, 
gobbles up  his food lickefy-spit, then  quarrels with his wife, 
beats his children w ithout rhyme or reason simply because he’s tired and  irritated, and  afterwards clenches his fists and 
sleeps. Waking up for a  m om ent he finds his wife a t his 
side, couples with her, clenches his fist once more, and 
plunges back into sleep . . . .”15
By contrast, Leo m aintains th a t the lazy m an, “who is w ithout work, >
children and wife th inks about God, a t first ju s t out of curiosity, bu t 
later with anguish”.^ ® W hat Leo declares is th a t unless a  m an avoids 
family and work, his notion of God is bound to be defined in term s of 
certain m aterial symbols. Although middle-class industriousness comes 
disguised as God’s advocate, Leo nonetheless in terprets the sense of well­
being and satisfaction th a t it often produces as a dangerous adversary of 
authentic spirituality. Like Je su s  in The Last Temptation, Leo interprets I
domestic bliss and m aterial comfort as Lucifer’s bait. The novel premise 
of Leo’s theology, then, is th a t indolence leads ineluctably to holiness.
Leo’s intense spiritual activism, which issues from his disdain for 
the world, is parabolized by Kazantzakis in a  scene when Leo narrates 
his brief encounter with an  unshaven, devout hermit:
“I bowed down, prostrated myself before him  and said:
‘Holy ascetic, I have se t out to find God. Show me the road.’ j
‘“There isn ’t  any road,’ he amswered me, beating his 
staff to the ground.
“‘W hat is there, then?’ I asked, seized with terror.
“‘There is the abyss. Jum p!’
“‘Abyss?’ I scream ed. Is th a t the way?’
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“‘Yes, the abyss. All roads lead to the earth; the abyss 
leads to God. Jum p!’
“‘I can’t, F ather.’
“‘Then get m arried and forget your troubles...’”i7 
This parable of the Hermit and Leo reflects Kazantzakis’s general theme 
of w hat one m ight call the will to spiritual evolution’. ^  ® Here Leo is left 
in no doubt th a t he m ust transcend  his own comfort-loving disposition, 
as did Je su s  in The Last Temptation, if he is to advance towards a  process 
God who constantly evolves. This entails Leo’s heroic acceptance of the 
savageness of life, the  nihil.
Leo’s basic task  is to energize his spiritual becoming w ithout any 
fear of punishm ent or hope for reward in the next life. As might be 
expected, Leo believes th a t th is ta sk  is by no m eans an  easy assignm ent 
since the natu ra l reaction when looking into the abyss is to tu rn  tail and 
flnd respite elsewhere. ^  ® In one sense, th is aspect of Leo’s attitude to life 
should not surprise us. Kazantzakis himself believed th a t the ta sk  of 
self-overcoming is som ething for which we can strive, yet we m ust resign 
ourselves to the fact th a t it is ultim ately unfeasible. A com m ent from 
Kazantzakis’s second wife, Eleni, confirms th a t through God’s Pauper, 
her husband  wished to “proclaim an  ideal m uch higher th a n  we can 
reach, in order to  awaken in th is way the secret powers and  the psychic 
intensity th a t seeks out, and sometimes accomplishes, the impossible”.^ ® 
Despite the Insuperable na tu re  of th is spiritual ideal, Kazantzakis 
characterizes both Francis and Leo as titanic m en who appear heroically
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to th irs t after it. They are models of spiritual becoming in  a  changing 
world. Indeed, the first cracks In Francis’s own spiritual chrysalis begin 
to appear when Francis s ta rts  to hear the divine Ciy bellowing within his 
under-developed soul. This untam ed shriek pushes Francis close to the 
edge of his own abyss and Instructs him  to abandon lasciviousness: 
“Francis, Francis, is th is why you were born—to sing, m ake m eny, and 
entice the girls?”^  ^  Clearly, Francis is here undergoing changes similar to 
those experienced by Je su s  in The Last Temptation. W hereas Jesus 
becomes C hrist through his significant prehension of God’s prevenient 
Cry, Francis becomes saintly through his free response to God’s initial 
aim  for him  to be poor, chaste, and obedient.
C. P eter  A. B ien ’s  P ost-C h ristian  R ead in g  o f  G od's Pauper
In Nikos Kazantzakis-Novelist, Peter Bien offers his “post-C hristian 
in terpretation” of St. F rancis’s ‘call’.^^ Here ‘post-C hristian’ m eans th a t 
Nikos Kazantzakls uses Francis to negate the classical C hristian belief in 
a  transcendent, ontologlcally independent God. At first sight, Bien’s 
account of God's Pauper: S t  Francis o jA ssisi seems plausible, for Francis 
frequently appears to deny any sup rana tu ra l origin for the voice which 
scream s inside him.^^ In one scene, Francis even equates God’s will with 
his own will.^^ However, the Issue is w hether or not F rancis’s apparent 
theological immsinentalism rules out all sense of transcendence In God's 
Pauper? In using ideas from both Charles H artshorne and Alfred North 
W hitehead, co-founders of the process m etaphysics, we find th a t it does
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not.
It appears to us th a t God's Pauper reflects the process Idea th a t the
divine paræntheisücally emhracos the creative advance. Panentheism  is a
term  used by the process philosopher Charles Hartshorne.^^ According to
H artshorne, God is totally aware of all events in  our world’s rhythm ic
process of becoming. This is because the divine is “the place of all
things, and  all things are, in the m ost utterly literal sense ‘in ’ htm”.^ ®
Against the classical the ist (who, it is thought, cannot explain the
divine-world relation w ithout postulating a  God unaffected by temporal
becoming) and the classical pan theist (who sees ‘God’ as na tu re  w ithout
remainder), the panentheist believes th a t aU the world’s inhabitan ts
develop and  emerge within the field of God’s all-encom passing activity.^ ^
God and the world constitute a single all-inclusive reality, a  m utual
circle of interdependence. For the process panentheist, God is pictured
as transcendent-yet-lm m anent presence. In God's Pauper, Leo attem pts
to convince the young Francis th a t th is  kind of process God has ‘spoken’
to Francis and  issued a call forward:
“Brother Francis,” I said, “eveiy man, even the m ost 
atheistic, has God within him  deep down in his heart, 
wrapped in layers of flesh and fat. It was God inside you who pushed aside the flesh and fat and called to y o u ”.2 8
An evolving God resides within Francis, as Leo rem arks, b u t the divine 
clearly agitates F rancis’s soul as if from without.
As we have observed, Alfred North W hitehead is not strictly a  
panentheist.^® However, we do believe th a t his process philosophy
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reflects the  dom inant feature of panentheism : the m essage of divine
transcendence-w ithin-im m anence.  ^® Writing in  his Stubborn Fact and
Creative Advance: A n Introduction to the Metaphysics o f Alfred North
Whitehead, Thomas E. Hosinski agrees:
In W hitehead’s philosophy, both the primordial and the 
consequent natu res of God are transcendent and Immanent. 
The primordial natu re  is transcendent in a  classical sense: it 
is eternal, infinite, and absolutely unconditioned. B ut it is 
also im m anent in the sense th a t th is ultim ate ground of 
possibility, order and  value is present in every tem poral 
occasion. The consequent nature is transcenden t in several 
ways. It is ‘everlasting,’ unlike every tem poral occasion. It is perfect in its prehension of eveiy actual occasion. And it is 
God’s ‘private’ harm onization and transform ation of the 
conflicting and m utually obstructive actualities of the 
tem poral world. B ut the doctrine of God’s ‘superjective 
natu re ,’ affirmed on the basis of religious experience, shows 
th a t the consequent na tu re  (or God as a  total actual entity) 
is also im m anent in the world, the flooding of God’s 
redemptive love into the world.si
In God's Pauper, Francis insists on both the trcmscendence and 
im m anence of the divine; indeed, Francis’s process God constitutes the 
surroundings of evolving reality, the cosmic m atrix out of which life 
emerges and returns:
As soon as he [Francis] had found him self alone he fell 
on his face and began to kiss the soil and  call upon God. “I know Thou art eveiywhere,” he called to Him. “Under 
whatever stone I lift, I shall find Thee; in whatever well I 
look, I shall see Thy face; on the back of eveiy larva I gaze 
upon, a t the spot where it is preparing to pu t forth its wings, 
I shall find Thy nam e engraved. Thou art therefore also in 
this cave and in the m outhful of earth  which my lips are 
pressing against a t th is moment. Thou seest me and hearest me and  takest pity on m e”.32
While Peter A. Bien m aintains th a t Kazantzakis’s Francis denies 
the transcendence of God in order to affirm the im m anence of the divine,
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we wish to propose an  alternative reading of God’s Pauper; namely, we 
hold th a t Kazantzakls sa tu ra tes  God’s Pauper w ith  his own account of 
divine transcendence-within-im m anence. Besides the examples cited 
above, we ean perhaps highlight others. Consider how Franels views a 
yellow daisy as an  agent of God.^^ Also, notice how Francis discerns 
God’s face “behind water, behind bread, behind every kiss; it is behind 
thirst, hunger, chastity. O Lord, how can I escape Thee?”^^ Even 
Bernard, F rancis’s close friend, insists th a t “night is the  m ost beloved of 
God’s m essengers”.^ ® Furtherm ore, the divine frequently appears as “a 
male bird” who ‘“sings to ease your labours”.^ ® In one scene, Francis 
declares to  Brother Leo th a t “God is Inside the bird’s th roat and  is 
s in g in g . . .F in a l ly ,  the transcendence-w ithin-im m anence of God’s 
Pauper may be seen in F rancis’s belief th a t “the entire world is God’s 
field”.^ ®
According to the contributors to a  recent anthology of critical 
essays devoted to Charles H artshorne’s  concept of God, H artshorne is a  
process philosopher whose account of the divine as transcenden t and 
im m anent has rehgious ram ifications congenial to C hristian faith. 
Although these various essayists note th a t H artshorne does not agree 
with the classical or Scholastic conception of God as Unmoved Mover, 
they do value the way th a t H artshorne has tried to engage and refine the 
work of classical theologians in order to offer a  new basis for a  Christian 
concept of God: neoclassical theism  Considering th a t so m uch  of
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-H artshorne’s work is an  attem pt to creatively transform  classical theism, 
we believe th a t the term  ‘post-C hristian,’ if it were to be applied to 
H artshorne’s thoughts about God, would be an  inappropriate sum m ary 
of the central aim and overall content of his philosophical writings. 
Analogously, it appears to  u s th a t Peter A. Bien’s ‘post-C hristian’ label 
m ay equally prove to fall far short of capturing w hat he wishes to say 
about the theological im plications of Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction.
When Peter A. Bien declares th a t the nature of St. F rancis’s 
vocational lure is ‘post-C hristian’, Bien w ants u s to appreciate how 
Kazantzakis’s ovm religious thought supersedes centuries of classical 
C hristian theological doctrine and  preacherly discourse. While we agree 
with Bien th a t Kazantzakls does su rm ount classical theism , we do not 
th ink  th a t th is autom atically enables u s to speak of Kazantzakis’s ‘post- 
C hrlstian’ status."^ ^  Consider how H artshorne overcomes the aims and 
Ideas of Scholastic theology w ithout ever leaving behind the Christian 
faith which inspires him  to do this. Indeed, we th ink  th a t H artshorne’s 
work is ‘post-dogmatic’, ra ther th an  ‘post-C hristian’, in  th a t he believes 
the classical dogma of God no longer serves Christian faith well. When 
‘post-C hristian’ is applied to Kazantzakis’s work, it implies th a t he has 
left behind the Christian faith with which, in his novels, he ceaselessly 
struggles and which he seeks to articulate. We th ink  th a t the term  
‘post-dogmatic’ (applied to Kazantzakls in the sam e way we apply it here 
to Hartshorne) does not succum b to th is perceived weakness.
D. F ran cis’s  D ream , th e  Canary, and O bjective Im m orta lity
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In chapter one of our study, we outlined Alfred North W hitehead’s 
idea th a t a  process God offers a  highly specific vocational aim  and  lure 
forward a t the base of subjective b e c o m i n g . A l s o ,  we utilized the work 
of Jo h n  Cobb to refer to God’s ‘aim and  lure’ as a  dram atic call into the 
future.'*^ Along with Cobb, we made a  note of the convergence between 
Kazantzakis’s understanding of the divine Cry and the  call forward’ 
issued by W hitehead’s God.^^ In Kazantzakis’s God’s Pauper: S t  Francis 
o f Assisi, God’s Cry or call forward appears to Francis in the form of a  
dream.
This dream  contains God’s ‘initial aim ’ for Francis to forsake his
prodigal lifestyle and transubstan tia te  his flesh into spirit, to free the
élanvital caged up  inside his body. How can we be so sure th a t Francis’s
dream  truly originates with God? Tom Doulls answers th is question in
his article “Kazantzakls and the Meaning of Suffering”:
.. .there is only one way in which the Kazantzakian m an can 
be certain th a t his dream, which he fuUy believes comes from 
either God or the Devil, is m eant for his own good. If it is 
pleasant, if it a t aU corresponds to his basest and least 
adm irable nature, then  he can be sure it comes from the 
Tempter. If, on the other hand, it conflicts with w hat his 
baser nature, his comfort-loving flesh, tells him  is good, 
then  it m ost certainly comes as a  dictate from God.46
Francis confirms th is m uch later: “Man stands within the bounds of
moderation: God stands outside them ”, and so the point of life is to
choose where to place oneself.^^
In God’s Pauper, Francis’s dream  equips him  with a  hitherto
unknow n sense of leading and divine guidance. It also affords him the
220
opportunity to apprehend the depthlessness of m iddle-class luxuriance; 
indeed, Francis’s dream  agitates th a t part of him  which is ‘creature- 
loving flesh.’ Further, it attem pts to lure him  to advance beyond his 
base nature, w hat one might call the ‘tyranny of the given’. In this 
sense, Francis’s dream  is ‘a  night-bird of God’.^ ®
This image of dream s as the ‘night-birds of God’ rem inds u s of 
Kazantzakis’s preference for bird imagery in The Last Temptation. We will 
recall how tenacious eagles ceaselessly dig their claws into Je su s ’s head 
throughout his spiritual evolution. And we will rem em ber how the caged 
partridge in Magdalene’s courtyard h in ts a t the soul’s  im prisonm ent 
inside the body. In the early part of God’s Pauper, Francis stirs from his 
dream ful sleep, during which the night bird of God issues its vocational 
lure, and he hears a  caged canaiy  singing.^®
Following one of Lady Pica’s stories about a  religious awakening in 
her own life, the narrato r of God’s Pauper draws our atten tion  to the 
canary’s melody once more.®® Another dream, in which S an  Damiano, 
patron sain t of Assisi, appears to Francis and enlists him  to help save 
the chapel outside Assisi which bears his name, follows posthaste.® ^  
Subsequently, the narra to r of God’s Pauper reintroduces the mellifluous 
canaiy  for a  th ird  and final time. Francis then  h in ts a t the canary’s 
figurative im portance when he suggests th a t it signifies the plight of the 
hum an soul as it struggles to escape its animalistic scabbard:
The canaiy  began to sing again. The su n  had struck  
it, and Its th roat and tiny breast had  fiUed w ith song.
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Francis gazed a t it for a  long time, not speaking, his m outh 
hanging half opened, his eyes dimmed with tears.
“The canary is like m an’s soul,” he whispered finally.
“It sees bars round it, b u t instead of despairing, it sings. It 
sings, and wait and see, Brother Leo: one day its song shall break the bars.”52
Kazantzakis’s choice of a  canary to reflect the sp iritual evolution
of the hum an  soul is not inconsequential. On the contraiy, Kazantzakls
probably had the following childhood experience in mind. It is recorded
for us in Kazantzakis’s Report to Greco:
1 m ust have been four years old. On New Year’s Day my 
father gave me a  canaiy  and a  revolving globe as a  handsel,
“a  good han d ,” as we say in Crete. Closing the doors and windows of my room, I used to open the cage and  let the 
canaiy  go free. It had developed the habit of sitting a t the 
veiy top of the globe and singing for hours, while I held my breath  and  listened.
This extremely simple event, I believe, influenced my 
life more th a n  all the books and all the people I came to 
know afterwards. W andering insatiably over the earth  for 
years, greeting and taking leave of eveiything, I felt th a t my 
head was the globe and th a t a  canary sa t perched on the top of my mind, singing.5 s
Much later in his life, after the canary’s death, Kazantzakls made a  point
to immortalize the bird’s significance by never forgetting its formative
power on his life:
The canaiy, the magic bird my father gave me as a New 
Year’s present when I was a  child, had become a  carcass 
years before; no, not “become a  carcass”—I b lush  th a t this 
expression escaped m e—had “passed away” I m eant to say, passed away like a  hum an. Or better stfll, had  “rendered its 
song up to God.” We buried it in our little courtyard-garden. 
My sister cried, bu t I was calm because I knew th a t as long 
as I rem ained alive, 1 would never allow it to perish. “I won’t 
let you perish,” I whispered as 1 covered it over with earth. “We shall live and travel together”.54
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In chapter one of our study, we saw  how Alfred North Whitehead 
spoke of actual entitles being ‘alive’ in their process of concrescence and 
then  ‘perishing’ into the past once th is creative becoming has ended.®® 
For W hitehead, though, the ‘being’ of a  p as t actual entity can become 
‘objectively im m ortal’ in th a t while the actual entity is no longer ‘alive’ 
in concrescence, it m ay still ‘live on’ to influence the directionality of 
other actual entities. In the quoted passages from Report to Greco, the 
canaiy, although drained of its subjective immediacy, leaves itself as an 
objective legacy for Kazantzakis’s future. With the aid of W hitehead’s 
sense of how the past can influence the future, perhaps we can see the 
narrative about the canary in God’s Pauper as a  record of the bird’s 
‘objective immortality’ in Kazantzakis’s h teraiy  im agination.
E. S an  D am iano and th e  In itia l P h ase  o f  F ran cis’s  S p ir itu a l E vo lu tion  
In common with Je su s ’s difficult passage through m any levels of 
m essianic formation in The Last Temptation, Nikos K azantzakis’s St. 
Francis also evolves through several arduous stages of spiritual becoming 
in response to the divine Cry. Consider the earlier phase of Francis’s 
spiritual rebirth. This occurs on the twenty-fourth of September, a  day 
after the feast of S an  Damiano. This is not w ithout significance, for San 
Damiano had earlier appeared to Francis in a  dream. Francis views this 
dream  as a  specific request to refortify the ailing chapel outside Assisi 
which bears San Deimiano’s name.®®
San Damiano’s overlooked, run-dovm chapel m irrors Francis’s
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equally neglected soul:
climb towards spiritual m aturation, his transubstan tia tion  of flesh into 
spirit. Like several Kazantzakian women, Clara serves only to inveigle 
Francis into entering the devil’s snare of domestic ordinariness.®® D runk 
vdth potent dream s of Quixotic spiritual adventure, Francis is
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...San Damiano is exposed to the rain, he is falling in 
ruins, stum bling in the darkness; he cannot wait. B ut our 
souls, Brother Leo: do you th ink  they can wait? They too are 
exposed to the rain; they too are falling in ru ins, stum bling in the darkness. Forward, comrade! In God’s name!”57
Reconstruction is Kazantzakis’s chosen symbol for how Francis
m ust lay the foundations for a  new self after the deconstruction of his
former life. At the sam e time as he repairs and fortifies the run-down
chapel, Francis assem bles the newly created parts of his freshly emerging
personhood. Here Leo’s narration underscores the im portance of this
reconstruction symbol:
That evening I understood for the first tim e th a t all things 
are one and th a t even the hum blest everyday deed is part of a  m an’s destiny. Francis too was deeply roused; he too felt 
th a t there is no such  thing as a  small deed or a  large deed, 
and th a t to chink a  crumbling wall with a  single pebble is 
the sam e as reinforcing the entire earth  to keep it from 
falling, the sam e as reinforcing your soul to keep th a t too from falling. 5 8
In the m idst of th is complex spiritual reconstruction, rem inders of !
F rancis’s former life appear to obstruct him. Consorts, parents, business 
partners, and the Assisi townsfolk are all shown to conspire against
Francis and his developing sense of vocation. Francis’s former girlfriend,
'■ 5Clara, is a  good example of one who seeks to curtail F rancis’s upward
, ::
emotionally vexed when one day he literally bum ps into C lara a t San 
Damiano’s ehapel. Afraid th a t she will em asculate him, Francis greets 
her with insouciance. This apathy com pares with Je su s ’s initial 
treatm ent of Magdalene in The Last Temptation.^^
W hat are we to make of Francis’s extreme reluctance to romance 
Clara? How does it fit into our view of God’s Pauper: S t  Francis o f Assisi 
as a  mythopoesis of process thought? Perhaps Kazantzakls uses this 
episode to present two im portant ideas regarding Francis’s spiritual 
evolution from opulent troubadour into the ‘poor m an of God’. First, 
F rancis’s former flame threatens to compete with God, the all-consuming 
Conflagration.® ^  Second, Francis uses emotional nonchalance to douse 
the hope of ever m ariying Clara, and  so keep God’s holy fire burning 
within him. Like Kazantzakis’s  Jesus, Francis m ust transfigure the 
fleshly appeal of wom ankind in  order to assist the dem aterialization of 
the élanvital.
Clara and Magdalene are not alone in being sp iritual casualties in 
Kazantzakis’s literary fiction. There are a t least three other incidents in 
which women senselessly suffer In order to pave the way for male heroes. 
First, our next chapter will note Sourm elina’s pointless decapitation at 
the hands of a  blood-thirsty and rapricious (male) mob in Zorba The 
Greek. Second, the widow Katerina is savagely tortured  and slain by the 
crazed Agha in Christ Recrucified. And third. Captain Michales is ‘forced’ 
to bayonet Eminé, in Freedom and Death, so th a t he m ay take his mind
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off her sexuality and wage war for Crete’s liberation.
These examples Indicate th a t Kazantzakls favours Herculean men 
who refuse to allow femininity to s tan d  in the way of sp iritual evolution. 
These m en appear robust, assertive, boisterous, and Dionysiac. Andreas 
K. Poulakldas agrees. Indeed, Poulakidas believes th a t K azantzakis’s 
male protagonists possess a  “Homeric, Faustian, Quixotic m entality” 
which helps to spiritualize ra th er th an  domesticate their being.®® By 
contrast, Kazantzakis’s women are placid, fragile, helpless, and 
Apollonian.®^
According to Poulakidas, “Kazantzakis’s m en are hard  on women if 
their m anliness is th reatened”.®® If Poulakidas is correct, perhaps we can 
see why Francis spu rns C lara in God’s Pauper. When she begs Francis to 
serenade and court her, it is clear th a t she imperils his godly mission to 
assis t the dem aterialization of the élanvital. And when she invites him  
to join her in a  picnic, and forget his labouring, she jeopardizes his 
brawny attem pt to reconstruct both San Damiano and  himself; in other 
words, Clara endangers Francis’s God-given, Spirit-driven vocational 
ascent towards meaningfulness. Her perfumed sentim entality threatens 
to engulf his plans to tran su b stan tia te  his own flesh into spirit. It is no 
coincidence th a t Kazantzakls has Francis use soteriological language to 
describe his sense of relief when Clara initially agrees to leave him alone: 
‘“We’re saved...’ m urm ured Francis, aind he breathed in deeply, as though 
he had ju s t escaped an immense danger”.®® In common with Je su s’s
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initial rejection of Magadelene in  The Last Temptation, Francis resists 
C lara’s m arital advances. With mocking irony, Leo refers to th is initial 
phase of Francis’s spiritual m aturation  as “a  period of betrothal, the 
betrothal of our souls to God”.®^
Betrothal implies happiness, and it comes as no surprise th a t th is 
is Leo’s preferred m etaphor. At th is stage of his own spiritual evolution, 
Leo helps to fortify the chapel’s structu re  in a  mood of bridegroom gaiety 
and tenderness. Upset by this, Francis, now the troubled searcher, asks 
Leo why he is so ecstatically content? To answer th is, Kazantzakls has 
Leo use Kazantzakis’s favourite m etaphor of the transubstan tia tion  of 
flesh into spirit in Leo’s reply, namely, the caterpillar-butterfly:
“Me? I believe I’m  a  caterpillar buried deep down under 
the ground. The entire earth  is above me, crushing me, and  I 
begin to bore through the soil, making a  passage to the 
surface so th a t I can penetrate the c rust and issue into the light. It’s hard  work boring through the entire earth, bu t I’m 
able to be patient because I have a  strong premonition th a t as soon as I do issue into light I shall become a  butterfly”.6s
Francis approves of Leo’s image: “That’s it! That’s it!” he confesses to
Leo, “We are two caterpillars and  we w ant to become butterflies. So...to
work! Mix cement, bring stones, hand  me the trowel!”.®® Since the image
of the caterpillar-butterfly reflects Je su s ’s spiritual becoming in The Last
Temptation, it seems we can say th a t both the Je su s  and  the St. Francis
of Kazantzakls exemplify the unfolding m aturation of the soul as it
responds to the lure forward of a  process God.
S uch  happiness is inevitably short-lived. With S an Damiano near
completion, Sior Bernadone, who, in his fortune and fame, signifies the
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downward pull of m atter, re tu rns from an extended business trip and 
discovers th a t his own com pany has been allowed to deteriorate through 
wilful negligence on Francis’s part. U nderstandably furious with th is 
state of affairs, Sior Bernadone confronts his recalcitrant son. Energized 
by a  process God who depends on Francis’s transubstan tia tion  of m atter 
into spirit, Francis evades his father’s interrogation and  continues to 
strengthen San Damiano as well as himself. F rancis’s attitude appears 
iniquitous, b u t we will recall from Kazantzakis’s The Saviors o f God: 
Spiritual Exercises how “satisfaction”, not indifference, qualifies as 
hum ankind’s greatest sin.^® Thus, to avoid his own stagnation, viewed 
here in term s of prosperity and prestige, as well as to facilitate the 
dem aterialization of the élanvital, Francis m ust bring abou t not only the 
cessation of all rom antic concerns (Clara) bu t a  breach from all familial 
connections as well. Like Je su s  in The Last Temptation, Francis assists 
the concrescence of an  evolving God through behaviour th a t seems 
conventionally sinful.
F rancis’s spiritual buUheadedness m anifests itself in  several ways. 
His nonchalEince toward his father parallels his d ispassionate approach 
toward Clara. In his mind, Francis disallows them  from having any 
influence over his spiritual becoming. This dem eanor is w hat motivates 
Francis heartlessly to  ridicule his father’s profit-based, mercantile 
livelihood:
“You are Sior Bernadone, the one who has the big 
shop on the square in  Assisi and who stores up  gold in his 
coffers and strips the people around him  naked instead of
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clothing them ”.71
Sior Bernadone is emotionally overwhelmed by his son’s insouciance and 
momentarily takes leave of him. By contrast, Francis completes his work 
on the chapel roof as if nothing of any consequence had  occurred. This 
scene between Francis and his father sum m arizes m any process them es 
in Kazantzakis’s  literary fiction: the m atter-spirit dialectic, religious 
formation, transubstan tia tion , the development of a  process God as well 
as how th is God relies on our evolution, and the unm aking of the élan 
vital.
According to the narrator of God’s Pauper, it is no t enough for 
Francis to denounce his family and former lover. Indeed, Francis m ust 
forswear both his public persona  and  his own privatefears as well. With 
regard to his societal reputation, God instructs Francis to dance in the 
streets of Assisi.^® Coneerned for how he vdll be received by the Assisi 
towasfolk, Francis begs God not to ta rn ish  his civic image in  th is way, 
b u t to have him play the jester in  another town. However, the evolving 
God of God’s Pauper insists th a t Francis will spiritually regress unless he 
eschews his former persona in his hometown, and so Francis gallops into 
Assisi and performs his Dionysiac pirouette to howls of derision.^®
With echoes of Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘m adm an’, F rancis cavorts 
with the villagers and announces his own “new m adness” regarding the 
redemptive power of selfless love.^"^ Francis’s  message is m et both with 
trenchan t abuse and  peals of laughter. By the end of th is specific scene.
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Francis has become Assisi’s social pariah; indeed, th is is Francis’s 
religious requirem ent if spiritually he is to ripen. Interpreting Francis’s 
dancing in light of an  informed reading of Alfred North W hitehead’s 
process philosophy, we can say th a t Francis becomes saintly because his 
subjective aim here learns to merge with God’s initial aim.
Before long, Francis’s family are awakened to his ‘religious lunacy’ 
and the réintroduction of Sior Bernadone frustrates Francis’s pious 
advance.^® The Bishop of Assisi intercedes, however, and offers his home 
as the location of a  consultation between father and son. Using 
language th a t m akes no sense unless the fate of the élanvital is implied, 
Francis interprets th is confrontation as “the beginning of the ascent”, 
and  Kazantzakls subsequently has Francis symbolically present his 
father with the fine silks on his back. Clearly, F rancis’s nakedness is 
ano ther attem pt to transubstan tia te  flesh into spirit. It signifies both a  
sense of closure on his former existence, and his com m itm ent to 
spiritual excess as the pattern  for his days ahead.
Symbolizing the downward pull of m atter in the shape of religious 
conformism, the Bishop of Assisi attem pts to regulate F rancis’s spiritual 
imm oderation by advising him  to cultivate an  attitude of Aristotelean 
tem perance. Driven by the need to ‘save’ a  process God, Francis knows 
th a t any ‘ethical m ean’ is impossible: the ascent to God, and with it the 
creative unm aking of the élanvital, needs a  litany of H erculean intensity 
and extreme vigour:
The bishop escorted Francis a  short distance out into
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the courtyard. Bending over, he said to him  in a  hushed 
voice, “Careful, Francis. You’re overdoing it.”
“That’s how  one finds God, Bishop,” Francis answered.
The bishop shook his head. “Even virtue needs 
moderation; otherwise it can become arrogance.”
“Man stands within the bounds of moderation; God 
stands outside them. I am  heading for God, Bishop,” said 
Francis, and  he proceeded hastily towards the street door.He had no time to lo se .77
Having m anaged to violate his public persona, Francis m ust now 
overcome his own private fears. It is no coincidence th a t Francis is made 
to feel a  social ou tcast after his gambol in Assisi’s m arketplace; Francis, 
it tu rn s  out, dislikes lepers, and so God arranges for him  to embrace one 
physically.^® Why does a  process God require this extreme action from 
Francis? One answ er involves making use of an  observation th a t John  
Cobb m akes in God and the World, For Cobb, K azantzakis’s writings teU 
of how each thing in life “wishes to continue essentially as it is, whereas 
the stability, the happiness, and  the security it enjoys are shattered  by 
the Cry”.^ ® In God’s Pauper, the narrato r seem s to suggest th a t F rancis’s 
felicity and  equilibrium m ust be destroyed if a  process God is to evolve 
into an  indeterm inate future. So it is th a t in God’s Pauper, the Cry of a  
concrescing God m akes dem ands on Francis th a t seem, a t least a t first 
sight, to be too difficult and spiritually dem anding but, on reflection, 
serve to ensure Francis’s and God’s own development.
Significantly, th is episode with the leper m arks the close of w hat 
Peter A. Bien calls the “private phase” of Francis’s vocation. In short,
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the kiss th a t Francis gives to the leper symbolically adds the finishing 
touch to F rancis’s construction work on his inner self. Bien expresses it 
well:
Having freed himself. . . from the parents, girlfriend, acquaintances, business pursuits, and image of his former 
self, the reborn Francis proceeds from village to village 
preaching universal love as the central m essage of his new 
vision. B ut love is still ju s t  an  idea for him, not an  
experience; th u s  the culm inating episode in the private phase becomes the one in which he acts upon th is idea by forcing himself to em brace the l e p e r .so
F. P o rtiu n cu la  and th e  D em a ter ia liza tio n  o f  th e  Élan Vital
In his Creative Evolution, Henri Bergson teaches th a t the cyclical 
m echanism  of evolution begins with the élanvital, the energetic impulse 
which grounds the creative processes of reality and its desire to become 
vibrantly alive through active collusion with corporeality (the solidified 
aspects of the élanvital). Once the vital impulse energizes life, it battles 
to prevent its own sedim entation in m atter. Throughout the process of 
becoming, the élanvital craves to be free from physical coagulation. To 
release itself from m atter, the élanvital m ust unite with corporeality in 
order to dispossess itself of its congealments and  so re tu rn  to itself, th is 
being the complex process of dematerialization.® ^
In Bergson’s understanding of the evolutionary process, it is very 
clear th a t the principal enemy of the élanvital is anything in life th a t is 
motionless or phlegmatic. Expressed another way, the élanvitaVs m ajor 
benefactor is anything in life th a t is anim ated or robust. For Bergson, 
fife’s forward directionality depends upon creative action consistent with
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the unm aking or dem aterialization of the élanvital. Following Bergson, 
Nikos Kazantzakls believes th a t the telos of our existence is to convert 
flesh into spirit. God, élan, or ‘the great Ciy’ is ‘saved’ whenever and 
wherever m en and women exercise spiritual meiousiosis. This em phasis 
on creative transubstan tia tion  is the basic m essage of Kazantzakis’s The 
Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises. And it is th is testimony, inspired by 
Bergson as well as converging with aspects of Alfred North W hitehead’s 
philosophy, th a t enables us to view God’s Pauper: St. Francis o f Assisi 
(like The Last Temptation and  Zorba The Greek) as a  process parable of an 
evolving God a t work in the world.
Kazantzakis’s m ain characters are usually ordinary individuals 
who become sanctified heroes through their struggle to eschew m aterial 
comfort. Turning aside from the lures of domestic bfiss or conventional 
happiness, Kazantzakis’s protagonists often strive to anim ate fife so tha t 
they may help set free the vital energy which fructifies and uses them  to 
advance the world’s development. To varying degrees, Leo and Francis 
are driven by a  deep need to accelerate their ovm religious development. 
And in different ways, they yearn to save a  process God who depends on 
their evolution for God’s own concrescence. Writing about God’s Pauper 
in his Nikos Kazantzakis-Novelist, Peter A. Bien insists th a t nowhere does 
the struggle to  evolve, to transubstan tia te  flesh into spirit, to ‘save God’, 
appear more evident th an  a t the beginning of w hat he calls the “public 
phase” of St. Francis’s vocation.®®
We concur with Bien. Consider the scene where Francis, on his
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way back to Assisi after m onths of preaching in d istan t villages, is forced 
to m eet w ith Clara once more.®^ Here C lara confesses th a t she has not 
stopped thinking about her ex-lover and Francis, mom entarily bewildered 
by her comeliness, adm its likewise. Immediately, Francis upbraids 
him self for th is ‘error’, and resolutely denies his entertaining the thought 
of her in his mind. As a  result, Clara suddenly becomes bitter and 
hostile toward Francis’s H erculean approach to life:
“Accursed is he who acts contrary to the will of God,” 
she said in a  fierce voice. “Accursed is he who preaches th a t 
we should not marry, should not have children and build a  
home; who preaches th a t m en should not be real men, loving 
war, wine, women, glory; th a t women should not be real 
women, loving love, fine clothes, all the eomforts of life. . . . 
Forgive me for telling you this, my poor Francis, bu t th a t is w hat it m eans to be a  true hum an being.”85
Clara then  throws a  red rose, a  symbol for the attractiveness of the 
m aterial world, a t Franeis’s  feet. He initially refuses to acknowledge her 
flower and, when Leo finally attem pts to retrieve it, Francis instructs his 
follower to leave it by the side of the road. Clearly, F rancis wishes to 
make it obvious to Leo (and to Clara) th a t he is interested only in how 
m an overcomes himself, the transubstan tia tion  of m atte r into spirit, the 
dem aterialization of the élanvital, the clawing ascent to God:
“To Assisi!” he said, and he began to run . “Take the 
ram ’s bell, ring it! Good God, to marry, have children, build a  hom e—I spit on them  aU!”
“Alas the day. Brother Francis, bu t I believe—forgive 
me. Lord, for thinking so—I believe the girl was right. A true 
hum an being— ”
“A true hum an being is someone who has surpassed 
w hat is hum an—th a t’s w hat I say! I implore you. Brother
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Leo, be quiet!”86
Later, after intense spiritual reflection had  “eaten away his flesh” 
and left only “pure soul”, Francis offers his own process model of God as 
the basic source of un rest in the universe:
“People have enum erated m any term s of praise for the 
Lord up to now,” he said. “B ut I shall enum erate still more. 
Listen to w hat I shall call Him: the Bottomless Abyss, the 
Insatiable, the Merciless, the Indefatigable, the Unsatisfied, 
He who has never once said to poor, unfortunate mankind:‘Enough!’”8 7
Francis’s  belief th a t God is caught up  in a  ceaseless quest for ever new 
instEinces of hum an flourishing com pares favourably with the view of 
providence suggested by David A. Pailin, the British process theologian, 
in his God and the Processes o f Reality: Foundations fo r  a Credible Theism. 
For Peiilin, God’s agency is “an  overall influence which stirs  people with a  
general dissatisfaction at w hat has already been achieved and, as its 
obverse, a  perpetual desire for w hat is enrichingly novel”.®®
Kazantzakls ushers in the “public phase” of F rancis’s vocation as 
Francis broadens his missiological purpose after several days of prayerful 
reflection.®® The blossoming almond tree a t the church of S an ta  Maria 
degli Angeli—the Portiuncula, is especially symbolic in  th is newest phase 
of Francis’s spiritual becoming.®® The tree’s m eaning may be traced to 
poetic lines th a t Kazantzakls first heard  during his travels through the 
Aegean: ‘“Sister Almond Tree, speak to me of God.’ And the almond tree 
blossomed”.®^  Once again, Kazantzakls pictures the divine as All in all.
God’s realiiy contains and perm eates the entire cosmos, so th a t
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every aspect of the universe (almond trees Included) abides in God. With 
regard to “Sweet sister almond tree”, the process religious vision ‘behind’ 
these words is panentheistie’, though Kazantzakls never used the term. 
Clearly, Kazantzakis’s Francis believes in God’s ebullient eruption within 
and through creation. To Kazantzakls, God’s eircum am bient presence 
sacralizes the processes of reality. The language of God’s Pauper is th a t 
of transcendence-w ithin-im m anence, though Kazantzakis’s novel does 
not m ention the phrase.
In addition to its being a  symbol of God’s panentheistie presence, 
the flourishing almond tree reflects the flowering of F rancis’s ministiy. 
Possibly the almond tree’s burgeoning radiance anticipates the ripening 
of F rancis’s ideals in the hearts and  m inds of others. This interpretation 
seems accurate when we consider th a t Francis eventually recruits some 
converts to meet under the tree’s majestic branches.®^ While these new 
‘brothers’ initieilly seem to share Francis’s vision of religious inclusivity 
and social engagement, all sense of fraternal bliss falls apart when 
Francis travels to the E ternal City in order to secure Papal support for 
his new order.®® Indeed, Brother Elias capitalizes on F rancis’s absence 
and begins to criticize F rancis’s political and theological views as 
unacceptably picayune and modest.®^
In Elias’s opinion, Francis deprecates the body, m isconstrues the 
role of corporeality in religious struggle, and is afraid tru ly  to revise his 
m issionary task  to include physical rebellion against the perpetrators of
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societal Injustice, In F raneis’s absence, Elias offers him self as Francis’s 
heir apparent, and  so seeks to galvanize, organize, and institutionalize 
the ffaterniiy so th a t the friars m ay reach their original goal of personal 
and social transform ation. At once, Father Silvester travels to Rome in 
order to inform Francis of the developing schism  a t Portiuncula:
“Elias w ants to alter your Rule, B rother Francis. It 
seem s too stric t to him, too inhum an. He says absolute 
Poverty is oppressive, and th a t hum an natu re  is incapable of 
reaching perfect Love, or perfect Chastity either. He comes 
and goes, talks with the brothers both openly and  in secret, 
and spends his nights writing the new Rule, with Antonio as 
his scribe. He has formidable goals in mind. He says he 
w ants to build churches, m onasteries, universities, to send m issionaries far and  vHde to conquer the w o r l d ”.95
This battle between Francis and Elias is more th an  a  disagreem ent 
over competing theologies of mission. More th an  a  clash of Interests, it 
seem s to be a t the veiy heart of God’s Pauper. When we burrow  beneath 
the surface of th is novel, we find th a t the hostility between Francis and 
Elias m irrors the cosmic friction between the upw ard lure of spirit and 
the downward push  of m atter. Energized by a desire to ‘solidify’ the 
spirit {élan) of the fraternity by erecting retreat cam ps and  centres of 
academic excellence th a t will bear the nam e of the Order, Brother Elias 
th rea tens to frustrate the dem aterialization of the élan vital. B y  
contrast, F rancis’s desire to practice ‘absolute poverty’ is his attem pt to 
‘save God’ (contribute to the fluid concrescence of the élanvital) by 
converting all his flesh into spirit.
Having ‘failed’ to win over the fraternity in Assisi, Francis and Leo 
depart for Egypt in an  attem pt both to convert the infidels, particularly
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S ultan  Melek-el-Kamil, and  to adm onish the crusaders.®'^ However, Leo 
later narrates th a t “the S u ltan  had  not become a  C hristian, and Francis’ 
tearful words to the crusaders had  been equally ineffective”.®® Why does 
Francis’s m ission languish in th is way? One answer to our question 
m akes use of the theory th a t Kazantzakls frequently has his heroes 
flounder in an  early stage of their vocation so th a t they m ay succeed at 
some later (‘higher’) point in their spiritual development. We do observe 
th is paradoxical state-of-affairs in The Last Temptation. Here Je su s  ‘fails’ 
in his revolutionary, ‘Son of David’ phase yet ‘succeeds’ in his later ‘Son 
of God’ stage. In God’s Pauper, Kazantzakls intends for u s  similarly to 
understand  Francis’s double vocational failure (Assisi and  Egypt) as a  
glorious success.
Brother Elias’s religious militancy seals Francis’s political fate for 
it dem onstrates how unsuspecting and unsuitable Francis is for public 
life. However, th is first failure is not a t all d isastrous since it enables 
Francis to look elsewhere to advance his message of selfless love. While 
his subsequen t defeat a t the hands of the infidels and the Christians 
seem s only to provide further evidence th a t Francis lacks political 
shrew dness, it nevertheless yields the opportunity for Francis to regroup 
himself on another, higher level of spiritual becoming.
In Nikos Kazantzakis-Novelist, Peter A. Bien suggests th a t this 
public phase of Francis’s vocational m aturation  reflects Kazantzakis’s 
belief that, “if the religious life is to rem ain truly sp iritual it m ust never 
rem ain contented with a  previous victoiy bu t instead m u st continuously
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expose itself to the possibility of defeat”.®® With regard to God’s Pauper, 
“previous victory” refers to the reconstruction of S an Damiano, the so- 
called ‘betrothal’ period of Francis’s vocation. For Kazantzakls, Francis 
m ust not luxuriate in  his construction work (San Dam iano or his own 
self); rather, Francis m u st continuously propel him self to greater heights 
of spiritual consum m ation. Similarly, Francis m u st no t delight in the 
persuasive power of selfless love; rather, Francis m ust expose this ‘new 
m adness’ to the danger of resistance and  rejection from others.
Francis’s double failure, schism  within the Portiuncula fraternity 
and ridicule in Egypt, serves to prove th a t stagnation has not crept into 
Francis’s spiritualify and caused him to falter in his m ission of ascent 
towards God. While Francis’s disagreem ent with Elias is protracted and 
bitter, it nonetheless indicates the extent to which Francis is ready to 
rem ain unbrokenly true to his ovm calling. By the sam e token, Francis’s 
ineffective m ission to Egypt au then ticates Francis’s steadfastness in the 
face of peril. In the context of our thesis, it appears th a t Kazantzakis 
intends for us to view Francis’s ‘unsuccessful’ actions as assisting the 
unfolding purposes of an  evolving God. In Bergsonian process term s, 
Francis’s ‘failure’ is really a  ‘success’ because avoiding the cardinal sin  of 
‘satisfaction* helps to accelerate the dynamic movement of the élan vital 
towards dematerialization.
In our reading of Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction as a  mythopoesis 
of process thought, we have th u s  far shovm th a t the evolving conflict 
between corporeality and the élan vital is central to the process view of
239
the world in Kazantzakls’s The Saviors ojGod. Moreover, we have noted 
when and where and how th is eternal struggle Is parabolized In The Last 
Temptation. God*s Pauper follows The Last Temptation in  its exploration 
of th is battle since Francis, like Je su s  in the desert and  a t Calvary, faces 
enticem ents which endanger the transubstan tia tion  of m atter into spirit. 
When Francis re tu rns from Egypt and ascends a  snow-capped m ountain 
to await instructions from God, Lucifer tem pts Francis, like the Je su s  of 
The Last Temptation before him, with the lure of m arriage and parenthood 
(two recurren t signs of ‘bodily inertia’ in The Last Temptation). However, 
Kazantzakis has Francis resis t S a tan ’s bait through the construction of 
seven snow sta tues. These sta tues signify the emotional attraction of 
progeny:
Francis gazed a t them  [the snow statues] and was 
suddenly overcome with laughter. “Look, Sior Francis, son 
of Bernadone,” he cried, “th a t is your wife, those your 
children, and behind them  are your two servants. The whole 
family had gone out for a  stroll, and you—husband, father, m aster—are walking in the lead”.ioo
The Apollonian charm  of domesticity threatens to incarcerate F rancis’s
riotous, Dionysiac spirit inside its civilized snares, and  so Francis looks
to the su n  to thaw  his creations and  symbolically set him  free:
But suddenly his laughter gave way to ferocity. He 
lifted his hand  towards heaven. At the in s tan t he did so the 
su n  appeared, the m ountain began to gleam; below, far in 
the distance, Assisi hovered weightlessly in  the air, 
uncertainly, as though composed of fancy and m orning frost.
“Lord, Lord,” Francis cried in a  heart-rending voice, 
“com mand the su n  to beat down upon my family and melt 
them! I w ant to escapel”ioi
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For Kazantzakis, it is Francis’s spirit of defiance in the face of 
possible physical gratification th a t ensures the dem aterialization of the 
éianvitaL In W hiteheadian term s, Francis constantly finds th a t he is 
faced with a  God-given initial aim  for enriching his experience and 
d isturbed by the divine lure to instan tiate th is optim um  possibility. An 
evolving God im presses Godself upon Francis with a  ferm ent for 
flourishing. By m aking God’s aim  his own subjective aim, chiefly 
through spiritual exercises, Francis finds th a t his transubstan tia tion  of 
flesh into spirit contributes to a process God’s continued 
concrescence. ^
G. F ran cis’s  D eath: E sch a to io g y  in  a P rocess P er sp ec tiv e
Process theologians recognize two approaches to the subject of 
eschatoiogy. Like Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki and David Ray Griffin, some 
th inkers subscribe to the notion of ‘subjective imm ortality’.^ ®  ^This is a 
belief in a  post-historical, non-tem poral redem ption and apotheosis of 
completed actuality in God. The doctrine of ‘subjective immortality’ 
teaches the notion of continued conscious existence after bodily death. 
O ther proeess theologians, like S chubert M. Ogden and  David A. Pailin, 
favour the idea of ‘objective immortality’.^ ®^  Proponents of th is view do 
not foresee our survival as conscious subjects; however, they believe th a t 
God prehends all th a t we do and  feel in the divine everlasting life.^®^ All 
the m any ingredients of a  person’s life have relevance because they are 
cherished in God’s eternal reality. Basically, there wifi be a  time when
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no one recollects the life and a rt of Nikos Kazantzakis b u t the idea of 
objective immortality teaches th a t God will still recall him. His feelings, 
decisions, and actions live on perpetually in God’s consequent nature.
In one of his recorded conversations with Lucien Price, Alfred
North W hitehead appears to favour th is view th a t we ‘live on’ or become
‘objectively imm ortal’ by contributing to the world’s creative advance:
Insofar as Man partakes of th is [evolutionaiy] process, does 
he partake of the divine, of God, and that participation is his 
immortality, reducing the question o f whether his individuality survives the death o f the body to the estate o f an irrelevancy. i o®
In The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises, Kazantzakis seem s to converge
with th is aspect of W hitehead’s philosophy when Kazantzakis offers his
own belief th a t we become ‘imm ortal’ through evolutionary striving:
Our profound hum an  duty  is not to interpret or to cast light on the rhythm  of God’s m arch, b u t to adjust, as 
m uch as we can, the rhythm  of our small and fleeting life to 
his.
Only th u s may we m ortals succeed in achieving 
something immortal, because then  we collaborate with One 
who is Deathless.
Only th u s  may we conquer m ortal sin, the concentration on details, the narrow ness of our brains; only 
th u s  may we transubstan tia te  into freedom the slavery of 
earthen m atter given u s to mold.io?
In Process and Reality: A n Essay in Cosmology, W hitehead holds 
th a t an  actual entity may become objectively Immortal in a  new process 
of concrescence which succeeds it. Indeed, a t the heart of his process 
philosophy is his belief th a t the concrescence of any one actual entity 
depends on aU those past actualities th a t ‘live on’ to shape the outcome
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of the curren t entity’s future:
All relatedness has its foundation in the relatedness of 
actualities; and such  relatedness is wholly concerned with 
the appropriation of the dead by the living--that is to say, 
with ‘objective immortality’ whereby w hat is divested of its 
own living immediacy becomes a  real com ponent in other 
living immediacies of becoming. This is the doctrine th a t the 
creative advance of the world is the becoming, the perishing, 
and the objective imm ortalities of those th ings which jointly constitu te stabhornfactjos
In The Saviors o f God, Kazantzakis holds th a t the decisions we make now
will ‘hve on’ to shape the future directionality of others. Like W hitehead,
Kazantzakis believes th a t our actions may become objectively immortal
in the lives of others:
You have a  great responsibUiiy. You do not govern 
now only your own small, insignificant existence. You are a  
throw  of the dice on which, for a  moment, the entire fate of 
your race is gambled.
Everything you do reverberates th roughout a thousand 
destinies. As you walk, you cu t open and  create th a t river 
bed into which the stream  of descendants shall enter and 
flow.
When you shake with fear, your terror branches out 
into the innum erable generations, and you degrade 
innum erable souls before and behind you. W hen you rise to 
a  valorous deed, all of your race rises with you and tu rn s valorous.
“I am  not alone! I am  not alone!” Let th is  vision 
inflame you a t eveiy moment. lOQ
At the heart of Kazantzakis’s own process way of looking a t the world is
his belief th a t there is som ething energetically alive in each new m om ent
of concrescence, something ceaselessly unfolding in relation to w hat has
been and  to w hat m ight be.
243
Eschatoiogy Is a  pertinent topic towards the close of God’s Pauper: 
S t  Francis o f Assisi', Indeed, Peter A. Bien suggests th a t when Francis 
leaves Assisi to regroup him self on Monte Alvernia in Tuscany, Francis 
launches him self into the “eschatological phase” of his spiritual 
becoming.^ Here we m ust note th a t in  a  Kazantzakian context, the 
idea of eschatoiogy does not entail any belief in our continued conscious 
existence after bodily death. This ‘subjective immortality’ may be a  vital 
part of the Christian tradition; however, Kazantzakis did not favour 
Christian otherworldliness. Indeed, he found it morally repugnant. ^  ^   ^
For Kazantzakis, eschatoiogy entails our potential to  anim ate the lives 
of others in the world. Eschatoiogy involves our ability to become 
‘objectively im m ortal’ in the ‘here-and-now ’ of the on-going processes of 
reality.
In God’s Pauper, Francis’s eschatological potency can be seen while 
he is still alive; indeed, it m anifests itself in Francis’s bold attem pt to stay 
unbrokenly true to his vows and  become a  spiritual paradigm  for others. 
Consider how his stigm ata enable him  to inspire num erous pilgrims to 
keep alight the hum an  torch of love and  order in the pain  and chaos of a  
changing world.^ Recall how he helps to establish good will between 
Assisi’s troublesome Mayor and  its intransigent Bishop.^ With regard 
to both incidents, one m ight say th a t Francis’s decisions and actions 
shape the concrescence of others. Francis contributes to their process of 
becoming. He exemplifies spiritual evolution because he steadfastly
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negates mediocrity, he resists bodily inertia, he craves self-improvement, 
and  he struggles to actualize God’s initial aim and lure forward. 
Francis’s eschatological power, then, may be viewed from a  process 
perspective.
Francis labours until h is death  to tran su b stan tia te  all of his flesh 
into spirit. Through filial adherence to his vows, F rancis assists  the 
dem aterialization of the éianvitaL He ‘saves’ his Bergsonian God by 
acting as though he were immortal, by striving for aesthetic flourishing 
instead of settling for familial satisfaction, and by constantly  forging 
ahead in response to the divine Cry. There is no belief in a  traditional 
afterlife in God’s Pauper; however, Francis does not die only to become 
totally extinct. Viewing Francis’s death  in light of an  Informed reading 
of W hiteheadian process philosophy, we can speak of how Francis lives 
on in the lives of those who are inspired by him. He becomes objectively 
immortal. Furtherm ore, we can say th a t Francis lives on in the mind of 
his process God. So far from utterly perishing when he dies, Francis 
affects God and th a t effect is eternal.
H. Divine-W orld R ecip rocity : R eyn o ld s and K azan tzak is on  God
In Franciscan Spirituality: Following S t  Francis Today , Brother 
Ramon SSF holds th a t process theology provides u s with a  theological 
term  with which to understand  Francis’s quest for the  sacred within 
nature:
He [Francis] actually entered into creation and 
discovered God in a  mystical relation of love. This was not 
pantheism, in which the being of God resides in the natural
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order so th a t natu re  becomes God. We have learned a  new 
word for an  old experience—It Is not the word pantheism, bu t 
panenthetsm. The being of God is not exhausted  by creation, 
bu t ra ther dwells deep a t the heart of things created, 
m anifests his being and  glory through them , so th a t they 
radiate and  reflect som ething of his m ysterious, transcendent, and unutterable gloiy.H4
W hat Brother Ramon says of the historical Francis, th a t a t the heart of
his spirituality is a  sense of God’s panentheistic presence, we also affirm
of Nikos Kazantzakis’s literary Francis. In God’s Pauper: S t  Francis o f
Assisi, Kazantzakis portrays the world as an  evolutionaiy process ‘called’
into becoming by the divine Cry, enticed to the level of energetic
responsiveness by the evocative lure of a  love th a t refuses to watch the
world stagnate. God is a t the centre of the creative advance from its
genesis, yet ever ahead, and moving on before. God’s Ciy is both
transcendent and Im m anent to  Kazantzakis’s Francis; indeed, God’s
Pauper shows how an  em ergent Deity broods over Francis, and yet is also
found throughout creation. In God’s Pauper, all th ings in na tu re  are the
incognitos of Francis’s panentheistic and  processive God. Support for
our ‘process reading’ of God’s Pauper (as well as The Last Temptation) is
found in Daniel A. Dombrowski’s article “Kazantzakis and  the New
Middle Ages”:
Kazantzakis’s Je su s  and St. Francis are panen theists (those 
who believe th a t all is in God, a  God who partially 
transcends the natu ra l world) ra ther th an  pantheists (those 
who believe th a t the natu ra l world is God w ithout remainder).! 15
In common with God’s Pauper, W hiteheadian process theology 
supports an  evolutionary view of realify, everything is ‘in the becoming’,
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together with a  belief th a t God’s circum am bient presence envelops and 
lovingly seeks to lure our on-going world to su rpass earlier stages of its 
own development. For Kazantzakis, as for W hiteheadians, the world 
m akes a  difference to God’s becoming. In his book Process and Reality:
An E ssay in Cosmology, Alfred North W hitehead offers his own view of 
divine-world interdependence:
It is as true to say th a t the World is im m anent in God, 
as th a t God is Im m anent in the World.
It is as true  to say th a t God transcends the World, as 
th a t the World transcends God.
It is as true  to say th a t God creates the World, as th a t 
the World creates God.i
The im portant idea a t the heart of these W hiteheadian antitheses 
is reciprocity between God and the world; indeed, W hitehead holds th a t 
God and the evolutionary process rely on each other for the realization of 
potential. In The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises, K azantzakis 
em phasizes his own sense of a  coinherence of the Cry w ith the World:
Within the province of our ephem eral flesh all of God 
is imperiled. He cannot be saved unless we save him with 
our own struggles; nor can we be saved unless he is saved.! 17
The process religious vision of The Saviors o f God underlies God’s Pauper. 
A  sim ilar account of God and  the world working together to  overcome 
earlier levels of their own concrescence is in the work of Blair Reynolds, 
a  W hiteheadian process theologian whose m ain work is Toward a Process 
Pneumatology.
While we observe the inklings of th is view of divine transcendence-
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wlthln-iiiiinanence in  W hitehead’s process philosophy, Reynolds seems 
to best develop th is concept in process theology. Therefore, it is 
necessary to view Reynolds’s  process theology alongside of Kazantzakis’s 
writings, culm inating in his God’s Pauper. We view first hand  the 
correlation between the two writers on th is subject of divine-hum an co­
creativity. Reynolds states:
...God is no mere element in an  abstract scheme, bu t a 
concrete presence in the dynam ism  of life and growth. The 
m utual im m anence between God and the world m eans th a t 
we ar e no longer forced to choose between the dignity of the 
hum an spirit and the Holy Spirit. All creatures are 
responsible co-creators of the universe. In other words, we, 
as constituents of a  dynamic, relativistic universe, are part of the vast dram a of creative advance th a t Involves ourselves 
and m uch more. 118
While th is process account of divine-world ‘co-creatorship’ is expressed
indirectly in God’s Pauper, it is stated  more directly in Kazantzakis’s
Report to Greco:
Every living thing is a  workshop where God, in hiding, processes and transubstan tia tes clay. This is why trees 
flower and fruit, why anim als multiply, why the monkey 
m anaged to exceed its destiny and stand  upright on its two 
feet. Now, for the first time since the world was made, man has been enabled to enter God’s workshop and labor with Him. The more flesh he transubstan tia tes into love, valor, and 
freedom, the more truly he becomes Son of God. 119
In God’s Pauper, Francis and  his process God work together in order to
tu rn  flesh into s p i r i t . T h e y  accomplish th is event of dem aterialization
by wrestling with w hat W hitehead refers to as the “stubborn  fact[s]” of
the evolutionary th ru st, by unfastening the chains of the p ast
(satisfaction), and by nurtu ring  each other’s concrescence.
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This accent on the m utual reciprocity between God and the world 
has not always been a  vital feature of Christian theology. Indeed, some 
theologians of the C hristian tradition strongly resist the idea th a t God 
requires us for God’s development. B ut as we noted in chapter one of 
our study, th is  classical model of God was criticized by W hitehead. In 
Process and Reality, he proclaimed th a t thinking of God as an  Unmoved 
Mover did not serve Christian faith well. In his book Toward a Process 
Pneumatology, Reynolds declares his own sense of dissatisfaction with 
the conception of God in classical forms of Christianity:
Since God, in classical theism, is a  self-contained. 
Immutable being th a t could neither be increased nor 
dim inished by w hat we do, it follows th a t God m ust be 
wholly indifferent to our sufferings and actions. Completely 
unaffected by the world, the suprem e cause b u t never effect, 
God is, as Cam us has charged, the eternal bystander whose 
back is tu rned  on the world. It is then  impossible to speak 
of the paraclete; for th is unmoved deity can  give neither comfort, consolation, nor love. 12 3
In opposition to a  m onarchical model of God-world asym m etrical
dualism , where God is conceptualized as the Unmoved Mover, Ruthless
Moralist, or Ultimate Philosophical Principle, Reynolds professes belief in
a  process God whose Spirit seeks both to persuade and  cherish us:
The m ain contribution of process theology to pneumatology 
is to stress th is fact th a t the Spirit is God as suprem ely 
sensitive. The Spirit exercises its power lovingly, so th a t its 
influence is never undue bu t persuasive ra ther th an  all­
determining and coercive. God is not aloof, an  unmoved 
dictator, b u t He is suprem ely and em phatically aware of oursufferings. 124
In God’s Pauper, Francis gives poetic expression to th is notion th a t God 
genuinely cares for the world with infinite patience, mercy, and  empathy:
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“Until now I [Francis] wept, beat my breast, and  cried out my 
sins to God. B ut now I understand: God holds a  sponge. If I 
were asked to paint God’s loving-kindness, I would depict 
Him with a  sponge in His hand....All sins will be erased. 
Brother Leo; all sinners will be saved-even  S a tan  himself, 
Brother Leo; for hell is nothing more th an  the antecham ber 
of heaven.”
“B ut th en —” I began.
B ut Francis held out his hand and covered my m outh.
"Quiet!” he said. “Do not dim inish the grandeur ofG od.”i25
Utilizing W hiteheadian terminology, Reynolds’s own doctrine of
divine circum am bient presence rests  on an understanding of the divine
primordial natu re  as “God’s primal urge for self-consciousness th a t is
fulfilled only through the reality of creation”. Reynolds also holds
th a t in the consequent nature, God is “an  all-encom passing m atrix of
sensitivity pervading throughout all things”. W i t h  W hitehead as his
m ain source of intellectual support, Reynolds never tires of proclaiming
his process them e of divine-world alliance:
The C hristian affirmation of God as love includes the notion of a  m utual reciprocity between God and the world. This 
reciprocity is a  central tenet in the m etaphysics of process 
theology. . . God is a  m atrix of sensitivfiy, a  feUow-sufferer who em pathetically participates in  all hum an  suffering. 128
In God’s Pauper, Francis shares th is process belief th a t the world and
God are inextricably bound together. Notice how Francis expresses this
conviction a t the sam e time as em phasizing divine sensitivity and God’s
transcendence-within-im m anence:
“How great God’s kindness is. Brother Leo,” he often 
said to me. “W hat m iraculous things su rro u n d  us! When
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the su n  rises in the morning and brings the day, have you 
noticed how happily the birds sing, and  how our hearts leap 
w ithin our breasts, and  how merrily the stones and w aters laugh? And when night falls, how benevolently our sister Fire always comes. Sometimes she climbs up  to our lamp 
and lights our room; sometimes she sits in the fireplace and 
cooks our food and keeps us warm in winter. And water: 
w hat a  miracle th a t is too. Brother Leo! How it flows and  
gurgles, how it forms stream s, rivers and then  empties into 
the ocean—singing! How it washes, rinses, cleanses 
everything! And when we are thirsty, how refreshing it is as 
it descends within u s and waters our bowels! How well bound together are m an’s body and the world, m an’s soul and God!”i29
For Reynolds, the concept of God’s dipolarity (defined as above)
carries with it the idea of divine transcendence-w ithin-im m anence. In
God’s primordial nature, the divine is ontologically independent of the
creative advance as the benevolent provider of optim um  initial aims. In
God’s consequent nature, the divine is the surrounding environm ent of
tenderness within which all actualizations originate. In Reynolds’s view,
God is both transcendent and im m anent as dynamic-responsive love:
Creativily and  sensitivfiy are inseparable in God. God’s 
creative activfiy in the world is based upon em pathie 
responsiveness (agape a t its best), and th is responsiveness is 
always in light of an  intended creative influence to lure the world to higher forms of realization. i3o
For Reynolds, God is in everything and eveiything is in  the  divine life.^^^
Reynolds’s process theology is unasham edly panentheistic; however, the
question th a t now arises is w hether or not the deity th a t Francis seeks
to worship and  serve in God’s Pauper is equally dynamic and, in one
sense, consequent to, hence contingent upon, the world? To answer th is
question, one th a t is so central to our thesis, we offer three observations
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regarding W hiteheadian process theology and Kazantzakis’s work.
First, Reynolds’s W hiteheadian notion th a t eveiything (including
God) is ‘in the becoming’ is analogous to Kazantzakis’s  general picture of
“the Cry” or “creative B reath” who storm s through m atter, fructifies it,
and seeks to urge it ever onward to fi-esh expressions of itself. ^  Report
to Greco is Bergson baptized, evolution sacralized:
It would seem th a t a  great explosive élan exists in life’s every 
molecule, as though each such molecule had  com pressed 
into it the im petus of life in its entirety, ready to explode at 
eveiy collision. Life liberates its inner yearnings in th is way, and advances .133
This process way of picturing God and the world in energetic term s 
appears throughout Kazantzakis’s writings. Consider his fondness for 
fire as a  symbol of change. In The Saviors o f God, Kazantzakis declares 
that, “Fire is the first and final m ask  of my God. We dance between two 
enormous pyres”. And in God*s Pauper, we find th a t Leo shrinks back 
when the ‘purified’ Francis touches him  on the head as if to anoint him. 
Subsequently, Leo com pares God’s savage presence, as it is mediated by 
Francis, to an  all-consum ing inferno. Further on, Francis becomes 
frustrated  with Leo’s inability to discern th a t “the soul of m an is a  divine 
spark”. Finally, in  Report to Greco, Kazantzakis reveals a  process God 
who frequently descends upon hum anity like “clum ps of fire”.^^^ W hat 
th is fire symbolism seem s to indicate is th a t Kazantzakis views both God 
and the world as ever-changing, like the flickering and interm ittent
flame.
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Second, the process idea of relational development dom inates 
Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction. In Report to Greco, Kazantzakis pictures 
God as “the Moving Monad, the shifting sum m it”. This ‘Moving 
Monad’ is a  central aspect of the way th a t Francis views the divine in 
God's Pauper. It is implicit in his belief th a t one com prehends God by 
intuiting divinfiy in all aspects of the creative advance, discovering the 
élanvital in “life’s eveiy molecule”. H e r e  Leo narra tes how Francis goes 
to an  abandoned cave in order to reflect on God’s dynamic and relational 
presence within the world:
As soon as he had found himself alone he feU on his 
face and began to kiss the soil and call upon God. “I know 
Thou a rt everywhere,” he called to Him. “Under whatever 
stone I lift, 1 shall find Thee; in whatever well 1 look, I shall 
see Thy face; on the back of every larva I gaze upon, at the 
spot where it is preparing to pu t forth its wings, I shall find 
Thy nam e engraved. Thou art therefore also in th is cave and 
in the m outhful of earth  which my lips are pressing against 
a t this moment. Thou seest me and hearest me and takest pity on m e”. 141
For Kazantzakis’s St. Francis, natu re  is God’s theatre. The universe is 
God’s wealth. Divine love extends throughout all of the world and is not 
ju s t restricted to hum an history, bu t includes the n a tu ra l environment 
as well. God is All in all. In keeping with Kazantzakis’s view of God as 
the ‘Moving Monad’, André Cloots and Ja n  Van der Veken, in their essay 
“Can the God of Process Thought be ‘Redeemed’?”, m ake the claim th a t 
“W hitehead’s m etaphysics is really a  pluralism  of interrelated m onads, 
with God as the Suprem e Monad”.
As God’s Pauper unfolds, we notice how Francis’s assim ilation to
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’God involves his becoming insensible to any form of hum anity-nature 
bifurcationalism. Indeed, Francis preaches th a t God is objectified in the 
interconnectedness of reality. All the m any inhab itan ts of the natu ra l 
world are inextricably bound together and continually participate within 
the on-going life of God, as  the image of the ‘Moving M onad’ suggests. In
the following passage, Leo views seasonal changes as indicative of a 
spiritual nexus between God and creation:
How m any tim es in my life had I seen the arrival of spring! This, however, was the first time I realized its true 
meaning. This year, for the very first time, I knew (Francis 
had  taugh t me) th a t all things are one, th a t the tree and the 
soul of m an--all things--follow the sam e law of God. The soul has its springtim e like the tree, and  unfolds. . . .143
Third, Kazantzakis’s Francis appears to approxim ate the process 
notion th a t God lures us on to novel expressions of aesthetic worth or, 
pu t In Kazantzakian parlance, th a t God Issues a  Cry from within us to 
help em ancipate the divine from the oppressiveness of corporeality. Like 
Je su s  in The Last Temptation, Francis moves through successive stages of 
spiritual evolution. It is a  vision of a  God in process, appearing as ‘the 
Cry’ or ‘creative B reath’, who strives to inspire both Je su s  and Francis to 
su rpass earlier developments of their own becoming. Here Francis takes 
us to the heart of Kazantzakis’s model of God;
“‘Not enough!’ That’s w hat He scream ed a t me. If you 
ask  me. Brother Leo, w hat God com m ands w ithout respite, 1 can tell you, for I learned it these past three days and nights 
in the cave. Listen! ‘Not enough! Not enough!’ That’s what 
He shouts each day, each hour to poor, m iserable man. ‘Not 
enough! Not enough!’, . . I can’t  go further!’ whines man. 
‘You can!’ the Lord replies. ‘1 shall break in  two!’ m an whines again. ‘Break!’ the Lord replies.”i 44
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Francis seem s to suggest th a t God works as the ground of the discontent 
we sense as, evaluating our previous achievements, we become cognizant 
of novel possibilities and  strive to actualize them .
Compare Francis’s model of God as the basic source of un rest with
Reynolds’s W hiteheadian construal of the divine m agnetism  which seeks
to liberate us from oppressive self-satisfaction. In Toward a Process
Pneumatology, Reynolds pictures God as “the suprem e organ of novelty”
who “opens up the future by luring us beyond the tyranny o f the given'*^^^
He proclaims th a t God (as transcendence-w ithin-im m anence) constantly
agitates us to prevent hackneyed monotony and to direct the upward
movement toward higher degrees of aesthetic harmony:
W hitehead argues th a t those species th a t self-transcend 
through actively modifying the environm ent spearhead the 
upward trend [we believe th a t Francis accom plishes th is self­overcoming in God*s Pauper], This modification of the 
environm ent is directed by the aesthetic quest for enriched 
experience. This m eans th a t creative transform atioh 
constitutes our very existence. When creativity ceases, the 
organism  dies. Thus, the Spirit continually functions to 
challenge the status quo, to ja r  us out of our complacency.
In a  sense, th is is divine chastisem ent. B ut it is essentially God’s agape, because it condem ns in the world th a t which 
would destroy us. This is God’s transcendence in  the 
context of im m anence. God as the principle of relevance of 
all genuine novelty transcends any given epoch. Yet God is 
also im m anent or incarnate to the extent th a t relevant 
potentiality is actualized, thereby deepening theincarnation. 146
In conclusion to th is th ird  point, André Cloots’s and  J a n  Van der 
Veken’s description of God in W hitehead’s process philosophy appears to 
parallel Kazantzakis’s (and Reynolds’s) ever-changing, ever-ascending
255
notion of deity:
The religious notion of God...is fundam entally linked to upw ard movement, to refreshm ent and beauty, to harmony, adventure, emd p e a c e .  14 7
In his m any writings, then, Kazantzakis evokes th is upw ard movement
together with the nature of God’s luring power in those scenes where our
attention is drawn to the dynamic presence of thorn-claws, intense fire,
butterflies, silkworms, and flying-fish. In the context of our thesis, we
interpret these tropes as suggestive of the power of hum an  potential,
grounded in a process God, to transubstan tia te  all flesh into spirit. In
K azantzakis’s view, metousiosis helps effect the ‘redem ption’ of God {élan
vital) in our time; indeed, to strive for forms of life Increasingly more
purposive is to co-create the world with deity. This idea of co-creatorship
is echoed in Reynolds’s own process pneumatology:
God and the world are inseparably bound together, so th a t 
there is a  genuine reciprocity between the two. . . neither 
God nor the world is self-sufficient. W ithout God there 
would be no world, and w ithout a  world there would be no 
God. God inherits from the world, and the world inherits from G o d .  148
At th is juncture , any connection between K azantzakis’s process 
God and  the W hiteheadian model of deity developed by Reynolds appears 
to suffer breakdown. This is because Reynolds, following W hitehead, 
promotes a view of God as One who gives unity and hum anity  to life; in 
contrast, Kazantzakis pictures his God in stark, threatening  term s. 
Reynolds images God as One who tenderly cares for the world; however, 
Kazantzakis’s deity is immitigably cruel and pitiless to the hum an and
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tem poral condition.
I. Kazantzakis and Reynolds on Divine Agency: Som e Differences
God*s Pauper: S t  Francis o f A ssisi is one of m any texts in which 
Nikos Kazantzakis, a t times, implies th a t God seeks to tear us to pieces. 
Francis is portrayed, like Je su s  in Kazantzakis’s The Last Temptation, as 
someone who confronts life with heroic pessimism, who gives voice to the 
Ciy bellowing within him, and who consequently saves God through his 
own spiritual entropy. B ut w hereas the process God of Alfred North 
Whitehead, and th u s of Blair Reynolds, tenderly cares for hum ankind, 
Kazantzakis’s in God*s Pauper exercises power arbitrarily and mercilessly. 
We see th is with particular clarity when Brother Leo struggles to 
com prehend the Christie significance of F rancis’s encounter with the 
leper:
God is severe, I reflected, exceedingly severe; He has no pity for m ankind. W hat w as it th a t Francis had  ju s t  finished 
telling me: th a t God’s will was supposed to be our own 
deepest, unknow n will? No, no! God asks u s w hat we don’t  
w ant and  then  says, “That’s w hat I want!” He asks us w hat 
we hate and  then says, “That’s w hat I love. Do w hat 
displeases you, because th a t is w hat pleases me!” And you 
see, here was poor Francis cariylng the leper in his arm s, having first kissed him on the m o u t h ! iso
Consequently, Leo calls the goodness of God into question by accusing
the divine of sinister tactics and of “playing games with u s ”.^^^ Further
on in the novel, th is becomes even more of a problem for Sior Bernadone,
Francis’s father:
“Have you not pity for your m other?” Bernadone asked 
again. “She weeps aU day and  all night. Come home; let her see you.”
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“I m ust first ask  God," Francis m anaged to answer.
“A God who can prevent you from seeing your mother: 
w hat kind of God is th a t?” said Bernadone, looking a t his son imploringly. 1S2
Francis is unable to respond. Yet Brother Leo, feeling a  deep sense of
theological disquiet a t th is point, takes u s to  the heart of Kazantzakis’s
idea of violent grace:
Truly, w hat kind of God was th a t?  I asked myself, 
remembering my poor, unfortunate mother, long since dead. 
W hat kind of God was capable of separating son from 
mother?
I gazed a t Francis, who was in front of me striding 
hurriedly up  the hill. . . .  1 sensed th a t inside his feeble, 
half-dead body there was hidden a merciless and inhum an 
force which did not concern itself with m other and father, 
which perhaps even rejoiced a t abandoning them . W hat kind of God was th a t—really! I did not u n d e r s t a n d !  153
This is not the only place where Leo lam ents th a t God appears as 
the Invulnerable despot in Francis’s life. Later, com plaining th a t 
F rancis’s God expects too m uch of us, he wonders why God behaves "so 
inhum anly towards u s ” if God w ants to work with u s in a  creative 
partnership. Francis attem pts to assuage Leo’s doubts by suggesting 
th a t God loves u s bu t m ust sometimes appear cruel in order to sustain  
the divine governance of the world. Leo dem urs, yet Francis resolutely 
preaches th a t God may "descend on us in any guise th a t pleases Him—as 
hunger, or as a  fine wind, or as the plague!”^ T h e s e  defiant words, 
however, seem curiously unsatisfactoiy when we discover th a t 
Kazantzakis’s Francis concludes his life gravely handicapped. We feel in
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the final chapters th a t Francis exemplifies heroic futility as we see the 
extent to which his life has been torn to shreds for the sake of furthering 
the im personal process of dematerialization- -the basis of divine 
salvation.
In our analysis of Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction, we have noted 
how Kazantzakis’s model of God d istu rbs and intim idate u s in order th a t 
we m ay realize authentic becoming. If this is how Kazantzakis’s deity 
works in the world, through testiness and irritability, the models offered 
by Kazantzakis and by W hiteheadian process theologians would seem to 
be a t variance with one another. The m ain difficulty presented to the 
religious sensibilities of process th inkers by Kazantzakis’s model is its 
apparen t valuational non-significance. According to Blair Reynolds:
The world has learned m uch since the days of the 
absolute m onarchs. Through the centuries there has been 
gained a  hard-won intuition th a t there is another, better 
concept of ruling power in which the personal dignity of the 
governed is protected and in which ru lers in teract with the 
governed, limited by the intrinsic rights of the latter. 
H um ankind h as had enough of despotic ru lers in history not to w arran t a  suprem e despot in the Spirit. 158
Against th is model of God as ‘conquering Caesar’, Reynolds offers a  view
of God’s hum aneness. Reynolds seems to represent m any process
theologians who find a  model of God th a t does no t contribute to hum an
flourishing problematic.^®® Those process theologians whose concern is
to ground theistic models pragmatically may conclude th a t Kazantzakis’s
way of picturing deity is non-significant practically since it does not
immediately appear to promote hum an flourishing.
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Process theologians hold th a t if one adopts im personal images for 
God—images like conflagration and claws—one implies th a t God is aloof 
from, and ostensibly indifferent to, the creative advance. We know th a t 
W hiteheadians, contrariwise, view God’s agency as the graceful provision 
of optim um  vocational lures for subjective becoming. They do not seem 
to support ways of Imaging God as malicious, or as indifferent to the 
creative advance, bu t instead favour ways of discerning the divine-world 
and hum an-world alliances as reciprocal, inclusive, tender, and m utually 
liberating.
We seem to have reached an  im passe with Kazantzakis’s view of
the divine and W hiteheadian process thought with regard to God’s
hum aneness. Yet we believe th a t an  underlying com plem entarily does
exist. To show this alliance, we recall a  book we first introduced in
chapter one of our study: John  Cobb’s God and the World. In an  early
part of our thesis, we noted how Cobb’s own W hiteheadian notion of the
divine “call forward” seems analogous to Kazantzakis’s idea of the “Ciy”
issuing from, and forming the ground of, our evolutionary-historical
trajectory. For Cobb, process accounts of God have m uch to gain from
an informed reading of Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction:
There is a  valid em phasis in Kazantzakis which is only partly 
to be found in W hitehead. Kazantzakis perceives the Cry or 
call forward as terrible and terrifying. W hitehead also knows 
th a t a t tim es the situation is such  th a t the best th a t is 
offered us m ust appear as oppressive fate. B ut Kazantzakis 
m eans more th an  this. He sees how passionately each thing 
wishes to continue essentially as it is, w hereas the stability, 
the happiness, and  the security it enjoys are shattered by the Ciy. 161
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We concur with John Cobb. For us, the power of Kazantzakis’s
symbols for God lies In the struggle th a t engages hum an  Indifference.
Throughout his writings, Kazantzakis says th a t the Ciy lures us towards
fresh possibilities for authentic becoming, bu t th a t th is involves us in
pain and loss as we reach beyond the comfort of the given. He believes
we can take heart, however, because to assum e our place in the creative
advance on such  an  uneasy footing is an  enorm ous act of cou rage-an
heroic ordeal befitting true  saviours of God. In his article “Anthropodicy
and  the R eturn of God”, Frederick Sontag, an  American theologian
sym pathetic to process thought, expresses Kazantzakis’s view of God in
the following terms:
Kazantzakis portrays God as needing hum an help if he is to 
be saved. The search for God and the struggle to help God 
involve sheer agony for people, not the bliss some comforting 
preachers offer us each Sunday. To struggle for God is also 
to  struggle with God, and it can be a  bloody battle. 
Kazantzakis th inks tha t, if we have too m uch hope, th is 
dulls one’s desire to engage in battle, because as long as we 
hold on to religious hope we avoid the struggle to helpothers. 162
For Kazantzakis, there exists an  unending interaction between 
God and  the world—between the divine and the creative advance—since 
each needs the other for its own redemption. His process God saves the 
world by fructifying m atter with the divine Cry; indeed, God inspires m en 
and women to fulfill themselves by luring them  into a  future rich with 
aesthetic possibilities. And hum ans liberate God wherever and  whenever 
they respond to God’s Cry w ith ethical and  religious beauty.
261
w ith in  his narrative fiction, Kazantzakis appears to say  th a t the 
effectiveness of God’s agency in the world is not assured  unless m en and 
women experience some degree of psychic turmoil, deep uncertainty, and 
disteleology as they (and God) seek to struggle against the tyranny of the 
given. The creative advance is hostile to novelty. God, acting as the Cry 
forward, m u st often wrestle with the worst in the world (stagnant matter) 
in order to bring forth the best in it. Using vivid language, Kazantzakis 
describes the agitating im pulses of God stirring nature, together with the 
feelings of creatures, as life uncoils and  moves ahead of itself. Following 
W hitehead, Reynolds believes in a process God who presses in upon the 
creative advance and its m any inhabitants, and who yearns for both to 
su rpass earlier stages of their own concrescence. In our view, the process 
God of God’s Pauper is compatible with Reynolds’s W hiteheadian view of 
God (Spirit) who, in the divine consequent nature, is enriched by 
expressions of spiritual engagement and praxis within the world.
J . (K azan tzak is’s) L iterature and (Process) T heology: A D ipolar V iew  
In th is penultim ate section of chapter four, we use the preceding 
‘exchange’ between Nikos Kazantzakis’s God’s Pauper: St. Francis o f Assisi 
and Blair Reynolds’s Toward a Process Pneumatology to throw  light on 
the nature of the relationship between literature and  theology in general. 
In keeping with the approach used in earlier chapters, we recognize tha t 
literature, as writing, may be seen to continually frustra te  the reference- 
claiming tendencies m anifest in system atic theology, and  we acknowledge 
th a t W hiteheadian process theology is one key example of th is way of
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thinking theologically. At the sam e time, we are careful to concede th a t 
w ithout ‘theology’—in the way we’ve been using th is word throughout our 
study—and its system atic ordering of experience, literature is in danger of 
assum ing a  ‘ludic random ness’ by which it is Impossible for u s to live. 
Thus, the central point here is th a t theological and literaiy  discourse 
may be seen to interact, producing an  understanding th a t we might 
designate as dipolar; in short, m etaphysical and poetic language are 
com plem entaiy yet antagonistic modes of discourse.
Our thesis has evolved th u s  far by asserting how Kazantzakis’s 
deep-rooted conviction about the intellectual and sp iritual efficacy of 
Bergsonian transform lsm  is expressed throughout his m any writings, 
especially his narrative fiction. This specific approach is not without 
support from other Kazantzakis scholars. As we have indicated, Peter A. 
Bien’s work concentrates on Kazantzakis’s “mythopoesis of Bergsonian 
doctrine”. Also, Andreas K. Poulakidas links Bergson and Kazantzakis 
together as “metaphysic aestheticians”.^ ®  ^Finally, Jam es F. Lea notes 
how Kazantzakis’s “Salvationist” approach to life utilizes m any aspects 
of Bergsonian transformlsm.^®^
These specific observations about Kazantzakis’s work are part of 
the more general conviction th a t critics may be justified in  their inquiry 
into how authorial beliefs help shape the literary style and  ou tput of a  
creative writer. In Religion and Modem Literature: E ssays in Theory and  
Criticism, G. B. Tennyson and  Edward E. Erickson show themselves to be
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im portant custodiems of th is approach to fiction:
... J u s t  as we know from the experience of Paradise Lost or 
The Divine Comedy th a t these are works of suprem e aesthetic achievement, so we also know from the experience of these 
works th a t the beliefs th a t are expressed in them  and th a t 
lie behind them  are not irrelevant to them . W hat is more, 
we experience the sam e awareness in m any m odern novels 
th a t are far less obviously religious th an  works of earlier 
ages. We may not know exactly w hat degree the beliefs 
impinge upon the works, bu t we know they impinge. If we 
w ant to see these works steadily and whole we know th a t 
one of our tasks as reader-critics is to determ ine ju s t  w hat 
the relationship of those beliefs to the finished work of art
i s .  168
Tennyson and Erickson’s approach to fiction m ay possess a  kernel 
of appropriateness; however, we m ust be aware of one im portant caveat 
to their m ethod of reading literary texts. Kazantzakis’s use of Henri 
Bergson’s process philosophy is clearly a  m atter of arden t in terest for 
Kazantzakis critics, and our thesis acknowledges th is point, bu t our 
responsibility as reader-critics of Kazantzakis’s a rt is not the apparently 
straightforward one of treating his writings as illustrated religious or 
m etaphysical tracts, and  then  proceeding to extrapolate the ‘essence’ of 
the ‘m essage’ which we believe Kazantzakis wishes to preach to us. 
Tennyson and Erickson come dangerously close to  suggesting th a t this 
‘m ethod of extrapolation’ is the m ost satisfying way to approach 
literature, yet it seem s im portant to assert (in one Im portant sense) th a t 
God’s Pauper is not narrativized Bergsonian process theology.
On one level, the value of God’s Pauper ought not to be assessed by 
criteria taken  from either Bergson’s or Alfred North W hitehead’s process 
m etaphysics. It ought not to be Judged by the yardstick of ‘conceptual
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coherence’ since KazantzaMs’s work is grounded In the imaginative use 
of literary forms, and these appear to resist the gravitational lure of 
formulated tru th  or logical exactness. In short, any concern for credal 
affirmation and theological dogmatics is beyond Kazantzakis’s scope as a  
novelist; indeed, his so-called duty’ as a  creative writer does not appear 
to be th a t of discovering ways to comprehensively delineate faith, to 
expound a  religious thesis, or to promulgate a special kind of 
metaphysics.
In a  brief article, “Some Theological Mistakes and Their Effects on 
Modern Literature,” the process philosopher Charles H artshorne appears 
to align himself with the specific practice of reading th a t we have ju s t 
d i s p u t e d . A f t e r  asserting th a t “poets and  fiction w riters...often express 
or imply philosophical beliefs”, he traces the concept of determ inism  as 
an  implied metaphysic in the literary fiction of Thomas Love Peacock, 
Robinson Jeffers, William Wordsworth, Robert Frost, Thomas Hardy, 
Wallace Stevens, and a  num ber of others. His reason for approaching 
literature in th is way is so th a t he can highlight the  logical pitfalls in a  
deterministic way of looking a t the world. But our approach so far has 
been to question the idea th a t creative writing prom ulgates an  implied 
metaphysic, or a  controlling logic. And we have been suggesting th a t to 
isolate ‘literary examples’ of conceptual understanding, as H artshorne 
does in th is article, is to trea t the literary fiction under Investigation as 
a  special kind of narrativized dogma or preachm ent. To assum e th a t 
fiteraiy fiction is basically tractarian  is arguably to evacuate creative
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writing of all its Active power. Under such  term s, we view H artshorne’s 
approach to literature as critically unhelpful.
In h is m any writings, Alfred North W hitehead initially does not
appear to fare any better th an  H artshorne. In Modes o f Thought, he puts
forward an  astonishing claim th a t part of the philosopher’s ta sk  is to
précis the imaginative vision of creative writers. For example, th is is how
W hitehead feels the philosopher should trea t Milton’s verse:
Philosophy is the endeavour to find a  conventional 
phraseology for the vivid suggestiveness of the poet. It is the 
endeavour to reduce Milton’s ‘Lycidas’ to prose, and thereby 
to produce a  verbal symbolism manageable for use in other 
connections of thought. 171
The issue here is w hether or not ‘reduction’ is possible w ithout loss of
aesthetic quality. In Speaking in Parables: A  Study in Metaphor and
Theology, S allie McFague depicts ‘theology’ as a  secondary activity, a  form
of critical reflection th a t arises/rom  the parabolic base of the biblical
witness. As a  consequence, McFague would issue an  em phatic ‘no’ as
part of her answer to the question we pose above:
One does not move easily from poetic forms to discursive 
discourse, for m etaphor is not finally translatab le or 
paraphraseable. No literaiy critic would attem pt to translate 
or paraphrase the ‘content’ of a  Shakespearian sonnet: it gcould not be done and it would be a  travesty if attem pted. 
The critic who does not attem pt to keep his or her m ethod 
and language close to the sonnet, who does not attem pt to bring others to the experience of the poem, m ay write an 
interesting book or article, bu t it will not have m uch to do 
with the sonnet. He or she may tu rn  out to be an 
aesthetician or a  philosopher, b u t th is  is to move into another mode entirely—th a t of discursive l a n g u a g e .  172
McFague connects her general belief in the irreduclblllty of fiteraiy
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discourse with her specific suggestion th a t we m ay not paraphrase, say,
the Lukan parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk. 15:11-32) w ithout losing the
m eaning Inherent within the form used by Luke.^^^ She concedes th a t we
could ‘extrapolate’ a  theological assertion ‘ou t’ of th is parable, th a t
God’s love Is unconditionally gracious, bu t McFague Insists th a t such  a
procedure has too m any shortcomings:
[paraphrase would] m iss w hat the parable can do for our Insight Into such  love. For w hat counts here is not 
extricating an  abstract concept bu t precisely the opposite, 
delving Into details of the story Itself, letting the m etaphor 
do its job of revealing the new setting for ordlnaiy  life. It Is the play of the radical Images th a t does the job. 174
Significantly, Kazantzakls offers his own version of th is parable, a
provocative piece of Intertextuallty which appears In Report to Greco, In
which he em ends the parable’s familiar ending to Include the possibility
of further rebellion by the father’s  other son:
The prodigal re tu rn s tired and defeated to the tranquil 
paternal home. That night when he lies down on the soft 
bed to go to sleep, the door opens quietly and  his youngest 
brother enters. “I w ant to go away,” he says. ‘‘My father’s 
house has grown too confining.” The brother who ju s t 
returned In defeat Is delighted to hear this. He em braces his 
brother and  begins to advise him  w hat to do and which 
direction to take, urging him to show him self braver and 
prouder th an  he did, and nevermore deign to re tu rn  to the 
paternal “stable” (that Is w hat he calls his father’s house).He accompanies his brother to the door and  shakes his 
hand, reflecting, perhaps he will tu rn  out stronger th an  I did, and will not return. 175
If we so wished, we could ‘extrapolate’ a  ‘doctrine’ of Bergsonlan process
philosophy In Kazantzakls’s renarration  of Luke’s parable. Indeed, we
could Interpret the younger brother’s desire to leave the hom estead as his
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hope to spiritualize his hitherto satiated  being, as the transm utation  of
his ‘average’ soul Into a  noble and  courageous spirit, or as an  expression
of heroic pessim ism  which facilitates the élan vitals  dem aterlallzatlon.
B ut like any ‘paraphrase’ of the original Gospel parable, any ‘explication’
of Kazantzakis’s  own rendition, Including the possibilities we offer here,
Is always likely to prove less Interesting than  the sto iy  Itself. And this,
McFague teaches us. Is because literary discourse Is “...shot through
with open-endedness, with pregnant silences, with cracks opening up
Into mystery. B ut It [‘the trope’] rem ains profoundly Im penetrable”.^^ ®
In light of McFague’s rem arks regarding the poet’s unphllosophlcal
tools of symbol, word-play, and irony, which she m aintains are not
susceptible to system atic extrapolation w ithout being cheated out of
their fictive power, we suggest th a t W hitehead overlooks how fictive
devices often crack when placed under the strain  of reduction. He falls
to value how m etaphor always works as /n o t. He does not recognize th a t
slmües and parables are finally Irreduceable.
In spite of the rem arks m ade above, some critics continue to hold
th a t the ta sk  of reading Involves Isolating a  text’s implied m etaphysic
and expressing th is in discursive language. In Literature and Religion,
Giles G unn speaks of how each reader-crltlc m ust Immerse him or
herself Into the fictional world of the creative writer In order to locate the
‘content’ of their work. Here Is G unn’s thesis In full:
Every work of imaginative literature is based upon some 
deeply felt. If not fuUy or even partially conscious, 
assum ption about w hat can, or ju s t possibly does,
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constitute the ground of experience itself. This primal 
Intuition then  becomes the  organizing principle for the 
hypothetical struc tu re  which the work tu rn s  out to be. And 
because th is Intuition or assum ption th u s  undergirds and 
conditions all th a t transp ires within the  world of the work,
It In tu rn  becomes the Interpretive key which will unlock the 
work’s special logic. Its peculiar causality, and  th u s  lay bare 
the axis upon which the world of the work tu rns. Call it 
w hat you will—the informing or presiding assum ption, the 
shaping cause, the concrete universal, the embodied vision, 
or the m etaphysic—eveiy meaningfully coherent work of 
literature has such  an  executive principle and It functions 
analogously to the notion of ultlm acy In religiousexperience. 177
W hat Is the ‘organizing principle’ a t work In Kazantzakis’s fiction? It 
could be his deep Interest In how m en and women strive to assist the 
transubstan tla tlon  of m atter into spirit, pushing the élanvital further 
along the evolutionary-historical trajectory, and how, In so doing, they 
come to redeem God. As we have suggested throughout our study, this 
seem s to be the ‘presiding assum ption’ of Kazantzakis’s work. Moreover, 
It Is th is ‘shaping cause’ which m ay be set forward In an  exchange with 
the picture of God In W hiteheadian process theology. Regarding their 
process view of God, W hitehead and Kazantzakls seem  to converge. 
However, G unn’s ta lk  of ‘the concrete universal’ and of the ‘special logic’ 
of the novel Implies th a t the creative writer seeks to offer his reader some 
kind of formulated tru th . Is th is true of Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction? 
Does Kazantzakls offer his readers an  implied ‘m etaphysic’, or Is It more 
appropriate to say, with N athan A. Scott, th a t “w hat the [creative] writer 
generally has Is not a  system  of belief bu t ra ther an  imagination of w hat 
Is radically significant”?^^® Our answer to th is specific question takes us
269
deeper into the relationship between literature and theology In general.
In opposition to G unn, we hold th a t Kazantzakis’s novels do not 
display a  unique logic, an  implied metaphysic, and  are not trac tarian  In 
quality. Clearly, Kazantzakls struggles to do battle w ith the  critical 
questions concerning God and salvation, and this is an  aspect of his art 
th a t we have tried faithfully to record. Yet Kazantzakls is principally a 
novelist who m akes use of a  profoundly ‘untheologlcal’ arsenal In his 
literary campaign: m etaphor, allegory, word-play, irony, and so on.
While It Is true to say th a t Kazantzakls wrestles with the notoriously 
Intractable topic of ‘God’ In his work, he explores th is ‘character’ 
th roughout his fiction in ways th a t ostensibly circum vent narrow 
theological categories.
Consider the Image of thorn-claws as suggestive of God’s engaging 
Spirit or the m etaphor of the caterpülar-that-becom es-the-butterfly as 
suggestive of hum an  possibility. Both recur throughout Kazantzakis’s 
writings; however, It seem s safe to assum e th a t he does not decide to use 
these devices by first assessing w hether or not they comply with classical 
C hristian theological creeds. On the contrary, Kazantzakls Is primarily 
concerned with the a rt of crafting fiction, not offering preachm ent, and 
so he Is therefore unconcerned with the exactness of doctrine th a t we 
find In both W hitehead’s cosmology and in Blair Reynolds’s process 
pneumatology. Kimon Friar offers a  gloss on how Kazantzakis’s 
literature Invariably counter-reads any philosophical or theological 
search for conceptual coherence (Gunn’s “special logic”):
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::l
No religious dogma, no political ideology may claim 
Nikos Kazantzakls. His works will always be a  heresy to any 
political or religious faith which exists today or which may 
be formulated in the future, for in the heart of his Spiritual 
Exercises lies a  bomb tim ed to explode all the visions which 
are betrayed Into the petrifaction of ritual, constitution, or 
dogma. His works are not solid land where a  pügrlm might 
stake his claim, b u t the ephem eral stopping stations of a  
m om ent where the traveler might catch his b reath  before he 
abandons them  also, and again strives upw ard on the steep 
ascent, leaving behind him  the bloody trail of his endeavor. 
The fate of all heresies is to soHdlfy, in the petrifaction of 
time, Into stable and comforting orthodoxies. It would be 
the deepest happiness of Nlkos Kazantzakls to know th a t 
those whom his works have helped to m ount a  step higher In 
the evolutionary growth of the spirit have sm ashed the 
Tablets of his Law, denied him, betrayed him, and struggled 
to su rpass him, to m ount higher on their own nakedwings. 179
With Gües G unn In mind, we readily concede th a t Kazantzakis’s 
philosophical beliefs obviously concern us as reader-crltlcs; however, this 
does not entitle us to conclude th a t God's Pauper Is narrativized process 
pneumatology. While Kazantzakis’s Francis resolutely holds th a t nature 
Is God’s theatre, God's Pauper Is not a  special kind of Bergsonlan tract. 
On the contrary, God's Pauperis a  dram atic narrative. Pneumatologlcal 
questions may Indeed emerge from an  Informed reading of God's Pauper, 
and we have sought to pose these In their tu rn , b u t K azantzakis’s novel 
about the Poor Man of God neither serves as a vehicle for pneumatology, 
nor depends for its energy upon Its connection to such. The point made 
here Is one which finds support In Charles I. GUcksberg’s early work. In 
Literature and Religion: A  Study in Conflict, he offers his belief in the self- 
sustain ing  natu re  of narrative fiction:
It does not m atter w hat philosophy or religion the  author
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espouses. W hat counts Is w hat he does with his material. 
Ideals, doctrines, and beliefs are only the by-products of 
literature. W hat m akes a  work of fiction live Is the degree to 
which Its m aterial is integrated and coherent—the degree, 
th a t Is, to which its view of the world Is presented in aesthetically satisfying term s.iso
To Insist th a t God's Pauper {or The Last Temptation] complies with 
categories derived from Christian theology Is to ask  of Kazantzakls, in 
his capacity as creative writer, for more th an  he can legitimately give us. 
Traditional credal language Is nowhere paralleled In God's Pauper, rather, 
Kazantzakls occupies himself with the pressing business of exploring 
characters, shifting voices, changing tones, weaving plots, and crafting 
Images—Integrating all these disparate parts as a  whole in a  bid to create 
a  lasting effect. As a  result, God’s Pauper secures Its cardinal ‘puissance’ 
from the notion th a t it is a  dramatic narrative in  which the aesthetic 
value of Kazantzakis’s language Is more significant th an  the Bergsonlan 
transform ism  th a t it m ight be tem pting to th ink  he sets out to versify.
With w hat we have said, both here and In earlier chapters, about 
the self-sustaining world of literary fiction as well as the proposltlonally 
orientated discipline of theology, we have outlined som ething of the 
nature of the general conflict between literature and theology. Now we 
are In a  position to focus on possible ways In which the two disciplines 
m ight be held together In a  kind of creative dlpolarlfy. To do this, we 
need to undertake a further exam ination of the natu re  of W hitehead’s 
system  of thought.
In his article, “Poetry and the Possibility of Theology: W hitehead’s
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Views Reconsidered”, F rank Burch Brown claims th a t while W hitehead’s 
prim ary Interest is speculative philosophy, his particular “observations 
on the Indeterminacy of m eaning In discourse anticipate certain  claims 
of the curren t 'deconstructionists’ (whose antl-m etaphyslcal bent he 
would obviously reject)”A® ^  Brown seems accurate In th is observation. 
In Process and Reality: A n E ssay in Cosmology, W hitehead searches for 
foundational tru th s  and yet he m akes num erous references to doctrinal
Inexactness.^®^ And In The Dialogues o f Alfred North Whitehead, Lucien
Price records how W hitehead repudiates dogmatic finality and lays bare
the uncertainty principle:
“Words,” said W hitehead, “do not express our deepest 
Intuitions. In the very act of being verbalized they escape us. 
The trouble Is th a t we are In the habit of thinking of words 
as fixed things with specific meanings. Actually the 
m eanings of language are in violent fluctuation and a  large 
part of w hat we try to express In words lies outside the rangeof language”. 183
Kazantzakls and W hitehead converge on this point since Brother Leo,
K azantzakis’s narra to r in God's Pauper, acknowledges his own sense of
dls-ease with the way th a t words lend themselves to m ultiple meanings
and a  lack of closure:
Yes, m ay God forgive me, bu t the letters of the alphabet 
frighten me terribly. They are sly, sham eless dem ons—and 
dangerous! You open the inkwell, release them ; they run  
off—Êind how win you ever get control of them  again! They 
come to life, join, separate, Ignore your com m ands, arrange themselves as they fike on paper--black, with tails and 
horns. You scream  at them  and Implore them  In vain: they 
do as they please. Prancing, pairing up  sham elessly before 
you, they deceitfully expose w hat you did no t wish to reveal, and  they refuse to give voice to w hat Is struggling, deep within your bowels, to come forth and  speak to m ankind. 184
■ f
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As a  philosopher, W hitehead clearly appreciates the conceptual
rigours of m etaphysical discourse, yet he w arns other th inkers against
assum ing th a t logical exactitude Is Einythlng realizable. “The curse of
philosophy,” he writes to Lucien Price, “has been the supposition th a t
language is an  exact m edium ”.^ ®® According to W hitehead, there Is no
such  ‘exactness’:
Words and phrases m ust be stretched towards a  generality 
foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such  elements 
of language be stabilized as technicalities, they rem ain m etaphors mutely appealing for an Imaginative leap. 186
W hitehead’s system atic work as a  philosopher Is th u s  shaped by 
poetry’s practice of deliberately eschewing abstractness, by Its refusal to 
em brace conclusive ainalysls, and by poetry’s lack of closure. In his book 
Modes o f Thought, W hitehead writes of discursive and poetic discourse In 
dipolar terms:
In spite of his Interest In the proposltlonally orientated traditions of 
m etaphysics and cosmology, W hitehead holds literary fiction In high 
regard for the way In which creative writers use elaborate language to 
make sense of their felt experiences of Life in process.^®®
While they often appear antagonistic to one another, literary and 
philosophical discourse m ay complement one another as well. Taken 
together, poetic m etaphor and discursive language work in a  creative
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Philosophy Is akin to poetry, and both of them  seek to 
express th a t ultim ate good sense which we term  civilization. 
In each case there is reference to form beyond direct 
m eanings of words. Poetry allies Itself to m etre, philosophy to m athem atlc pattern . 187 •S i:
.i
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dipolarity in W hitehead’s philosophy. Clearly, W hitehead believes th a t
m etaphysicians can learn a  great deal from how the poet Is able to
Imaginatively represent the m any opaque, Imprecise, yet lllumlnatory
Insights which first enter our m inds In a  jum bled, confused, and
unsystem atic fashion. By the sam e token, W hitehead holds th a t the
m etaphysician Is of equal value to the poet. Driven by the concern for
rational plausibility and logical rigour, m etaphysicians rem ind poets th a t
‘understanding’ Inevitably occurs as and when we m ake the attem pt to
m arshall our thoughts, order our Insights, and system atically reflect on
our experience. F rank Burch Brown describes the dipolar aUlance
between literature and m etaphysics In the following terms:
. . . such  understanding as we do possess appears to emerge 
from a process th a t Is fundam entally dipolar. At one pole we 
find the kind of experientlally rich understanding  embodied 
In poetic, artistic language and arising from the awareness 
generated by our whole selves and m inds acting as a  unity. 
Then, a t the opposite pole, we find the understanding  derived from critical, logical reflection. While W hitehead considers 
the latter a  higher—and definitely clearer—form of knowledge, 
he nonetheless never leads us to believe th a t a t any given 
time we can expect an  exact fit between these two modes of 
discourse and understanding. It th u s  becomes obvious that, 
ju s t as a  viable theology needs m etaphysics for its 
reasonable expression, so both m etaphysics and  theology 
continually require w hat W hitehead calls the “evidence ofpoetry”. 189
Applied to Nlkos Kazantzakis’s God's Pauper and  Blair Reynolds’s 
Toward a Process Pneumatology, th is dipolar approach to the relationship 
between literature and  theology may be stated  In the following way. Both 
Kazantzakls and Reynolds are engaged In a  narrative exercise. However, 
Reynolds’s book on process pneumatology uses conceptual discourse and
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is committed to notions of system atic thought. In con trast to Reynolds’s 
use of ‘argum entation’ as his form of address, Kazantzakis’s novel adopts 
a  different textual mode; Indeed, Its use of poetic m etaphor ra ther than  
discursive language m eans th a t God’s Pauper Is m uch less structured  
th an  Reynolds’s text, th a t It juxtaposes opposite viewpoints, and  th a t it 
supports a  herm eneutic of openness ra ther th an  reduction.
Although discursive and poetic modes of discourse are dissimilar, 
the difficulties th a t th is difference yields may m ean th a t they need one 
another. Despite the fact th a t Kazantzakls and Reynolds appear to craft 
very different texts, when viewed together they appear to be engaged In 
essentially the sam e (de)constructive task: contradicting one another, 
correcting one another, and  rem inding one another of the kind of text 
they are both writing. While Kazantzakis’s literary mode can serve to 
release one from the constra in ts of rational system atization, Reynolds’s 
conceptual mode rem inds one of the im portance of ‘coherence’ In 
narrative style,
K. C on clu d in g  R em arks
Throughout th is chapter we have outlined the m essage of divine 
transcendence-w ithln-lm m anence as It appears w ithin the work of two 
sim ilar yet different writers: Nikos Kazantzakls and  Blair Reynolds. By 
bringing God’s Pauper: S t  Francis o f Assisi and Toward a Process 
Pneumatology together, we have provided more support for our thesis th a t 
Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction can be viewed as a  m ythopoesls of process 
thought. However, the necessity of reading requires not one bu t a
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complex of strategies. Thus, we have been careful to m ake a  strategic 
distinction between KazEintzakls and Reynolds In the form of their 
writing. Although Kazantzakls shares common assum ptions with 
Reynolds’s W hiteheadian process theology, the difference in textual 
em phasis m eans th a t Kazantzakls Is to Reynolds w hat literature Is to 
theology: com plem entary yet antagonistic.
In our next chapter we examine Kazantzakis’s Zorba The Greek and 
aspects of David Ray Griffin’s W hiteheadian postm odern theology. Here 
we read  the character of Zorba as a  symbol of evolutionary striving, not 
static repose, and we focus on how Griffin’s own theology rests on a 
Bergsonlan-W hlteheadlan view of universal creativity. In our exposition 
of Zorba The Greek, Friedrich Nietzsche’s distinction between Apollonian 
and Dlonyslac modes of existence will seem to be helpful on two counts. 
First, It will become clear th a t Apollo Is to Dionysus w hat the Boss Is to 
Zorba. Second, the difficult symbiosis between Apollo and Dionysus 
(which Nietzsche believes Is sustained  Indefinitely) m ay be considered a  
trope for the tension th a t exists between system atic theology and literary 
fiction. J u s t  as Nietzsche Insists th a t ‘tragedy’ fuses two dissimilar 
modes of life together as vital and necessary concom itants, so we 
m aintain th a t literature and theology come together in  a  sim ilar 
fraternal union for they seem  largely (de)constructlve of one another.
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1. Helen Kazantzakls, Nikos Kazantzakls: A Biography Based on his Letters, trans. Amy 
Mims (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968) 514. For Greek text, see Eleni N. 
Kazantzaki, NiKOçKct.ÇoivcÇdKT]ç, o otcm|J,pip otoxDÇ (Athens: Eleni N. Kazantzaki 
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2. Helen Kazantzakls, Nikos Kazantzakls: A Biography Based on his Letters, 549. The 
Greek text of this letter is in Pandelis Prevelakis, TcTpoucomcx.'ypappotpot tqoj 
K(xÇo:uxÇoî,ict] orov npepc^&Kij (Athens: Eleni N. Kazantzaki Publications, 1965) 650. 
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3. Nikos Kazantzakls, God’s Pauper: St. Francis of Assisi, trans. Peter A. Bien (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1962) 7.
4. Blair Reynolds, Toward a Process Pneumatology (Selinsgrove PA: Susquehanna 
University Press, 1990). One of a new generation of Whiteheadian process theologians, 
Reynolds is currently an assistant abstract editor for Process Studies. His book is one of 
the first attempts to understand God as Spirit from a Whiteheadian process perspective.
5. In Whiteheadian process thought, God is ontologically independent of the world in the 
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Natural Theology for Our Time (La Salle IL: Open Court, 1967) 20, 113. Also see 
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5 . Im ita tin g  a P ro cess  God;
K azan tza k is and G riffin o n  S p ir itu a lity
A. In tro d u cto ry  R em ark s
Throughout our study we have been suggesting th a t there exists a  
nexus of the process idea of God in the work of Alfred North W hitehead 
(as well as W hiteheadian theologians like John  Cobb and  Blair Reynolds) 
and  the narrative fiction of Nikos Kazantzakis.^ When viewed together, 
they support a  construal of God as the vital Ciy or Lure tow ards which 
the evolutionary th ru s t is directed, they write of how Je su s  of Nazareth 
experiences God’s progressive agency, and they model God as a  supremely 
m utable Spirit who is able to be both radically im m anent and sufficiently 
transcenden t of the world. In stating these points of convergence 
between Kazantzakis and W hiteheadian process th inkers, we have also 
noted possible areas of divergence between them.
One specific tension m ay be seen when we com pare Kazantzakis’s 
textual em phasis (poetic metaphor) with the form of address used by 
both W hitehead and  W hiteheadian theologians (discursive discourse). 
Conceptual language often appears to be deeply reductive because every 
assertion m ust lead to eveiy other, in an  allegedly im penetrable scheme 
of m utua l implication. As we have seen, W hiteheadian process theology 
appears anchored to th is discourse. By contrast, poetic forms seem  to be 
endlessly productive of further poetic forms. Literaiy tropes often open 
up to m ultiple readings and limitless interpretations. Kazantzakis’s 
novels are seemingly reliant on m etaphoric discourse, and  when they are
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placed ‘in  conversation’ with discursive texts by Cobb and  Reynolds, they 
often appear to counter-read the allegedly comprehensive explanation of 
reality offered by Cobb and Reynolds. By the sam e token, the disciplined 
and schem atic process theology of Cobb and Reynolds seem s to counter­
read the opaque and playful qualities of K azantzakis’s literaiy discourse.
Our sense th a t Kazantzakis’s narrative fiction and W hiteheadian 
process theology often appear to (dis)orient one another, an  observation 
m ade in all our chapters th u s  far, is pertinent to the wider problem of 
the relationship between literature and theology. It helps u s to realize 
th a t while literature and theology use different modes of discourse, the 
complications th a t th is difference yields may entail th a t they need each 
other for a  (de)constructlve ta sk  (contradicting, correcting, and revising 
one another) th a t can only b u t be ‘in  process’ itself.
In th is chapter, we propose to place Kazantzakis’s Zorba The Greek 
‘in conversation' with the so-called ‘revisionaiy postm odernism ’ of David 
Ray Griffin, culm inating in  his book God and Religion in the Postmodern 
World: E ssays in Postmodern Theology.^ Griffin’s work represents a  new 
and recent development within W hiteheadian process theology. Indeed, 
his SUNY series in Constructive Postm odern Thought is a  multi-volume 
response to the curren t notion th a t our era (‘the postm odern age’) stands 
a t a  crossroads, moving into a  radiceilly new site th a t calls into question 
m any of the assum ptions—the belief in  a  common rational discourse, the 
befief in  universal ethical precepts, the belief in an  ordered universe, and 
the befief in the difference between fact and in terpretation—th a t formed
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the foundation of modernism.
With the loss of the absolu te—the ‘death of God’—academ icians 
have recently had  to formulate an  answ er to the question of how to 
understand  a  world which has become relativized.^ In opposition to the 
""deconstractive or eliminative postmodernism'* of Mark C. Taylor and other 
theologians whom he believes promote an  “anti-worldview” th a t 
eradicates the possibility of belief in God, David Ray Griffin favours the 
radical am endm ent of key theological concepts from within modernity’s 
world-view, a  ta sk  he term s “constructive or revisionary postm odernism ”.^  
For our purposes, it is im portant to note th a t Griffin maikes full use of 
both Henri Bergson and Whitehead, two process th inkers whom he 
regards as ‘founders of constructive postm odern philosophy’.  ^ Clearly, 
Griffin’s employment of Bergson and  W hitehead connects him  with 
Kazantzakis.
When we place Griffin and  Kazantzakis ‘in conversation’ with one 
another, we find th a t they both m aintain  a  belief in the universality of 
creativiiy; all living things, including God, embody energy.® However, 
neither Kazantzakis nor Griffin believes th a t God is the sole possessor of 
creativiiy; rather, each believes th a t our world possesses inheren t powers 
of self-creation. It has vital potential to fashion itself. And so, God is 
never the to tal cause of ainy event. For Kazantzakis, as for Griffin, God 
is portrayed as ou t in front of the evolutionary process, the Cry or lure 
for feeling. God coaxes us forward. Within th is process account of God
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and the  creative advance, sp iritual formation is neither impossible nor 
Irrelevant. On the contrary, a  process-spirltualiiy of creativiiy nu rtu res 
a  desire to im itate a  God who ceaselessly seeks an  increase in 
satisfaction in order to spiritually ascend. From a  certain  perspective of 
reading, K azantzakis’s Zorba practices th is process spirituality  of 
creativity. He im itates an  adventurous God.
Before we show these and  other points of convergence between 
K azantzakis’s Zorba The Greek and Griffin’s constructive-revisionary 
postm odernism , we m u st trace a  source common to both Kazantzakis 
and postm odernism  (by whatever name). This source is Friedrich 
Nietzsche. Although we have m ade brief rem arks abou t Nietzsche’s 
writings th u s  far in our study, we have waited un til now to delineate 
certain  aspects of his philosophy.^ Nietzsche is no t indispensable to our 
study; nonetheless, it seem s only appropriate to incorporate him  into our 
analysis of Zorba The Greek. This is because several critics m aintain th a t 
K azantzakis’s picaresque tale of a  M acedonian sa n tu rl player is one 
which owes a  debt to Nietzsche’s The Birth o f Tragedy and  Thus Spake 
Zarathustra.^ Therefore, early sections of th is fifth chap ter will outline 
N ietzschean them es imm ediately relevant to our analysis of Zorba The 
Greek. In addition, Nietzsche’s work gives birth to M ark C. Taylor’s 
deconstructlve postm odernism , an  ideology which Griffin considers 
antagonistic to his own process account of God.® After d iscussing Taylor 
and Griffin on the subject of God, we close with a  d iscussion of possible
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points of divergence between (Kazantzakis’s) literatu re and (Griffin’s) 
theology in light of insights from deconstruction theory.
B. The Birth o f Tragedy an d  Zorba the Greek
In his The Birth o f Tragedy, Friedrich Nietzsche suggests th a t Attic 
tragedy fuses the Apollonian and  Dlonysiac m odes of life together as vital 
and  necessary concom itants.  ^® While the  Dlonysiac sp irit is a  frenzied, 
formless, and  orgiastic chaos which occurs a t the base of all n a tu ra l and 
creaturely becoming, the Apollonian spirit embodies m easured  sublimity, 
calm  enjoyment, and  ordered discipline. Tragedy is the  “fraternal union 
between the two deities [Apollo and Dionysos]”.^   ^ Thus, “to understand  
treigic m yth we m u st see it as Dlonysiac wisdom m ade concrete through 
Apollonian artifice”. In his Report to Greco, Nikos K azantzakis’s gloss 
on th is  aspect of Nietzsche’s thought is illustrative of h is own Dlonysiac 
faith:
Apollo and  Dionysus were the sacred pair who gave b irth  to tragedy. Apollo dream s of the world’s harm ony and  beauty, 
beholding it in serene forms. E ntrenched in  his individuation, m otionless, he stands tranqu il emd sure 
am idst the tu rb u len t sea  of phenom ena and  enjoys the billows presented in his dream . His look is full of light; even 
w hen sorrow or indignation overcome him, they do not sh a tte r the  divine equilibrium.
Dionysus sh a tte rs  individuation, flings him self into 
the sea  of phenom ena emd follows its terrible, kaleidoscopic 
waves. Men and women become brothers, death  itself is seen 
as one of life’s m asks, the m ultiform  stalking-blind of 
illusion rips in two, and  we find ourselves in  breast-to-breast 
contact w ith tru th . W hat tru th ?  The tru th  th a t we are all 
one, th a t all of u s  together create God, th a t God is not 
m an’s ancestor b u t his descendent. i s
304
Zorba the Greek converts th is ApoUonian-Dionysiac duality into a  
parable. While the narrator, the  pen-pushing Boss, embodies peaceful 
serenity, Zorba, the untam able Macedonian, incarnates confident
vitality:
I hung  the lam p up  again in its place, watching Zorba 
work. He w as giving all of him self to the job, he had nothing 
else in his mind, he was becoming one w ith the earth, with 
the pickaxe, with the  coal. It was as though the  ham m er 
and  nails had  become his body and  he w as wrestling with the wood, wrestling with the ceiling of the galleiy, which was 
bulging, w restling with the entire m ountain , in order to take 
the coal from it and  leave. Zorba felt the  m aterial with 
sureness, and  struck  w ithout error where it w as the weakest 
and  could be conquered. And as I was w atching him now 
sm udged in  th is way, coal all over, with only the whites of 
his eyes gleaming, I kept saying th a t he had  been 
camouflaged into coal, had  tu rn ed  into coal, so th a t he 
could approach his enemy more easily and  se t foot in his 
citadel.
‘Bravo, Zorba!’ 1 shouted  involuntarily.
B ut he did not even tu rn . How could he have sa t 
down now to engage in conversation w ith an  “unsu n b u rn ed  
piece of m eat” who held in  his hand a  tiny  pencil Instead of i|a  pickaxe? 14
i:*
Evoking Dlonysiac wisdom, Zorba’s energy appears staggeringly frenetic; 
fi'om the book’s beginning to end, Zorba repeatedly launches him self into 
new ordeals and  tasks. By m ining both lignite and women, Zorba frolics 
w ith his environm ent in  order to tran su b stan tia te  life’s cruel experiences 
into frenzied dances. Devoid of aU concern for em otional restrain t, 
Zorba evolves with the creative advance. Very strong and  self-reliant, he 
welcomes the savageness of life. Zorba even cu ts off one of his fingers 
because it obstructs the full expression of his pottery skills.^®
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Alarmed by Zorba’s creativity, the Boss is initially Incapable of 
m aking any strides tow ards self-actualization. It is clear th a t he would 
ra th er read  a  book about love th a n  actually fall in love.^^ Indeed, he tries 
to avoid all contact w ith the young widow Sourm elina. ^  ^  Consum ed by a  
desire to complete h is m anuscrip t detailing the life of th e  Buddha, the 
Boss disengages him self from ordinary life and  refuses to im itate Zorba’s 
spontaneity  by dancing alongside him  A® Thus, all the la ten t Dlonysiac 
chaos swirling within the Boss is tem pered by his Apollonian qualities. It 
is only after Zorba abandons the collapsed Cretan quarry  and  travels to 
Europe th a t the Boss is ‘qualified’ to mine Zorba’s fathom less depths in 
order to craft the novel which wifi bear Zorba’s nam e.
It is clear th a t Kazemtzakis in tends for u s to see Zorba and the 
Boss as  reflective of different models of spirituality  w ithin a  processive 
and  changing world.^® At the book’s beginning, the B oss’s spirituality is 
restrained  and  reasoned. His flirtation with B uddhistic resignation is 
presented by Kazantzakis as a  flight from fife into the realm  of ideal and 
therefore of illusion. In s ta rk  con trast to the Boss’s esoteric detachm ent 
from everyday existence, Zorba’s spiritual urge is creative and  dynamic, 
even w hen it resu lts in  impulsive and  untam ed behaviour. By the book’s 
end, we learn  th a t Zorba’s spirituality  of creativity em ancipates the Boss 
to parallel Zorba’s affirmation of fife. Thus, the Boss tran su b s tan tia te s  
Zorba’s Dionysiac vitality and fruitfulness into Apollonian artifice. This 
‘Apollonian artifice’ is the Boss’s fictional account of Zorba’s life, a  text
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which the Boss disciplines him self to au th o r in order to secure Zorba’s 
‘objective im m ortality’ (Alfred North W hitehead) in th e  im agination of 
others.^  ^
At the end of Zorba the Greek, then, both Zorba and  the Boss are
spiritually creative. They jointly tran su b s tan tia te  m atte r into spirit in
order to save a  process God imperiled in a  changing world. While their
actions are different, Zorba dancing before the Boss in a  frenzied fashion
and  the Boss completing his h tera iy  presentation of Zorba’s fortunes and
m isfortunes, both characters accelerate the dem aterialization of the élan
vital through acts of metousiosis. In process theological term s, Zorba and
the Boss contribute to the richness of God’s on going experience in the
appreciative aspect of God’s becoming. In th is quotation from his Nikos
Kazantzakis-Novelist, Peter A. Bien com m ents on the process spirituality
a t the  close of K azantzakis’s Zorba The Greek:
Life itself (Zorbas), instead  of preventing u s  from attaining 
spirituality, is our p a th  to th a t goal. God does not save us 
from the m iseries of the flesh; on the contrary, we—through our exercises (cxaicr|TiK'q) in life, exercises th a t  allow us to 
evolve towards the sp irit—save God. In th is  case, the Boss, 
by evolving (always w ith Zorbas’ help, life’s  help, 
m ateriahiy’s help) to the point where he can 
tran su b s tan tia te  Zorbas’ m aterialiiy, h as  enabled ‘God’ (the élan vital) to  accom plish H is/Its  design for life.2 2
In Report to Greco, Kazantzakis points ou t th a t Nietzsche opposes 
the ‘official view’ of Greece as a  “balanced, carefree land  th a t confronted 
life and  death  with a  sim plehearted, smiling serenity”.  ^^  This belief th a t 
Apollo’s restrained  approach to life signifies the greatness of the Greeks 
is a  destructive fantasy which Nietzsche, writing in The Birth o f Tragedy,
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associates w ith Socrates, the so-called “theoretical m an ”.^^ Inspired by
Apollo, Socrates creates “the illusion th a t thought, guided by the  th read
of causation, m ight plum m et the farthest abysses of being and  even
correct it”.^^ Here Nietzsche’s com plaint is th a t Socratic rationalism
(‘theoretical optim ism ’) perverts the tragic spirit by replacing vibrant
m yths and  veracious in tu ition  with em pty logical schem atism s and an
exaggerated sense of conceptual finality.^® Writing in Report to Greco,
K azantzakis follows Nietzsche’s criticism  of Socrates:
It [Greek tragedy] was m urdered by logical analysis.
Socrates, w ith his dialectics, killed the Apollonian sobriety 
and  Dionysiac intoxication. In the h an d s of Euripides, 
tragedy degenerated into a  hum an  ra th e r th a n  a  divine 
passion, a  sophistical serm on to propagandize new ideas. It lost its tragic essence and perished.2?
For Nietzsche, the Apollonian-inspired theoretical sp irit is far too
eager to assum e th a t any idea or experience which is no t susceptible to
conclusive analysis lacks m eaning or significance. As the  chief priest of
intellectual open-endedness, Dionysus exorcises the spectre of fixed and
canonic tru th s  by hinting a t a  realm  of wisdom from which the logician
is excluded.^® Dionysiac wisdom, as Nietzsche playfully rem arks in The
Birth o f Tragedy, s tan d s in s ta rk  con trast to the theoretical optim ism  of
the dialectician because the la tter practices a  logic which often “curls
abou t itself and  bites its own ta il”.^ ®
This ApoUonian-Dionysiac interplay is relevant to our analysis of
the relationship  between (Kazantzakis’s) literature and  (W hiteheadian
forms of process) theology. Thus far in  our thesis, we have found th a t
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the major difference between these two disciplines is textual. The mode 
of writing favoured by Kazantzakis is very different from the  form of 
address favoured by W hiteheadian process theologians like Jo h n  Cobb.
In light of an  informed reading of Nietzsche’s The Birth o f Tragedy, it 
m ight be suggested th a t the system atic theologian is to the  creative 
writer as the theoretical optim ist is to the  Dionysiac tragic spirit.
Like the Apollonian-inspired theoretical optim ist, the  system atic 
theologian arguably craves final or conclusive analysis, appears 
dissatisfied with diversity and  plurisignification, and  seem s to prefer the 
apparen t securfiy of fixed and canonic tru th s  about divine and  creaturely 
existence. In contrast, the creative w riter recalls the  Dionysiac tragic 
spirit, for neither seem s perturbed by paradox, polysemy, or a  lack of 
eplstemological closure. At one ju n c tu re  in The Birth o f Tragedy, 
Nietzsche wonders if “a rt m u st be seen as the necessary com plem ent of 
rational discourse?”^ ® Toward the end of th is chapter, we wonder if a  
study  of the relationship between (Kazantzakis’s) literatu re and (forms of 
W hiteheadian process) theology can evoke a  com parable idea, namely, 
th a t narrative fiction can serve to com plem ent (perhaps even correct) the 
essentializing tendencies of m uch system atic theology.
Evidence of Zorba’s Dionysiac wisdom and the B oss’s theoretical 
optim ism  is found th roughout Zorba the Greek, W hen Zorba and the 
Boss first m eet in a  P iraeus café on the ir way to Crete, and  a  degree of 
philosophical openness is established between them , it becomes obvious 
th a t the m ild-m annered, Apollonian Boss is looking for release from his
309
stud iousness, h is search  for salvation hinted a t by his use of Dante.
On the  other hand, the Dionysiac Zorba comes across as  both fiery and
reckless, craving new escapades to transform  into song and  dance with
his own constan t friend, namely, the  s a n tu r l .K a z a n tz a k is  in tends for
us to u nderstand  th a t Zorba’s a ttachm en t to and  playing of the san tu ri
is m ost unlike the Boss’s scholarly endeavours. W hen the Boss reads or
writes, he does so w ith a  calm detachm ent and  a  m easured  concern for
structu red  thought. In contrast to th is harm onious approach toward
life, Zorba does not simply play his san turi; ra ther, he launches into it,
a ttacks it w ith fervour, with excitem ent, and w ith unbridled lust.
Initially, the Boss does not grasp Zorba’s en thusiasm :
“...Ever since I [Zorba] learned the santuri, I becam e another 
person. When I’m  depressed or when I’m  pressured  by poverty, I play the santuri and feel relieved. W hen I play, 
people ta lk  to me and  1 don’t  hear; and  if 1 do hear, 1 cannot 
speak. I w ant to, I w ant to, bu t 1 can ’t!”
“B ut why, Zorba?”
“Eh, love!”33
The Boss eventually becomes a  convert to Zorbatic vigour. He gradually 
accepts th a t unless he allows him self to learn from Zorba, the simple 
workm an with a  philosophy chiseled out of raw  experience, all th a t he 
will be left with is a  Weltanschauung stenosis, a  narrowing of his world­
view:
“...The santuri w ants you to th ink  of nothing b u t santuri-- 
understand?”
I understood th a t th is  Zorba was the  person 1 had 
been searching for and  not finding for su ch  a  long time; an
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alive heart, a  w arm  throat, a  great rough soul whose umbilical cord had  not been cu t from its m other, E arth .
The m eaning of art, love of beauty, purity, passion was 
clarified for me by th is workm an by m eans of the  m ost simple and  hum ane w ords.34
D uring the course of their friendship, the im prudent Zorba teaches 
the Boss by lam pooning the la tte r’s efforts to intellectualize life and  its
"I
-m any mysteries :
“...Ah, one day I was passing through a  little village. And an  
elderly m an ninety years old was planting an  alm ond tree. 
‘Hey, g randpa,’ 1 says to him, ‘you’re p lanting an  alm ond?’ 
And he, leaning over as he was, tu rned  and says to me: ‘My 
son, I act as though 1 were imm ortal!’ ‘And I,’ I answered 
him, ‘I act as though  I were going to die every m inute.’Which of u s  two w as right, boss?”
He looked a t me in  trium ph:
“Answer me th a t one if you dare!”
I kept silent. The two routes are equally ascending 
and brave, and both can lead to the sum m it. To act as 
though death  does not exist and  to act having death  in m ind a t every m om ent are one and  the sam e, perhaps. B ut 1 did 
not know th a t then, when Zorba asked me.
“So?” Zorba asked tauntingly. “Don’t  take it to heart, 
boss, you can ’t get to the bottom  of it. Common kids, change the subject!”35
Here Zorba playfully derides the way in which the Boss, like Nietzsche’s
theoretical optim ist, seeks to schem atize life’s existenUalaporias into
tidy, logical groupings. In con trast to the Boss’s lu st for form ulated
tru th , Zorba dem ands a  tru th  th a t is creative and  serves life. Wisdom
cannot be enclosed in a  secure, unchanging system, b u t is a  process, and I
th u s  involves ceaseless struggle. In short, Zorba lives paradoxes and
coagulates contradictions. He is both in control and  out of control, an
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impossible figure b u t necessary in h is impossibility:
The universe for Zorba, as also for the  first hum ans, 
was dream stuff tu rned  solid: the s ta rs  touched him, the 
seawaves broke inside his brain; he experienced soil, water, 
anim als, God w ithout the  distorting intervention ofrationality . 3 6
Zorba’s spirituality  of creativity, expressed though num erous acts 
of Dionysiac passion and  dithyram bic intensity, recalls K azantzakis’s 
religious vision th a t a  process God depends on u s  to exert our inventive 
energies to the fullest in  order to help liberate an  imperiled divine from 
the confines of m atter. To Kazantzakis, Zorba’s titan ic approach to life 
facilitates the dem aterialization process. This is because Zorba never 
allows tragedy and  suffering to disappoint him; on the contrary, Zorba 
welcomes the  savageness of life with real vitallfy and  strong  power. In 
the face of failure Zorba rem ains undaunted , transform ing suffering so 
as to aiffirm existence. In short, Zorba’s process spirituality  of creativity 
is based on the im itation of a  God of adventure and  creative movement. 
Zorba copies the energy of an  evolving God. K azantzakis gives poetic 
expression to th is process religious vision in Report to Greco:
1 rem em bered som ething Zorba once said: “1 always act 
as though 1 were im m ortal.” This is God’s m ethod, b u t we 
m ortals should follow it too, not from m egalom ania and 
im pudence, b u t from the soul’s invincible yearning for w hat 
is above. The attem pt to imitate God is our only m eans to su rp ass  hum an  boundaries, be it only for an  in s tan t (remember the flying fish).37
From  a  W hiteheadian process theological perspective, our tendency to
im itate a  dynam ic God invariably leads to the idea of divine-hum an co-
creativify, a  concept favoured by David Ray Griffin in Spirituality and
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Society:
Although different constructive postm odernists describe it 
[spirituality] with different nuances, m ost of them  affirm a  
vision th a t can be called naturalisUcpanenttieism, according 
to which the world is p resen t in deity and  deity is p resent in 
the world. The shape of the world in th is view resu lts 
neither from the un ila teral activity of deity nor from th a t of the creatu res b u t from their cocreativity. 3 8
Through dangerous leaps and  bounds, Zorba’s dancing is K azantzakis’s
preferred symbol of divine-hum an movement, co-operation, and
transform ation. In short, Zorba’s Dionysiac gambol contributes to a
tran su b stan tia tin g  process leading to dem aterialization and the
salvation of God.
To Kazantzakis, tran su b stan tia tio n  is a  complex process relian t on 
sp iritual exercises willed by an  evolving and processive God. Since Zorba 
converts life’s b ru tish  features into dance and song, Zorba can  be spoken 
of as one who tu rn s  m atter into spirit, who affects God’s concrescence, 
who facilitates the  process of dem aterialization, and  who subsequently  
liberates the élan vital from its m aterial congealm ents. Furtherm ore, it is 
Zorba’s tendency to wrestle with life’s barbarism  th a t inclines u s to trea t 
him  as an  example of a  ''strong pessim ist”, a  phrase used  by Nietzsche in 
The Birth o f Tragedy to denote a  person with “a  p enchan t of the  m ind for 
w hat is hard, terrible, evil, dubious in  existence, arising from a  plethora 
of health, plenitude of being”. T h e  strong pessim ist is a  tragic spirit 
who, while refusing all m etaphysical palliatives, is nonetheless able to 
confront the paradoxes and  inequalities of life with adm irable fortitude. 
Attem pting to navigate both the abysses and heights of life, the  strong
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pessim ist collaborates w ith the evolutionary th ru s t of th e  world. He or 
she tran su b stan tia te s  w eakness into strength, res tra in t into excess, and  
flesh into spirit. These are qualities of the titanic spirit, a ttribu tes of a  
saviour of a  process God; to Kazantzakis, Zorba tabernacles each and 
eveiy one of them . Hence, Peter A. Bien refers to Zorba The Greek as “a 
parable of Dionysiac knowledge, Dionysiac wisdom m ade concrete 
th rough  Apollonian artifice”.'^ ®
Strong pessim ism  is an  aspect of Zorba’s character th a t the Boss, 
Kazantzakis’s chief symbol of level-headedness, struggles to accept. For
instance, consider how the Boss hires Zorba and imm ediately announces
■a  plan for the ir continued happiness and  well-being. This involves Zorba
m ining the Cretan countryside during the day and playing the san tu ri by 
night. Here Zorba vehem ently protests the Boss’s contrived, Apollonian 
desire for order and harmony:
“If I’m  in a  good mood, do you hear? If I’m  in a  good 
mood, ru  work for you all you w ant—your slave! B ut the 
santuri is som ething else. It’s a  wild beast, it needs freedom. 
If I’m  in a  good mood, I’U play, I’U even sing. And I’ll dance 
the zeïbeküco, the hasapiko, the pendozali. B u t—no 
argum ent!—1 need to be in  a  good mood. T hat’s clearly my business! If you force me, you’ve lost me. I’m  a  m an in 
these things, you better know.”
“A m an? W hat do you m ean?”
“T hat’s i t- f re e .”4i
Clearly, the Boss suffers from a  form of weak pessim ism . His academic 
in terest in the  life of the asocial B uddha, his sense th a t the  world is 
m eaningless, h is morbid fear of death, and his inabilify to apply his own
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learning to some of Zorba’s more far-reaching sta tem en ts and  questions, 
are all factors which appear to  illustrate his despair of life. Powerless to 
convert or tran su b s tan tia te  his reasoned though t Into fervent action, the 
Boss Initially appears to be consum ed by w hat Paul TllUch, writing in 
The Courage to Be, refers to as ‘the anxiety of non-being’. B y  contrast, 
Zorba displays w hat Tillich refers to as the courage to  be’.^^ Expressed 
In W hiteheadian term s, Zorba Is a symbol of process (becoming) while 
the Boss, in contrast, signifies static repose (being).
Zorba teaches th a t the  character of a  person, w hat W hiteheadian 
process th inkers call one’s ‘subjective concrescence’, Is constructed  out 
of m any choices, namely, by an  expression of the will as It responds to or 
prehends a  series of possibilities. For David Ray Grlffin, writing In his 
book God and Religion in the Postmodern World, “the  Divine One” offers us 
the possibility to Instan tiate  “m oral and  religious beaufy”.^^ This Is 
God’s optim um  aim  for us: the evocation of Intensities of experience. 
Insofar as Zorba seeks to exert his own creative energies to the best of 
his ability by tackling his life—the m ining project, M adam e Hortense, 
and  Lola—with headstrong Integrity, perhaps we can  say th a t Zorba 
faithfully responds to God’s aim  and  lure forward (as defined above). By 
contrast, the Boss disengages him self from God’s aim  and  lure to seek 
adventure. The Boss distances him self from others and  appears to 
resem ble Thoreau, Spinoza, or the religious ascetics like S ain t Jerom e or 
the B uddha, with the la st being the subject of the B oss’s scholarly
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m onograph. Having dem onstrated how Nietzsche’s The Birth o f Tragedy 
applies to K azantzakls’s  initial characterization of Zorba and  the Boss, 
we are now ready to m ake more explicit ‘process’ connections between 
K azantzakls and  Nietzsche
C. T ruth  and  B ecom in g: N ie tz sc h e  and  K a za n tza k is  C om pared
In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Friedrich Nietzsche declares th a t the
collapse of the  entire edifice of Platonlc-Christlanlty Is im m inent because
the values Inherent w ithin Its conception of life have a  false foundation;
namely. Its understanding  of becoming as an  abstraction  firom being Is
misguided.^^ To Nietzsche, ‘reality’ ought to be pictured In fluid, dynamic
ways, and  the assum ption  th a t ‘tru th ’ Is absolute, static , and  certain
needs to be replaced by a  notion of tru th  more in accordance with a
processive way of looking a t the world. In short, a  “flashing question
m ark” ought to be placed beside allegedly fixed and  stable accounts of
our evolving c o s m o s . I n  the following quotation firom his Thus Spake
Zarathustra, Nietzsche gives poetic expression to the process idea th a t
‘reality’ changes and develops :
When w ater Is planked over so th a t it can  be walked upon, 
w hen gangway and railings span  the stream ; truly, he Is not believed who says: ‘Eveiything Is In flux.’
On the contraiy, even sim pletons contradict him. 
‘W hat?’ say the sim pletons, ‘everything In flux? B ut there 
are planks and  railings over the stream!
'Over the stream  everything Is firmly fixed, all the 
values of things, the bridges, concepts, aU “Good” and “EvU”: 
all 3XG firm ly fixed l ’
B ut w hen hard  w inter comes, the anim al tam er of 
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stream s, then  even the cleverest learn  m istrust; and truly, not only the sim pletons say then: ‘Is not everything m eant 
to —stan d  still?’
‘Fundam entally, everything s tan d s still’--tha t Is a  
proper w inter doctrine, a  fine thing for unfruitfu l seasons, a  
fine consolation for h ibernators and  stay-at-hom es.
‘Fundam entally, everything stands still—the thawing 
wind, however, preaches to the contrary\
The thawing wind, an  ox th a t Is no ploughing ox—a raging ox, a  destroyer th a t breaks Ice with its angry horns! 
Ice, however—breaks gangways\
O my brothers. Is everything not now influx?  Have 
not all railings and  gemgways fallen Into the  w ater and come 
to nothing? Who can  still cling to good’ and  ‘evil’? 47
Why does Nietzsche give poetic expression to a  ‘process’ account of 
‘reality’? One possible answ er lies In Nietzsche’s regard for the attack  on 
substan tla lls t m etaphysics m ade by evolutionary scientists and  th inkers 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth  centuries.^® In the context of our own 
thesis, Nietzsche’s predilection for becoming over being foreshadows the 
work of process th inker Henri Bergson, an  Im portant Influence on Nlkos 
K azantzakls’s process poesis, and  h is vision of sp iritual energy dispersed 
throughout the plurlverse.^® In addition, Nietzsche anticipates a  striking 
aspect of Alfred North W hitehead’s process philosophy, namely, the belief 
th a t all actualities In the  evolutionary advance exhibit creativity.
A concern for a  view of tru th  th a t Is Itself dynam ic, containing the  
sam e Ingredients as existence, namely, change, contradiction, and error, 
and th a t resists eplstemologlcal conclusiveness and dogm atic finality Is 
still ano ther reason why Nietzsche favours a  ‘process’ way of viewing the
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world. In his book The Birth o f Tragedy, Nietzsche provides the Inklings
of su ch  a  view of tru th  w ith his provocative claim th a t “both  art and  life
depend whoUy on the laws of optics, on perspective and  Illusion; both, to
be blunt, depend on the necessity of error”. I n  her book Nietzsche:
Disciple o f D ionysus, Rose Pfeffer com m ents on Nietzsche’s account of
tru th  In the following term s:
T ru th  Is not sta tic  and üfeless, merely there for us to 
discover; It Is changing and  dynamic and  m u st ever be 
created anew  by m an. It has no closed boundaries and 
definite solutions, b u t leads In Its lim itless, unending course to Invention an d  experim entation.52
W ithout a  doubt, Nietzsche unknowingly bequeathed th is perspectivlsm
to K azantzakls. Writing In Report to Greco, K azantzakis gives expression
to th is aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy:
The world Is my own creation .. .Reality, I said to myself, does 
not exist Independent of m an, completed and  ready; It comes 
abou t w ith m an’s collaboration, and Is proportionate to m an’s w orth.5 3
In Zorba the Greek, Zorba’s perspectivlsm  reflects the Nietzschean 
view of tru th  as processive and In flux. Em bracing the  world of change 
and  opposition, Zorba resem bles the spider who sp ins ou t of him self the 
world which he Inhabits:
“No I don’t  believe In anything—how m any tim es do I 
have to tell you? I don’t  believe in emythlng or In anyone, 
only In Zorba. Not because Zorba Is better th a n  the o thers— 
not a t all; no, no t a t all! He, too, Is a  beast. B ut I believe 
In Zorba because he’s the only one I have in m y power, the 
only one I know. All the o thers are ghosts. I see with his 
eyes, I hear w ith h is ears, I digest with his Innards. All the 
others are ghosts, I tell you. When I die, everything dies.The whole Zorbaworld sinks to the bottom! ”5 4
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Nietzsche supplem ents his conviction th a t tru th  is developmental 
w ith his belief th a t the highest form of knowledge is a  wisdom attainable 
th rough  a  m ixture of Dionysiac intuition, dithyram bic m adness, and  
instinctual u r g e s . I n  the following quotation, the  Boss responds to 
Zorba’s confession th a t he has spen t the  Boss’s m oney in frenzied, 
orgiastic living with Lola in Candia. The Boss’s rem arks help u s  
understand  his increasing aw areness of Zorba’s ability to philosophize 
w ith a  hcimmer:
W hen I had  read  Zorba’s letter, I rem ained undecided 
for some time, I d idn’t  know w hether to be angry, to laugh, 
or to adm ire th is primitive person who, su rpassing  life’s 
c ru s t—logic, morality, honesty—reached the  essence. He 
lacked all the sm all virtues, those th a t are so useful, and  
retained only a  single uncom fortable, inconvenient, dangerous virtue th a t was pushing him  irresistibly toward the hrrtherm ost border, the ab yss.56
For Kazantzakis, as for Nietzsche, dancing and  laughter are the 
basic symbols of life and  tru th  in process. In light of Thus Spake 
Zarathustra, perhaps we can say  th a t Zorba is the “Higher M an” who 
w ears “laughter’s crown” and  who is able “to dance beyond” himself.
Here the Boss describes Zorba’s ludlc creativity and ageless élan:
He threw  him self into the dance, clapped his hands, 
jum ped, tu rned  in mid-air, landed on bended knees and 
reversed the leap in sitting position, lightly, like a  rubber 
band. Then he suddenly sprung  up  again high in the air, as 
though resolutely determ ined to conquer great laws, sprout 
wings, and  depart. You felt the soul inside th is worm-eaten, 
dried-out body struggling to sweep away the  flesh and  dart 
w ith it into the darkness like a  shooting star .58
Zorba’s “wild, desperate [or: hopeless] dance” appears to indicate two 
im portant facets of his Dionysiac personality.^®
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First, dancing expresses Zorba’s desire to transcend  his own limits 
and  seek freedom, if only for a  fleeting moment. Indeed, Zorba’s leaps 
and  bounds recall th a t other image so m uch favoured by Kazantzakis, 
namely, the flying fish th a t m om entarily soars ou t of the  sea.®® Both 
Zorba and the flying fish seek to propel them selves above their na tu ra l 
habitat, earth  and  water, even though the act of doing so is tantalizingly 
ephem eral. Here Kazantzakis arguably in tends for u s to understand  th a t 
it is through dancing th a t Zorba acts as  though he were immortal.®^ In 
the context of our thesis, Zorba saves a  process God by converting food 
and  wine into song and  dance.
Second, Zorba’s gambol suggests th a t prim ordial passions and
instinctual tru th s  are often incapable of being conceptualized or tu rned
into form ulated tru th . In defieince of logical schem es and  closed system s
of meaning, Zorba loses him self in d runken  abeindon:
“W hat took hold of you to m ake you s ta r t  dancing?”
“W hat did you expect me to do, boss? 1 w as choking 
from my great joy; I had  to let off steam . And how can a  m an let off steam ? With words? Pfuiiiiil. ”6 2
W ith his titanically striving will, Zorba creatively actualizes h is potential
th rough  both m usic and dance, twin ingredients of dithyram bic m adness,
and, in so doing, he symbolizes both the Dionysiac h ea rt of an  evolving
cosmos and Nietzsche’s theory of tru th , a  tru th  re lian t upon unending
play as well as ceaseless improvisation, and characterized by an  absence
of closed boundaries and  definite solutions.
Nietzsche’s view of tru th  as being ‘in process’ anticipates claims
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regarding the deferral of m eaning m ade by Robert DetweÜer and M ark C.
Taylor, two representatives o f ‘deconstructive postm odernism ’. In his
Breaking the Fall: Religious Readings o f Contemporary Fiction, Detweiler
describes the necessary b u t im possible ta sk  of tex tual interpretation:
It is impossible for u s ever to express our reality perfectly 
because th a t reality is partly our creation and takes shape 
only as we struggle to express it. W hat we call 
in terpretation, giving signification, m aking m eaning, are as m uch invention as discoveries and  organizations of reality, 
and  they are bound to rem ain partial and  insufficient 
because reality, th u s  understood, is always in process, unfinished, multifold and  c h a n g i n g . 6 3
In his book Erring: A  Postmodern A /theology, Taylor asse rts  (after Jacques
Derrida) th a t ‘m eaning’ m ust ever be realized afresh in  a  lim itless process
of invention and  experim entation :
One consequence of th is unending play of signification 
is th a t there seem s to be no exit from the  labyrinth  of in terp retation .. .In other words, there is no “Archim edean 
point” to provide access to a  nonflgural world th a t can 
function as the critical norm  with which to judge conflicting 
interpretations. Experience is never raw; it is always cooked in a  figurational c o d e . 6 4
In short, Taylor believes th a t there is no pure, strictly representational
language. There is no proper or literal meaning. To Taylor, l a n g u ie  is
built on a  system  of signs and  these “are always slipping and sliding;
their boundaries cannot be se t or their m argins fixed”.®® Because of th is
endless game of signification, Taylor opposes conclusive certainly as well
as  finality of thought and, instead, believes th a t language and the
process of tru th  show the sam e tra its  as life appears to express, namely,
erring, creative play, plurisignification, and inconclusiveness:
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The unending play of surfaces discloses the 
ineradicable duplicity of knowledge, shiftiness of tru th , and 
undecidability of value. Since there is no transcenden ta l 
signified to anchor the activity of signification, freely floating 
signs cannot be tied down to any single m eaning...Inasm uch 
as signs are always signs of signs, in terpretations are inevitably in terpretations of in terp reta tions.66
The deconstructive postm odernism  favoured by both Detweiler and 
Taylor converges with some of the ideas previously d iscussed  in  relation 
both to Nietzsche and  Kazantzakis. Indeed, Nietzsche and  Zorba share a 
belief th a t life evolves (the unlim ited play of signification), th a t tru th  can 
be unlocked through error and  experim entation (‘m eaning’ can  never be 
settled  w ith dogmatic com pleteness), and  th a t a  philosophical ‘realist’ 
way of looking a t the world (the m etaphysics of presence) is outmoded.
This d iscussion of deconstructive postm odernism  is relevant to our 
d iscussion  of (Kazeintzakis’s) literature and  (W hiteheadian accounts of 
process) theology. Indeed, we in terpret Zorba’s ability to coagulate 
contradictions as anticipating the postm odern sense of th e  aporetic 
(paradox). This is because Zorba’s frenzied activity h in ts  a t a  level of 
wisdom (m arked by am biguity and  tension) from which the  Boss, as an 
Apollonian-inspired theoretical optim ist, is excluded. Zorba’s erran t 
w andering m eans th a t he is an  im possible character b u t utterly  
necessary  in his impossibility. While he is both frequently in control 
and  frequently out of control, Zorba is crucial to the B oss’s 
concrescence. By fivlng fife’s m any paradoxes, Zorba appears to offer us 
a  clue to a  process poetics of tex tual interpretation. Since narrative 
fiction is relian t upon aporetlcs, it appears to endlessly inspire a
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recessive series of conversations th a t show  literaiy criticism  to be a  ta sk  
th a t is necessaiy  and yet impossible, an  assignm ent th a t we can only 
su sta in  ‘in process’. In term s of our thesis, the business of interpreting 
Kazantzakis’s  narrative fiction is an  exercise th a t is both  necessary 
(because we desire understanding) and impossible (because of the tensive 
quality of literary tropes). By having his Zorba act on an  aporetic stage, 
K azantzakis challenges and  provokes th inkers like Griffin into coping 
when language is stretched to breaking point.
D. Zorba a s  a  Sym b ol o f  P ro cess , N ot S ta t ic  R ep o se
Zorba the Greek is a  m ythopoesis of process though t because it 
reflects the  Bergsonian picture of the world th a t Nikos K azantzakis offers 
in The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises, the process view of evolution as 
a  lum inous interval between two dark  voids.® ^  In our study, we have 
found th is poetic account of Bergsonian transform ism  to be present in  a t 
least two o ther novels in  K azantzakis’s oeuvre; The Last Temptation and 
God’s Pauper: S t  Francis o f Assisi. In our discussion of The Last 
Temptation in chapter three, we wrote of how Bergsonism  is apparen t in 
K azantzakis’s so-called ‘ring s tru c tu re ’, his technique of placing 
m etaphorical elem ents a t both the onset and  the end of h is literary 
fiction so th a t they  encircle a  section concerned with the  development of 
plot and  character. In The Last Temptation, J e su s ’s m essianic evolution 
(the m ain part of the novel) is framed by two dream  sequences. This 
narrative form evokes the Bergsonian account of the élanvitaVs 
movement in The Saviors o f God: evolutionary striving (wrestling with
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m atter) occurs in the intervening period between two voids (spirit).
While th is ring stru c tu re  is difficult to view in God’s Pauper, we do find it 
in Zorba the Greek.
The ring structu re  employed in Zorba the Greek tak es the following 
form. The m ain section of the  novel (materiality), an  account of Zorba’s 
num erous attem pts to  behave as though he were im m ortal, is bound on 
either side by two episodes th a t involve the Boss (spirituality).®® At the 
novel’s onset, spirituality  is m anifest in  the void of despair th a t the Boss 
feels as he sets out for Crete, refusing Stavridaki’s offer to help effect 
social and  political change in  the C aucasus. Towards the end of Zorba 
the Greek, spirituality  takes the  form of Apollonian artifice; indeed, the 
Boss pours all h is own vitality into the a rt of writing a  book based on 
Zorba’s life. These two episodes border Zorba’s evolutionary striving, his 
robust a ttem pt to save God by excavating lignite and  rom ancing Lola as 
well as Bouboulina. Turning all his fortunes and m isfortunes into song 
and  dance, Zorba facilitates the dem aterialization of th e  élan vital: the 
duty  of hum ankind  as it is outlined in The Saviors o f God. Learning from 
Zorba’s creativity, the Boss evolves and  converts him self from a  sterile 
and  ineffectual pen-pusher to a  resourceful and constructive artist.
A helpful way to describe Zorba’s struggle to tran su b s tan tia te  his 
mainy experiences into song and  dance is to refer to Zorba as a symbol o f 
process, not static repose. Throughout Zorba the Greek, K azantzakis 
presen ts Zorba as the suprem e example of evolutionary striving:
In Zorba’s mind, contem porary th ings had
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degenerated Into age-old ones, he had  surely su rpassed  them  
to such  a  degree inside himself. Surely, inside him  the 
telegraph and steam ship  and  railroad and  cu rren t morality and the fatherland and  religion m u st have seem ed like V 
ancien régime. His spirit advanced m uch  faster th an  theworld.6 9
Zorba changes continually so as to m eet with the fresh situations he 
encounters in his experience. His development never ceases because, like 
the process th inker H eraclitus centuries before him, Zorba believes th a t 
eveiything is in flux and  change.
Using h is wit to keep life’s horrors a t arm ’s length, Zorba outlines 
in a  letter to the Boss from C andia th is  process spirituality  of creativiiy:
“Since I don’t  have a  contract specifying a  deadline in 
my life, I release the brake when 1 reach  the m ost dangerous 
incline. The life of every person is a  track  w ith ups and downs, and  every sensible person travels with brakes. But 
I—and  th is is where my value lies, boss—1 threw  away my 
brakes a  long time ago, because pile-ups don’t  frighten me. We working m en call a  derailm ent a  pile-up. D am n me if I 
pay atten tion  to  the pile-ups I have; day and  night I speed 
double-quick, do as I like, even if 1 crash  and become 
sm ashed to sm ithereens. W hat do 1 have to lose? Nothing. 
Do 1 th ink  I won’t  c rash  if 1 travel sensibly? 1 will. So, bu rnup  the countryside!”70
We refer to th is aspect of Zorba’s approach to life as h is ‘spiritualiiy  of 
creativity’ because instead  of seeing evolution in the physical realm  only, 
Zorba in tu its  growth in the sphere of the psychological. Constantly 
tran su b stan tia tin g  m atter into spirit, Zorba evolves th rough  a  series of 
profound changes which represen t a  shift from one level of process to 
another. Zorba’s frenetic approach to h is work shows him  to be a  m an  
who experiences complex development along the way to integrating the 
sacred and the m aterial universe:
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I kept looking a t Zorba in the m oonlight and  
adm iring w ith w hat pluck and  simplicity he adapted  to the 
world, how body and  soul were one, and  eveiything--women, bread, brains, sheep- - blended harm oniously, directly, happily 
w ith h is flesh and  tu rn ed  into Zorba. Never had  I seen  such  a  friendly correspondence between m an an d  u n iv e r s e .7 1
In David Ray Griffin’s W hiteheadian process theology, all potential
for sp iritual growth is grounded in God’s prim ordial na tu re . For Griffin,
“the divine call [God’s Initial aim] is to exert our creative energies to  the
fullest in a  wide variety of dim ensions’’.^^ Working as a  creative influence
on all energy-events in the evolutionaiy th ru st, b u t never the sole creator
of anything or anyone, God “inspires the creatures to create them selves
by instilling new feelings of im portance in them ”.^ ® Using Henri Bergson
and  Alfred North W hitehead, Griffin writes of a  process God who vdlls
the inhab itan ts  of an  evolving world to im itate God’s adven tu rousness.
Writing in God and Religion in the Postmodern World, Griffin delineates
his process theological belief th a t sp iritual discipline am oun ts to copying
a God who dynamically evolves with the world:
As religious beings, we naturally  w ant to be in harm ony with 
the ultim ate reality of the universe and  our own deepest natu re ...If the ultim ate reality and therefore our own deepest 
n a tu re  is creativity, th en  to “obey” it m eans no t to give 
complete allegiance to any of creativity’s p as t products, be 
they  scientific ideas, religious dogmas, political institu tions, 
or economic system s. Likewise, to “obey” th e  will of God for 
our lives is to become more ra ther th a n  less creative. True 
obedience is therefore m anifested in a  life of m axim alcreativity. 75
Reading Zorba the Greek in light of Griffin’s theological use of Bergson 
and  W hitehead, we can perhaps m aintain  th a t Zorba practices a  process
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spirituality  of creativity because he constantly im itates an  evolving God 
who proceeds out from life’s ted ium  and  towards increased satisfaction. 
Zorba instan tia tes ‘m axim al creativity’ through spontaneity , resistance 
to pre-existing social s tan d ard s and  cu ltu ra l conditioning, and  greatly 
increased self-awareness. In Bergsonian term s, the élanvitaVs creative 
influence upon Zorba can  be though t of as the stim ulation of Zorba’s 
own creativity.
Zorba im itates or copies the dynam ism  of the élan vital, actively co­
operating with it in order to ass is t its demateriaUzation. Responding to 
the élanvitaVs persisten t surge for novelty, Zorba m eets its challenge to 
produce w hat is value-enriching; th u s, Zorba is a  contem porary Vitalist 
who saves an  evolving God. In W hiteheadian term s, Zorba’s m any acts 
of metousiosis show  th a t he in stan tia tes  the divine initial aim  an d  lure 
forward. In addition, Zorba saves or ‘contributes to’ the  dependent pole 
of God’s dipolarity. In h is struggle to avoid being broken on the  wheel of 
lesser passion, Zorba behaves as though he were im m ortal, converting all 
h is flesh into spirit.
E ntering into God’s receptivity, Zorba’s sp iritual discipline affects 
God’s fu ture decisions for the directivity of the world. The basis of the 
claim here is th a t God’s consequent na tu re  is contingently relian t on 
creaturely actions and feelings, hence the appreciative aspect of divine 
becoming has the capacity for growth. Where ‘saving God’ am ounts to 
the ability to affect and change God in God’s consequent natu re , Zorba’s 
heroism  (as detailed in Zorba the Greek] ‘saves God’. In short, Zorba toils
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for the sake of a  process GodJ® A ddressing th is them e of ‘saving God’ in
his article “K azantzakis’ Dipolar Theism ”, Daniel A. Dombrowski passes
a  sim ilar, though more generic, com m ent regarding creaturely ability to
contribute to God’s on-going life. Notice how  he connects the idea th a t
we can  affect the divine with an  evolving conception of perfection:
God’s perfection does not ju s t  allow him  to change, bu t 
requires him  to change. New m om ents bring w ith them  new 
possibilities for Zorba-like or F ranciscan heroism , new 
possibilities for saving God. This, I th ink, is w hat Kazantzakls m eans w hen he describes God as not all-good, 
in  th a t God’s goodness, greater th an  any o ther goodness, 
nonetheless depends on the activities, particularly  the 
struggles, of o thers to become greater still. 7 7
E. T h e  B o ss 's  E v o lu tio n
The ‘God’ who is a t work in the fictional world of Zorba the Greek 
is One who is in process, posited as ou t in  front of the  evolutionary 
th ru st. This view of the divine both recalls Henri Bergson’s concept of 
the élanvital and  anticipates the dipolar God of W hiteheadian process 
theology. The formal goal of th is  process God is the  unending  advent of 
novelty and  the proliferation of value. To Nikos Kazantzakis, the élan 
vital is th a t energetic force or desire for transm utation  which ensures 
th a t every concrescing event h as  the possibility of in stan tia ting  aesthetic 
worth. In short, the God of Zorba the Greek is a  process God who is 
forever disturbing the creative advance.
While we have already described the m any ways in which Zorba is 
‘faithful’ or ‘obedient’ to the élanvitaVs (or God’s) persistently  disturbing 
challenge to produce novelty and value, we m ust now d iscuss the Boss’s
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evolution. The im m ediate difference between Zorba and  the  Boss is th a t 
the Boss takes m uch longer to prehend the élanvitaVs dem ands to seek 
expressions of m oral and  religious beauty. Com pared to Zorba’s frenetic 
quest for meaning, the Boss’s own evolution from non-productive artis t 
to resourceful au th o r is torpid, w ithout real energy. The reasons for th is 
recall the idea of Buddhistic res tra in t th a t we outlined in  earlier sections 
of th is chapter. In Zorba the Greek, several exam ples illustrate the Boss’s 
struggle to actualize God’s aim  for him  to lead a  better, more purposeful, 
integrated, and  fruitful life.
First, consider the scene where the Boss a ttem pts to befriend the 
m iners who work for him.^® Vehemently opposed to any soft-hearted and 
pastoral approach, Zorba insists th a t the Boss decide between preaching 
or profit.^® Inwardly torn, the Boss strives to reconcile the forces (m atter 
and  spirit) a t w ar within him. Initially, the Boss is unsuccessful:
B ut how to choose! 1 was consum ed by the simplistic 
yearning to combine both of them, to find the  synthesis by which deadly an titheses become brothers and  1 gained 
earthly fife and the kingdom of heaven. For years now, since I w as a  c h i l d .  8 0
In response to Zorba’s decisions and  feelings, the Boss comes to regret 
his own pen-pushing existence:
My life has gone to waste, I was thinking. If only 1 could have grasped a  sponge and wiped away eveiything 1 had 
read, eveiything 1 had  seen and heard, in order to en ter 
Zorba’s school and  begin the great, true  alphabet!81
It is only the  different and  conflicting layers of his ovm self th a t prevent
the Boss from m aking the arduous transition  from scholar-ascetic to
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productive artist.
Second, note how the Boss reacts when the villagers a ttem pt to 
m ake Sourm elina ‘responsible’ for Pavll’s s u ic id e .In i t ia l ly ,  he opposes 
their hatred  for the young widow. Later, the Boss detaches him self from 
their mode of being. Retreating from life, the Boss appears unable to 
convert w eakness into strength.®® It is here th a t the Boss’s ovm Socratic 
tendencies appear as a  logical approach to the complexities of existence, 
an  educated belief th a t life is ru led  by the philosophical principle of fate. 
This intellectual way of looking a t the world functions as a  block tow ards 
the Boss’s sp iritual groAvth.
Knowing th a t h is duty  is to evolve forward, the Boss tries to fall
under Zorba’s tutelage, to become Zorbatic, to reconcile w hat he calls
“these two age-old enem ies” of flesh and  souL®^ However, the Boss fails
to take any strides tow ards self-actualization because he seem s unwilling
to indulge inJLeshly concerns: the only escape routeJrom  the confines of
m ateriality. Writing in  Nikos Kazantzakis—Novelist, Peter A. Bien holds
th a t the Boss’s refusal to launch  him self into m ateriality  (after Zorba)
effectively leads to the B oss’s arrested  spiritual development:
.. .in order to accom plish th is tran su b s tan tia tio n  of the 
world of things into spirituality  [the book based  on Zorba’s 
life], the Boss m u st participate in th a t world, m u st allow him self to evolve w ith it. He cannot partic ipate in spiritualily  directly, cannot avoid l i f e .s 5
For the  Boss to evolve, participation in  the world am ounts to heeding
Sourm elina’s cry for affection and  love. However, before he m akes love
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with Sourm elina, the Boss’s sp iritual growth is powerfully generated 
through a  series of o ther experiences which force him  to co-operate with 
the process of tran su b stan tia tio n  already a t work (albeit in a  torpid way) 
in h is own life.
First, the Boss learns from Zorba th a t bread and  wine (materiality) 
are the raw  m aterials from which ethical beauty  and intellectual fineness 
(spirituality) are made.®® In th is view, eating and  drinking m ysteriously 
com bine to vitalize and  stim ulate the  consum er to th ink  great thoughts 
and  perform noble deeds: the basis of the élanvitaVs dematerialization.®^
For example, consider how the Boss tran su b s tan tia te s  the red eggs, the 
paschal lamb, and the E aster cakes into courage enough to finally visit 
the widow.®® Furtherm ore, the Boss slowly comes to realize th a t Zorba’s 
frenetic life is wholly dependent on food and wine. To Zorba, eating and  
drinking anim ate the soul and  th u s  guarantee sp iritual grovHh.®® In 
Bergsonian term s, Zorba’s  developmental and  experim ental life helps to |
free the élanvital from the confines of m atter. In W hiteheadian parlance,
Zorba’s decisions and  feelings become a  litany to the consequent na tu re  
of a  process God. Zorba contributes to the divine concrescence. Zorba 
saves an  evolving God. And so, a t the novel’s end, the  Boss jo ins hands
with Zorba and  dances his own frenetic gambol in honour of the soon- 
to-be-released élanvital.^^
Second, the Boss w rites to h is friend Stavridakl in  the C aucasus 
and  declares th a t he is sta rting  to change his life-outlook on account of
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Zorba’s influence.®^ We can believe the Boss, a t least in  part, for he soon 
learns to disavow his ‘book-knowledge’ of the world.®® Third, the poems 
of Mallarmé slowly begin to lose their value.®® Finally, the  Boss resists 
the (last) tem ptation to re trea t from the world and  live ou t his days in a  
nearby monasteiy.®^ In all these instances, the Boss s tra in s  to convert 
his flesh into spirit.
For the Boss, the tran su b stan tia tin g  process is no t w ithout its 
difficulties and  tensions. Seeking to hasten  his own development, the 
Boss soon encounters the problem th a t change requires patience and 
timing. Consider how the tragic episode with the butterfly--the Boss 
tries to expedite the m etam orphosis of a  cocoon he sees on the bark  of a  
tree--illustrates a  salien t feature of K azantzakls’s process way of looking 
a t the world: it is no t possible to artificially accelerate metousiosis since 
the creative advance functions according to its own steady cadence.®® If 
we can  tru s t the account in h is Report to Greco, K azantzakis had  to learn  
th is lesson of forbearance w hen he first began writing abou t his time 
with Zorba.®®
As we have noted with regard to The Last Temptation and  God’s  
Pauper: S t  Francis o f Assisi, the caterpillar-that-becom es-the-butterfly  is 
K azantzakis’s basic m etaphor for the process of sp iritual formation in a 
harsh-b itten  and  taste less world.®^ It connotes the  vitality of creation, 
the th ru s t of new  life as it emerges through the c ru st of w hat has been, 
and  it h in ts a t the courage of a  fresh reality cracking ap a rt the hard  shell
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of the p as t as it launches itself into an  unknow n fu ture. Thus, we can 
in terp ret K azantzakls’s caterpillar-butterfly trope as  his a ttem pt to 
reflect Bergson’s in tuition th a t m atte r is constemtly being transform ed 
into energy, and vice versa. If th is  in terpretation is granted, it is possible 
to connect Kazaintzakis’s m ythopoesis of Bergson’s process philosophy 
w ith David Ray Griffin’s 'postmodern anim ism’, according to which “the 
world is composed exclusively of m om entary un its  of partially self- 
creative perceptual experiences”.®® For Griffin, as for Kazantzakis, 
sp iritual energy is d issem inated th roughout the evolutionary advance.®® 
In God and Religion in the Postmodern World, Griffin reconceives the 
n a tu re  of the physical world in light of process philosophy. In reaction 
to the idea th a t the building- blocks of the physical world lack the power 
of self-determ ination, Griffin works w ith Alfred North W hitehead’s theory 
of ac tual entities (outlined in chap ter one of our study) to advance the 
notion th a t m atte r is self-creative:
M oments in the life-history of an  electron, a  cell, and a  hum an  being obviously differ im m ensely in term s of the 
forms they embody. B ut they all have one th ing  in common: 
each is an  instance of creativiiy. Creativity is in th is sense 
the ultim ate reality, th a t which all actualities embody. All actual entities are thereby creative events, loo
Following W hitehead, Griffin holds th a t each self-determ ining actuality
in the tem poral advance is dipolar. While the physical pole of an  actual
entity prehends its p as t influences, its m ental pole responds to future
possibilities. In addition, each ‘com pleted actuality’ (an occasion’s loss
of subjective imm ediacy in the processes of becoming) is creative in th a t
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it m ay leave an  objective legacy for emerging entities. ^   ^ Thus, the basic 
elem ents of the evolutionary th ru s t are m om entary experiences m arked 
by “radically different levels of anima".^^^
Griffin’s process view th a t our emerging cosmos is sa tu ra ted  with 
sp iritual energy converges w ith the m ythopoesis of universal creativity 
outlined in K azantzakis’s oeuvre. Beginning with The Saviors q f God: 
Spiritual Exercises, Kazantzakis outlines h is belief th a t all entities, 
including the élanvital {'God’), are both actively involved in  and  affected 
by events th a t occur w ithin a  complex process of evolution.  ^®® Using 
imagery th a t counter-reads the classical C hristian  belief in a  static God 
and  an  unchanging universe, Kazantzakis writes of “the  voracious, 
tunneling whirlwind of God”, and  he characterizes life as a  “violent 
whirling”. The unfolding universe is viewed as a  m atrix  of energized 
entities proceeding tow ards spirit, lured forward by a  God {élan vital) who 
is subject to development as we are subject to development:
The prim ordial Spirit b ranches out, overflows, 
struggles, fails, succeeds, tra ins itself. It is the  Rose of the 
Winds.
W hether we w ant to or not, we also sail on and 
voyage, consciously or unconsciously, am id divine endeavors. 
Indeed, even our m arch has eternal elem ents, w ithout beginning or end, assisting God and sharing  His perils.
This indestructible p rehum an rhythm  is the only 
visible journey of the Invisible on th is  earth . Plants, 
anim als, and  m en are the steps which God creates on which to tread  and  to m ount upward. i os
This process conception of the world and  God is cen tral to K azantzakis’s
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narrative fiction. It is an  evolving Spirit who lures Je su s  to become the 
Son of God, who coaxes F rancis B ernadone to convert firom troubadour 
to saint, and  who agitates the Boss to in stan tia te  a  sp irituality  of 
creativity.
As we suggested earlier in th is section, Sourm elina is a  vital aspect 
of the Boss’s own evolution firom scholar-ascetic to productive w riter in 
Zorba the Greek. While the Boss seeks to annu l the  vailue of the body, he 
can only accom plish th is -b e a rin g  in m ind the Bergsonian system —if he 
indulges the flesh. Apart from m atter, spirituality is impossible. By 
finally m aking love with Sourm elina, the Boss tran su b s tan tia te s  m atter 
into spirit. ^  It is no coincidence th a t after having sex, the Boss hurries 
home from the widow’s house, completes his m anuscrip t on the Buddha, 
and  thereafter feels a  new sense of Zorbatic freedom. All of the above 
‘events’ are signs th a t the chiysalis of E astern  renunciation  a n d /o r  
Socratic rationalism  is rup tu red , an d  th a t flight tow ards union with 
Spirit is under way.^^^
The collapse of the m ining project is the ‘final’ stage of the 
evolution tow ards dem aterialization--the movem ent of the élanvital is 
cyclical, as we noted in chap ter one of our study, and  so the long process 
whereby spirit is released from m atter is forever repeated—in Zorba the 
Greek. Naturally, the (still largely) Apollonian Boss tries to rationalize 
the project’s demise b u t Zorba, gripped by Dionysiac passion, proceeds to 
laugh and dance with reckless abandon. Inspired by Zorba’s spirituality
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of creativity, the Boss forsakes any  fu rther a ttem pt to conceptualize his 
m isfortune. Rather, he begs Zorba for the  first time to teach  him  how to 
dance. This willingness to dance w ith Zorba is a  tangible sign of the 
Boss’s evolution. Through dancing, Zorba teaches the Boss to have 
perspective and courage in spite of the burden of tim e and  suffering. 
Zorba helps the Boss u n d erstan d  th a t the hum an  will is not im potent, 
th a t the spirit of a  person is constructed  out of his choices, and  th a t it 
is vital to avoid being broken on the wheel of lesser passion. For these 
reasons, it is possible to com prehend why the Boss believes th a t h is life 
with Zorba had  expanded his heart. ^   ^^  Peter A. Bien holds th a t the Boss 
welcomes with Zorba the collapse of the cableway and  so “gains freedom 
and salvation [both for him self and  for an  evolving deity] by accepting 
the contradictory, destructive n a tu re  of existence”.^   ^^
As we draw  to a  close in our analysis of Zorba the Greek, we hold 
th a t it is im portant to note th a t the Boss never becom es ‘ano ther Zorba’ 
in th is novel. Indeed, the Boss is never completely a t ease w ith the life 
of passionate action and  frenzied folly.^ In his a ttem pt to justify  his 
reluctance to visit Zorba in Serbia, the Boss declares th a t he lacks “the 
courage to abandon eveiything and to perform, I too, a  brave illogical act 
once in my fife”.^  Noting th is  tim idity in his com m entary on the Boss’s 
evolution, Je rry  H. Gill writes of how “the last pages of Zorba, which 
span  the years after the m en’s separation  until Zorba’s death, show th a t 
the boss’ battle was not yet won”.^ "^^
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Ironically, it is the ta sk  of writing a  book th a t secures the  Boss’s
victory. Even though Zorba had  appeared in  his life m uch  too late to
change his pen-pushing proclivities, the Boss still decides to accom plish
the one project he knew  he w as more th an  capable of finishing: mining
Zorba’s life and  extracting from it a  lesson for others.^ Addressing the
ending to Zorba the Greek, Peter A. Bien holds th a t the Boss applies “his
Apollonian powers to the Dionysiac figure of Zorba,’’ and  tu rn s  Zorba’s
passionate life into a  myth, achieving w hat Bien calls “the synthesis of
E ast and  West, passion and  Logos, which has always been the acme of
Greek civilization’’. ^ T h e  ensuing novel, as we rem arked earlier, is w hat
Bien refers to as a  “parable of Dionysiac knowledge, Dionysiac wisdom
m ade concrete through Apollonian artifice’’.^
In Whiteheadlcm process term s, K azantzakls’s Zorba the Greek m ay
be interpreted as an  account of Zorba’s ‘objective im m ortality’, a  process
poesis th a t a ttem pts to pass on the influence of Zorba’s acts and  ideas
and  feelings (his objective legacy) to the Boss and  to others. It is a  sm all
step from th is reading’ of how K azantzakis (objectively) immortalizes
Zorba’s life to David Ray Griffin’s belief th a t our objective im m ortality
consists of God’s prehensions of all th a t is of value in  our lives:
As the sym pathetic soul of the universe, God feels and  is in 
fact partly constitu ted  by the contributions of all creatures, 
and  is enriched or pained by them , depending upon their 
qualities. We can serve God, therefore, prim arily by serving 
our fellow creatures. W hat we do for our descendants will, 
for example, continue to enrich God long after we die. 
Besides answ ering the question of the ultim ate m eaning of 
our lives, th is vision of ourselves and  all o ther creatures as
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objectively immortal in  God pulls u s beyond our na tu ra l 
egoism, with its ethic of enlightened self-interest, tow ards an 
ethic in which we evaluate all actions in  term s of their 
contribution to the  good of the whole.n®
F. K azan tzak is , D io n y sia n  T h eo lo g ie s , and P o stm o d ern ism
Writing abou t the religious aspects of Nikos’s K azantzakis’s 
narrative fiction, Joseph  B lenkinsopp holds th a t one of K azantzakis’s 
lasting accom plishm ents w as to have inspired (i.e., become objectively 
im m ortal in the  work of) a  generation of “dionysian theologians” in the 
second half of the present century. ^   ^® Jam es F. Lea supports th is  view in 
his book, Kazantzakis: The Politics o f Salvation.^ According to Lea, 
K azantzakis’s idea th a t we ‘save God’ converges w ith notions of freedom 
and  responsibility expressed in the C hristian theologies of the 1960s.
In our view, tw entieth  century C hristian  theology is too richly diverse to 
w arran t B lenkinsopp’s rubric. It seem s to be more appropriate to write of 
a  ‘Dionysiac s tran d ’ in recent C hristian  theologies, a  s tran d  which 
emerges in diverse ways. Also, while Lea connects K azantzakis and  the 
secular or radical theologians of the 1950s and 1960s, he fails to 
com m ent on how the la tte r m ight link to literature in  general. It is no 
coincidence th a t Kazantzakis can  be associated with D ietrich Bonhoeffer 
(who wrote num erous poems), w ith Paul Tillich (known for his in terest in 
religion and the arts), and  w ith Thom as J . J . Altizer (a Blake scholar); all 
four w riters share a  preparedness to see theological issues in  culture.
This Dionysiac s tran d  in  recent theologies, w ith its claim th a t our 
read iness to utilize the world and  to hold ourselves responsible for all
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th a t occurs within it is an  expression of au then tic  faith, m ay be traced 
to the  collapse of the classical C hristian  doctrine of God into a  doctrine 
of C hrist in the la s t 170 years. In opposition to the allegedly lifeless 
and  deistic God favoured by m any nineteenth  century th inkers, m odern 
theologians now appear to favour kenotic Christologies. ^  ^  ^  C oncom itant 
with th is paradigm  shift in  C hristian  theological understand ing  is both 
the reforming of theological language into anthropological discourse, and 
the emergence of new concepts o f ‘transcendence’ and  ‘im m anence’. ^  ^
The following paragraphs note how the Dionysiac s tran d  in tw entieth 
century  theologies has emerged, often in very diverse ways, out of the 
above changes.
The Dionysiac stran d  in  theology arguably begins in the 1930s with 
the work of Rudolf B ultm ann. Acutely conscious of the need to reform 
God-talk, B ultm ann se t out to demythologize the ‘outm oded’ language of 
the C hristian Bible and  remythologize it in Heideggerian existentialist 
term s. His New Testam ent criticism  and in terpretation  m ay be 
described as Dionysiac since it em phasizes the urgency of living 
‘authentically’ (i.e., as m atu re  agents capable of being stew ards of the 
earth). We see a  continuance of th is Dionysiac them e into the 1940s 
with the work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Motivated by the  thought of a 
suffering God who would have u s  live in the world as  if God were not 
there, Bonhoeffer wrote from a  Nazi prison about the need for a  “non- 
rehgious in terpretation  of biblical concepts”, a  socio-political way of
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referring to God as One who gives both  creativlly and  direction to llfe.^^^ 
Em bracing Bonhoeffer’s dislike of m etaphysical ‘ja rgon’ abou t God ‘up 
th e re’ or ‘ou t there’, Paul Tillich tried to reform theological discourse to 
account for the depths (rather th a n  the heights) of existence. Writing in 
the 1950s, his model of God as ‘Being itself was designed to evacuate the 
classical view of God of all its anthropom orphic associations and  to open 
up the possibilily of talking about God in ways th a t prom ote hum an  
flourishing.
The work of Bultm ann, Tillich, and  Bonhoeffer serves as precursor 
to the intellectual, cultural, and  social upheaval of the  1960s. During 
th is time, Paul van B ur en developed his ‘secular in terp retation’ of the 
Bible. In his view, God-talk is possible only when it is thoroughly non­
m etaphysical, w hen it ‘speaks’ to our desire for existential change, and 
w hen it bears w itness to a  relational presence th a t encounters u s in the 
world. For Harvey Cox, secularity  liberates u s  from closed world-views 
and  is an  au then tic  expression of biblical faith where the  creation story 
signifies the d isenchantm ent of nature; the story of the  Exodus indicates 
the desacralization of politics; and  the story of the  Covenant represents 
the deconsecration of values. Cox’s work may be viewed as Dionysiac 
because he in terprets our secular autonom y as p art of our responsibility 
to the divine. God calls u s  into a  partnership , a  co-creatorship which 
entails we can contribute aesthetic value to life and  to God.^^^ Finally, 
Thom as J . J . Altizer and  William Ham ilton are responsible for forcing
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C hristian  theologians a t the close of the 1960s to accoun t for ‘the death  
of God’.^^^ To Altizer and  Hamilton. ‘God’s dea th ’ connotes the negation 
of theology’s highest ground A
Given the  theological ferm ent of the early-to-mlddle tw entieth 
centuiy, it appears th a t Blenkinsopp and Lea are accurate  in believing 
th a t K azantzakis’s narrative fiction and  the ‘Dionysiac’ s tran d  in recent 
C hristian  theologies m ay be com paratively studied. In common with the 
proponents of ‘secu lar C hristianity’, Kazantzakis repud ia tes the classical 
concept of God, favours a  ‘this-worldly’ in terpretation  of spirituality, and 
affirms the responsiveness of God to the divine creation.
The radical or secular theologies of the 1960s have given way to 
w hat m any theologians and  philosophers now refer to as the  ‘postm odern 
era’. 133 w hile critics tend  to disagree abou t w hat the term  m ay m ean, 
postm odernism ’ is frequently associated with Friedrich Nietzsche and 
his lack of confidence in  any ultim ate ground or foundation of m eaning 
(‘the death  of God’).i^^ In his Report to Greco, Kazantzakis declares his 
own (though inspired by Nietzsche) view of epistemological 
fragm entation, aporia, and  eclecticism:
Always, whenever I reach  some certainty, m y repose and  assu rance  are short-lived. New doubts and  anxieties 
quickly spring from th is certainty, and  1 am  obliged to 
Inaugurate a  new  struggle to deliver m yself from the former certitude and  find a  new one—until finally th a t  new one 
m atu res in  its tu rn  and is transform ed into uncertainty .... 
How, then, can we define uncertainty? U ncertainty is the m other of a  new certainty. 135
Clearly, th is  uncertain ty  principle’ recalls Nietzsche’s theory of tru th  as
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in flux, creative, and  m arked by experim entation. i Also, Kazantzakis 
anticipates the postm odern process of deconstruction in which so-called 
‘realist’ views collapse. To Kazantzakis, God, the singu lar perspective, is 
dead and  buried. Now it is we, the m any perspectives, who m u st assum e 
“full adm inistration  of the cosm os”,
In h is book God without Being: Hors-Texte, Jean-L uc Marion holds 
th a t “postm odernify begins when, am ong other things, the m etaphysical 
determ ination of God is called into question”.!^® In o ther term s, Marion 
rejects the idea th a t religious signs signify a  pure signified, Building 
on M arion’s work, Kevin H art roots the  logocentric m istake of system atic 
theology in the  use of God’ as an  agent of totalization, One example 
of a  recent logocentric theologian is Paul Tillich and  h is idea of God as 
Being i t s e l f . W i t h i n  Tillich’s architectonic theological system , ‘Being 
itself functions as ‘a  pure signified’—an  ontologically independent reafity 
th a t depends for its significance on nothing beyond itself an d  is thought 
to guaramtee and  privilege (Tillich’s) theological discourse. According to 
postm odernists, it is veiy difficult (if not altogether impossible) for any 
discourse to be privileged because nothing resem bling a  ‘pure signified’ 
exists. Indeed, Jacques Derrida (after Saussure) h as  persuasively argued 
th a t language is constitu ted  by a  m ultifarious interplay of signs which 
appear to resis t totalization and  frustra te  any desire for a  closed system  
of meaning. ^
In The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises, K azantzakis anticipates
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the postm odern challenge to the idea of stable s tru c tu re  and  solid 
foundation. He holds th a t the élanvitaVs “gigantic erotic whirling” is so 
bewildering to the finite m ind th a t it cannot be adequately described. 
Thus, he refuses to fall into the trap  of ‘verbal immobility’ in which the 
word, by tiylng to define mobiliiy, Immobilizes it. According to 
Kazantzakis, an  a rtis t relian t upon polysemy, we m u st “battle with 
m yths, w ith com parisons, w ith allegories, with rare and  common words, 
with exclam ations and  rhym es” so th a t we m ight “transfix” the élan vital. 
Having given these instructions, Kazantzakis concedes th a t  the ta sk  of 
transfixing the élan vital is a  necessary yet impossible struggle. This is 
because the divine “Spirit” is an  evolving presence th a t “cannot be 
contained in the twenty-six le tters of an  alphabet”. Given th is caveat 
lector, Kazantzakis can be viewed as an  imaginative w riter w ith strong 
links to the  apophatic or negative tradition  in C hristian  theology.
This la s t point could apply to Nietzsche as well.
Jean-Luc Marion views Nietzsche’s own belief in  the  non-existence
of God as a  form of apophatic theology:
Nietzsche not only proclaimed the “death  of God,” he 
brought the grounds for it to light: under the conceptual 
nam es of “God” only m etaphysical “idols” emerge, imposed on a  God who is still to be encountered. 147
In other words, since our language can only improperly signify ‘God’--and
K azantzakis adm its th is notion in The Saviors o f God--we ought to expect
only ‘idols’ or imaginative construc ts’ to emerge from our attem pt(s) a t
th inking theologically. As Jean-Luc Marion states:
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W hat, then , is p u t a t stake in a  negation or an  affirmation 
of God? Not God as such , b u t the com patibility or 
incom patibilify of an  idol called “God” w ith th e  whole of the 
conceptual system  where beings in their Being m akeepoch. 148
According to Marion, theologians err when they seek to identify the  God 
of the ir m etaphysics with the God of faith. As Kevin H art suggests, 
Nietzsche’s announcem ent th a t ‘God is dead’ m u st not be viewed as “a 
form ula of unbelief’; on the  contrary, it is a  way to correct theologians 
who seem  to celebrate the “reasonab leness” of their own “accounts of the 
highest ground”. Significantly, we view a  sim ilar a ttack  on claims to 
‘coherence’ and  ‘intelligibility’ in  Zorba the Greek. Indeed, Zorba’s refusal 
to em brace the Boss’s frequent a ttem pts to grasp life’s m ysteries by 
m eans of logical form ulas is com parable to the M arion-H art approach to 
the lim its of rational discourse.
G. D e c o n str u c tio n  an d  P r o c e ss  T h ough t: T aylor an d  G riftin
First published in 1984, M ark C. Taylor’s Erring: A  Postmodern 
A/theology addresses m any of the Nietzschean concepts th a t we have 
discussed  th u s  far in our chapter. For instance, Taylor accepts the 
dem ise of the Platonic-Christian belief in absolute tru th  and  he supports 
the idea th a t consciousness is anthropologically conditioned. In 
addition, Taylor celebrates the way in which Friedrich Nietzsche subverts 
all ‘conceptual understand ing’ of ‘objective reality’ and, instead, shows 
how Ufe is governed by the laws of optics, namely, by subjective 
projection and relative symbohsm.^^^
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Following Nietzsche, Taylor w arns against any belief th a t linguistic 
constructs embody some kind of trans-anthropological tru th . For Taylor, 
Nietzsche’s rem ark  th a t ‘God is dead’ Implies the coUapse of the singular 
perspective and  refers to the irrevocable eradication of the  absolu teness 
and  certainty  of knowledge. As we m entioned in  the early sections of 
th is fifth chapter, the notion of im m utable tru th  is itself grounded in  the 
belief th a t na tu re  is sta tic  and  fixed when, as Nietzsche w rites in Thus 
Spake Zarathustra, “the thaw ing w ind” preaches “to the contra iy”.^^^ In 
s ta rk  opposition to notions of being an d  tru th  offered by substan tia lis t 
philosophers, Nietzsche endorses a  theoiy  of tru th  th a t both  accounts 
for n a tu re ’s dynam ism  and, in words used by Rose Pfeffer, “grows out of 
the dialectical pa ttern  of life itself. It is a  tru th  th a t is dynam ic and 
problem atic and  contains change and contradiction, as  does life 
its e lf ’. As we noted earlier, Nikos Kazantzakis follows Nietzsche (and 
th u s  anticipates Taylor) in  h is own disbelief in transperspectival 
‘facts’. B u t  as we shall soon observe, these philosophical ideas (those 
of Nietzsche-Kazantzakis-Taylor) diverge from and upse t the theological 
beliefs a t the heart of David Ray Griffin’s constructive-revisionaiy 
postm odernism .
The serpentine course of Taylor’s Erring ‘begins’ w ith the claim th a t 
the history  of W estern philosophical though t is founded on a  trad ition  of 
binary opposites th a t appear to be inescapably oppressive: G od/hum an, 
spirit/body, history/fiction, content/form , speech/w riting, m ale/fem ale
345
literal/m etaphorical, objective/subjective, tran scen d en t/im m an en t A 
Taylor believes th a t binary thinking is oppressive since it often leads to 
an  “asym m etrical hierarchy” in  people’s m inds A The two term s never 
appear to live in peaceful co-existence with one another; on the contrary, 
the first term  is usually  privileged over and  against the  second term .
In Taylor’s view, “m odernism  might be described as the  intense
struggle to overturn th is s truc tu re  of dom ination” by reassigning the
b inaiy  oppositions so th a t the traditionally superior term  is relegated
beneath  the traditionally inferior term.^®^ He speaks, for instance, of
how the “hum anistic  a theist” of the m odern period denies the objective
existence of deity “in the nam e of self by transferring the  a ttribu tes of
the divine Creator to the h u m an  creature”. H e r e  the  C reator/ creature
relation is inverted and, as a  consequence, theology becomes a  special
k ind of anthropology.^®^ Even though Taylor believes th a t th is  inversion
is necessary, he steadfastly  m ain tains th a t it is not enough:
This reversal reveals the slave’s struggle against the m aster 
to be a  struggle Jb r m astery. By transferring the  predicates of 
divinity to the hum an  subject, the humemistic atheist inverts, b u t fails to subvert, the logic of r e p r e s s i o n .  16 3
According to Taylor, postm odernists seek to subvert and  recast binary
contraries in order to “dissolve their original propriety and  proper
identity”.
In Taylor’s opinion, because it appears “inseparably  bound to the 
psychology of m astery  and  the economy of dom ination, hum anistic  
atheism  is irrevocably narcissistic”.^ ®® By assassinating  God (the “figure
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of dea th”) in its struggle for m asteiy, the “revolutionary sub ject” appears
both to crave the denial of death  and  the goal of self-possessionA®® B ut
in  h er p u rsu it of self-affirmation, the hum anistic  a th e ist only m anages
to negate herself. “Through an  unanticipated  tw ist,” Taylor writes, “the
riotous subject discovers th a t, in  tu rn ing  everything upside down, it also
tu rn s  everything outside in ”.^®  ^W hat the  hum anistic  a th e is t is th u s
unable to grasp (or perhaps denies) is th a t the death  of the  objective,
tran scen d en t God carries w ith it the  death  of the th inking self. As a
result, Taylor believes th a t hum anistic  atheism  is deficient:
Far from suffering the disorientation brought by the loss of 
center, m odern hum anism  is self-confidently 
anthropocentric. While denying God, th e  h u m an is t clings to 
the sovereignly of the self. The hum anistic  critique of values 
never reaches the extreme point of questioning the function 
of tru th  and the value of value. As a  resu lt of th is 
shortcom ing, the nihilism  of m odern hum anistic  atheism  is incomplete and  th u s  inadequate. 168
Erring h as not escaped criticism  since its publication. At least one 
process theologian, David Ray Griffin, has attacked Taylor’s controversial 
prem ises and  provocative conclusions. In his “Postm odern Theology and 
A/Theology: A Response to M ark C. Taylor”, Griffin initially agrees with 
the general th ru s t of Taylor’s own form of thinking theologically. Griffin 
seem s to acknowledge with Taylor the death  of the su p e rn a tu ra l God of 
Platonic-Christianity.^®® Similarly, Griffin appears to accept th a t ideas 
of self, tru th , histoiy, and  m eaning are inescapably subverted by news of 
God’s m urder. Like Taylor before him, Griffin believes th a t  hum anistic 
atheism  is dangerously unstable. “Modernity’s b lindness,” Griffin asserts,
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“lies in no t seeing th a t the effort to magnify the self by elim inating God 
is literally se|f-defeating’’A^®
Accompanying these initial points of convergence, Griffin shares 
Taylor’s belief th a t hum anistic  atheism  is responsible for transferring  the 
predicates traditionally ascribed to God to the hum an  subjectA^^ It is 
the nature of th is ‘trad itional God’ th a t appears to in te rest Griffin more 
th an  it does Taylor. Indeed, Griffin believes th is trad itional God’ (the 
God of classical theism ) has an  enorm ous bearing on the  m odern 
understand ing  of self. He suggests th a t the God of classical theism  lacks 
in ternal relations and  coercively controls both n a tu ra l and  creaturely 
becoming from ‘outside’ the creative advance. If these  tra its  are 
transferred  to the  self, Griffin m ain ta ins th a t the  resu lting  concept of 
personhood will involve desire for m astery, acquisitiveness, coercion, and 
com petitiveness. Are these values a t all reflective of the  m odem  world?
In Griffin’s view, “a  utilitarian , consum er society h as  resu lted  from 
m aking th is hum an  self the center of existence, for w hich all else 
ex ists”. Following Taylor, Griffin holds th a t ‘God’s d ea th ’ signals the 
loss of the m odern self as well. This loss is welcomed by Griffin on the 
grounds th a t the m odern self has “brought us to the brink  of total 
destruction”
In spite of these instances of apparen t unanim ity  between Griffin 
and  Taylor, Griffin proceeds w ith the re s t of his article to  com plain th a t 
Taylor’s work only serves to eliminate ra th e r th an  revise the  assum ptions
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%of m odernity. Indeed, Griffin lam ents how “the trad itional deity, w ith its 
dom inating aloofness, is not replaced by some less repressive notion of
way th a t Taylor dram atically qualifies all ta lk  of God:
This brief rem ark  illustrates Griffin’s belief th a t Taylor’s  deconstructive
a/theology is an  unforgivable descent into perspectM sm , namely, the
N ietzschean view th a t life is governed by the laws of optics:
There is, accordingly, no truth. Saying th is  does not m ean th a t we cannot know  the tru th ; it m eans, a s  Nietzsche said, 
th a t there is no true  world. The death  of God m eans 
absolute relativism: there is no eternal tru th , only everlasting flux.1 77
In addition to his dislike of Taylor’s perspectivism, Griffin appears
to be unhappy  with Taylor’s belief th a t the unending play of signification
m eans th a t there is no ''translinguistic referent for linguistic signs”.
For Griffin, Taylor’s denial of trans-anthropological tru th  is unstable:
Because we can never get beyond in terpretation  to reality 
itself, according to th is  position, ta lk  abou t truth as 
correspondence of in terpretation  to realfiy m akes no sense. 
D iscussion can  only consist of the superficial play of signs w ithout t r u t h .  179
In con trast to Taylor’s “eliminative postm odernism ”, Griffin holds
th a t h is own constructive-revisionary postm odernism  postu lates certain
""hard-core commonsense notions'" th a t he insists we all e ither implicitly or
explicitly accept.^®® One of these is the concept th a t “one’s interpretive
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deity” in Taylor’s post-hum anistic  a/theology.^^® Here Griffin attacks the I
The idea of a  unifying One or Center of existence is instead  
elim inated altogether. A central perspective, serving as the 
judge and criterion of tru th  is denied. W hat rem ains is a  
m ultiplicity of perspectives, none of which is m ore normative th a n  the others. 176
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ideas are true to the degree th a t they  correspond” to “an  ac tual world” 
th a t “exists independently of and  exerts causal efficacy upon th a t 
person’s interpretive perception of it”A®^  While Taylor m ay deny th is so- 
called ‘com m onsense notion’ in  principle, Griffin m ain ta ins th a t Taylor 
affirms it in practice A Indeed, Griffin even goes so far as to say th a t 
Erring is riddled “with sta tem en ts abou t the n a tu re  of reality beyond 
consciousness”. ^
W hat are we to mgLke of Griffin’s criticism s of Taylor? First, if 
there is one perspective then , by implication, there would appear to be 
several. Indeed, Taylor holds th a t  one effect of the lim itless play of 
signification is a  sense th a t “interpretive perspectives are neither 
independent nor self-identical; they  are thoroughly differential and  
radically r e l a t i o n a l " Thus, it arguably m akes little sense to insist upon 
a  “central perspective” to serve “as the judge and  criterion of tru th ” for 
that would seem  to imply the possibility (that perhaps is an  impossibility) 
o f ‘stepping outside’ the m arginless signs and  m arks of language.
Also, Griffin’s tren ch an t dem and for im m utable tru th  (the m etaphysics 
of presence) appears to underestim ate and m isrepresent Taylor’s 
argum ent th a t since language is plurisignative, m eaning and  tru th  are 
seemingly never finalized or secured.
D econstruction theory and process philosophy represen t two key 
s tran d s of intellectual though t in the late tw entieth centu iy . And yet, 
Carl A. Raschke m ay be correct when he refers to them  as “strange
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bedfellows”.^ ®® Similarly, M ark C. Taylor th inks of process theology as an  
“innovative” development in  tw entieth century  religious thought, b u t he 
sees it struggling to defend Itself w ithin the cu rren ts of critical thinking 
outside ‘theology’ and its prem ises. Why is th is?  To Raschke, part of 
the answ er is th a t “W hitehead’s own process model w as devised in order 
to rem edy the defects of classical m etaphysics within the constraints o f 
metaphysics itself " But  as Kevin H art suggests, deconstruction theory 
signals the  collapse of m etaphysics traditionally understood.^®® Indeed, 
D errida’s deconstructive postm odernism  forces the dissolution of all 
a ttem pts to view the signified “as a  m om ent of pure presence, and  the 
sign as representing the concept in its absence”.^ ®® The m ain  problem 
th a t postm odernists have with process theology—including Griffin’s —is 
th a t it believes it can  work w ithin a  m etaphysical fram ework when there 
exists a  way of th inking and  writing which calls into question the very 
possibility of m etaphysies per  s e . ^  ® ^
In h is article “D econstruction and  Process Thought”, Carl Raschke 
suggests th a t "dtfferance" is “the pivot term  in deconstruction  as ‘process’ 
is in process though t”. ^ ®^  Djfferance is Jacques D errida’s te rm  for how 
any com ponent of language relates to o ther com ponents in  a  text, and  
for the fact th a t it is different from them.^®® According to Derrida, 
différance ensures th a t language ceaselessly and  playfully frustra tes 
“those essentializing fetishes which m ight still tantalize th e  dogmatic 
philosopher”.^ ®  ^AppUed to our thesis, différance continually  resists the
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system atizing tendencies of process theology. Carl Raschke writes:
Once the w ritten character, the graphem e, is posited, it 
annih ila tes the linguistic intention, the  ‘presenee’ of th a t 
signified. The presence of the signified, therefore, is revealed 
only after it is gone, only after it has been dislodged by the m ovement of language. Presence is show n to be absence, and  the  signified ‘object’ rem ains as n au g h t b u t trace. 195
In light of these rem arks by deconstructive postm odernists, it is
questionable w hether Griffin realizes the  extent to which his process
theological writings m ay be seen to contribute to the wider, logocentric
error of m etaphysical theology. Indeed, Griffin neither acknowledges how
‘initial aim ’, ‘creativity’, prehension’, and  the ‘prim ordial n a tu re  of God’
together constitu te his own ‘vocabulaiy of presence’, nor how such
notions arguably serve as agents of totalization in  h is theology. From  a
certain  perspective, Griffin m isrepresents Taylor by om itting to tackle the
la tte r’s earlier roots in F rench critical theory. R aschke’s challenge to  all
process theologians is a  pertinen t and  timely one:
D econstruction accom plishes a t the critical level w hat 
process thinking h as labored for w ithin its own am bit of 
theological natu ra lism  and  m etaphysical idealism. The 
crypto-orthodoxy th a t h as  been developed w ithin some 
cenacles of process theology, the  flailing of an  anim us th a t w as appropriate in an  earlier generation of controversy, the 
pounding of d rum skins th a t have gone slack, m ay be dissolved if those th inkers se t about to edueate them selves in  the crucial problem s of language. 196
As will become clear in  moving tow ards the  closing sections of th is fifth
chapter, th is  uncom fortable relationship between deconstruction and
process thought has an  im portant bearing on how we com prehend the
association of (Kazantzakis’s) narrative fiction and  (W hiteheadian
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process) theology.
H. K azantzakis and Griffin: Further Considerations
In the  presen t section, we look more closely a t Nikos Kazantzakis 
and  David Ray Griffin and  we revisit several them es we only briefly 
considered in early parts  of th is  chapter. The purpose of further 
investigation is to reinforce our earlier suggestion th a t Zorba the Greek 
and  God and  Religion in the Postmodern World can be com paratively 
studied. Through special and  detailed atten tion  to the process them es 
underlying each text, we observe how a  com bination of bo th  can shed a  
double light on common issues.
As we have noted before, the philosophical basis for Zorba the 
Greek is The Saviors o f God: Spiritual Exercises, the lyrical essay  th a t 
incorporates Bergsoniem process philosophy. Of the several ideas 
com mon to  both texts, two im portan t notions can  be singled ou t for 
detailed attention. First, it seem s th a t Kazantzakis did no t care for 
sensationism , namely, the belief th a t sense-perception is th e  prim ary 
route to a  full and  complete grasp of the evolving world a round  us. 
Writing in The Saviors o f God abou t “the second du ly” facing all m en and 
women, K azantzakis describes the need both to escape “th e  holy 
enclosure of our five senses” and  to upse t the "performance given by the 
five actors of my body”.^®  ^In Zorba the Greek, the B oss’s sense of “awe, 
sacred fright” h in ts a t a  level of wisdom not acquired th rough  sense- 
perception alone, namely, existential wisdom.^®® Given K azantzakis’s 
sceptical approach to sensationism , it is possible th a t he w as influenced
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by Bergson’s belief th a t ‘real tim e’ is grasped as duration  and  understood 
only by intuition.^®® Significant to our thesis, an  equally strong 
criticism  of “sensate  em piricism ” forms an  importcint aspect of David 
Ray Griffin’s process theology.^®® In common with the  process th inkers 
Henri Bergson and Kazantzakis, Griffin grounds our wisdom in  another, 
m ore basic mode of perception:
Epistemologically, postm odern theology is based  on 
the affirmation of nonsenso iy  perception. This nonsensory 
form of perception is said not only to occur--which is 
shocking enough to the  m odern m ind—b u t also to be our 
Jundamental mode of relating to our environm ent, from 
which sensory perception is derivative. This affirm ation 
challenges one of the m ain pillars of m odern thought, its 
sensationism , according to which sense-perception is our 
basie and only way of perceiving realities beyond ourselves. The primacy of nonsensory perception, or w hat Alfred North 
W hitehead called prehension [we discussed ‘prehension’ in 
chap ter one of our study], lies a t the root of h is contribution to postm odern theology . 2 0 1
The Saviors o f God and  Zorba the Greek share a  second them e, one 
which can  be called process nature-mysticism. According to th is position, 
the  unfolding cosmos is com posed of realities characterized by feeling, 
experience, and  inheren t value. In The Saviors o f God, K azantzakis gives 
poetic expression to his Bergsonian process belief th a t the world is self- 
creative, with the evolutionary advance (propelled by God) bringing forth 
new  instan tia tions of creativity in  each fresh m om ent. ^ ®  ^ In Zorba the 
Greek, process nature-m ysticism  appears to be a t the centre of the  Boss’s 
in tu ition  th a t the expanding universe is a  battlefield, com m andeered by 
an  evolving God, in which m atte r is constantly  being transform ed into
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energy:
“I th ink  Zorba, b u t I m ay be wrong, th a t  hum an  beings 
are of three types: Those whose aim  is to live the ir lives, as 
they say—to eat, drink, kiss, get rich, be glorified. Then 
those whose aim  is not the ir own lives b u t th e  fives of all 
hum an  beings; they feel th a t all hum anity  is one, and  they 
struggle to enlighten, love, and  benefit humeinity as m uch  as 
they can. Finally, those whose aim  is to five the  fife of the 
universe: all—hum ans, anim als, p lants, s ta rs —all are one, 
the sam e substance  fighting the sam e terrible battle. W hat 
battle? To tran su b s tan tia te  m atter and  tu rn  it intosp irit”. 2 03
To the Boss, a  process God energizes butterflies and  seagulls as well as 
lignite rock and  alm ond trees. In short, na tu re  seem s to incarnate  an  
evolving deity.
David Ray Griffin articu lates his own belief in the  universality of 
creativity in h is God and Religion in the Postmodern World. Here Griffin 
calls th is  position ""panenergism, the idea th a t the world is exhaustively 
composed of things th a t embody energy”.^ L i n k e d  to panenergism  is 
"panexperientialism, the  idea th a t all the individuals of w hich the world is 
composed are experiences”.^ ®® Both positions, informed by Alfred North 
W hitehead’s process philosophy, seem  to converge w ith K azantzakis’s 
process nature-m ysticism . C entral to both K azantzakis’s narrative 
fiction and  Griffin’s process theology is a  belief th a t all m em bers of the 
evolutionaiy process exhibit vitality, m anifest creativity, and  initiate 
activity.
In his explanation of panenergism  and  panexperientiafism , Griffin 
m akes use  of W hitehead’s theoiy  o f ‘ac tual occasions’, namely, the idea 
th a t the building-blocks of the world are inherently dynam ic, relational
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and  creative energy-events.^®® Griffin holds th a t ac tua l entities in the 
creative advance have the power of self-determ ination, are connected to 
the wider society of emerging entities, and (since they  are ‘experiences’) 
th a t they possess in trinsic value.^®^ As we will soon observe, the idea 
th a t ‘creativity’ is universal is vital to Griffin’s process theology since it 
entails th a t the divine m ay not be viewed as the sole possessor of all 
creativity in the evolutionary process. Indeed, Griffin’s process God does 
not unilaterally control or determ ine the direction of events w ithin an  
open and (partially) self-creative world.^®®
While Griffin notes and  values the  fact th a t both W hitehead and 
Bergson th ink  of creativity as “the central category for in terpreting reality 
as a  whole”, Griffin is conscious of one m ajor difference between these 
two process th inkers, a  con trast th a t is relevant to ou r own account of 
W hiteheadian process theology and  K azantzakis’s  narrative fiction.^®® 
Whüe Bergson understands ‘God’ to be synonym ous w ith creativity, 
W hitehead claim s th a t ‘God’ is the paradigm  of creativity. Here Griffin 
outlines the nuances of th is distinction:
W hitehead a t first followed Bergson in the  equation of 
creativity (then called substantial activity] and  the divine.
B ut he soon distinguished between creativity and  God, 
defining the la tte r as the  principle of lim itation and of rightness, which divides good from evil. At th is  point, God 
was not an  instance of creativity, b u t only an  abstrac t 
principle qualifying it. Before long, however, W hitehead 
portrayed God as embodying creativity. God no t only exerts 
a  creative influence on all other ac tual entities (God’s “prim ordial n a tu re”); God also exemplifies the  receptive 
creativity characteristic of all o ther ac tual entities (God’s 
“consequent n a tu re”). God is said to be not the  exception to
356
the m etaphysical principles applying to o ther ac tual entities, 
b u t the ir “chief exemplification.” Creativity is not God, bu t 
creativlfy is the ultim ate reality, which God and  the m ost trivial puff of existence in far-off space both  e x e m p l i f y . 2 1 0
Insofar as Kazantzakis’s process beliefs were influenced by Bergson and
not by W hitehead, Griffin’s distinction between W hitehead and  Bergson
entails th a t a  caveat lector regarding the ultim acy of God relative to  the
s ta tu s  of creativity m u st always accom pany any suggestion of a  link
between Kazantzakis and W hiteheadian process theology. This specific
difference notw ithstanding, the  Bergsonian-W hiteheadian em phasis on
universal creativity is consistently  echoed in  K azantzakis’s Zorba the
Greek:
...I kept saying: “God is the indestructib le force 
th a t transform s m atte r into spirit; each h u m an  being has a  piece of th a t divine whirlwind inside him, and  th a t is why he 
memages to tran su b s tan tia te  bread, water, and  meat, 
tu rn ing  them  into though t and  action . . . ”2 1 1
As we m entioned earlier, Griffin believes th a t God is no t the  sole 
possessor of creativlfy in the evolutionary process. On the contrary, his 
sense th a t creativity is universal im plies th a t all ac tual entities have the 
power of self-determ ination (to varying degrees). Here Griffin outfines 
his view of God’s power as persuasive, not coercive, and  he characterizes 
the  divine as th a t suprem ely loving influence which seeks to  call u s  
forward to new expressions of aesthetic worth:
Because each ac tual occasion is affected by the 
creative influence of all previous occasions and  also h as  its 
own inheren t power of self-creation, God can  never be the 
to tal cause of any event. God is a  creative influence on all 
events, b u t never the sole creator of any, because each is 
partially created by its own p ast world and  by itself. God is
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uniquely the creator of the world, in th a t God is the  one 
em bodim ent of creativlly who is both everlasting and 
om nipresent. As such, God is the only enduring  being who 
h as influenced every elem ent in the world directly. It is 
th rough  the steady divine persuasion th a t order has been 
coaxed out of chaos and  th a t the higher forms of existence, 
which m ake possible the  higher forms of value, have come into being.212
In Zorba the Greek, the divine-world relation is p ictured in a t least three 
ways, which resem ble Griffin’s outline of divine agency.
First, Rodin’s ‘The H and of God’ is enough to inspire the Boss to 
th ink  of God’s ‘panentheistic presence’ within the  world.^^® While the 
Boss does not utilize th is process theological term , his own belief th a t 
all individuals struggle within a  world intim ately know n to God seem s to 
converge with Griffin’s own account of how the divine panentheistically  
em braces the world.^^^ Second, the B oss’s  belief th a t “God changes 
faces” appears to concur with Griffin’s view th a t God evolves (in the 
receptive aspect of divine becoming only).^^® Third, the  B oss’s idea th a t 
“the future is unborn, ungraspable, fluid...a cloud stru ck  by strong 
w inds—love, im agination, chance, God”, is a  notion th a t is com patible 
w ith Griffin’s “theistic evolutionism ”, according to which the  fu ture of 
the cosmos is radically indeterm inate and  yet is being lured  forward by 
God, “the appetitive soul of the universe”.^
In earlier sections of th is chapter, we briefly in troduced Griffin’s 
process account of sp iritual discipline as the im itation of the suprem e 
power (God as persuasive love) of the universe. In our initial exposition 
of th is view, we interpreted Zorba’s energetic striving as an  example of
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K azantzakis’s own view of sp iritual discipline as the im itation (and 
redem ption) of a  process God. In the following paragraphs, we develop 
th is them e more fully.
Following W hitehead, Griffin believes th a t God works w ithin the 
world by persuasively luring u s  to in stan tia te  God’s ideal aim  for our 
subjective becoming.^ ^  ^  However, since all entities have som e power of 
self-determ ination, we m ay or m ay no t actualize th is aim. We do have 
choices. In Griffin’s view, “postm odern spirituality” is the  im itation of a  
persuasive God.^^® To be spiritually disciplined in an  evolving universe is 
to m odel oneself after the suprem e power of the cosmos, emd th is entails 
co-operating with a  process God by practicing persuasive love, seeking 
fresh experiences, realizing novel opportunities for h u m an  flourishing, 
and  avoiding stagnation  a t all costs.
T hroughout his narrative fiction, Kazantzakis seem s to agree with 
th is view of hum an  spirituality  as creative engagem ent w ith God and  the 
tem poral th ru st. That is to say, he believes th a t we find ourselves m ost 
able to em ulate the  dynam ism  of the élan vital when we propel ourselves 
into the processes of na tu re  and history in  order to acquire an  increase 
in m eaningfulness. In Zorba the Greek, it is clearly Alexis Zorba who best 
collaborates with life’s vital im pulse. Consider Zorba’s defiant la s t letter 
to the Boss. Facing im m inent death, Zorba declares th a t he ought to be 
allowed to live forever.^  ^® In th is scene, as in so m any other places in 
Zorba the Greek, Zorba becomes K azantzakis’s  paradigm  for a  life th a t
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spiritually  ascends. Here the Boss, too, offers som e reflections of his
own regarding the im portance of hum an  becoming:
W hat is th is  world? I wondered. W hat is its aim  and  in 
w hat way can  we help to a tta in  it during our ephem eral 
lives? The aim  of m an and  m atter is to create Joy, according 
to Zorba--others say ‘to create sp irit’, b u t th a t comes to the 
sam e thing on ano ther plane. B ut why? With w hat object?
And w hen the body dissolves, does anything a t all rem ain, 
and  does our unquenchable desire for Im m ortality spring, 
not from the fact th a t we are imm ortal, b u t from the fact 
th a t  during the short span o f our life w e are in the sew ice o f 
something immortal.
At th is junctu re , we are introduced to another them e in process 
thought. This is because the practice of ‘serving som ething im m ortal’ 
appears to imply th a t the m eaning of Ufe lies in the contribution th a t 
each of u s m ay bring to the overall richness of God’s experience. In the
'divine consequent natu re , God is suprem ely dependent on n a tu ra l and 
subjective becoming. Indeed, Griffin m aintains th a t w hat happens in 
our world enters and  then  percolates in the divine aw areness where, in 
time, it m ay or m ay not serve as the  stim ulus for fu ture divine alms.^^^
W hat th is m eans is th a t our actions are able to change God and  m ay 
even contribute to the on-going richness of the divine experience. In th is 
view, w hat we contribute to God is aesthetic value, the  actualization of 
potentials.
In K azantzakian term s, our struggle to actualize adventure and 
zest in the  world is itself capable of moving (saving) God the “Mflitant 
E ros” (the é l a n v i t a l ) As Daniel A. Dombrowski indicates, Kazantzakis 
sees hum an  willingness to transform  m atter into sp irit as the prim ary
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activity though  which “the dependent pole of the divine n a tu re ” is 
saved.^2® It is im portan t to point ou t th a t Griffin does no t write about 
God’s need for salvation in  God and Religion in the Postmodern World, 
However, we hold th a t Griffin can  be informed by K azantzakis by 
in terpreting Griffin’s idea of contributing to God’s on-going life as 
involving the redem ption of God.
The idea th a t God relies on u s  for God’s salvation is powerfully 
underscored by Uncle A nagnosü in Zorba the Greek, and  m ay be one way 
to elaborate upon  Griffin’s notion of co-operating w ith th e  divine power:
“I shared  everything I had  and d idn’t  have with my 
children. Poverty crushed  us, crushed us. B u t I don’t care-- 
God is rich!”
“God is rich, uncle A nagnosti,” shou ted  Zorba in the  
old m an’s ear, “God is rich, b u t we aren ’t. He doesn’t  give 
u s  anything, the m ega-skinflint.”
B ut the old notable knitted  his eyebrows.
“Hey, friend, don’t chew out God,” he sa id  with severity. “Don’t  chew him  out. Poor fellow , he too depends on u s ”.224
Both Griffin and Kazantzakis seem  to underscore th e  in tim ate and all- 
inclusive relationship between God and  the world. As we have suggested, 
th is process belief has the consequence th a t all th a t occurs in  the world 
m atters to God as all things are enveloped by the divine. We save God by 
contributing aesthetic value to God’s life. By the sam e token, our efforts 
to tran sm u te  m atter into spirit are em braced in the appreciative aspect 
of divine becoming. O ur actions become objectively im m ortal in the life 
of God. Thus, God saves us.^^®
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I. L itera tu re  an d  T h eology; F ratern a l U n ion , D ia le c t ic a l A m b iva len ce
In Zorba the Greek, Nikos K azantzakis con trasts the  obdurate, 
ascetic soul of the Boss against th e  disorderly, playful flesh of Zorba. As 
we have observed, th is relationship  is one th a t seem s to be consciously 
or unconsciously modeled aifter Friedrich Nietzsche’s own belief th a t 
tragedy occurs w hen Apollonian and  Dionysiac forms of life a ttem pt to 
fuse together.^^® At th is point in  our discussion, it seem s im portan t to 
recognize th a t any fraternal un ion  of Apollo and  D ionysus is never an  
easy interface of the two; on the contrary, Nietzsche believed th a t the 
dialectical am bivalence of the two deities is su sta ined  indefinitely.®^^ A 
struggle com parable to the duel th a t takes place between Apollo and  
D ionysus is worked out in the encounter between Zorba and  the Boss in 
Zorba the Greek. Although they have two very different tem peram ents 
and  frequently jo u s t with one another, Zorba and the Boss nonetheless 
rem ain close allies.
In th is  la st section, we suggest th a t Nietzsche’s theory (one th a t is 
given poetic expression in  Zorba the Greek) of the troublesom e symbiosis 
between Apollo and  D ionysus m ay be viewed as a  trope for the tensive 
relationship th a t seemingly exists between ‘system atic theology’ (in the 
way we’ve been defining th is phrase th roughout our study) and  narrative 
fiction. In particular, while K azantzakis and  Griffin m ay be considered 
‘conversation partners’ in th a t they  seem  to share beliefs abou t a  process 
God, the aim s and  m ethods of both w riters are veiy different. From  a 
certain  perspective of reading, Griffin and Kazantzakis seem  to be as
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Iseparate  as D ionysus an d  Apollo are in  Nietzsche’s tragic conception of 
hfe. The conclusion th a t  we draw  from the above observation is th a t 
(Kazantzakis’s) narrative fiction and  (W hiteheadian forms of process) 
theology m ay be symbolized by both fraternal union and  dialectical 
ambivalence.
In our exam ination of the religious aspects of K azantzakis’s m any 
writings, we have found th a t Kazantzakis has been categorized under as 
m any inventive headings as there are critics of his work. Cohn Wilson 
describes K azantzakis as a  “religious philosopher crucified on the cross 
of m etaphysics”.®® ® On ano ther level, Charles I. Glicksberg calls him  a  
’’religious a th e is t”.®®® Alternatively, Jam es F. Lea refers to him  as an  
“an tith e is t”.®®® Finally, Nicholas S. Racheotes holds th a t “K azantzakis 
was a  subtle and  controversial philosopher, though it would be stretching 
the point to call him a theologian".
Why would it be ‘stretching  th e  point’ to  refer to  K azantzakis as ‘a  
theologian’? One answ er to th is question m akes use  of the  relationship 
between Nietzsche and  Kazantzakis, especially the idea th a t both w riters 
appear to be opposed to the ta sk  of philosophical system -building. As we 
suggested earlier in th is  chapter, Kazantzakis and  Nietzsche are lim inal 
or problem atic th inkers who lack the consciousness of certainty  because 
they, like the deconstructive postm odernists we have cited th u s  far, value 
the dynam ic and  contradictory aspects of life and tru th . Com m enting on 
Nietzsche’s ‘literary’ though t and  style in her book Nietzsche: Disciple o f
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Dionysus, Rose Pffefer states:
He [Nietzsche] cannot be understood by m eans of 
logical form ulas and closed system s. His mode of thinking is 
dialectical, and  intrinsically opposed to dogmatic finality 
cind sta tic  com pleteness...N ietzsche does not p resen t u s with 
a  system atic theoiy  of knowledge. Any attem pt to construct 
one on the  basis of his scattered rem arks, aphorism s, poetry, 
and  m yth would be a  difficult, if not im possible, task . It 
would, above all, be contrary  to the in ten tion  of his thought and  lead to a  distortion of his vlews.232
In a  recent article, Je an  Ellen Petrolle asserts  th a t K azantzakis chose to
use narrative form over disciplined argum entation (as a  form of address)
because the former better su ited  his apparently  anti-system atic (anti-
theological?) instincts:
In his philosophical writings [The Saviors o f God], 
K azantzakis faced the  difficulty of expressing his vision in a 
m edium  unfriendly to paradox; designative language cannot 
represen t an  ironic or dialectical vision w ithout resolving it 
into separate  com ponents...F iction offered Kazantzakis a  
more flexible vehicle for his ideas.23s
Thus far in our thesis, we have defined ‘system atic theologians’ as so-
called ‘constructive’ th inkers who appear to assum e th a t  religious tru th
can be w ritten down in num bered theses and  offered to o thers in the
form of an  architectonic system.®®^ We m aintain  th a t it would be
‘stretch ing  the point’ to call K azantzakis a  ‘theologian’ since he does not
write ‘theology’ th u s  described. Instead, he uses narrative form in  order
to craft imaginative fiction. As Nicholas S. Racheotes rem inds us:
In his quest for and  com bat with God, Kazantzakis w arned 
against w hat are generally considered to be positive 
a ttribu tes: health , inner peace, education, logic, theology,and  science.235
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As we noted earlier, K azantzakis follows Nietzsche In believing 
th a t the Dlonyslac universe Is characterized by evolving flux, Mmitless 
experim entation, unresolved ambiguity, and  e rran t play. Significant to  
our thesis, these are Inescapable a ttribu tes of the literary devices th a t 
both w riters use to reflect the ir conception of üfe. Here Kazantzakis and  
Nietzsche m ay once again be linked w ith  deconstructlve postm odernists 
since the la tte r frequently highlight how language Is transform ational.
As Robert Detweller h as  recently stated , “creative literatu re Is In fact the 
kind of discourse In which linguistic play comes Into Its own”.^ ^® In light 
of Detweller’s claim, perhaps we can  suggest th a t K azantzaklan parables
appear both to resis t conceptual finality and  to  fru stra te  all a ttem pts to
.construc t a  stable herm eneutic. In addition, perhaps we can  say th a t 
K azantzaklan m etaphors seem  to invite the possibility of num berless 
Interpretations, e rran t wanderings, and  ludlc m isreadings. It Is th is 
tensive quality of Uteraiy devices th a t appears to render narrative fiction 
Irreducible to form ulated tru th , the very kind of tru th  th a t we often 
observe In ‘system atic theology’.
In con trast to the open-ended character of narrative form, perhaps 
we can say th a t It Is th e  system atic theologian, w ith her h ard  penchan t 
for stru c tu red  thought and  logical abstractions, who appears to ensure 
th a t the Apollonian tendency appears In her Avrltlng as ‘dogmatic finality’ 
and  ‘sta tic  com pleteness’ of thought. Consider the case of David Ray 
Griffin, who seem s to regard argum entation as the prim ary model for 
theological reflection, and  how his version of W hiteheadian process
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theology “m akes its claims in  term s of its Internal coherence, its 
adequacy to experience, and  its illum inating p o w e r W h i l e  Griffin 
clearly Intuits the Ideas of ‘process and  becoming’, h is u se  of discursive 
discourse arguably entails the eventual replacem ent of su ch  Intuition 
with logical schem atism s and conclusive analysis. K azantzakls’s loose, 
m etaphor-grounded notlon(s) of divine and  creaturely becoming can  be 
viewed In con trast to Griffin’s system atic approach to God and  the world.
As we have noted already, K azantzakls’s m etaphor of a  process 
God Is ‘the Cry’. The Greek term  th a t Kazantzakis frequently uses is 
Kptmyq. While we have accepted the  custom aiy  transla tion  of Kpcmyfj as 
m eaning ‘ciy’, Kpoîuyp can  very well be outcry’. With th is transla tion  in I
m ind, consider the following rem arks m ade by David Patterson  In his
book The J ^ rm in g  Flame: Religion, Language, Literature:
The speculative though t th a t distinguishes philosophy and 
theology, the scientific m ethod th a t characterizes psychology 
and sociology, these canno t begin to grasp  the  outcry th a t Is 
the m ark  of the religious life. Indeed, outcry cannot be 
grasped a t all; a t best. It can only be responded to.238
While he Is not addressing K azantzakls’s notion of the outcry’, we hold i
th a t P atterson’s sta tem ent can  perhaps apply to our thesis In th is way.
Here Patterson  seem s to acknowledge the difficulties th a t  ‘theology’ faces
w hen It a ttem pts to cast religious experience In designatlve language. As
we have seen, Kazantzakis recognizes th a t ‘God’s outcry’ comes to us as
p a rt of our religious Intuition and, as such, th a t It Is very difficult to
sta te  th is divine outcry In the form of a  w ell-constructed proposition.^
We m ain tain  th a t process theologians Uke Griffin can  perhaps learn  from
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Kazantzakis’s  recognition of the limits of language.
System atic theology, and  we are saying here th a t Griffin’s process 
theology Is an  example of th is way of thinking and writing, often appears 
as U n b e z e i c h n u n g In other words, system atic theology (In the way 
we’ve been defining the term) arguably values order a s  well as discipline, 
and  It apparently  seeks to be tension-free, devoid of ambiguity, 
contradiction, and  doub t—all Apollonian qualities. Narrative fiction, 
and  here we use K azantzakis as our example. Is not Unbezeichnung; on 
the contrary, It arguably appears as  Rausch. This Is because narrative 
fiction appears to celebrate the chaotic, ludlc, and  polysémie character of 
language and  t ru th —all Dlonyslac qualities. From th is strategic 
distinction between (W hiteheadian forms of process) theology and 
(Kazantzakls’s) narrative fiction, we can  perhaps draw  one sm all b u t very 
im portant conclusion. We can  perhaps suggest th a t Imaginative writers 
(like Kazantzakis) are  to system atic theologians (like Griffin} w hat 
Dlonyslac bacchan ts are to  the restrained  serenity of Apollonian 
dialecticians, namely, anarchic pillagers of the  M ansion of Literal 
Meaning.
In spite of the strategic differences between theology and literature, 
we w onder If It Is possible for them  to be fraternally affiliated, to exist in 
an  association th a t resem bles the one between Apollo an d  D ionysus In 
The Birth o f Tragedy, where dialectical am bivalence between the two 
disciplines (as w ith the two deities) Is susta ined  Indefinitely? Nietzsche 
thought of tragedy as the dynam ic collusion of two com plem entary yet
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antagonistic forces or activities, with each being responsible for creating,
destroying, and re-creating the other. This Is how the  disciplines of
literature and  theology best relate to one another. They appear to work
well w hen they function as vital and  necessary concom itants. It Is the
creative writer, arm ed with her herm eneutic of openness, who frequently
rem inds the theologian th a t he Is engaged In a  narrative exercise, th a t
there Is always a  degree of oddity w ithin theological language, and  th a t
theologlems veiy often gloss over the fissures in  their own writing. By
the sam e token, It Is the  m odern theologian, w ith his herm eneutic of
reduction, who often em phasizes to the novelist the need for rational
coherence and  unity  in her largely experim ental and  Inventive work. As
F rank  B urch Brown m aintains:
...as a  mode of conceptual understanding , theology tends to 
be em pty In Its clarity of vision and  In Its generality, and  
th u s  to need m etaphoric and  experiential Interpretation. As a  mode of m etaphoric understanding , poetry (In the broadest sense) tends to be blind In Its experiential fullness, and  so to 
need conceptual clarification, criticism, and  generalization. 
In dialogue, however, poetry and  theology together play a  
vital role In the unending process of understand ing  faith and transform ing llfe.24i
The Dlonyslac an d  Apollonian natu res a t  the centre of Zorba the 
Greek exist in a  necessary b u t tense symbiosis. Zorba and  the Boss both 
com plem ent and  trouble one another. It seem s we can  see th is as an 
example of the relationship between literature and  theology. Zorba the 
Greek and  Griffin’s W hiteheadian process theology serve as vehicles for 
th is dipolar alliance, an  alliance which em erges no t only In th is b u t in 
each chapter th roughout our study  w hen we bring together a  literary
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work and  theological text. As In the fraternal union between Zorba and  
the  Boss, the  litera tu re  of Kazantzakis and  the  theology of W hiteheadian 
process thought (de)construct one another to su s ta in  a  troublesom e 
sym biosis th a t, In the  end, creates a  process poetics of faith.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE
1. In Whiteheadian process theology, a ‘nexus’ occurs when actual entities cluster together 
in a set of relations. This seems an instructive metaphor for the relationship that seems to 
exist between Nikos Kazantzakis and Alfred North Whitehead/those theologians writing 
from a Whiteheadian perspective.
2. See Nikos Kazantzakis, Zorba The Greek, trans. Carl Wildman (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1961). For the Greek text, see Kazantzakis, ■noAiTEioi tou 
Zopp^Tid 5th ed. (Athens, 1959). Also see David Ray Griffin, God and Religion in the 
Postmodern World: Essays in Postmodern Theology (Albany NY ; State University of New 
York Press, 1989). Griffin is Professor of Philosophy of Religion at the School of 
Theology at Claremont CA, USA. He is also Executive Director of the Center for Process 
Studies and founding president of the Center for a Postmodern World in Santa Barbara 
CA, USA.
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random 
House, 1974) 181.
4. David Ray Griffin, God and Religion in the Postmodern World, x. Also see Mark C. 
Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern AI theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
5. David Ray Griffin, et. al.. Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, 
James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne (Albany NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1993).
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6. David Ray Griffin, God and Religion in the Postmodern World, 23. Griffin’s term for 
the universality of creativity is “panenergism”.
7. Nikos Kazantzakis was deeply influenced by the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. While 
we propose to examine the salient features of Nietzsche’s celebration of Dionysus, the 
mythical Greek god of ascending life, adventure, and ecstatic motion, a comprehensive 
examination of Kazantzakis’s Nietzscheanism is beyond the scope of our thesis. For a 
discussion of Kazantzakis’s Nietzscheanism, see Peter A. Bien, Kazantzakis: Politics of 
the Spirit (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989) 24-36. Also see B. T, 
McDonough, Nietzsche and Kazantzakis (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 
1978).
8. See Peter A. Bien, ""Zorba The Greek, Nietzsche, and the Perennial Greek 
Predicament”, Antioch Review 25.1 (1965): 163. Also see Andreas K. Poulakidas, 
“Kazantzakis’ Zorba The Greek and Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra'\ Philological 
Quarterly 49 (1970): 238. Finally, see Joseph Blenkinsopp, “My Entire Soul Is a Cry: The 
Religious Passion of Nikos Kazantzakis”, Commonweal 26 Feb. 1971: 515.
9. David Ray Griffin, “Postmodern Theology and A/Theology: A Response to Mark C. 
Taylor”, Varieties of Postmodern Theology , et. al. David Ray Griffin (Albany NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1989) 29-52.
10. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, trans. and 
with an introduction by Francis Golffing (Garden City NY : Doubleday Anchor Books, 
1956) 19.
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11. Ibid., 131.
12. Ibid., 132.
13. Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, trans. Peter A. Bien (London: Faber and Faber, 
1965) 323.
14. Nikos Kazantzakis, Zorba the Greek, 113-14. Also, see Kazantzakis, Biogicm 
TtoAuEicx Tcru Zopp^ira, 139. The English translation has been altered to make it
conform more accurately to the Greek. The reference to the “unsunburned piece of meat” 
means, figuratively, ‘inexperienced’ or ‘unexposed to life’.
15. Nikos Kazantzakis, Zorba The Greek, 73.
16. Ibid., 20.
17. Ibid., 105.
18. Ibid., 104.
19. Ibid., 72-79.
20. In addition to Zorba and the Boss, the character of Stavridaki is important in Zorba 
The Greek , 7. He is one of two men who conduct conespondence with their former 
professor, the Boss, during the latter’s time in Crete. Writing from Russia, Stavridaki
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represents a balance of Apollonian and Dionysiac impulses. For support of this
interpretation, see Morton P. Levitt, The Cretan Glance: The World and Art of Nikos
Kazantzakis (Columbus OH; Ohio State University Press, 1980):
Stavridhakis is the synthesizer who joins the Dionysian ecstasy of Zorba with the Apollonian dreaminess of Boss, creating a new union in life as the classical tragedians did in their art. (106)
21. We have discussed Alfred North Whitehead’s theory of objective immortality in earlier 
chapters. See Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, ed. David Ray Griffin and 
Donald W. Sherburne, cor. ed. (1929; New York: The Free Press, 1978) 45, 84, 245.
22. Peter A. Bien, Nikos Kazantzakis—Novelist {London'. Duckworth, 1989) 13.
23. Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, 323.
24. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 79. Throughout the remainder of this fifth 
and final chapter we make a connection between Apollo-theoretical optimism-Socrates. We 
believe this link is possible; however, we need to clarify any possible misunderstanding. 
We do acknowledge that Nietzsche distinguishes Socratic rationalism from both the 
Apollonian and the Dionysiac modes, not merely from the Dionysiac ( 19-21, 31,56-7, 65, 
93-7, 102). Essential to the Apollonian is the “principle of individuation”; this distinguishes 
it from the Dionysiac but also from the Socratic (97). Having said this, we do assert that 
Socrates is ‘inspired’ by Apollo’s balance, symmetry, and serenity. Indeed, it is Socrates 
who ensures that “the Apollonian tendency [this, in part, manifests itself as rationality, 
lucidity, clarity] now appears as logical schematism” (88). Remember that language is the 
instrument of Apollo (82-90). Socrates (who composes poems to Apollo from jail) uses 
language (and dialectic) to build rational constructs where there was once the vibrant reality
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of myth (90). Thus, Nietzsche’s overall complaint is that Socrates’s emphasis on reason 
and knowledge of Reality is much too confident (theoretical optimism). It is in this sense, 
then, that we connect Apollo-theoretical optimism-Socrates. This connection-pointedly 
and soberly supported by the references cited above—enables us to continue our study’s 
own trajectory towards the view that literature and theology exist in a dipolar alliance, a 
complementarity in which each needs the other. At this stage of the fifth chapter, and to 
save ourselves from misunderstanding, we recognize that it is important not to overlook 
Socrates and to assume that ‘theoretical optimism’ is all connected with Apollo. Also, we 
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C on clu sion
W hen we began our study, we se t out to exam ine the  relationship 
between literature and  theology by scrutinizing the n a tu re  and  shape of 
the  conversation between Nikos K azantzakis's narrative fiction an d  the 
theology of W hiteheadian process thought. As we have observed In all 
our five chapters, th is dialogue h as  been, a t tu rn s , both  effortless and 
difficult to susta in . For Instance, our com parison of the  concept and 
role of God as held by K azantzakis and  W hiteheadian process theology 
h as  shown th a t the ta sk  of finding and  delineating points of convergence 
between these two partners is not a t all formidable. Clearly, both view 
God as the transcendent-im m anent ground of the creative processes of 
reality, as subject to time and  change, an d  as reliant on our actualized 
value. Nevertheless, there Is a t least one difference between Kazantzakis 
and  the W hlteheadlans th a t s tra in s  the ir conversation. This Is their 
choice in tex tual m odes and  forms of discourse. Alfred North W hitehead 
employed argum entation to create a  m ajor system  of speculative Ideas by 
which we can grasp our experlence(s) of the world. After W hitehead, the 
theologians who foUow his philosophical lead do so by presenting their 
own views w ith the aid of deslgnatlve language. In con trast, Kazantzakis 
utilized narrative and m etaphoric understanding  to express h is concrete 
Intuitions.
Although W hitehead evidently attem pted to construc t a  rational, 
coherent, and  necessary system  of Ideas, it is significant to our thesis 
th a t he som etim es found it essential to traverse the conspicuous divide
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between propositional discourse and  story. Recognizing th a t there is an
Intensity of life which is voiced In poetic m etaphor b u t no t In conceptual
understanding , he tu rned  to the literature of W ordsworth and  Shelley as
well as of Milton, Pope, and  Tennyson In order to refine an d  augm ent his
own speculative metaphysics.^ Interestingly, W hitehead’s recognition of
the need to allow literature and  philosophy to come together seem s to be
noticeably absen t from the work of W hiteheadian process theologians.
Few W hlteheadlans would d ispute W hitehead’s in te rest In the Rom antic
poets. The process philosopher Victor Lowe intim ates.
Some of those who know  W hitehead w onder if William 
W ordsworth did not Influence him  quite as  m uch  as any 
other m an —and  Shelley alm ost as m uch as Wordsworth.2
However, W hiteheadian process theologians seem  unwilling to learn from
W hitehead’s own eagerness to hold th a t literary language is a  feasible
m edium  for philosophy and for theology. O ur own study, one th a t
dem onstrates th a t several points of convergence exist between
(Kazantzakls’s) literary fiction amd (W hiteheadian process) theology, Is a
productive attem pt to thaw  the glacial divide between two m ajor
disciplines. It proposes the possibility of a  process poetics of faith, a  way
of th inking  and  writing theologically th a t Incorporates llteraiy  forms.
Thus, the  presen t work Is an  attem pt, a t least In part, to challenge those
theologians who work from within a  W hiteheadian perspective to th ink
and  write of God in ways th a t account for w hat we call the  dipolar
alliance of m etaphoric and  conceptual understanding .
A nother possibly productive study, too large to be included in the
400
-4 .
presen t work, would involve showing th a t while K azantzakis would never 
have agreed to being labeled ‘C hristian’, he warm ed to C hristlanlly’s key 
them es, imagery, and  symbolism. Despite the fact th a t K azantzakis was 
persecuted by certain  Greek Orthodox Churchm en, and th a t 
posthum ously he has come u nder severe a ttack  from P ro testan t 
evangelicals for the film version of The Last Temptation, we m ain ta in  th a t 
it is possible for Kazantzakis scholars to show th a t he contribu tes to a  
wider, C hristian  faith still In the m aking. As we have dem onstrated, 
K azantzakls’s beliefs are strikingly sim ilar to theological them es found in 
both  m odern and postm odern C hristian  doctrine. The prospect of study
. . . .In th is area  Is intriguing. While we in no way try  to a ttem pt su ch  a  task , 
we indicate where th is ‘rehabilitation of K azantzakis’ m ight begin.
Now th a t W hiteheadian process theology is considered to be both 
an  Ingenious and  an  accepted trend  w ithin recent C hristian  theology, we 
appear to have a  case for the rehabilitation of K azantzakis and h is work.
By ‘rehabilitation’, we m ean the  ta sk  of showing (contra certain  sections 
of the C hurch  th a t su spect K azantzakis of atheism ) how K azantzakls’s 
a r t exists w ithin w hat m ight be term ed ‘the perm issible lim its of 
C hristian  reflection’. While th is  Is perhaps a  subject for ano ther paper, 
one th a t could be tim ed to coincide with the fortieth anniversary  of 
K azantzakls’s death  (1997), we believe th a t K azantzakis and  his work 
need no longer be viewed as either ‘heretical’ or ‘b lasphem ous’. Indeed, 
his ‘connection’ to W hiteheadian process theology Is one significant 
reason  why charges of ‘heresy’ and  ‘blasphem y’ neither seem  possible nor
401
acceptable w hen we consider h is contribution to reflection on C hristian 
them es in the tw entieth  century.
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NOTES FOR THE CONCLUSION
1. See Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 
1925) 75-89.
2. Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1966) 256.
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